Taming the Hegemon: Chinese Thinking on Countering U.S. Military Intervention in Asia

Joel Wuthnow 

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This report assesses recent Chinese thinking on countering U.S. intervention in Asia, specifically in a Taiwan contingency. Key findings include:

■ People’s Liberation Army (PLA) analysts assume U.S. forces will intervene in a Taiwan contingency, up to and including mainland strikes. This assumption, based on prudent military planning, has persisted for decades even as Chinese observers increasingly viewed U.S. power in a state of relative decline. It drives the PLA to advocate for careful preparation of counter-intervention options.

■ States in China’s position have historically relied on four options to counter third-party intervention in offensive campaigns: direct assault against intervening forces; deterrence actions against the third party’s political leadership; a fait accompli against the main target before the intervener can mobilize; and creation of strategic buffers between the attacker and the intervener.

■ PLA sources emphasize the options that require direct confrontation—direct assault and strategic deterrence of the United States—because they are the most decisive. The first relies on asymmetric warfare against key targets in the U.S. military system. The second leverages nuclear, conventional, and informational (space, cyber, and cognitive warfare) tools to pressure U.S. leaders to reject a recommendation to intervene. Both options are part of an effort to “deter and check” the “powerful enemy," which is a frequent euphemism for the United States.

■ The PLA has a different attitude toward escalation in these two options. A direct assault emphasizes military expediency. PLA scholars focus on precision strikes but also highcasualty attacks if necessary for the campaign plan. Deterrence relies on brinkmanship. The two Taiwan Strait crises of the 1950s are touted as examples of successful deterrence while managing risks.

■ The PLA appears less interested in the two indirect options because they cannot guarantee success. A fait accompli would be difficult due to strategic warning and a U.S. ability to respond quickly. Beijing will try to create strategic buffers by pressuring U.S. allies and partners to deny access, but those efforts could fail—and the U.S. military has options to intervene that do not rely on host nation support.