Rachel Butler
Why Moral Signaling in Emerging Domains Undermines the Credibility of the United States
When state actors violate legal or ethical norms, the United States and its allies have a duty to respond—not just strategically, but morally. Yet when punishment or pressure is applied in an emerging domain where U.S. capabilities are contested, it risks undermining U.S. credibility more than deterring bad behavior. This dilemma is most evident in space and the Arctic region, both of which are considered emerging warfighting domains. These domains are parallel in their exposure to intensifying global power competition, accelerating military modernization, and the expanding presence of state and non-state actors. Yet the most striking similarity is the contested status of U.S. power and influence in both regions. This prompts a critical question: What drives the U.S. to assert moral authority in domains where it lacks enforcement capabilities?
China and Space
Angered by China’s long-standing human rights violations, Congress sought to alter Beijing’s trajectory by hindering its progress in space. Believing that China’s capacity to advance in orbit depended on American cooperation, the Wolf Amendment was enacted which prohibited NASA and the OSTP from collaborating with China on any "policy, program, order, or contract of any kind" without explicit authorization from Congress and the FBI. The U.S. thought it had claimed the moral high ground while tightening its grip on strategic superiority. Yet China’s human rights record has deteriorated further, while Beijing clearly demonstrates its ability to advance its space capabilities without aid from the U.S.
China's advancements in space have been significantly aided by a longstanding pattern of stealing intellectual property, enabling progress that is both impressive and alarming despite operating at under 30% of the U.S. space budget in FY2023 (NASA’s $25.4 billion and the US Space Force's $26.3 billion). The Tiangong Space Station, the planned International Lunar Research Station, as well as the Chang’e-6 mission, which established China as the first nation to collect lunar samples from the far side of the Moon, are just a few notable examples.
Yet China’s exploratory initiatives and deepening human rights violations have become the least of U.S. concerns. China has begun positioning itself to establish warfighting readiness in a domain intended to be a shared frontier. Fusing its space resources by integrating its civil and military spheres, China has enabled the development of dual-use technologies that, although nominally aligned with international norms due to their peaceful applications, conveniently enhance its warfighting capabilities. Launch sites, control centers, and numerous satellites now fall under the control of the PLA (People’s Liberation Army). This integration has yielded technology that has heightened tensions in the space domain. Recent developments include satellite systems equipped with grappling mechanisms capable of disrupting or capturing other satellites, as well as "kinetic kill vehicles" (KKVs) designed for satellite disruption and missile interception. These capabilities were identified alongside Russia’s in the DoD’s 2020 Defense Space Strategy as “the greatest strategic threat” to the U.S. in space.
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