Images From 4 Days of Conflict and Its Aftermath in India and Pakistan

The New York Times

Source Link

In one image, a plume of smoke obscures the vibrant sunrise over a Himalayan landscape. In another, men carry a coffin past soldiers on the verdant grounds of a damaged mosque.

The beauty of Kashmir has once again been scarred by military confrontation, which included days of heavy shelling on both sides of the line dividing the territory between India and Pakistan. On Saturday, after four days of escalating conflict, the two sides agreed to a cease-fire.

The military conflict began on Wednesday, when India hit several sites on the Pakistani-controlled side of Kashmir and in areas within Pakistan. On Friday, Pakistan launched drone attacks along India’s western border. Both sides reported deaths.

India struck in the aftermath of a terrorist attack on the Indian-controlled side of Kashmir on April 22, in which 26 civilians were killed. India has suggested that terrorist groups harbored by Pakistan were behind the attack, an assertion that Pakistan has denied.

While the fighting has now stopped, the return to normalcy for those living along the dividing line will take time. Kashmiris are mourning the loss of loved ones, with about 20 civilians killed on the Indian side and Pakistan reporting more than 30 deaths on its side. Tens of thousands remain displaced from border villages.

The Danger for India and Pakistan Has Not Gone Away

Mujib Mashal

Source Link

India and Pakistan have seemingly pulled back from the brink again. But so much was new about the nuclear-armed enemies’ chaotic four-day clash, and so many of the underlying accelerants remain volatile, that there’s little to suggest that the truce represents any return to old patterns of restraint.

A new generation of military technology fueled a dizzying aerial escalation. Waves of airstrikes and antiaircraft volleys with modern weapons set the stage. Soon they were joined by weaponized drones en masse for the first time both along the two countries’ extensive boundaries and deep into their territory — hundreds of them in the sky, probing each nation’s defenses and striking without risk to any pilot.

Then the missiles and drones were streaking past the border areas and deep into India’s and Pakistan’s territories, directly hitting air and defense bases, prompting dire threats and the highest level of military alert.

Only then did international diplomacy — a crucial factor in past pullbacks between India and Pakistan — seem to engage in earnest, at what felt like the last minute before catastrophe. In a new global chapter defined by perilous conflicts, distracted leaders and a retreating sense of international responsibility to keep peace, the safety net had never seemed thinner.

“Going back historically, many of the India-Pakistan conflicts have been stopped because of external intervention,” said Srinath Raghavan, a military historian and strategic analyst.

Nightmare Of Neighbors – OpEd

Bhabani Shankar Nayak

Source Link

The feudal foundations, British colonial legacies, American imperialist support aimed at containing China and India, and Chinese geopolitical ambitions continue to form the lifeblood of the Pakistani armed forces. The Pakistan Army not only controls the nation’s resources and dominates democratic politics but also undermines the conditions necessary for peace and prosperity. The people of Pakistan suffer under the unchecked power of the military and its politics of terror, which threaten both regional stability and global peace. The Pakistani army’s nuclear blackmail makes it a lethal force that keeps peace in chains for the sake of its own survival.

The authoritarian legal, political, and military framework in Pakistan aligns closely with the interests of landed elites, industrialists, corporate entities, political dynasties, and capitalist classes. The hegemonic rule of the Pakistani Army secures the dominance of both ruling and non-ruling elites, while consigning the working masses to persistent deprivation and marginalisation. Religion has been instrumentalised by the governing elites to deflect attention from the underlying causes of hunger, homelessness, poverty, and unemployment. The ideals of peace, prosperity, and progress remain hostage to the Pakistani military, which systematically sabotages all popular movements for democratic politics, human rights, and economic justice in the country.

The toxic cocktail of money, military power, militancy, and religious extremism has not only eroded Pakistan’s cultural, linguistic, religious and social diversities but has also undermined the foundations necessary for nurturing scientific and secular education—essential for building a society grounded in reason. The militarisation of public consciousness enables the ruling classes to maintain their grip over national resources, even as deprivation and inequality continue to deepen across the country. This creates fertile ground for reactionary forces to thrive, reinforcing the hegemony of the military, militants, and mullahs, while normalising crisis as a permanent feature of national life.

The normalisation and naturalisation of crisis serve to domesticate the working masses through the instrumentalisation of religion, enabling the ruling classes to govern without facing democratic dissent. Such a framework provides the foundation for the Pakistani military to govern the country both directly and indirectly, with the support of mullahs and militants who can no longer be considered non-state actors. These forces live as neighbours and exercise control over the working masses, as if they are inseparable from everyday life of the country.

India’s Two-Front Dilemma

Anushka Saxena

Source Link

China’s narrative and material backing of Pakistan throughout the current Kashmir crisis is worrying India’s overstretched military.

India and Pakistan are embroiled in hostilities in the aftermath of a terror attack on civilians in Pahalgam, Kashmir on April 22. India’s military response is the result of Pakistan’s military-jihadi complex perpetrating terrorism and discord in Kashmir. With Operation Sindoor, India has set a new normal by expanding the scale of its response to terrorism. This includes moving beyond Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and terror camps and sites to striking targets closer to military installations across Pakistan.

This operation was undertaken to respond to Pakistan’s escalation on May 7, wherein it retaliated to India’s counterterrorism response by shelling border areas. India has also demonstrated a willingness and capability to undertake drone warfare, including the liberal use of loitering munition. On May 10, Pakistan claimed Indian missiles hit three air bases within the country. As the conflict continues, the international community has engaged with both India and Pakistan, seeking de-escalation. The path to a thaw, however, remains elusive.

India faces two overlapping security dilemmas—how to manage both the naval and continental theaters and how to face its two most troublesome neighbors—Pakistan and China. As a regional power, a strategic ally of Pakistan, and a threat actor for India, China is developing its own response to the hostilities. Chinese government officials and media are shaping rhetoric on what India-Pakistan tensions mean for each of the actors specifically and for regional stability in general. Beijing is also enhancing Pakistan’s defense arsenal. In this regard, it becomes vital to understand China’s position and role in the matter.

Indian Tejas vs. Pakistani F-16: Both of These Fighters Jets Are Built With U.S. Technology

Christian D. Orr

Source Link

The current iterations of the Tejas, the 2001 Mark 1 and Mark 1A, utilize G.E. Aerospace’s F404-GE-F2J3 afterburning turbofan engine.

India and Pakistan are fighting each other once again, as India is retaliating for terrorist attacks that killed more than two dozen people, including tourists, in the Indian part of Kashmir on April 22. Thus far, the conflict hasn’t escalated into a situation like the two nations’ full-scale wars of 1965 and 1971; instead, it seems to be limited in scope a la the 1999 Kargil War.

Pakistan claims to have shot down five Indian fighter jets already, but these claims have not been independently corroborated, and what’s more, the Pakistani government is mum on specifics of how it accomplished this alleged feat. Thus far, there have been no reports of any air-to-air combat between the two nations’ fighter jets. The last significant Indo-Pakistani jet vs. jet combat took place in the 1971 war; as The National Interest’s Michael Peck noted in a May 20, 2021, article,

“Both sides claimed victory in the air war. Chuck Yeager, who was in Pakistan advising their air force, claimed the Pakistanis ”whipped their asses.” The Indians claim Yeager was crazy. However, it does appear that India had the upper hand in the air, controlling the skies over East Pakistan and losing about forty-five aircraft to Pakistan’s seventy-five.”

If and when the Indian and Pakistani Air Forces’ jet jocks do clash with one another once more, there’s a distinctive possibility that they’ll be doing so using warbirds that at least partially incorporate U.S. technology.

Pakistan’s F-16: Wholly American-Made

Ceasefire can’t mask India-Pakistan’s dangerous new conflict norms

Farah N Jan

Source Link

India and Pakistan have seen the scenario play out before: a terror attack in which Indians are killed leads to a succession of escalatory tit-for-tat measures that put South Asia on the brink of all-out war. And then there is a de-escalation.

The broad contours of that pattern have played out in the most recent crisis, with the latest step being the announcement of a ceasefire on May 10, 2025.

But in another important way, the flare-up – which began on April 22 with a deadly attack in Indian-controlled Kashmir, in which 26 people were killed – represents significant departures from the past. It involved direct missile exchanges targeting sites inside both territories and the use of advanced missile systems and drones by the two nuclear rivals for the first time.

As a scholar of nuclear rivalries, especially between India and Pakistan, I have long been concerned that the erosion of international sovereignty norms, diminished US interest and influence in the region and the stockpiling of advanced military and digital technologies have significantly raised the risk of rapid and uncontrolled escalation in the event of a trigger in South Asia.

These changes have coincided with domestic political shifts in both countries. The pro-Hindu nationalism of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government has heightened communal tensions in the country.

Military briefing: India and Pakistan test red lines of nuclear rivalry

Source Link

Clashes have been carefully calibrated since they became atomic powers. But the informal rules are fraying © FT Montage Military briefing: India and Pakistan test red lines of nuclear rivalry on x (opens in a new window) Military briefing: India and Pakistan test red lines of nuclear rivalry on facebook (opens in a new window) Military briefing: India and Pakistan test red lines of nuclear rivalry on linkedin (opens in a new window) Save current progress 0% Charles Clover in Vilnius, Andres Schipani in New Delhi, Humza Jilani in Islamabad and Krishn Kaushik in Mumbai PublishedMAY 9 2025 Print this page Unlock the Editor’s Digest for free Roula Khalaf, Editor of the FT, selects her favourite stories in this weekly newsletter. With roughly 170 nuclear warheads apiece, India and Pakistan have evolved a singular approach to armed conflict. Both sides are willing to use military force — but cautiously and according to unwritten rules that aim to prevent escalation. 

The last major war between the two countries — the 1999 Kargil War — took place in the shadow of successful nuclear tests by each side the previous year and typified a new era in ultra-caution: only ground forces were used. In recent years, however, those informal rules have been loosened, with both countries brandishing weapons and tactics not seen in the post-nuclear era. Air power was first witnessed in 2019, with strikes into Balakot that hit undisputed Pakistani territory for the first time in almost half a century. This week’s fighting started with air strikes too, launched by India on both Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. But the attacks, which Islamabad said killed 32, were deeper into Pakistan than before — one strike was 100km from the border — and simultaneous across multiple targets, including urban areas. “One really important threshold that both India and Pakistan have respected was the use of air power against each other. That source of restraint has now entirely, I think, evaporated,” said Ankit Panda of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and author of the 2025 book The New Nuclear Age. “India and Pakistan are in a place where these types of skirmishes, in which they both employ air power against each other, are apparently now tolerable to each side.”

America Failed to Stop Pakistani Nukes. Will It Repeat the Error with Iran?

Michael Rubin

Source Link

B-2A, serial #88-0331, 'Spirit of South Carolina' of the 509th Bomb Wing, Air Force Global Strike Command, on the parking ramp at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma, during a visit April 11, 2017. The B-2A 'stealth bomber' visited the base to allow hundreds of personnel who work in direct support of the aircraft program through continuous software upgrades to see it in person and better understand the aircrafts' role in the nation’s defense. (U.S. Air Force photo/Greg L. Davis)

Key Points – Sixty years ago, Pakistan vowed to build nuclear weapons despite international opposition, ultimately succeeding due to American complacency.

-Today, as nuclear tensions flare between India and Pakistan—risking catastrophic conflict—U.S. negotiators seem poised to repeat past mistakes with Iran. Tehran’s nuclear ambitions clearly extend beyond peaceful energy, aiming instead for military dominance in the Middle East.

-Allowing Iran’s nuclearization could spark a devastating conflict with Israel, whose small size invites Iranian overconfidence. With the stakes incredibly high, America’s current amateur diplomatic approach risks repeating past errors.

-The nuclear standoff on the subcontinent must serve as a stark warning: preventing Iranian nuclearization is urgent.

The Pakistan Nuclear Mistake America Can’t Afford to Repeat in Iran

Just 60 years ago, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto declared the country’s intention to become a nuclear power. “If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass and leaves for a thousand years, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own. The Christians have the bomb, the Jews have the bomb and now the Hindus have the bomb. Why not the Muslims too have the bomb?,” he declared.

Bangladesh’s Interim Government Bans Awami League

Saqlain Rizve

Source Link

Bangladesh’s interim government has banned all activities, including the online presence, of the Awami League (AL), led by former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, until the ongoing trials for crimes against humanity and genocide involving its leaders — these relate to the party’s deadly crackdown on the July uprising of 2024 — are concluded.

The decision, which came nine months after Hasina’s ouster from power by student-led mass protests, has been taken under the Anti-Terrorism Act, which was enacted by the AL back in 2009. The interim government banned the Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL), the AL’s notorious student wing, under the same act on October 23 last year.

The ban on the AL marks a significant escalation in Bangladesh’s turbulent political landscape. It also raises questions about the efficacy and implications of banning political parties in a country with a history of such measures.

Civil society groups and political parties, particularly the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), the AL’s archrival since the 1971 Liberation War, as well as the recently formed National Citizens Party (NCP) and most right-wing groups, have been calling for banning the AL.

However, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) has not adopted a firm stance on banning the party. In October 2024, BNP Secretary General Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir told Prothom Alo, a Bangladeshi daily, “We have no objection to AL participating in elections, but criminals must face trial.” Last week, before the interim government announced the ban, BNP Standing Committee Member Abdul Moyeen Khan said that the decision to ban the AL lies with the Election Commission or the government, not the BNP. Following the ban announcement, however, Alamgir said that the “BNP is happy with the government’s decision.”

With the ban on the AL, a critical contradiction has emerged in the current political landscape, where the JI, a party that collaborated with West Pakistan during the 1971 genocide, led the call for the ban on the AL. This paradox is striking, given the JI’s historic role in opposing Bangladesh’s liberation. What further complicates matters is the alignment of JI activists with the NCP in recent protests against the AL, which have also featured prominent far-right political personalities.

Northern Myanmar Poses a Challenge to China’s Critical Minerals Strategy

Wai Yan Phyo Naing and Lin Sae-phoo

Source Link

Amid the ongoing conflicts between Myanmar’s military junta and various ethnic armed groups, two recent meetings – one between representatives of the Kachin Independence Army and Chinese officials, and the other between the Myanmar junta and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) – have taken place in Yunnan, China, which borders northern Myanmar. China, acting not only as a mediator but also as a stakeholder, has been actively involved in the conflict developments in the northern and northeastern parts of Myanmar.

This neighboring country forms a crucial part of Beijing’s global strategy to secure access to critical minerals (rare earths and other minerals, including copper, lithium, nickel and cobalt, etc.) – particularly amid intensifying geostrategic competition with the United States over renewable energy and advanced technologies, both of which heavily rely on rare earths production.

China, the world’s largest producer of rare earth elements, accounts for nearly 90 percent of global processing capacity for these critical metal compounds. Still, a significant portion of the raw materials refined in China is imported from other countries. Specifically, the three primary sources are Myanmar, Laos, and Malaysia, with Myanmar being the top supplier. In 2024, Myanmar delivered 44,000 tonnes of rare earth elements to China, which comprised approximately 57 percent of Beijing’s total rare earth imports. Accordingly, a supply chain has emerged in which rare earth extraction occurs in Myanmar and processing takes place in China.

China’s supply chains – and thus the world’s supply chains, and the global green energy transition – heavily rely on the mining industry in Myanmar, especially in the northern part of the country. The stability of northern Myanmar, including Kachin State, has a direct impact on the mineral trade with China, prompting Beijing to position itself as a stakeholder amid the ongoing conflict between the junta regime and local rebels.

China’s absence from talks on Ukraine shows ‘real limits’ of its leverage, analyst says

Dewey Sim

Source Link

Since his return to the White House in January, Donald Trump has pushed to end the war in Ukraine, including through talks with Russian leader Vladimir Putin.

But China – once seen as a potential mediator in the conflict – has been strikingly absent from the negotiations.

The US reached separate deals with Russia and Ukraine in March to halt military activity over the Black Sea, and negotiations between American and Russian officials have continued. Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff has met Putin four times in just over two months.

As Moscow launched a barrage of missiles on Kyiv in April, Trump again called for a peace deal. It was later reported by US media outlet NBC that a “term sheet” with 22 proposals, including a 30-day ceasefire, had been drawn up by American, European and Ukrainian negotiators and that it met Putin’s demand that the US would not support Ukraine joining Nato.

On Sunday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said he was prepared to meet Putin for “direct talks” in Turkey on Thursday – a meeting proposed by the Russian leader after Brussels pressed Moscow to agree to an unconditional 30-day ceasefire or face further sanctions.

It is unclear whether Ukraine and Russia can reach a peace deal after three years of fighting, but it is evident that China has not been part of the recent developments.

Foreign ministry spokesman Lin Jian on Monday said Beijing supported all efforts to achieve peace, when asked about a potential ceasefire.

“We hope the relevant parties will continue dialogue and negotiations to reach a fair, lasting and binding peace agreement accepted by all parties involved, ultimately achieving a political resolution to the Ukraine crisis,” Lin said.

US-China tariff truce gives Asia time and space to reset

Nigel Green

Source Link

The US and China have agreed to sharply lower tariffs for the next 90 days, offering a crucial pause in a trade war that is straining global supply chains and testing the patience of capital markets.

The deal, struck in Geneva, Switzerland, and announced on Monday (May 12), cuts US tariffs on Chinese goods from 145% to 30% and reduces Chinese duties on American imports from 125% to 10%.

While limited in duration and uncertain in outcome, the agreement is already delivering tangible effects on Asian markets, currencies and sentiment.

Asian equities rallied in the immediate aftermath, led by exporters, semiconductor manufacturers and industrials. Hong Kong’s Hang Seng Tech Index up 5.2% at the close, the biggest gain in two months.

The most telling response could be in foreign exchange markets. The dollar enjoyed its best day in over a month on a trade-weighted basis, but the big question for FX markets going forward is whether the damage to the greenback’s long-term standing has already been done.

While the initial market reaction today was clearly dollar-positive, it also reflected stretched short positioning being unwound, Bloomberg reported. Before today’s announcement, the Taiwan dollar surged and was up more than 8% against the greenback this year, and certain other Asian currencies have followed suit.

This isn’t just noise or temporary rebalancing; it’s a shift in positioning. The recent strength in Asian currencies reflects two key forces. First, a mechanical one: lower tariffs reduce inflationary pressure on imported goods, giving central banks in emerging Asia more breathing room.

China-US AI Technology Competition: Who’s Winning in Key Inputs?

Sara Hsu

Source Link

After China revealed its own homegrown large-language model, DeepSeek, in January 2025, the artificial intelligence (AI) competition intensified. Much of the conversation on this new technology has focused on semiconductors or model speeds, but the race is very much dependent on several upstream factors: energy, rare earth elements, and talent. These critical inputs into the AI industry face vastly different structures in the two countries and may determine the pace and scale of AI innovation.

Energy: Powering the AI Revolution

AI models use massive amounts of energy to power their computations. Ensuring a consistent and growing energy supply to power data centers and cool servers is now an essential part of national AI strategies. The United States and China have different energy ecosystems, with alternative methods of pricing, regulating, and sustaining energy for AI endeavors.

Due to increasing investment in electricity generation, the energy requirements of AI data centers have placed a great amount of pressure on local power grids. A notable incident occurred in July 2024, when 60 data centers in Northern Virginia were disconnected from the grid due to a surge protector failure. This incident forced operators to rapidly reduce power generation to prevent widespread outages, and demonstrated the challenges that utilities face in providing data centers with growing amounts of power.

In addition to energy supply, electricity prices and supplier choice are factors that AI producers consider. Electricity produced from U.S. energy sources faces prices that are market driven, with high regional variation due to local energy resources, infrastructure, and regulation. Deregulated markets in some states allow consumers to choose suppliers. In order to maintain a stable supply of data output, data centers often negotiate long-term contracts for electricity.

In contrast to the United States, China’s energy industry is centralized and planned. The government guides the location of data hubs to optimize national grid loads. The Eastern Data, Western Computing plan, for example, pairs data centers with renewable energy in underdeveloped western regions such as Guizhou, which has abundant hydropower. In Sichuan, the Tianfu Intelligent Computing Center is powered by surplus hydro and wind power in a tightly integrated system that supports various sectors.

U.S. and China Agree to Temporarily Slash Tariffs in Bid to Defuse Trade War

Daisuke WakabayashiAmy Chang Chien and Alan Rappeport

Source Link

The United States and China took a step on Monday to defuse the trade war between the world’s two largest economies, agreeing to temporarily reduce the punishing tariffs they have imposed on each other.

The move by the United States, after President Trump had repeatedly declared that he would not lower tariffs without concessions from China, represented an acknowledgment of the costs of an all-out trade war with China. Despite the White House’s bluster, the Trump administration backed off, for now, from its steepest tariffs, and agreed to hold more formal talks with Beijing after companies and consumers started showing signs of economic strain.

Explaining that many of the tariffs that he imposed remain in place, Mr. Trump said at the White House on Monday that talks would be focused in part on “opening up” China to American businesses. He said that he expected to talk to President Xi Jinping of China this week, but that putting a full deal on paper would take a while.

“We’re not looking to hurt China,” Mr. Trump said.

In a joint statement released earlier in the day, the United States and China said they would suspend their respective tariffs for 90 days and continue negotiations they started this weekend. Under the agreement, the United States would reduce the tariff on Chinese imports to 30 percent from its current 145 percent, while China would lower its import duty on American goods to 10 percent from 125 percent.

Osirak’s Shadow: Israel and the Iranian Dilemma

Jay Pasquarette 

Source Link

Neutralizing Iran’s nuclear program would be a far cry from the single, decisive blow of Operation Opera. It would likely require a sustained air campaign, going beyond surgical airstrikes to incorporate cyber operations and other forms of warfare.

Israel faces a crucial decision regarding Iran’s nuclear program and ambitions. The Islamic Republic, grappling with internal unrest and economic turmoil, is arguably at its most vulnerable in years. Protests in the streets challenge the regime’s grip on power while crippling sanctions imposed by the United States have strangled its economy. Adding to the pressure, Israel’s persistent covert operations, from crippling cyberattacks to the targeted elimination of key scientists and the degradation of Iranian air defenses, have further weakened Tehran’s position. This has bolstered Israel’s leverage on the world stage as it attempts to coerce great powers, namely the United States, to assist with this venture. This confluence of factors presents Israel with a complex dilemma, echoing a monumental event in its past: the 1981 airstrike on Iraq’s Osirak reactor. That operation was characterized by its speed, unilateral execution, and contained fallout. As a result, Israel successfully neutralized Saddam Hussein’s nuclear ambitions. Applying a similar approach to Iran today is fraught with far greater risks and uncertainties. The Osirak operation’s defining characteristics are worth analyzing to determine their relevance to Israel’s current predicament, given the starkly different challenge Iran poses on the world stage today. Although the operational challenges may be vastly different, Osirak’s imprint on Israel’s strategic calculus makes it enduringly relevant.

A Fast Strike

On June 7, 1981, Israeli F-16 fighter jets carried out Operation Opera. Their target was the Osirak nuclear reactor near Baghdad. Within minutes, the reactor, nearing completion and feared to be on the verge of producing weapons-grade plutonium, was destroyed. This daring operation, executed with surgical precision and speed, showcased the Israeli military’s commitment to denying its enemies any nuclear capability, regardless of the potential consequences.

The Long Game in the Desert: Saudi Arabia’s Strategic Pivot on Oil Production

Greg Priddy

Source Link

Saudi Arabia’s strategic pivot is about letting go of the illusion of market control and moving production back up toward capacity, which will provide more revenue in the long-term.

At a brief online meeting on May 3, OPEC+ decided to again surprise the market with a bit more supply, raising its quotas for June by 411,000 bpd. This, once again, accelerated the pace of phasing out the years-long production cuts which have been in place in various forms since 2020.

This came despite the fact that Brent crude oil closed around $61 per barrel the previous day, and WTI was around $58.

Unlike the previous surprise a month earlier, which led to a sharp selloff, this one did not come as much of a shock to the market. It underscores the fact that after trying to restrict the oil supply for most of the period since 2016, except for a brief price war with Russia in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Saudis are once again accepting that they will end up a “price taker” – and that this is the revenue-maximizing strategy over the long-term.

The rhetoric in recent months has downplayed the shift – since nobody wants to admit the failure of one of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s (MBS) signature initiatives: a more activist OPEC+. Instead, it has been dressed up as a cudgel against OPEC+’s cheaters, particularly Kazakhstan, which has produced more than 400,000 bpd over its quota, and Iraq. But the talk of forcing “compensation cuts” on them has ebbed in recent months.

What has changed is that producers, including Saudi Arabia, have let go of the notion that global demand growth will be strong enough to open up a gap for OPEC+ to expand into. Instead the “call on OPEC+” has stayed relatively flat in recent years, as non-OPEC+ supply has expanded fast enough to fulfill the relatively weak increases in demand.

The Israel-Iran Nuclear Rivalry: Can War Be Prevented?

Assaf Zoran

Source Link

The line between persuading Tehran to denuclearize and provoking it toward rapid weaponization is dangerously thin.

Over the past eighteen months, tensions in the Middle East have escalated dramatically. The launch of hundreds of missiles from Iranian territory toward central Israel and F-35 jets striking near Tehran last year marked some of the most critical moments of the regional confrontation that began on October 7, 2023. Now, Tehran and Jerusalem are on a trajectory that risks further escalation in an already volatile regional conflict. At the center of this tension remains Iran’s nuclear program, seen as an existential threat by Israel and a major regime safeguard in Iran.

The debate is not over whether Iran should be prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons but over how. To assess the best path forward and its impact on Iran-Israel relations, three main scenarios should be considered.

The first and most probable is a partial nuclear agreement, which may temporarily curb escalation but risks renewed hostilities without additional leveraging. The second, a comprehensive nuclear resolution, could significantly reduce tensions but remains unlikely due to time constraints and the wide gap between U.S. desires and Iran’s willingness to compromise. The third, an Israeli military strike on Iran’s nuclear program, becomes increasingly probable in the absence of any agreement over the next months.

Could the strategies employed by global powers during the Cold War provide insights into alternative scenarios for reducing tensions in the Middle East? While détente between Israel and Iran would require fundamental shifts in perception and remains unlikely in the foreseeable future, certain measures can help reduce miscalculations and the sense of immediate threat. In a rapidly evolving Middle East, potential domestic and regional shifts may create better conditions for de-escalation.

With Extra Oil, Trump Already Has His Big Saudi Win

Clayton Seigle

Source Link

President Trump’s two-day visit to Saudi Arabia is expected to focus on bilateral deals, including a Saudi pledge to invest $600 billion in the United States. Cooperation on arms deals and a civil nuclear program for Riyadh are said to be on the agenda. Trump and his host, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, will surely also discuss regional hot spots, including Gaza, Yemen, and Iran.

But even before leaving Washington, Trump had already secured an important win from Riyadh in the form of extra crude oil that has contributed to a drop in oil prices.

The oil market was surprised in early April when a subset of eight members of the OPEC+ (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) producer group announced it would be increasing supply at triple the previously expected rate. That’s because the Saudi-led coalition had worked assiduously for more than a year to keep supply tight—twice postponing a program to very gradually add barrels until the market was strong enough to support the move.

Suddenly, in early April (just as financial markets were reeling from the trade war), the producer group announced it would be hiking May output by 411,000 barrels per day—three times the volume it had previously publicized. And just last week, it doubled down, maintaining the faster supply rate for June.

What explains the about-face from the Saudi-led group that has helped sink oil prices?

Pundits have offered uncompelling justifications, such as punishing Kazakhstan and Iraq for “cheating” on their production quotas. But the more likely explanation is the simplest—to curry favor with Trump at relatively low cost.

Trump’s Middle East trip could end the Gaza War

Source Link

President Trump’s upcoming Middle East trip, his first foreign tour since returning to the White House, is more than diplomatic theatre. It could mark a genuine geopolitical turning point that ends the war that has torn the region apart since Oct. 7, 2023.

But that would require something other than the standard Trumpian bluster: a focused action to compels the Arab states to break totally with Hamas, and then force Israel to step aside.

In short, Trump must strongarm both sides. There is no middle ground left. The default outcome, with Israel planning to intensify its Gaza war, would be a true cataclysm.

The landscape is not unpromising, because despite Trump’s penchant for bombast he has never been a warmonger. His foreign policy record is defined less by strength than by showmanship. He speaks loudly, but carries a light stick. His acceptance in recent days of a ceasefire with the Iran-backed Houthis — widely seen as a betrayal of Israeli interests — and his quiet drift toward a nuclear deal with Iran that looks increasingly similar to Obama’s, are evidence that Trump prefers deals over fights, even if problematic.

That contradiction is now at the heart of the Gaza war. Back in January, Trump pressured Netanyahu into a temporary ceasefire with Hamas. Then in February, he reversed course and gave the green light to resume military operations. But what Trump wanted was a short, sharp campaign — not the prolonged, grinding conflict Netanyahu seems ready to deliver.

Israel’s Security Cabinet approved an expansion of the war this week – but delayed it until after Trump’s trip this week to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. A key Netanyahu ally, ultranationalist finance minister Bezalel Smotrich, said the goal was long-term occupation of Gaza. “There will be no retreat from the territories we have conquered, not even in exchange for hostages,” he said.

What Does Trump Want in the Middle East?

Marc Lynch

Source Link

This week, U.S. President Donald Trump is set to visit three key American partners in the Middle East: Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). It is not yet clear what he hopes to achieve. He may be seeking to secure arms deals and investments in the United States. He might hope to personally enrich himself through Gulf investments in Trump properties, investment funds, and cryptocurrencies. But many hope—and others worry—that he has larger ambitions. In particular, it seems possible that his trip is mostly about Iran, a country with which his administration has been conducting negotiations relating to its nuclear program. Because of the erratic nature of Trump’s administration and internal disagreement among his key advisers, however, his trip could just as easily set the stage for war with Iran as it could for signing a nuclear agreement.

Leaders in the Arab states of the Gulf had hoped for Trump’s reelection. They had done well during Trump’s first term and had little love for U.S. President Joe Biden. (The same was true of most ordinary people in their countries, who blamed Biden for enabling Israel’s destruction of Gaza.) Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, also known as MBS, would never forgive Biden for calling Saudi Arabia a “pariah” because of its assassination of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi. MBS maintained close relationships with Trump and his associates during the Biden years, and he strung Biden along with the prospect that Saudi Arabia might normalize relations with Israel, which, before October 7, 2023, was the single overriding goal of an administration that was otherwise disengaged from the Middle East.

But 100 days into the second Trump administration, those leaders are perplexed and concerned. Trump’s Middle East policies look similar to Biden’s, which is surprising considering how radically the new administration has moved to transform the federal government and alter core U.S. alliances. Trump’s policies toward war-torn Gaza and Yemen, for example, are essentially more brutal and less restrained versions of those Biden had pursued.

But perhaps that shouldn’t be so surprising. After replacing Trump in 2021, Biden had continued virtually all of Trump’s Middle East policies, focusing on extending Trump’s Abraham Accords (a set of normalization agreements between Israel and a number of Arab states) while not returning to the Iran nuclear agreement from which Trump had withdrawn, declining to pursue Israeli-Palestinian peace, and neglecting to prioritize human rights.

The Resurgence of Europe

Arancha González Laya

Source Link

At the beginning of this year, many were hailing a triumphant American economy buoyed by the prospect of tax cuts, deregulation, cheap energy, and massive investments in artificial intelligence. In January, the World Economic Forum in Davos celebrated the unleashing of the “animal spirit” in the U.S. economy. U.S. companies’ stock valuations—in particular digital firms—seemed as though they could not get any higher. In panel discussions, roundtables, and closed-door meetings, analysts exalted the virtues of the United States as an investment destination and excoriated Europe as overregulated, uncompetitive, and incapable of innovating. Questions about the overheating of the American economy were brushed aside as impertinent. Concerns about the combined impact of potential tariff hikes and deportations on inflation were met with skepticism.

Almost four months later, the contrast could not be more stark. The Trump administration’s chaotic trade policy, the retaliation it has provoked, and the uncertainty generated by the U.S. president and his advisers’ contradictory statements are taking a toll on the U.S. economy. Markets and businesses overestimated the solidity of the administration’s economic plans. Even worse, Trump’s attacks on the rule of law and the judiciary, universities, law firms, and scientific institutions are undermining the foundations of what makes the United States so attractive for investment and gives it such great weight on the world stage. Neighbors and allies, threatened with territorial demands or with questions related to their defense partnerships, have lost trust in Washington.

Bolton: Putin at risk of ‘overplaying his hand’ on Ukraine talks

Filip Timotija 

Source Link

Former national security adviser John Bolton said during a recent interview that Russian President Vladimir Putin may be at risk of “overplaying his hand” with President Trump amid the talks to end the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine.

Bolton, a vocal critic of Trump, said that Russia is still “suffering” economically from the sanctions that Western Europe and the U.S. have imposed over the three-year war in Eastern Europe, but he argued that Putin is still in a “very strong” position politically.

“But as this war drags on, I think his position does get weaker. The real question is whether, between the efforts of the United States, the efforts of Europe to get a Ukraine-Russia ceasefire, it’s going to happen,” Bolton said during his appearance on John Catsimatidis’s radio show, “Cats Roundtable” on WABC 770 AM.

“Putin has already gotten a lot of concessions for what he wants. He wants to hold on to the territory Russia’s seized in Ukraine … but I think at this point, he may be at risk of overplaying his hand with Trump,” Bolton said.

Ukraine and its allies in Europe — France, Germany, the U.K. and Poland — have turned up the pressure on Russia to accept a 30-day ceasefire that would start as early as next week.

“Ukraine and all allies are ready for a full, unconditional ceasefire on land, air, and at sea for at least 30 days starting already on Monday,” Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha said Saturday. “If Russia agrees and effective monitoring is ensured, a durable ceasefire and confidence-building measures can pave the way to peace negotiations.”

Trump has pushed for both countries to sign on to a temporary truce, a plan only Ukraine has endorsed so far. The president has warned that if the deal is not forged, Russia could suffer from more sanctions.

Nuclear Power Reactors and the Next War

Henry Sokolski

Source Link

In future conflicts, Nuclear power reactors could make attractive military targets with dangerous repercussions.

With President Trump’s latest announcement that Iran’s centrifuges either will “blow up nicely in a deal” or “viciously without one,” the odds of a military strike against Iran’s nuclear program just shot up. This raises the question: if negotiations in Oman this weekend fail, what might Israel or the United States target? Would they just hit the centrifuges? What of Iran’s large power reactor at Bushehr?

The conventional wisdom is no: that, in a shooting war, striking the reactor would harm not just Iran but our Persian Gulf friends. A less popular argument is that once the shooting goes large, hitting the reactor is a relatively minor event.

Both arguments are appealing. But are they correct? The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC) decided to test them in two war games. What these games suggest is quite different than the conventional wisdom. Israel or the United States might well target Bushehr and that, if they hit the reactor, it would be far more than just an inconvenience.

The first game was set in 2037 in Eastern Europe. In the scenario, Ukraine’s electrical system included large U.S. and Russian reactors and smaller American modular plants. Beyond Ukraine, nearly 100 reactors—big and small, American and Russian—operated in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia.

At the game’s start, Russia invaded Ukraine yet again. This time, instead of threatening nuclear use, the Kremlin attacked Ukraine’s nuclear power plants. This sent a clear message: If Moscow is willing to induce major radiological releases by attacking civil nuclear plants, NATO needed to worry all the more that Russia might use nuclear weapons next. The attacks resulted in a significant radiological release that drifted into NATO states. Russia then conducts missile strikes against the emergency diesel generators at Polish and Romanian nuclear power plants.

Exclusive: US Army Reevaluates Tank Warfare Strategy Amid Drone Threats.

Source Link

On May 6, 2025, U.S. Army Secretary Daniel Driscoll announced a significant shift in the operational deployment of the M1 Abrams main battle tanks, acknowledging the evolving nature of modern warfare. Drawing lessons from the Ukraine conflict, Driscoll emphasized the need for tanks to adapt to the increasing threat posed by inexpensive drones. This strategic pivot underscores the Army's commitment to preserving its armored capabilities while addressing emerging battlefield challenges.

The M1 Abrams is shifting from leading assaults to providing long-range fire support and entering battle only after drones have cleared threats, reducing vulnerability to loitering munitions and FPV drones. (Picture source: US DoD)

The M1 Abrams, a cornerstone of U.S. armored forces, has historically led frontal assaults, leveraging its formidable firepower and armor. However, the proliferation of low-cost drones equipped with advanced surveillance and attack capabilities has exposed vulnerabilities in traditional tank tactics. In Ukraine, both Russian and Ukrainian forces have suffered significant tank losses due to drone strikes, prompting a reevaluation of armored warfare strategies.

U.S. Army Secretary Driscoll highlighted the necessity for tanks to operate from more secure, defended positions, rather than spearheading attacks. This approach aims to mitigate the risk of detection and destruction by enemy drones, which have become ubiquitous on the modern battlefield. The U.S. Army is exploring the integration of uncrewed systems to lead initial assaults, allowing tanks to exploit breaches and provide sustained firepower from safer distances.

Marine Corps releases AI implementation plan

Jon Harper

Source Link

U.S. Marines with Maritime Raid Force, 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, prepare to launch JaiaBot unmanned underwater vehicles during reconnaissance beach survey training as part of MEU Exercise at Kin Blue Beach Training Area, Okinawa, Japan, May 6, 2025. The Marines conducted the training to ensure dive proficiency and further enhance amphibious reconnaissance skills by utilizing drones to locate the optimal crossing point in the water enabling rapid and safe crossing. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Alora Finigan)

Marine Corps officials unveiled the service’s new artificial intelligence implementation plan, laying out timelines for achieving key objectives and milestones for digital transformation.

Lt. Gen. Melvin “Jerry” Carter, deputy commandant for information, approved the 57-page document April 23 and it was recently published. The plan was developed following last year’s release of the Corps’ AI strategy.

The service sees artificial intelligence capabilities as transformative technologies to “enhance decision advantage in the evolving landscape of modern warfare,” officials noted.

The AI implementation plan includes objectives and tasks related to five strategic goals.

Advertisement

Tactical innovation is one of the main objectives related to achieving the goal of “mission alignment.”

No later than March 2026, the implementation plan directs the deputy commandant for information (DC I) in coordination with the deputy commandant for combat development and integration, to “develop a use case process that captures, assesses, and prioritizes concepts for the application of AI from across the warfighting functions, and at all echelons, to implement targeted actions” as well as “identify major roadblocks in policy, workforce, and infrastructure that have a large impact on innovation and acceleration of AI implementation to mitigate through change.”