Indian Strategic Studies: 07/19/25

19 July 2025

Bookshelf: risks of Sino-Indian rivalry set to grow

The rapid ascent of China and its increased presence in South and Central Asia, as well as in the Indian Ocean, have increased the risks of the Sino–Indian rivalry.

The security threats of the Sino-Indian rivalry are sharpened by each country’s strategic partnerships: India with the US; and China with Pakistan, which is also India’s traditional adversary. The authors note that Indian elites regard China as India’s principal rival, ranked above Pakistan, whereas Chinese elites regard India as a lesser rival than the US and Japan.

The authors argue that the Sino-Indian rivalry started almost immediately after the two countries’ emergence into the global arena in the 1940s. India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, tried to promote India as the natural leader of Asia,

a role that was contested by China. And the rivalry takes two forms: spatial rivalry, including disputes over borders and territory; and positional rivalry, related to each country’s position in the regional pecking order. The authors believe that positional rivalry may be more consequential in the Sino-Indian relationship.

China gradually chipped away at India’s ambitions. India inherited from Britian the notion that Tibet served as a good buffer for keeping hostile armies away from the northern Indian border. But when China occupied Tibet in the 1950s,

India was too weak to challenge it. India was further weakened by the 1962 Sino-Indian War, when its army was beaten by China. Despite the territorial aspect, the authors believe this war to have been an important mark of the positional rivalry.

India became a marginal strategic player in Asia for the rest of the twentieth century. And with China’s rapid economic development, the material power gap between China and India only became more substantial.

The Sino-Indian Rivalry: Implications for Global Order

Drawing on a wide body of literature on international rivalries, this comprehensive and theoretically grounded work explains the origins and evolution of the Sino-Indian rivalry. Contrary to popular belief,

the authors argue that the Sino-Indian rivalry started almost immediately after the emergence of the two countries in the global arena. They demonstrate how the rivalry has systemic implications for both Asia and the global order,

intertwining the positional and spatial dimensions that lie at the heart of the Sino-Indian relationship. Showing how this rivalry has evolved from the late 1940s to the present day,

the essays in this collection underscore its significance for global politics and highlight how the asymmetries between India and China have the potential to escalate conflict in the future.

How India Can Placate America

Over the past quarter century, few countries have commanded as much sustained attention from U.S. foreign policy officials as has India. Since the George W. Bush administration, the United States has placed India not just at the heart of its approach to Asia but at the center of its global strategy.

This enduring partnership rested on an unspoken doctrine of strategic altruism. U.S. policymakers believed that supporting India’s rise—economically, militarily, and diplomatically—would pay dividends for the United States in the long term. A stronger, more prosperous India would open markets for American companies,

bolster regional deterrence against China, and serve as a democratic counterweight to authoritarianism in Asia. India’s ascent was perceived not as a threat but as an opportunity. Because India’s rise aligned with American goals,

Washington made substantial investments in India without demanding immediate returns. That long-term bet endured across both Democratic and Republican administrations—including President Donald Trump’s first term.

But Trump’s return to office could mark the end of this approach. The second Trump administration is driven not so much by transactionalism as it is by an insatiable desire to burnish its dominance in virtually all its foreign relationships. Its dealings with India have been no exception.

To preserve the relationship, it now falls to India—not the United States—to practice strategic altruism: making concessions to, generating deliverables for, and limiting what it asks of a U.S. administration primarily concerned with maintaining the upper hand. For a country committed to strategic autonomy and “multialignment,” this is an uncomfortable proposition. Nevertheless, it may be India’s best bet for weathering Trump’s second term and positioning itself for a more favorable future.

The Guardian view on Brics growing up: A new bloc seeks autonomy – and eyes a post-western order

The Brics summit in Brazil last week revealed a loose alliance of emerging powers becoming more complex – and perhaps more consequential. For Brics, heft matters. It now counts 11 member states – including Indonesia, which joined this year – representing half the world’s population and 40% of the global economy, outpacing the G7 by $20tn.

Yet its size hides its contradictions. The grouping’s call for more inclusive global institutions sounds welcome, but there is a preponderance of autocracies within its own ranks. Brics is right that international law should be upheld in Middle Eastern conflicts. But it climbs down from its moral pedestal by condemning Ukraine’s strikes on Russian infrastructure – while staying silent on Moscow’s relentless attacks on civilians.

The acronym “Bric” – Brazil, Russia, India and China (South Africa wouldn’t join until 2010) – began as a Wall Street bet on rising powers challenging the west. But what defines Brics today is a subtler, more strategic ambition: to insulate themselves from Washington’s gravitational pull while cooperating to build a joint hi-tech industrial base. There are things that the Brics get right.

Financial global institutions such as the International Monetary Fund are in need of reform; the rich world has failed to honour climate finance promises. The group’s understandable response in the face of inaction is to create its own development bank to promote a form of green industrialisation.

A pre-summit agreement on a formal collective Brics stance on funding climate action will help. Rapid growth in renewable energy means fossil fuels now account for less than half of the bloc’s total electricity generation. Given the climate emergency, such progress can only be welcome. Brics member states now lead in green tech and boast booming consumer markets – offering both the tools and the scale to drive industrial growth.

Recent Developments Underscore Beijing’s Global Security Ambitions

Eduardo Jaramillo

Source Link

Beijing is looking to increase its security presence in Asia and further afield, according to two recent high-level statements of intent—a white paper on “national security in the new era” and a new “model of security for Asia.”

Beijing senses opportunities amid policy uncertainty from the United States. Efforts on the margins, such as limited security cooperation with Southeast Asian states, could lay the groundwork for higher-stakes security cooperation in the future.

The ideas behind the Party-state’s latest announcements have been over a decade in the making. One such idea, the “comprehensive national security concept,”

is now linked explicitly with Xi Jinping’s Global Security Initiative, indicating Xi’s ambitions to promote his governance models beyond the borders of the People’s Republic of China.

Two high-level announcements relating to international security shed light on how the leadership of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) sees the state of the world and its role in it. A white paper titled “China’s National Security in the New Era” (新时代的中国国家安全)—the first of its kind for the country—portrays Chinese society as an example of stability amid a world facing “new turbulent changes”

(新的动荡变革). It also stresses the need for a “comprehensive” (总体) approach to national security (Xinhua, May 12). [1] Meanwhile, General Secretary Xi Jinping has introduced the concept of a “model of security for Asia” (亚洲安全模式), described as featuring “sharing weal and woe, seeking common ground while shelving differences, and prioritizing dialogue and consultation as the strategic support” (以安危与共、求同存异、对话协商的亚洲安全模式为战略支撑) (FMPRC, April 9; People’s Daily, April 10).

Thucydides trap averted: China speed, dodgy data and the Houthis

Han Feizi

Humanity may have lucked out. China speed, dodgy data and the Houthis may just have derailed the 21st Century Thucydides trap.

While Athens and Sparta careened unstoppably towards the Peloponnesian war, each powerless to arrest rising tensions, today’s Sparta should consider itself lucky: It cannot win the 21st Century Peloponnesian War and, as such, will not press for one.

The most consequential military development of the past few years – and there have been legion – is empirical proof that expeditionary navies are obsolete. China proved it in the South China Sea. Ukraine proved it in the Black Sea. And the Houthis (the Houthis!) proved it in the Red Sea.

Like the Blitzkrieg field-tested during the Spanish Civil War and Azerbaijan’s drone warfare against Armenia, recent littoral challenges against expeditionary navies will prove more consequential in a completely different theater. But in a good way – more to preclude future conflict than as a field test for future tactics.

Contrary to popular belief, China does not covet the South China Sea for mere scraps like oil, natural gas or fish. China is more than happy to negotiate with other claimants to exploit South China Sea resources. What China wants in the South China Sea are airstrips, missile sites, naval bases and electronic listening posts, extending the southern maritime security perimeter.

What China really wants in the South China Sea is a theater, far away from anything of real value (Taiwan, for example), to demonstrate US Naval impotence for all of Asia to witness.

Pentagon yanks speakers from Aspen Security Forum, blasts its values

Stephen Losey

The Pentagon abruptly pulled several of its top officials from speaking this week at the Aspen Security Forum in Colorado, saying Monday the forum’s organizers do not share values with the Defense Department.

“Senior Department of Defense officials will no longer be participating at the Aspen Security Forum because their values do not align with the values of the DOD,” Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell said in a statement to Defense News.

The department will remain strong in its focus to increase the lethality of our warfighters, revitalize the warrior ethos, and project peace through strength on the world stage. It is clear the ASF is not in alignment with these goals.”

The Aspen Institute, which stages the forum every summer, said in a statement to Defense News that it sought to include top leaders from President Donald Trump’s administration in its discussions on national security, and that the canceled speakers are still welcome there.

“For more than a decade, the Aspen Security Forum has welcomed senior officials — Republican and Democrat, civilian and military — as well as senior foreign officials and experts, who bring experience and diverse perspectives on matters of national security," the institute said. “This year, we extended invitations to senior Trump administration officials, including several cabinet-level leaders. ... We will miss the participation of the Pentagon, but our invitations remain open.”

America’s AI Pivot to the Gulf

Ferial Ara Saeed

The Red Cell series is published in collaboration with the Stimson Center. Drawing upon the legacy of the CIA’s Red Cell—established following the September 11 attacks to avoid similar analytic failures in the future—the project works to challenge assumptions,

misperceptions, and groupthink with a view to encouraging alternative approaches to America’s foreign and national security policy challenges. For more information about the Stimson Center’s Red Cell Project, see here.

In 2029, the world’s most advanced artificial intelligence (AI) data center will probably be in Abu Dhabi, not Silicon Valley. President Donald Trump is building the backbone of American AI dominance far from home, in a bold gambit with profound geo-strategic consequences and risks.

Data centers are critical in the race for AI dominance. Like factories, they bring together semiconductors (the parts), software (the plans), and experts (the engineers) to build and run AI systems. The United States cannot build data centers fast enough at home owing to resource, regulatory, and political constraints. Overcoming these bottlenecks requires time, money, and political commitment, with no guarantee of success.

Meanwhile, China could catch up with its all-out state-backed infrastructure push. Trump has thus opted to scale US-anchored data centers abroad, namely in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia. To clear the way, the administration had to rescind Biden-era controls on AI chip exports, marking a decisive turn in US strategy from containment to strategic diffusion.

Details of these chips-for-infrastructure agreements are still emerging, but the terms are already clear. According to the White House, the Emiratis and Saudis will fund data centers at home and in the United States in exchange for advanced chips. American chipmaker Nvidia will supply about a million AI chips in total, mainly to the UAE,

with 80 percent earmarked for US partners, according to SemiAnalysis, an independent research firm specializing in the AI industry. The US partners—including OpenAI, Amazon, and Microsoft—will develop the data centers with the UAE’s G42 and Saudi Arabia’s Humain.

The United States and NATO at a Crossroads regarding the War in Ukraine

President Putin’s decision to annex four regions of Ukraine and his definition of his struggle against the Western elites as an existential struggle, while avowing his determination to defend the annexed territories and making implicit threats about the possibility of using unconventional weapons, significantly increase the risk of escalation.

Consequently, the United States and its allies are now at a crossroads. It seems that Russia’s conduct will compel them to formulate a follow-up strategy that will heighten the challenge of supporting Ukraine without getting dragged into war with Russia. Thus far, aside from the threat of a serious and “decisive” response,

the United States and NATO have maintained a veiled response to Russia’s potential use of unconventional weapons. The response could be political (cutting off relations) and economic, but a conventional military response cannot be ruled out.

The official statement by Israel – which so far has refrained from responding to Ukraine’s request to provide it with military aid – that it will not recognize Russia’s annexation of the Ukrainian regions is a positive step, but insufficient. The Israeli government should stand clearly by Ukraine’s side,

including responding to its military requests. In addition, it should unhesitatingly stand by the side of the US in the struggle, which will influence the shaping of the future world order and the leading role of the United States.

The United States administration persists in its determined statements regarding Russia's actions in the war in Ukraine. In response to Russia's decision to annex four regions of Ukraine's territory, President Biden condemned the move,

The Brics Coalition Is Starting to Gel Into a Real Threat to the West

About the author: Maria Vassalou is the head of the Pictet Research Institute, part of the Geneva-based bank and asset manager Pictet.

President Donald Trump announced last week that not only would he be placing a 50% tariff on Brazil, but he would also impose an additional 10% tariff on its fellow Brics members in an effort to counter the group’s “anti-American policy.” The coalition—led by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa—had just days prior renewed their pledges of solidarity and cooperation at its annual summit in Rio de Janeiro.

The group has long been dismissed as a collection of developing countries with little in common other than historical border disputes and troubled economies. But in recent years, it has expanded beyond its original membership to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates and has extended invitations to Saudi Arabia. Turkey, Mexico, and others have applied for membership.

Some of these countries lack punch or significance on their own. But they have all been carefully chosen to add to the coalition’s collective strengths and levers of global influence. The Trump administration’s tariffs may be an overreaction to this—but there are signs the group is methodically threatening the economic and geopolitical hegemony of the U.S.

Brics is for China what the G-7 and the European Union are for the U.S. The G-7 and the EU, however, want for resources Brics is rich in. Brics dominates global production in magnesium, aluminum, and antimony, all of which are needed for ammunition production.

It has more rare earths, industrial metals, and grains than the G-7, and produces more oil. The group also owns almost double the precious metals reserves of the G-7 and EU combined. Overall, Brics has significant advantages in the artificial intelligence and clean energy revolution.

The Age of Netanyahu

Robert D. Kaplan

America’s policy class has been obsessed for decades with presidents Bill Clinton, Barack Obama, and Joe Biden. That is natural, since they have been the country’s national leaders. But decades from now, they will have been mostly forgotten like the Gilded Age presidents Rutherford B. Hayes, Chester A. Arthur, Benjamin Harrison, and so forth.

The fact is, most of America’s presidents have been little more than competent managers, and our time is little different than in past eras. George W. Bush will be remembered for the tragedy of the Iraq War. And Donald Trump obviously will cut a large figure in history, for better or worse, because he has drastically changed the nature and style of the presidency.

The same goes for the overwhelming majority of European leaders and NATO secretaries-general. Though they command attention among the policy elites, they, too, will be forgotten. Few of them, since Margaret Thatcher,

have stood out as believing in anything in particular. They have droned on about international law only because they have had the luxury to do so, having been defended since 1945 largely by American taxpayers.

An unstated reason for Europe’s particular animus toward Israel over the decades is that the continent’s leaders secretly resent Israel’s willingness and ability to regularly defend itself through tough military action: something Europe’s elites never had even to countenance, and arguably couldn’t manage.

They rightly condemn many of Israel’s actions in Gaza, brought on by the worst atrocity since the Holocaust. Still, they have virtually forgotten the 650,000 dead in Syria and the many tens of thousands of dead in Sudan in recent civil wars. Antisemitism, among other things, resides in selectivity.

From Minerals to Microchips: What Taiwan Can Learn from Ukraine

Yen-ting Lin

In May 2025, Ukraine signed a $60 billion critical minerals agreement with the United States—an investment framework celebrated as a landmark in bilateral cooperation. Yet, this deal was forged only after two years of war,

a 29% GDP contraction, and the loss of industrial territories holding over 30% of the world’s titanium and rare earths. Long recognized for their importance in aerospace, defense, and clean energy, these resources became bargaining assets only after immense national sacrifice and the failure of deterrence.

Taiwan, meanwhile, occupies a pivotal role in the global semiconductor supply chain, producing over 90% of the world’s advanced chips under 10 nanometers and contributing more than $70 billion annually through firms like TSMC, MediaTek, and UMC. These semiconductors power artificial intelligence, precision weapons,

and cutting-edge computing. Yet Taiwan faces mounting pressure from the People’s Republic of China, whose military doctrine increasingly signals 2027 as a potential flashpoint for unification by force.

Despite over $50 billion in Taiwanese-led investments in the United States, Japan, and Germany—spanning fabs from Arizona to Dresden—Taiwan remains outside formal military alliances like NATO and without a bilateral defense treaty. The Taiwan Relations Act provides strategic ambiguity but no explicit defense guarantee, leaving the island vulnerable to coercion.

This juxtaposition raises urgent questions: How can Taiwan ensure its semiconductor dominance translates into binding security guarantees? What lessons can it draw from Ukraine’s reactive resource diplomacy to avoid similar costs? And how can Taiwan’s strategic interdependence with the United States and its allies be leveraged to deter aggression without eroding its “silicon shield”?

Africa Corps Maintains Russia’s Presence in Africa After Wagner’s Departure From Mali

The Wagner Private Military Company (PMC) announced its departure from Mali on June 6. The PMC’s operations in Africa enabled Russia to establish a network of influence on the continent and secure access to natural resources.

Late-Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin’s failed rebellion in 2023 led to Wagner’s operations in Africa being largely taken over by the Africa Corps, a paramilitary group entirely subordinate to the Russian Ministry of Defense.

The Africa Corps’ operations in place of Wagner sustain Russia’s presence in Africa but take away the Kremlin’s ability to distance itself from any crimes Russian paramilitary operations may commit on the continent.

On June 6, the Wagner Private Military Company (PMC) announced that its mercenaries would withdraw from Mali after a three-and-a-half-year presence in the country (see EDM, July 9). Russia’s military presence in Mali is not ending

however, but is transitioning to another paramilitary formation under the Russian Armed Forces—the Africa Corps. Yevgeny Prigozhin, the late leader of Wagner, turned his private army against the Russian Ministry of Defense on June 23, 2023.

The Wagner leader aimed to confront then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, whom he accused of attacking the mercenaries’ rear positions (Meduza, June 23, 2023).

Prigozhin’s personal accusations against Russia’s top military leadership quickly became politicized, prompting a response not only from state media but also from Russian President Vladimir Putin himself (President of Russia, June 24, 2023).

Containment vs. confrontation: Trump and a nuclear Iran

Mohammad Eslami, Christian Kaunert

Bringing peace back to the Middle East, securing the release of all Israeli hostages, and normalizing relations between Israel and its neighbors have been among Donald Trump’s most prominent election promises in his second-term bid for the presidency (Rynhold, 2024). However,

Iran appears to be the primary obstacle to Trump’s strategic goals in the Middle East—in particular its nuclear program, which is coupled with its expanding drone and ballistic missile capabilities and its support for regional proxies. The Trump administration has expressed a strong commitment to curbing Iran’s military ambitions,

not only to prevent the development of nuclear weapons but also to restrict Iran’s ballistic missile program, military drone capabilities, and proxy networks (Eslami, 2021, 2022). To achieve this, Trump has emphasized a hardline approach,

including the threat of military operations against Iran’s nuclear facilities and the continuation of economic sanctions as part of his “maximum pressure” campaign (Saleh and Yazdanshenas 2024).

At the same time as Trump’s pressure campaign, Iran has also been engaged in a long-standing shadow war with Israel, which has significantly shaped its security doctrine, causing Iran to engage in indirect confrontations through regional proxies and asymmetric warfare.

The escalation of hostilities, particularly after the Hamas-Israeli conflict that started on October 7, 2023, has seen Iran and Israel move from covert operations to direct military confrontations (Mens, 2024).

These advancements raise pressing questions about whether Iran’s growing defense capabilities will eventually lead to its emergence as a nuclear-armed state and how Trump’s second administration will respond to such a development.

Nobel laureates and nuclear experts gather at University of Chicago on Trinity anniversary, press world leaders for action on nuclear dangers

John Mecklin

After two-and-a-half days of meetings in a mostly sunny midsummer Chicago, concerned Nobel Prize laureates and many of the world’s top experts on nuclear weapons spoke out on a dark subject: the high and seemingly rising prospect of nuclear war.

The Nobel Laureate Assembly for the Prevention of Nuclear War issued a declaration Wednesday—keyed to the 80th anniversary of the first nuclear weapons explosion in New Mexico, known as the Trinity Test—that presented a series of practical recommendations to world leaders for reducing the nuclear threat.

The impetus for the assembly came from Nobel laureates who, after issuing their own declaration on nuclear danger in 2024, felt public attention was not commensurate to the threat. Brian Schmidt, who won the Nobel Prize in Physics in 2011,

said the idea of the assembly initially arose last year at a meeting in Lindau, Germany, when Nobel laureates from more than 10 countries signed the “Mainau Declaration 2024 on Nuclear Weapons,” an echo of a Nobel laureates declaration on the same subject in 1955.

“We were discussing at this meeting of laureates, how this seemed to have gone off the radar of the world. And yet we were saying it’s, to our mind, the existential risk,” Schmidt said.

Daniel Holz, a University of Chicago astrophysicist and chair of the Bulletin’s Science and Security Board, was a co-organizer of the three-day assembly, held at the university’s David Rubenstein Forum this week. “Needless to say,

Ukraine Clears Up Airspace With Modernized Munitions

The Ukrainian Air Force is seeing increased success in eliminating Russian aircraft and missiles, thereby opening up more opportunities for offensive air and ground operations.

Ukrainian units are effectively using Western aircraft (e.g., F-16 and Mirage fighter jets) and various missile and bomb kits (e.g., AASM Hammer guided bombs) to take out Russian fighters and troop positions.

Gaining air superiority is a critical condition for future operations to liberate Ukraine’s temporarily occupied territories. Doing so depends on the political will and decisiveness of Ukraine’s Western partners to continue supplying weapons.

On June 18, the Ukrainian Air Force conducted an air strike on the personnel assembly point of the Russian Armed Forces in the village of Kozynka in Belgorod oblast. A Ukrainian MiG-29 Fulcrum fighter jet launched two French-made AASM Hammer guided bombs,

destroying the building where a concentration of Russian troops had taken shelter (Militarnyi, June 18). The strike was another example of Ukrainian pilots effectively obliterating targets in Russian territory as part of a concerted effort to increasingly bring the war home to Russia and put more pressure on the Kremlin (see EDM, August 13, November 13, 2024, February 24, June 9, 27).

In May, Ukrainian forces carried out another air strike in the same region, eliminating a border guard unit of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) (Militarnyi, May 27). A video of the operation, recorded via reconnaissance drone,

was posted on the “Sunflower” Telegram channel associated with the Ukrainian Air Force (Telegram/Soniah_hub, May 26). This high-precision strike, too, was made possible by the modular AASM Hammer bomb modernization kit. Meanwhile,

Security Competition Intensifies on the Caspian

The Caspian Sea is becoming a site of geopolitical conflict as Russia is rapidly losing its dominance over the four other littoral states: Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan.

Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan have been expanding their fleets and are now entering into security accords with each other, making them individually and collectively forces to be reckoned with by the other littoral countries and all who want to use the Caspian.

In response to increased naval expansion and cooperation among the three Turkic littoral states, Russia is expanding its Caspian naval cooperation with Iran, setting the stage for serious competition between the three Turkic countries and Moscow, allied with Tehran.

The Caspian Sea is rapidly ceasing to be a Russian lake. The other littoral countries have grown their navies and increased cooperation amongst themselves, upending the Russian Flotilla’s preeminence in the Caspian (see EDM, June 24, 2021). Over the last few years, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,

and Turkmenistan have all significantly expanded their fleets. The three Turkic countries bordering the Caspian are forming more security cooperation agreements and increasing their individual and collective leverage relative to Russia. Türkiye’s backing also increases the three countries’ bargaining power vis-à-vis Russia and countries,

including the People’s Republic of China and the European Union, who want to use the Caspian for transit or development (Kaspiyskiy Vestnik, July 8 [1], [2]). In a transparent effort to recover some of its former influence, Russia announced on July 14 that it will be expanding naval cooperation with Iran (Izvestiya, July 14).

This announcement sets the stage for competition in the Caspian between the three Turkic countries and Türkiye, on the one hand, and Moscow and Tehran, on the other (see EDM, April 11, August 1, September 5, 2023).

Major Power Rivalry and Domestic Politics in South Asia

Paul Staniland

The South Asia Program informs policy debates relating to the region’s security, economy, and political development. From strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific to India’s internal dynamics and U.S. engagement with the region, the program offers in-depth, rigorous research and analysis on South Asia’s most critical challenges.Learn More

Major power competition has returned to Asia. Controlling Chinese access to advanced technology and managing deterrence over Taiwan pose pressing technical and military problems for American policymakers.

1 However, the most complicated political challenge facing policymakers is crafting effective strategy toward the many states in the region that are not fully aligned with China, the United States, or India.

2 Managing relationships with such third-party states was a crucial issue in Cold War Asia.

3 And in Asia today, major powers are trying to influence these swing states to prevent them from tilting toward geopolitical rivals.

4These third-party countries may be smaller than the behemoths seeking to influence them, but they are nevertheless often still quite large, have growing economies, and occupy strategic locations in Asia.

5 Major power rivalries interact with complicated domestic politics within these swing states.6 Their internal political divisions often do not straightforwardly line up with the interests and goals of external powers, and the priorities of local leaders can be far more focused on domestic rather than geopolitical competition.

The deepening water shortage row between the US and Mexico

After the thirtieth consecutive month without rain, the townsfolk of San Francisco de Conchos in the northern Mexican state of Chihuahua gather to plead for divine intervention.

On the shores of Lake Toronto, the reservoir behind the state's most important dam – called La Boquilla, a priest leads local farmers on horseback and their families in prayer, the stony ground beneath their feet once part of the lakebed before the waters receded to today's critically low levels.

Among those with their heads bowed is Rafael Betance, who has voluntarily monitored La Boquilla for the state water authority for 35 years.

"This should all be underwater," he says, motioning towards the parched expanse of exposed white rocks.

"The last time the dam was full and caused a tiny overflow was 2017," Mr Betance recalls. "Since then, it's decreased year on year.

"We're currently at 26.52 metres below the high-water mark, less than 14% of its capacity."

Rafael Betance says that water levels in the reservoir have fallen for the past eight years

Little wonder the local community is beseeching the heavens for rain. Still, few expect any let up from the crippling drought and sweltering 42C (107.6F) heat.

Now, a long-running dispute with Texas over the scarce resource is threatening to turn ugly.

Under the terms of a 1944 water-sharing agreement, Mexico must send 430 million cubic metres of water per year from the Rio Grande to the US.

Not our war' - Trump's Nato weapons deal for Ukraine sparks MAGA anger

Some conservative members of Donald Trump's "Make America Great Again" movement have reacted angrily to the president's plans to sell weapons to Nato, arguing it is a betrayal of his promise to end US involvement in foreign wars.

On Monday, Trump said he would send weapons to Ukraine via Nato, while also threatening Russia with more tariffs if a deal to end the war is not reached in 50 days.

Republican Congresswomen Marjorie Taylor Greene, a key Trump ally, and former Trump strategist Steve Bannon are among those who have criticised the decision, with Bannon telling his podcast listeners that Ukraine is a "European war".

In an interview with the New York Times, Greene - an isolationist member of Congress from Georgia who has been one of the most loyal Trump supporters on Capitol Hill - said the move was at odds with what she had promised voters on the campaign trail.

"It's not just Ukraine; it's all foreign wars in general and a lot of foreign aid," she said. "This is what we campaigned on. This is what I promised also to my district. This is what everybody voted for. And I believe we have to maintain the course."I'm 'disappointed but not done' with

Trump sought to emphasise that the weapons would be paid for rather than given as direct aid, saying on Monday: "We're not buying it, but we will manufacture it, and they're going to be paying for it."

Europeanize’ the War: Trump’s New ‘Master Plan’ for Ukraine

Robert E. Kelly

Key Points and Summary on Ukraine and Trump – President Trump’s abrupt pivot to aggressively arming Ukraine is not about achieving a total military victory, but rather a calculated strategy to force a recalcitrant Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table.

-Frustrated by Putin’s refusal to engage in good-faith peace talks, Trump is now using the threat of advanced, long-range weapons—including potentially encouraging strikes deep inside Russia as leverage.

making European allies pay for and transfer these weapons, Trump is also “Europeanizing” the conflict’s costs and risks. The new strategy aims to exhaust Russia into a stalemate, not necessarily defeat it on the battlefield.

United States President Donald Trump just met the secretary-general of NATO in the White House and pledged substantial new assistance to Ukraine in its war with Russia.

The most important element of the latest aid is greater air defense, because Russia has been pounding Ukraine with its most punishing air strikes of the war.

But most controversially, Trump seems open to Ukrainian deep strikes into Russia, perhaps as far as Moscow and Saint Petersburg.

Now he would attempt to walk it back and say he was not in favor of attacks on Moscow or deeper into Russia. However, the threat remains.

Putin has hinted in the past that Western weapons used for such attacks would bring Russian retaliation against NATO itself.

Both the Trump and the previous Joe Biden administrations have resisted giving Ukraine long-range missiles because of that threat.

In the Indo-Pacific, US defense industrial partnerships go much deeper than AUKUS submarines

Adam Kozloski and Markus Garlauskas

This week, Australian and US forces began Talisman Sabre, a major biennial military exercise that sends a powerful message of the two countries’ resolute bilateral ties and joint capabilities. This year’s iteration is being described as the “largest and most sophisticated war fighting exercise ever conducted in Australia,” involving some 35,000 personnel.

The successful completion of this major, three-week exercise will hopefully alleviate some of the anxiety that has built up following the US Department of Defense’s recent decision to review the defense industry pact among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, known as AUKUS.

Much of this anxiety was misplaced in the first place. The US review is not the alliance-busting event that some have portrayed it as. Far from it. It is reasonable and expected that a new US administration would review such an agreement,

and it is something that new governments in both the United Kingdom and Australia have also completed. Moreover, the review of AUKUS should be understood as just one part of a larger US effort to accelerate and refine defense industry cooperation to meet shared security goals in the Indo-Pacific.

What else is included in this larger US effort? In a speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in May, for example, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announced the first tranche of Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience (PIPIR) projects.

It was a decisive move toward deepening US-led defense industrial base cooperation—within the administration’s “America first” framework—to counter China’s looming threat. PIPIR and AUKUS, if employed properly, will be powerful tools to achieve the Trump administration’s vision of ensuring US deterrence against aggression in the Indo-Pacific.

Arms Race in Ukraine

As I was waiting outside Kyiv’s main military hospital at the end of April, I saw a man in a wheelchair come out of the main gate. He wove gingerly past seven “hedgehogs”—the large metal antitank traps that were deployed across the capital’s streets at the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.

Now they have almost all been cleared away. Soldiers were walking out of the gate carrying bags of medicine and large flat folders with their X-rays, while visitors were checking in.

Amid this morning rush the man wheeled himself to the end of the short, blocked road leading to the street. There he lit a cigarette and watched the world go by. He was wearing a T-shirt in the yellow and pale blue Ukrainian colors.

One of his legs had been amputated below the knee, and the other one was gone entirely. Both stumps were still bound with dressings. Maybe he suffered from phantom limb pain. In a few weeks perhaps he will be out of the wheelchair, learning to walk again on prosthetic legs.

The man was almost certainly one of the 380,000 Ukrainians who President Volodymyr Zelensky said in February had been wounded in this war. A few days earlier I had been in a bunker talking to a Ukrainian commander.

We were watching live drone feeds from the front line when he showed me a grainy one zooming in on a wounded Russian solider. “See, he has lost his leg,” he said. “So, are you going to finish him off?” I asked naively. “No, no!” he replied. A badly wounded soldier was worse for Russia than a dead one, he explained. First he would endanger the lives of any men who tried to rescue him,

Did Trump Really Just Break Up with Putin?

Donald Trump finally called “bullshit” on Vladimir Putin this week, though nobody seems to quite know what it means. One explanation, and perhaps the best one, is that Trump, belatedly, recognized what has long been apparent to the rest of us:

that Putin has been playing him, pretending to talk peace while escalating Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine. On Monday, Trump announced that he was “not happy with President Putin at all” and overruled his own Pentagon to re-start arms shipments to Ukraine.

A day later, during a Cabinet meeting at the White House, Trump said bluntly, “We get a lot of bullshit thrown at us by Putin,” observing that when the two talk—as they have frequently in recent months—he’s “very nice all the time, but it turns out to be meaningless.”

Soon enough, the Wall Street Journal editorial board was praising Trump’s “pivot on Mr. Putin.” One could practically hear the sighs of relief in European capitals. In Kyiv, Ukrainian officials welcomed the news,

even if they were understandably wary. On Capitol Hill, Republicans seized the moment to announce that they now expected to call a vote as soon as this month on bipartisan legislation—co-sponsored by more than eighty senators—that would allow Trump to impose a crippling tariff of up to five hundred per cent on countries that purchase Russian oil, gas, or uranium.

On Wednesday, the Senate Majority Leader, John Thune, revealed the plans to move ahead with the bill. Lindsey Graham, who has been the measure’s chief proponent in the Senate, claimed that Trump “is ready for us to act,” though an unnamed White House official told Politico that the Administration still had qualms about being “micromanaged” by Congress on foreign policy.

Undersea Cables Are Vulnerable to Sabotage—but This Takes Skill and Specialist Equipment

John Aitken

Countries have come to rely on a network of cables and pipes under the sea for their energy and communications. So it has been worrying to read headlines about communications cables being cut and, in one case, an undersea gas pipeline being blown up.

Critical undersea infrastructure (CUI) as these connections are known, supports about US$9 trillion (£6.6 trillion) worth of trade per day. A coordinated attack on this network could undoubtedly have devastating consequences.

But, as a former submarine commander who researches maritime security, I believe that attacking and disrupting the network is not as easy as some reports might make it appear. Deliberately snagging a pipeline with a dragging anchor in relatively shallow waters can cause a lot of damage, but it is fairly indiscriminate trick with a shelf life, since the damage can be repaired, and deniability becomes increasingly difficult.

Targeting the cable networks in deeper waters require more sophisticated methods, which are much more challenging to carry out.

A hostile state wishing to attack this network first needs to locate the cables they wish to target. The majority of the newer commercial cables are very clearly charted, but their positions are not exact.