Vietnam The Fulcrum Of India’s Defence And Strategic Policy Towards ASEAN – Analysis

Dr. Rajaram Panda

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India and Vietnam held the 15th Defence Policy Dialogue in Hanoi on 10 November. While India’s Defence Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh represented India, Vietnam was represented by Lt. Gen. Hoang Xuan Chien, Deputy Minister of National Defence. Both co-chaired the dialogue session. In the dialogue, both sides took significant steps to reinforce their defence partnership with the signing of two major agreements.

At the dialogue, the two sides exchanged views on regional and global situations and issues of shared concern. Lt. Gen. Chien underlined that the traditional friendship and multifaceted cooperation between Vietnam and India have been deepened. Since the establishment of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2016 during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Vietnam, bilateral ties have grown increasingly substantive across all pillars, particularly in politics, diplomacy, and defence-security.

Both the countries have deepened defence collaboration between the two countries in various areas, including delegation exchanges and high-level contacts, dialogue and consultation mechanisms, young officer exchanges, training and education, cooperation among services and arms, UN peacekeeping operations, and defence industry development. Vietnam’s foreign policy has remained fiercely independent with focus on self-reliance, peace, friendship, cooperation, and development, diversification and multilateralisation of external relations. Vietnam is ready to cooperate with all countries and international organisations for peace and development.

There are “Four No’s” in Vietnam’s defence policy that underlay in the country’s defence strategy. These are not participating in military alliances, not affiliating with one country to oppose another, not allowing foreign countries to establish military bases or use Vietnamese territory to oppose other countries, and not using force or threatening to use force in international relations. Its stance on resolving disputes in the South China Sea by peaceful means based on international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) remains firm.

How India’s Himalayan Frontier Lost Faith in Modi’s Rule

Tarushi Aswani

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LEH, LADAKH: Prayer flags flutter under clear skies, in the winter breeze that wraps Ladakh – India’s northernmost frontier. Instead of loud laughter and trailing tourists, an ominous silence lurks around the lanes of Leh, the capital of Ladakh.

Over a month ago, the unimaginable happened in Leh; since then, the cold desert region barely speaks and shrinks at the thought of asking questions and demanding rights.

On September 24, police opened fire on protesters demanding statehood and constitutional safeguards, killing four people and injuring more than 90. The demonstration had begun peacefully, led by activists, students, and other locals, but ended in chaos, as the crowd scattered under gunfire. A curfew and internet bans followed.

Ladakh’s location, wedged between India, China, and Pakistan, makes it one of the world’s most strategic yet fragile frontiers. Local feels that the September 24 incident in Leh has transformed their struggle for constitutional rights into a flashpoint between the people and the state, unsettling a border zone already shadowed by militarization and mistrust.

Demanding Democracy

Six years ago, in 2019, the Modi government revoked Jammu and Kashmir’s autonomy. It also bifurcated the erstwhile state into two new Union Territories: Jammu and Kashmir, and a newly separate Ladakh. In Leh, many residents rejoiced, imagining liberation from Kashmir’s neglect. But soon they realized that though they had gained a separate administration under the Union Territory mechanism, they had lost even the limited self-governance once enjoyed by their local councils.

Chhering Dorje Lakrook, former minister and president of the Ladakh Buddhist Association (LBA), recounted how the last six years of unemployment, false promises, and robbed rights hardened into resistance. On September 24, when two elderly locals had to be hospitalized after 10 days of hunger strikes, the local youth intensified protests outside the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) office in Leh. Then, stone pelting began, with security forces lobbing tear gas bombs on protesters. After this, vehicles were set on fire and security forces allegedly fired rounds of bullets to dispel the protesters.

The Folly of India’s Illiberal Hegemony

Muhib Rahman

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In September 2025, tens of thousands of young protesters poured into the streets of Kathmandu and stormed Nepal’s Parliament. They were furious about entrenched corruption and opposed recent attempts to clamp down on free speech and dissent through a social media blackout. Although the authorities killed numerous demonstrators, the uprising forced the resignation of Nepalese Prime Minister K. P. Sharma Oli and the installation of an interim government. Nepal, however, is only the latest example of a broader trend in South Asia. In 2024, a youth-led uprising ended the 15-year rule of Sheikh Hasina as prime minister of Bangladesh. Sri Lanka witnessed repeated waves of mass demonstrations, most dramatically in 2022, resulting in the ouster of a corrupt government. And in the Maldives, discontent over corruption, democratic backsliding, and polarizing foreign entanglements have led to similar protests demanding political change.

The uprisings across the region stem from domestic grievances, but that isn’t the whole story. For years, India has embraced the notion that it is the world’s largest democracy. It has championed liberal values and accepted the role—bestowed by the United States—of the Indo-Pacific’s democratic linchpin. Yet when it comes to dealings in its own neighborhood, India has often behaved in decidedly illiberal ways, propping up autocratic regimes and meddling in the affairs of other sovereign countries. New Delhi has treated democratic ideals and human rights as expendable whenever its own strategic interests are at stake.

The United States, wary of alienating its key Indo-Pacific partner, rarely challenges India on how it manages its backyard. In 1979, President Jimmy Carter announced that the United States would defer to India in most matters to do with South Asia. Every U.S. administration since has echoed that policy of deference. New Delhi has propped up neighboring governments by bankrolling them, lobbying the West on their behalf, or deploying its security forces. In return, Washington has often stayed silent about any indiscretions it sees, retreating from the promotion of democracy when such an effort might clash with India’s preferences.

Pakistan’s Afghan Retaliation Imminent After TTP’s Twin Attacks

Umair Jamal

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A suicide bomber strapped with explosives blew himself up outside the District Judicial Complex in Islamabad on Tuesday afternoon, killing 12 people and wounding at least 36, including police officers. This was the first such attack in the Pakistani capital in over three years and points to a sharp escalation in militancy in the country in recent weeks.

Police confirmed that the militant outfit Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility for the attack. Investigators in Pakistan are examining how the bomber bypassed multiple checkpoints to reach the heavily guarded judicial area in the capital.

The blast occurred at a time when Islamabad is hosting many international events, including a Pakistan-Sri Lanka cricket match in nearby Rawalpindi. For many Pakistanis, the incident revived painful memories of the 2009 militant assault in Lahore that targeted the Sri Lankan cricket team and local players.

The suicide bombing in Islamabad bombing follows another major TTP attack on the Cadet College Wana in South Waziristan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) on Tuesday, when TTP-affiliated militants stormed the military-run school. Around 650 people, including 525 cadets, were present at the time of the attack. Security forces reportedly killed all the attackers. Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi told reporters that the operation succeeded without cadet casualties.

The attack in Wana has revived memories of the 2014 Army Public School (APS) massacre in Peshawar, where TTP militants killed over 130 children. The military’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) condemned the militants for attempting to repeat the “barbaric” APS attack.

Pakistani officials have accused Afghanistan of direct involvement in the Wana attack. Naqvi stated that the Wana attackers were Afghan nationals who maintained contact with handlers across the border throughout the night. Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Asif pointed out that such terrorist operations require external support and sanctuaries.

Pakistan’s Generals Are Marching Toward Another Disaster

Aziz Amin and Atif Mashal

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For the first time, Kabul has come under aerial attack not by a superpower, but by its neighbor, Pakistan. In early October, Pakistani fighter jets struck Afghan territory, including Kabul, Kandahar, and Paktika, claiming to target militants from Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). In reality, the strikes killed civilians, among them women, children, and three young cricketers. It prompted Kabul to condemn the attack as a blatant violation of national sovereignty and to launch retaliatory attacks that killed 58 Pakistani soldiers.

The irony is unmistakable. A country that once portrayed itself as a sanctuary for Afghan refugees fleeing foreign invasions has now assumed the role of aggressor. For Islamabad’s military establishment, these strikes were meant to project strength. Yet they revealed fragility – a state increasingly trapped in the consequences of its own strategic contradictions.

Mirage of Strength

The Pakistani military’s approach reflects a familiar pattern: projecting external aggression to mask internal disarray. For decades, generals in Rawalpindi have externalized domestic insecurity, blaming instability on Kabul, New Delhi, or Western conspiracies. But the truth lies closer to home. The TTP, which Pakistan now seeks to eliminate through airstrikes and cross-Durand Line operations, is not an imported menace. It is the by-product of Islamabad’s own long-standing policy of nurturing militant networks as instruments of regional influence.

Groups once described as “strategic assets” and “good Taliban” have metastasized into uncontrollable insurgencies that now threaten Pakistan’s own citizens. The military’s double game has come full circle; it is now battling the very forces it helped create.

The latest air campaign, then, is not a show of dominance but an act of desperation. By exporting conflict across the Durand Line, Pakistan’s military hopes to reassert control at home, distract from economic collapse, and re-engineer a sense of purpose amid growing dissent. The tactic is old, but its effectiveness is waning.

A State in Search of Legitimacy

Pakistan’s Afghanistan Policy: From Strategic Depth to Deadlock

Saher Liaqat & Abu Hurrairah Abbasi

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The Pak-Afghan border skirmishes on the volatile Durand line in early October represent one of the most active confrontations between the two neighbors since the Taliban returned to power in 2022. What started as a border conflict has evolved into a question about the long-standing Pak-Afghan policy, as well as a potential trigger of future instability across the region. Pakistan’s strategic depth has now become its most lethal liability. It has become painfully clear since the recent attacks.

For nearly two decades, the Pakistani policy on Afghanistan was based on the strategic depth, i.e., maintaining a friendly or at least amenable regime in Kabul to cushion the western frontier of Pakistan. The doctrine was based on two key concerns: the threat of militant Islamist organizations, such as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and Indo-Pak rivalry. An amicable or compliant Afghan Taliban was meant to contain both. In the 1990s, Islamabad viewed the Taliban as a means to achieve both objectives, even extending political and diplomatic support to ensure a congenial neighbor. Pakistan continued to maintain ties with the Afghan Taliban after 9/11, while aligning with Washington’s war on terror.

The Taliban regime that came back to power in 2021 turned out to be far more aggressive than expected. The new regime in Kabul has lost the stigma of being a client force and, instead, has been emboldened by its victory over the Western powers, becoming an active defender of Afghanistan’s sovereignty. Despite Islamabad’s pressing for action against the TTP, Kabul terms it an internal issue of Pakistan. Deep ethnic and ideological links between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP have rendered meaningful cooperation.

The situation was further heightened by Pakistan’s fencing of the Durand Line, an act to protect its border, but one that Kabul views as a one-sided institutionalization of a colonial-era cleavage separating Pashtun tribes. The result is a growing mistrust in bilateral relations. Pakistan feels that Afghanistan is a refuge for militants that attack its territory, and the Taliban denies Pakistan’s claims to its sovereignty. Pakistan’s long-cherished notion of strategic depth has now devolved into a strategic deadlock, with both parties increasingly viewing each other as threats rather than allies.

Recent Pak-Afghan Clashes in Perspective

Taiwan moves to counter China’s drone dominance

Brandi Vincent

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The Albatross II attack and surveillance unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) drone developed by the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) and its American partner, is on display at the Taipei Aerospace & Defense Technology Exhibition 2025 (TADTE), in Taipei, Taiwan, on September 19, 2025. (Photo by Daniel Ceng/Anadolu via Getty Images)

Taiwan is strategically moving to expand its arsenal of military and commercial drones, as China mobilizes and modernizes its forces with aims to be ready to seize its smaller, self-governing neighbor as early as 2027.

During a panel hosted by the Center for a New American Security on Tuesday, defense experts discussed Taiwan’s unfolding plans to grow its domestic production pipelines for unmanned aerial systems and its military’s adoption of associated, emerging weapons technologies. They also shed light on ways recent U.S. initiatives, as well as the Russia-Ukraine war, are informing those pursuits.

“China now has the dominance of the supply on a lot of different components that are used in drones,” said Hong-Lun Tiunn, a nonresident fellow at the Research Institute for Democracy, Society and Emerging Technology.

“So that is very critical for Taiwan, for us to actually start gradually building up a non-reliant supply chain [and] to basically make sure that — way before the contingency happens — we already have the capacities to manufacture enough and good quality components and drone models that can be integrated into our layered defense strategy,” Tiunn noted.

Although the Chinese government sees the island as a piece of its territory, Taiwan has been self-ruled for more than 75 years.

Tensions between Beijing and Taipei have intensified in the last decade, and particularly since Chinese President Xi Jinping unveiled his intent to ensure that the People’s Liberation Army would be prepared and equipped to “unify” or invade its smaller neighbor by 2027.

China’s steel slowdown and the global iron-ore and emissions outlook

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China’s steel sector, long the engine of its industrial rise, now faces a structural slowdown as construction wanes and exports surge. The shift exposes the limits of Beijing’s investment-led model and threatens upheaval across global iron-ore markets.

China’s long dependence on heavy industry has made its economy unusually steel intensive. Even as growth slows, the sector remains vast: China still produces more than half of the world’s steel and accounts for more than a quarter of global carbon emissions. But with construction and infrastructure activity slowing, domestic demand is falling, leading to persistent oversupply, a surge in exports and renewed trade friction with the United States and the European Union.

These pressures are exposing the limits of an investment-led model that has shaped global markets for two decades. They also signal a turning point for China’s steel producers, its major iron-ore suppliers and the global effort to cut industrial emissions.

Steel intensiveness

In 2000, China consumed around 124 million tonnes of steel, which was roughly on a par with the US but lower than the 168m tn consumed in the EU. By 2020, China was consuming over one billion tonnes of steel annually, while the EU’s steel use had fallen to 131m tn. It is nearly impossible to overstate the steel intensity of China’s economy.

It is nearly impossible to overstate the steel intensity of China’s economy.

Typically, economies increase steel use as they develop, until they reach GDP-per-capita incomes of about US$40,000–US$50,000, at which point steel use starts to taper off. This makes sense: by this stage, most of the necessary infrastructure and housing stock is already in place. Consequently, steel consumption in construction tends to be higher in developing countries, whereas the auto sector accounts for a larger share of steel use in developed economies.

America’s Self-Defeating China Strategy

Lael Brainard

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LAEL BRAINARD is a Distinguished Fellow at the Georgetown University Psaros Center and a Senior Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Mossavar-Rahmani Center. She has served as Director of the National Economic Council, Vice Chair and Governor on the Federal Reserve Board, and Undersecretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury.

The landmark meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping in October brought a respite to the trade war and led to some reciprocal deals. But it did not suggest any breakthrough in addressing the problems that have fueled tensions between the two countries in recent years. Instead, the meeting confirmed the curious direction of U.S. China policy in Trump’s second term. The president has not only broken with the policy of the Biden administration but also seems to have forsaken the strategic direction of his own first term.

Trump’s Year of Living Dangerously

Peter D. Feaver

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Both supporters and critics of U.S. President Donald Trump agree that the first year of his second term has been an extraordinarily disruptive one. But for all its significance, this disruption wasn’t entirely unexpected. Even as the final votes were being tallied, enough was known about Trump’s intentions to make some relatively confident predictions about the shape of his second term, as I did one year ago for Foreign Affairs. Many of these predictions have already manifested. For example, Trump’s most senior advisers are, as he promised they would be, people chosen based on personal loyalty and their capacity to mobilize his base. With some notable exceptions, such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent, who may have fit into the old Trump cabinet, the personnel now driving Trump’s second term policy apparatus are the “chaos agents” who were expected after the election.

Trump is also leaning even further into unilateralism, which was predictable given that he entered office this time around without many of the geopolitical constraints he had previously. In 2017, for instance, he inherited two coalitional wars with U.S. troop involvement (Afghanistan and the counter-ISIS campaign), and his hands were tied in regard to Iran by the coalitional diplomatic approach embodied in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Similarly, the constraints of the global trading system, which the first Trump administration had already sought to reduce, were reduced still further in the intervening years by efforts after the COVID-19 pandemic to create greater resiliency. Economically, Trump had a much freer hand to play in 2025, and as such he could pursue his maximalist approach to tariffs.

It was also possible to foresee much rockier civil-military relations this time around. Trump spent much of his first term surrounded by retired military brass, but during the last six months of that term, when their advice increasingly diverged from Trump’s preferences and his base criticized him for giving in to their concerns, Trump concluded that the military was part of a “deep state” that was committed to hobbling him. Trump and his surrogates made clear that they intended to clean house on their return. Although his decision to summarily remove at least 15 senior officers—many of them women or people of color—without reference to specific instances of dereliction was alarming, it was not altogether surprising.

AI-Driven Disinformation Campaigns on Twitter (X) in the Russia-Ukraine War

Tayyaba Rehan 

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In the Russia-Ukraine war, sectors like the digital and psychological ones were added to the conflict, and AI-driven fake news on Twitter (X) played a major part. Propaganda was disseminated to large numbers by operatives who used automated tools powered by artificial intelligence. They applied data mining and AI techniques to read through large data sets, find out what people felt about certain situations, and then send messages that mattered to specific groups. People were exposed to AI-created content, which included articles, images, and deepfakes, all aimed at copying the look of trustworthy sources, tricking users, and harming what people think about Ukraine’s leadership and help from the West.

Introduction

The Russia-Ukraine conflict, which reached its peak in February 2022, has fought a massive struggle of information dissemination in addition to its existing military hostilities. Current media organizations work to provide reports about the situation, but people turn primarily to Twitter (X) platforms to share news and opinions with disinformation. Twitter (X)’s network features, including instant posting and tagging patterns, enable users to distribute content widely, thus creating an effective means of influencing public opinion. Artificial intelligence (AI) stands as an essential tool for people who wish to control and shape information during this particular time. Artificial intelligence enables the production and dissemination of false information on Twitter (X), which produces major changes in how audiences think about the conflict. The analysis of disinformation campaign mechanisms on Twitter (X) enables people to understand the effects these techniques have on their perceptions and perspectives. During the Russia-Ukraine war, Twitter (X) and AI have enabled multiple disinformation methods that altered global public perception and war narrative formation. AI bots, together with AI-backed accounts, generate artificial propaganda that opposes alternate perspectives and advocates opposing viewpoints.

The level of complexity with which AI handles disinformation campaigns on Twitter (X) continues to advance. It utilizes machine learning algorithms to evaluate big datasets from the platform, which helps them detect patterns and user attitudes alongside population statistics. AI analytics produce targeted disinformation programs that speak directly to various audiences through content that appeals to them. Comprehensively detailed messages take advantage of people’s existing viewpoints, therefore becoming more convincing in their delivery and difficult to detect AI-generated content.

The Role of Twitter (X) in Information Warfare

Drones Won’t Save Us: Learning the Wrong Lessons from Ukraine Will Cost the US Army its Edge in Maneuver Warfare

Matthew Revels and Eric Uribe 

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The US Army remains anchored to an era when its technological and qualitative superiority ensured dominance on the battlefield. Yet battlefield losses and grinding attrition in the Russo-Ukrainian War reveal the growing vulnerability of platforms such as the Big Five, which have long defined the Army’s approach to land warfare. The Department of War’s recent drone dominance initiative reflects the growing sense that small drones have reached a critical demonstration point—one capable of transforming the character of land warfare and challenging the conceptual foundations of the Army’s preferred way of fighting. As potential challengers for land dominance integrate small drones into their arsenals, the Army must determine whether to adopt or counter the ongoing innovation to help it maintain its asymmetric advantage in maneuver warfare.

As the world’s leading military power and defense spender, the US armed services are actively working to adopt drone innovations diffusing from Russia and Ukraine, driven by their technophile military culture. But the quest to rapidly adopt small drones and make the attendant organizational changes to optimally employ them ignores the capital required to do so and fails to recognize that Russian and Ukrainian employment methods are misaligned with the US Army’s preferred way of war. Unfortunately, the assumption that the United States must adopt the innovation misses the alternative—one far more aligned with the American way of war—of countering the drone revolution to restore maneuver to the battlefield. Reestablishing the Army’s land dominance and tilting the balance of power in America’s favor will require pursuing counterinnovations in the form of counterdrone integrated air defense systems that restore tactical and operational maneuver. Succeeding on the future battlefield does not necessitate the blind acceptance of new technologies and concepts, but rather a consideration of which innovation response leverages the state’s advantages and mitigates its strategic limitations. Seeking to counter recent drone innovations will provide the US Army with the capabilities to restore its asymmetric advantage on the battlefield—rapid maneuver, sustained by a high operational tempo and massed armored penetration forces.

The Drivers of Diffusion: Assessing the Impact of Critical Task Focus on Organizational Capital

Who Really Owns America? The Banks, The Billionaires, And The Deep State – OpEd

John and Nisha Whitehead

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As President Trump floats the idea of 50-year mortgages, Americans are being sold a new version of the American Dream—one that can never truly be owned, only leased from the banks, billionaires, and private equity landlords who profit from our permanent state of debt.

Which begs the question: who owns America?

Is it the government? The politicians? The corporations? The foreign investors? The American people?

While the Deep State keeps the nation divided and distracted by circus politics—the bread and circuses of empire—the police state’s stranglehold on power ensures the continuation of endless wars, runaway spending, and disregard for the rule of law.

Meanwhile, America is literally being bought and sold right out from under us.

Consider the facts.

Homeownership—the cornerstone of middle-class stability—is being transformed into a lifetime rental agreement. Cars, homes, and even college degrees have become indentured commodities in a debt-driven economy where the average American family serves as collateral for Wall Street’s profits.

This is not accidental.

It’s the natural evolution of an economy built to enrich the few at the expense of the many.

The American Dream has been repackaged as a subscription service—an illusion of ownership propped up by 0% down payments, predatory interest rates, and fine print that lasts a lifetime.

What used to be called “buying” is now simply renting from the future.

Benjamin Netanyahu Is Getting Royally Trumped

Shalom Lipner

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President Trump’s steamrolling toward a lasting deal in Gaza could deliver a crowning blow to the Israeli government.

A potent version of the Changing of the Guard, viewed annually by millions of spectators at Buckingham Palace and Windsor Castle, is playing out presently on the British Empire’s former stomping grounds. The Middle East, where provisions for the aftermath of the Gaza war are the subject of intense discussion and activity, is in the throes of upheaval with principals jockeying to exert influence over the region’s future. One of them, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, is getting trampled—or rather, “Trumpled”—royally by the process. The damage to him may be irreversible.

With combat in the Gaza Strip winding down—to the chagrin of some Netanyahu allies who would persist in battle—leadership vacuums have emerged on both sides of the border. Earlier initiatives to draft plans for post-conflict Gaza never came to fruition, owing to, among other factors, Israel’s refusal to countenance any role for the Palestinian Authority. Hamas, which Netanyahu pledged originally to “eliminate,” has seized that opening to exercise violent control over territories evacuated by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Any hopes for alternative rule in Gaza will have to contend with the prospect of armed resistance from retrenched Hamas militants.

A similar void exists within Israel, where the senior ranks of Netanyahu’s professional team are almost emptied out. Ron Dermer—his closest confidant and Trump administration whisperer—has just resigned as strategic affairs minister. His exit follows that of Tzachi Hanegbi, Israel’s national security advisor, who was dismissed on October 21, against the backdrop of disagreements over policy. Tzachi Braverman, the chief of Netanyahu’s personal bureau, will be heading to London shortly as Israel’s next ambassador to the Court of St. James. Major turnover at the top will create an inevitable operational deficit, as experienced hands depart at a critical moment for Israel.

Filling the space enterprisingly is President Donald Trump, who has stepped in to run roughshod over all parties amid a possible collapse of a US-sponsored ceasefire. “If Hamas does not behave,” he threatened on October 29, “they will be terminated.” But it is Israel—whose reliance on America’s diplomatic, military, and economic munificence renders Netanyahu beholden to Trump’s demands—that has been the beneficiary of a tangible, full-court press from Washington. “I pushed [Netanyahu],” the president told 60 Minutes on October 31, “I didn’t like certain things that he did, and you saw what I did about that.”

US Army Tests AI for Faster Targeting, Smarter Command Networks

Christine Casimiro

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The US Army’s Next Generation Command and Control (NGC2) prototype is putting a new capability powered by artificial intelligence (AI) to the test.

During the 4th Infantry Division’s (4ID) Ivy Sting 2 exercise, the service trained an AI-aided target recognition system to spot hulks, or old vehicles used as targets, Breaking Defense reported.

The goal: teach the AI to identify a tank and automatically trigger a fire mission, shortening the “sensor-to-shooter” loop. That speed could give US forces a decisive edge in multi-domain operations, where milliseconds matter.

For now, the system can identify a single target, but the next step is teaching it to distinguish between multiple objects on the battlefield.

According to 4ID Commander Maj. Gen. Patrick Ellis, much of the effort focuses on refining and training models so they perform reliably in complex environments.

The system still relies on human oversight. When the AI flags a potential target, a human operator reviews the result before action is taken.

Ellis said the army sees strong potential in the technology and is working closely with industry partners to improve the algorithms and expand their capabilities.

The 4ID is leading the army’s effort to test and develop NGC2 through a series of division-level training experiments known as Ivy Sting and Ivy Mass.

Each iteration adds more complexity and equipment.

The first Ivy Sting exercise began in September 2025, when an Artillery Execution Suite — a new fire control software — was integrated into the NGC2 ecosystem and used in a live-fire test.

Russia Might Soon Run Out of Money for the Ukraine War

Reuben Johnson

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Key Points and Summary – Russia’s draft 2026–2028 budget signals mounting strain on war financing. Opposition economist Vladimir Milov flags seven straight years of >2% deficits and a 2025 shortfall raised to 2.6%, with official claims of later decline dismissed as unrealistic.

-Sanctions have shut Moscow out of global capital; domestic borrowing and dwindling reserves fill the gap as China reportedly rebuffs loans.

-The Kremlin hints defense outlays will fall as a share of GDP, while Rostec’s chief concedes near-zero profitability.

-With transparency shrinking, Russia can likely sustain only lower-intensity warfare—drones, missiles, limited offensives—raising doubts about duration and purpose of its campaign.

Seven Years of Red Ink for Russia: Can Putin Still Pay for Ukraine War?

Last month, the Russian government released a draft of the proposed 2026–2028 federal budget, which purports to show the near-term priorities of President Vladimir Putin.

Vladimir Milov, a Russian opposition politician who left Russia after Putin’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, has released a pessimistic assessment of the former KGB lieutenant colonel’s chances of being able to continue to bankroll his war in Ukraine.

Milov is now part of the leadership of the Free Russia Foundation, a think tank based in Washington, D.C.

In his latest report for the Foundation, he projects rough times ahead for Moscow due to a series of unfavorable trends.

According to his analysis, Russia’s budgetary situation is anything but “normal.”

“To keep [Russia’s] military machine running like this, a lot more money is needed — and there simply is not any,” said Milov, who in the early 2000s was an economic advisor for the Russian government.

Microinsurgency: Introducing and Defining a Distinct Category of Intrastate Conflict

LTC Michael F. Trevett

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Microinsurgencies, small-scale armed conflicts over natural resources internal to one country, are not necessarily new. Although such conflicts involving natural resource wealth occurred in ancient times, little seems to have been studied and published about the interaction of these conditions and variables until the late 1900s. For example, the King Scorpion settled and united ancient Egypt in approximately 3150 BC, after centuries of fighting by “dozens of independent chieftains” over control of the Nile River. Whoever controls the Nile still controls the wealth of modern Egypt today. Other examples from the distant past are those of Portugal and Spain with their avarice for gold, silver, precious stones, silks, and spices, even slavery and human trafficking. According to Charles Chasteen, “the Iberian invaders…came to [the Americas] seeking success in the terms dictated by their society: riches, the privilege of being served by others, and a claim to religious righteousness.” Jasper Humphreys offers another example below.

The Portuguese adventurers often faced stiff local opposition to their gathering of the commodities they sought; to deal with this, the Portuguese frequently resorted to the tried-and-tested economics of capturing and ransoming local chiefs and notables. Sometimes these and other people were brought back to Portugal where they could make an economic contribution to the costs of the expedition [and resource exploitation] by being sold.

The article “Scarcity and Abundance Revisited: A Literature Review on Natural Resources and Conflict” explains, since the 1990s, the “body of literature devoted to analyzing the relationship between resources and conflict can be broadly divided into two groups: studies which focus on resource scarcity and conflict and studies that analyze the relationship between resource abundance and conflict.” The resource scarcity and conflict group has many more qualitative works using case studies. The resource abundance and conflict group instead overwhelmingly employs quantitative analysis and studies. Each of these groups has its own proponents and critics, but none identifies the unique category of microinsurgency.

Definitions

Intrastate Conflicts

Ukraine’s Hardest Winter

Jack Watling

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Russia had planned to seize the Ukrainian town of Pokrovsk, a logistical hub in the Donetsk region, by November 2024. Its forces are a year behind schedule. Ukrainian defenders, although vastly outnumbered, have fought tenaciously to hold on to the Donbas defense line, killing over 20,000 Russian troops a month in the process. Now, Russia appears to be on the cusp of consolidating control over the ruins of the town as it pushes more and more troops into Pokrovsk’s shattered buildings, and Russian drones cut off Ukrainian defenders from resupply.

A Hidden Hunger Crisis Is Destabilizing the World

Arif Husain

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Considered as a whole, the world has never been richer, more technologically advanced, or more capable of feeding itself. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, many analysts feared that the world could run out of food. The rate of population growth, especially in developing countries, far exceeded the growth of agricultural capacity, and UN and World Bank reports suggested that without dramatic changes, the world was headed toward catastrophic shortages. But the so-called Green Revolution soon helped yield far greater agricultural productivity, ensuring successive waves of improvements and innovations in farming techniques. The UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization.

Crypto Faces an AI Bubble Reckoning: Collateral Damage or Opportunity?

Emily Vartuhi

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Warnings of an AI market bubble are growing louder. If valuations collapse, crypto could face amplified losses—though decentralized AI may emerge stronger in the aftermath.

Fund managers, experts, and institutions are increasingly warning of an artificial intelligence (AI) bubble. The Bank of England cautioned that the risk of a sharp market correction has increased, noting that equity valuations have been stretched for tech firms in the AI space. Goldman Sachs CEO David Solomon predicted a market drawdown in the next 12-24 months, and drew explicit parallels to the dotcom bubble. World Economic Forum President Børge Brende identified crypto, AI, and debt as three potential bubbles forming simultaneously. More recently, a Bank of America survey found 54 percent of fund managers believe AI stocks are in a bubble.

These warnings, coming from prominent financial institutions, go beyond theoretical grounds. They’re founded on a record degree of market concentration: extreme valuations in the AI sector. Nvidia recently made history by becoming the first firm to reach above a $5 trillion market valuation. Today, the chipmaker dominates 8.5 percent of the entire S&P 500, which is above the bottom 240 firms combined. The top five tech firms control 30 percent of the index, the highest concentration in 50 years. With AI-related firms responsible for 75 percent of all US stock market gains, the broader market’s performance is increasingly dependent on AI bets paying off. OpenAI lost $13.5 billion on $4.3 billion in revenue in the first half of 2025, yet is targeting a $1 trillion IPO. These are the types of numbers that have preceded painful corrections in the past.

Crypto’s Correlation and Vulnerability

From a crypto market perspective, this presents a true paradox. Crypto is vulnerable as an adjacent emerging technology sector that shares the same speculative capital and risk-on sentiment driving AI investments. Bitcoin’s correlation with the NASDAQ has been markedly strengthened, especially during times of AI uncertainty, which means that if tech investors hit the panic button, it’s probable that they will pull back across the board. Recall 2022, when rate increases and tech selloffs hit crypto even harder than stocks. If AI valuations collapse, it’s reasonable to expect crypto to suffer amplified losses as investors flee from anything speculative.

An Algorithmic Loosening of the Atomic Screw? Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear Deterrence

Iskander Rehman 

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“It did not take atomic weapons to make man want peace. But the atomic bomb was the turn of the screw. The atomic bomb made the prospect of future war unendurable. It has led up those last few steps to the mountain pass; and beyond there is a different country.”

— Robert Oppenheimer, commencement address at the University of Pennsylvania, February 28, 1946.

In the annals of transformative technologies, the detonation of the first atomic bomb in New Mexico’s desert in July 1945 stands as a world-changing moment. Today, many query whether the emergence of artificial superintelligence (ASI), an artificial intelligence that surpasses humans in every cognitive field of endeavor, might herald a similarly profound inflection point in global affairs. Experts and government officials regularly draw analogies between the birth of nuclear weapons and the potential dawn of ASI, suggesting that the lessons of the atomic age—from the Manhattan Project to the brief period of US nuclear monopoly to the arcane intricacies of Cold War deterrence theory—might help illuminate the promises and perils of ASI. But how appropriate and useful is this analogy? More importantly, if one is to reach beyond this imperfect parallel, what might the growing use and integration of advanced AI mean for nuclear deterrence?

An Imperfect Analogy

If one starts from the premise that no single analogy is ever perfect, but that the process of analogical reasoning is itself a natural, and deeply human, way of thinking through labyrinthine problem sets then, yes, there is a partial utility in resorting to this parallel. The emergence of nuclear weapons on the world stage was a paradigm shift—one that resulted from remarkable breakthroughs in scientific ingenuity, but also embodied a new, and terrifying, form of existential danger to mankind. In so doing, it abruptly compelled strategists and decision-makers to reconceptualize many, if not all, of their core assumptions regarding the nature of coexistence, competition, and conflict. As the renowned strategist Bernard Brodie famously observed in 1946, “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them.”