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24 November 2025

The Sikh-Separatist Assassination Plot

Taran Dugal

The night before the political activist Hardeep Singh Nijjar was murdered, in the spring of 2023, he made an urgent call from his home in Vancouver to a friend in New York. Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, a lawyer and fellow-activist, picked up around midnight. Nijjar had phoned to deliver a warning: there was “chattering going on” among acquaintances of his who frequented night clubs in downtown Vancouver. A group of men had recently begun to show up at the clubs, looking for “a high and some weapons”—and inquiring about Nijjar and Pannun. “He said that I needed to be careful, that I was in danger,” Pannun recalled.

The next day, June 18th, Nijjar made his way to the outskirts of Vancouver to visit the gurdwara where he worshipped. A plumber by trade, he’d been the temple’s president for four years, and had spent much of that time advocating for the creation of a homeland for Sikhs, called Khalistan, in an area of northern India that includes the state of Punjab. The separatist movement, which has inspired generations of activists, has long infuriated the country’s leadership. When Nijjar left the temple that evening, he was in a good mood. It was Father’s Day, and his son Balraj had given him a pair of jeans. They’d planned a special meal: pizza and seviyan, a sweet pudding that was Nijjar’s favorite dessert. From the parking lot, Nijjar called his family. “Get dinner ready,” he said. “I’m coming home.” As he drove his truck toward the exit, however, a white sedan pulled up, blocking his way. Two hooded men approached on foot, drew handguns, and fired some fifty rounds into the driver’s-side door—shattering the glass, puncturing the metal, and piercing Nijjar’s arm, chest, and head. He died instantly.

Judicial Islamization and the Crisis of Governance in Pakistan

Carlo J.V. Caro

Pakistan’s latest constitutional amendment, which transfers the Supreme Court’s authority over constitutional questions to a new Federal Constitutional Court and elevates the army chief to a constitutionally entrenched post with lifetime legal immunity, is widely described as the final blow to an already fragile democracy. The familiar storyline is straightforward: a besieged liberal judiciary is being strangled by an overmighty military. There is an important truth in that account. But it also omits a more awkward dimension. For roughly four decades, Pakistan’s higher courts have operated within an Islamized constitutional framework they did not design but have repeatedly enforced, elaborated, and legitimized.

The question, therefore, is not whether judges are personally “Islamists,” but whether the architecture of judicial review has, in practice, served Islamist objectives in ways that have made governing harder and, at times, contributed to radicalization and security problems. Read against the constitutional text, key judgments, and their political effects, there is a strong case that it has.

The 1973 Constitution declared Islam the state religion, created the Council of Islamic Ideology as an advisory body, and gave Islam a prominent symbolic place. Under General Zia-ul-Haq, those gestures were converted into an institutional program designed to reshape the hierarchy of constitutional authority. The Objectives Resolution—originally a preamble declaring that sovereignty belongs to God and that laws must reflect Islamic principles—was elevated into the operative text of the Constitution as Article 2A. Article 227, which requires all existing laws to conform to “the injunctions of Islam,” was activated as a substantive constraint. And in 1980 Zia created the Federal Shariat Court (FSC), with authority under Article 203D to examine and strike down any law deemed “repugnant to the injunctions of Islam,” with appeals to a Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court.

Armenia to Purchase Indian Fighter Jets

Syed Fazl-e-Haider

Armenia is reportedly nearing a $3 billion deal to purchase Su-30MKI fighter jets from India. Built by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, the Su-30MKI is a multirole fighter jet with advanced avionics, dual-engine thrust-vectoring, and significant weapons-carrying capacity. Under the deal, India will begin delivery of the first batch of eight to twelve aircraft to Armenia in 2027 and complete it by 2029 (Indian Defense News, October 28; Open Caucasus Media, October 31). The deal between India and Armenia comes after Azerbaijan’s recent purchase of 40 JF-17 Thunder Block III aircraft from Pakistan, India’s main geopolitical rival. In October, the arrival of Pakistan’s JF-17 fighter jets in Azerbaijan sent a ripple of anxiety through Yerevan. At the end of October, the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), the Pakistan military’s media wing, also announced a joint combat exercise with Azerbaijan, saying an air force contingent comprising JF-17 Thunder Block-III fighter jets arrived in Azerbaijan for a bilateral aerial combat exercise (Dawn, October 19). Additionally, on November 8, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev confirmed that JF-17 Thunder Block III fighters were included in Azerbaijan’s military armament (President of Azerbaijan, November 8). The deal between Armenia and India is believed to enhance Armenia’s long-range air combat capabilities and could serve as a strategic counter to Azerbaijan’s growing defense partnership with Pakistan (Indian Defense News, October 28).

Pakistan and India are set to trigger an arms race in the South Caucasus. The Yerevan–New Delhi deal also reflects the pursuit of the “enemy of my enemy is my friend” line as a countermeasure to Azerbaijan’s acquisition of JF-17 fighters from Pakistan (The Week, October 27). Armenia’s deal with India is part of Yerevan’s strategy to diversify its defense partnerships away from its traditional reliance on Russia (see EDM, September 12, 2024). Armenia has already purchased Pinaka multiple-launch rocket systems, Swathi counter-battery radars, and ATAGS 155mm howitzers from India (Open Caucasus Media, October 31). The deal is one step in India’s efforts to establish its footprint as an arms supplier in a region where Russia and Türkiye have been the key players (Indian Defense News, October 28).

Forecasting the PRC’s Next Global Initiative

Kyle Marcrum

Since 2021, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has announced a string of global initiatives that it has billed as providing “Chinese solutions” (中国方案) to reform the global governance system (Chinese People’s Institute for Foreign Affairs [CPIFA], April 2024). These include initiatives on development, security, civilization, and governance (China Brief, September 6, 2024, January 17, October 31). According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), they have focused on “promoting international cooperation on development, encouraging dialogue and consultation over international discord, promoting exchanges and mutual learning among civilizations, and anchoring the direction, principles, and path of the global governance system and mechanism reform”

The four initiatives announced to date align with four of the five lines of the Community of Common Destiny (CCD; 人类命运共同体), the overarching framework of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for reforming global political, security, development, culture, and environment policy (Texas National Security Review, November 2018; The Asan Forum, May 7). Combined, these initiatives give the PRC a codified approach to achieving CCD objectives.

China’s Foreign Affairs Apparatus Grapples with Succession Challenges

Michael Cunningham

In August, reports surfaced that Chinese authorities had detained Liu Jianchao (刘建超), a senior diplomat widely viewed as a leading candidate to become the country’s next foreign minister (The Wall Street Journal [WSJ], August 10). Authorities have not commented on Liu’s status, and he was not among the 14 officials expelled at the Central Committee’s Fourth Plenum in October (Xinhua, October 23). But his prolonged absence, coupled with the appointment in late September of Liu Haixing (刘海星) to replace him as the head of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) International Liaison Department (ILD; 中国共产党中央委员会对外联络部), strongly suggests that Liu Jianchao’s career is over (CCP ILD, September 30).

The foreign affairs apparatus in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has faced a succession crisis since 2023, when Qin Gang (秦刚) was removed as foreign minister only seven months into the job (Lowy Institute, August 20). The reappointment of Qin’s predecessor Wang Yi (王毅), who had moved in 2022 to a higher-ranking role as head of the Party’s Office of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission (CFAO; 中央外事工作委员会办公室), signaled that the Party lacked an obvious replacement for Qin. Wang had already surpassed the customary retirement age before being appointed to lead the CFAO, indicating a shortage of diplomats with the experience, Party rank, and political reliability that the CCP seeks for its top foreign policy leadership, even before the country’s top diplomats started going missing (Baidu/Wang Yi, accessed.

China solves Japanese spy cases, vows counter-intelligence crackdown

Yuanyue Dang

China’s top anti-espionage agency said it had solved several infiltration and espionage cases involving Japanese spy agencies in recent years and vowed to step up counter-intelligence work amid serious diplomatic tensions between Beijing and Tokyo.

On Wednesday, the Ministry of State Security said in a social media article that it had “cracked a series of espionage cases involving Japanese intelligence agencies infiltrating and stealing secrets from China”.

It added that this had “effectively safeguarded the security of the nation’s core secrets”.

The ministry vowed that China’s state security officers would “resolutely crush any insidious plots to split the nation on the secret service front” and “firmly oppose any despicable acts by foreign countries trying to disrupt regional peace and stability”.

Wednesday’s article did not detail any specific cases of espionage, and such cases have rarely been disclosed to the public.

In May, China confirmed a Japanese citizen had been sentenced for espionage. Japanese media previously reported that a Japanese man in his fifties had been detained in Shanghai in December 2021 and was prosecuted in August 2023.

In another case, Beijing municipal state security authorities arrested a staff member of the Japanese pharmaceutical company Astellas Pharma. China’s foreign ministry confirmed in August last year that the employee had been prosecuted for espionage.

Beijing and Tokyo are engaged in a serious diplomatic dispute over remarks made by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi about Taiwan.

China’s Demographics Problem Grows

Philip Bowring

China’s leaders have known for some time that they have a demographics problem, with their concern growing at the threat to future prosperity and dynamism. The population decline is set to accelerate, with China’s male-female imbalance presenting limiting factors not faced by the rest of Asia.

The median age is already 40.2, nearly the same as older developed countries such as the UK (40.8) and higher than the United States at 38.5. China’s fertility rate appears to be about 1.1, or half the population replacement level.

Various programs in China, as in other countries such as South Korea with similar challenges, are focused on issues such as financial support for children, greater equality in the workplace, provision of nursery facilities, etc. Such incentives make sense but so far have had limited success in other countries. They may yet have an impact in China – though it is rather more difficult to force couples to have more children than it was to limit them to one child, as was the case with the One Child policy introduced in 1979 and only formally abandoned in 2015.

But compared with other countries facing the same birth collapse, China’s prospects for raising the fertility rate face a major additional obstacle, the imbalance between numbers of men and women of the childbearing age bracket. This is the indirect consequence of One Child – a deep-rooted patriarchal bias towards male children which led to widespread abortion of female foetuses. This is not just a product of the past. Although the imbalance of sexes at birth has narrowed, there is still a significant gap.

A Chinese firm bought an insurer for CIA agents - part of Beijing's trillion dollar spending spree

Celia Hatton

Since 2018, the United States has been tightening its laws to prevent its rivals from buying into its sensitive sectors – blocking investments in everything from semiconductors to telecommunications.

But the rules weren't always so strict.

In 2016, Jeff Stein, a veteran journalist covering the US intelligence community, got a tip-off: a small insurance company that specialised in selling liability insurance to FBI and CIA agents had been sold to a Chinese entity.

"Someone with direct knowledge called me up and said, 'Do you know that the insurance company that insures intelligence personnel is owned by the Chinese?'" he remembers. "I was astonished!"

In 2015, the insurer, Wright USA, had been quietly purchased by Fosun Group, a private company believed to have very close connections with China's leadership.

US concerns became immediately clear: Wright USA was privy to the personal details of many of America's top secret service agents and intelligence officials. No one in the US knew who might have access to that information now the insurer and its parent, Ironshore, were Chinese-owned.

Wright USA wasn't an isolated case.

The BBC has exclusive early access to brand new data that shows how Chinese state money has been flowing into wealthy countries, buying up assets in the US, Europe, the Middle East and Australia.

Jeff Stein's story brought a swift reaction in Washington

In the past couple of decades China has become the world's biggest overseas investor, giving it the potential to dominate sensitive industries, secrets and key technologies. Beijing considers the details of its foreign spending overseas – how much money it's spending and where - to be a state secret.


New Iraqi Leadership Confronts Water Shortage and Economic Strain

James Durso 

Now the election is over and Sudani faces the task of building a governing coalition. (After the 2021 election, it took one year to form a government.) 38 political parties won seats in the contest, so Iraq’s complex political landscape will demand negotiation and consensus building to form a government. Other major winners are former prime minister Nouri Al-Maliki (Shia/State of Law Coalition), former parliament speaker Mohammed al-Halbussi (Sunni/Taqadom (Progress) party), former militia leader Qais al-Khazali (Shia/Sadiqoun Movement), and the Kurdistan Democratic Party.

Whoever can corral enough support to become Iraq’s next prime minister faces four major challenges: the water crisis, public finances, U.S. relations, and regional entanglement with Iran.

Iraq’s most immediate problem is water scarcity. It depends on Turkey and Iran for nearly 75% of its freshwater through the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, which originate upstream. Torhan al-Mufti, Sudani’s advisor on water affairs, warns that Iraq’s vulnerability stems from these transboundary flows.

There is some good news: according to Mufti, water inflows from Turkey to the Tigris have doubled in two years. And Iraq is taking proactive steps, such as the November 2025 Iraq-Turkey water agreement that introduces a five-year water management mechanism between the two nations. Under the deal, Turkey will oversee and manage water releases and related infrastructure rehabilitation, including dams and distribution systems, during this period, after which control will revert to Iraq.

Saudi Prince Mohammed is being lavished with praise by Trump. It’s clear why

Mohamad Bazzi

Saudi Arabia’s crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, visited the US this week for the first time in seven years – and Donald Trump rolled out the red carpet for his favorite Arab autocrat. On Tuesday, Trump hosted the prince for lunch and talks at the White House, followed by a black-tie dinner that included members of Congress, business leaders and top administration officials. The next day, Trump and the prince appeared together at a US-Saudi investment summit at the Kennedy Center.

It’s all part of a rehabilitation tour for Prince Mohammed, years after US intelligence agencies concluded that he had ordered the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi, a Washington Post columnist and Saudi dissident. In October 2018, Khashoggi was ambushed inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul by a 15-member hit team, who dismembered his body with a bone saw. For a time, the killing turned Prince Mohammed into an international pariah. But Trump never wavered in his support of the Saudi leader, and during his first term protected the prince from US sanctions and pressure from Congress.

Uzbekistan and European Union Sign Cooperation Agreement

Emil Avdaliani

On October 24, Uzbekistan and the European Union signed an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA). The agreement is far more expansive than what governed the Brussels–Tashkent relations since bilateral cooperation was officially established in 1999 (European Council, October 24). The previous engagement framework no longer addressed today’s challenges, and both sides urgently needed an upgrade. Uzbekistan has grown economically, Central Asia has become more important, and the European Union is eager to diversify its energy dependence.

The expanding ties between Uzbekistan and the European Union are indicative of a changing approach in Brussels’s foreign policy. The European Union has become increasingly adaptable to the needs of each Central Asian country. In many ways, this mirrors how the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Russia, and, more recently, the United States have engaged with Central Asia. The November summit between the United States and the five Central Asian countries is a good example of this developing trend (Novaya Gazeta, November 14). To highlight the growing attention the European Union now pays to Central Asia, the EPCA follows the Central Asia–European Union summit held in April in Samarkand, during which Brussels pledged around 12 billion euros (about $13.9 billion) within its Global Gateway framework for infrastructure development in the region (European Commission, April 3; Invexi, April 4).

Uncle Sam as Religious Crusader?

Doug Bandow

There may be nothing more dangerous for America than President Donald Trump learning about another nation. The president who once campaigned for the Nobel Peace Prize might take America into another foolish war there.

Such as in Nigeria. The West African nation possesses the continent’s largest population and economy. The country is a major oil producer and has survived civil war and military dictatorship. However, it has long been troubled with corruption, instability, and violence. Almost equally divided between Christians and Muslims, Nigeria is home to virulent Islamist terrorist movements and suffers from a brutal rural/tribal conflict with sectarian overtones. Some Muslim-majority states impose shariah law.

The specter of religious conflict looms. In June, some 200 people were murdered in an attack on a largely Christian village. Yunusa Nmadu, head of Christian Solidarity Worldwide-Nigeria, warned that “The rising levels [of] violence and instability being endured by Nigerian civilians constitute a national emergency.” The violence could spread well beyond Nigeria itself. “We are at the precipice,” Nmadu worried. “If Nigeria goes into civil war, all of West Africa is gone.”

How to Topple Maduro

Elliott Abrams

On the last day of October, CBS’s 60 Minutes asked U.S. President Donald Trump about his policy on Venezuela and his thoughts about that country’s dictator, Nicolás Maduro. “Are Maduro’s days as president numbered?” asked Norah O’Donnell. “I would say yeah,” Trump replied. “I think so, yeah.”

This phlegmatic response was a good summary of current U.S. policy: Washington favors Maduro’s downfall, but its position lacks clarity and is not backed by the actions—including military strikes inside Venezuela—that would bring about the outcome U.S. officials appear to want. And therein lies the danger for Trump and his administration: that after a great deal of chest-thumping and a show of naval force aimed at Maduro, they will leave him in place. In that scenario, Maduro would emerge as the survivor who bested Trump and showed that American influence in the Western Hemisphere is limited at best.

Removing Maduro, on the other hand, would advance Washington’s interests, protect U.S. national security, and benefit Venezuelans and their neighbors. Regime change would result in reduced migration to the United States, less drug trafficking, more freedom and prosperity in Venezuela, and an end to the country’s cooperation with China, Cuba, Iran, and Russia, which gives countries hostile to U.S. interests a base of operations on the South American mainland.

Japan Says Population Crisis Is ‘Biggest Problem’

Micah McCartney

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi of Japan has called population decline the country's "biggest problem" and set out an action plan for her ministers to follow in hopes of tackling the issue.
Why It Matters

These demographic trends have hollowed out rural communities, driven up the dependency ratio—the number of working people supporting those outside the labor force—and placed growing strain on social safety nets, threatening the long-term growth of Asia's second-largest economy.

Japan, like many high- and middle-income countries, has struggled to stabilize its declining birth rate amid the rising cost of living, stagnating wages, and shifting attitudes among younger generations toward work-life balance and parenthood.

The impact is especially pronounced in Japan, which the United Nations has classified as a "super-aged" society—meaning at least 20 percent of the population is over 65. In Japan, that figure is close to 30 percent.

An era of harder security is beginning in Takaichi’s Japan

Jake Thrupp

Don’t underestimate the strength of Japan’s strategic transformation, above all in its hardening determination to face accumulating threats. The shift becomes clear to anyone who engages these days with Japanese officials and defence analysts, as I discovered at the Security and Defence PLuS Joint Conference on Comprehensive Security in the Indo-Pacific, held on 14 and 17 November.

This shift is being driven in large part by the new political leadership of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and her mentee, Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi, who have pledged to accelerate defence spending.

But an even more important shift is in Japan’s strategic mindset. Tokyo is becoming more willing to call out the threat posed by Chinese aggression and to shoulder a greater share of the regional security burden. Takaichi’s recent break from strategic ambiguity, describing a conflict in the Taiwan Strait as a potential ‘existential crisis situation’ for Japan, was a case in point. It was bold statement she later softened only marginally, but by then the message had been delivered.

Expect this clarity to flow directly into Japan’s next National Security Strategy. Scheduled for release between late 2026 and early 2027, the strategy will almost certainly frame China as Japan’s central challenge and serve as the precursor to a defence–industrial expansion not seen in decades.

Trump's '28-point plan' for Ukraine War provokes political earthquake

Anatol Lieven

When it comes to the reported draft framework agreement between the U.S. and Russia, and its place in the Ukraine peace process, a quote by Winston Churchill (on the British victory at El Alamein) may be appropriate: “Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.” This is because at long last, this document engages with the concrete, detailed issues that will have to be resolved if peace is to be achieved.

The plan has apparently been worked out between U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff and Russian envoy Kirill Dmitriev (together reportedly with Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and the president's son-in-law Jared Kushner) but a great deal about it is highly unclear. The Trump administration reportedly believes that a deal is imminent, but the Russian government has been at pains to stress that no agreement has yet been reached. We do not know if Moscow will try to exact further concessions; the details of several key points have not been revealed; and above all, it may be impossible to get the Ukrainian government to agree to essential elements, unless the Trump administration is prepared to bring extremely heavy pressure to bear on both Ukraine and America’s European allies.

It has already been reported that President Zelensky has rejected the plan and is working with European governments to propose an alternative — though so far, nothing that the Europeans have proposed stands the remotest chance of being accepted by Moscow.

Political Purification and Strategic Realignment in the PLA

Gerui Zhang and Brandon Tran

On October 17, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) of the People’s Republic China (PRC) released a statement by video and text detailing disciplinary actions against nine PLA general officers. [1] The ministry revoked their Party memberships and military rank, and they now await further consequences (MND, October 17). Of the nine generals listed, seven held major commands in the former Nanjing Military Region Command, with He Weidong (何卫东), Miao Hua (苗华), Lin Xiangyang (林向阳), Qin Shutong (秦树桐), and Wang Xiubin (王秀斌) all serving in the former 31st Group Army (BBC News, October 23). He Weidong, Miao Hua, and He Hongjun (何宏军) controlled personnel selection, promoting the interests of their network of officers (China Brief Notes, October 17).

The purge of general officers responsible for planning and operations related to the unification of Taiwan has prompted a possible temporary strategic realignment. Given that the highest ranks of the PLA experienced an overhaul of officers in the PLA Navy and Eastern Theater Command, the probability of success for a protracted blockade or joint amphibious landing campaign has decreased. The remaining PLA leadership has incentives to pursue other strategies for unification, such as a joint firepower strike campaign or decapitation strikes. The purges therefore may influence a shift in PLA strategic decision-making, at least in the short-term.

The long shadow of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials

Iain MacGregor

‘The wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish have been so calculated, so malignant, and so devastating, that civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored because it cannot survive their being repeated,’ declared Justice Robert H. Jackson in his opening statement at the Nuremberg Trials, on 20 November 1945.

Eighty years on, those words land with the full weight of history. Picture the room: panelled wood, a tangle of microphones, translators in glass booths, a forest of uniforms and armbands muted now by defeat. Outside, Nuremberg is rubble – its grand avenues scoured of pageantry, its stonework scorched and fissured; the theatre of power inverted into a courtroom for accountability. Inside, Jackson fixes the narrative from his first sentence: this will not be a trial for vengeance, but an insistence that the modern world, having created the machinery of annihilation, must also forge a law to judge those who used it. Even Jackson’s earlier phrase about the defendants – ‘They are symbols of fierce nationalisms and of militarism… living symbols of racial hatreds… of the arrogance and cruelty of power’ – cut like a chisel into stone, carving the plaque that would hang over the entire proceedings.

The men in the dock were already familiar to the world by their surnames alone: Göring, Ribbentrop, Keitel, Hess, Streicher, Kaltenbrunner, Sauckel, Jodl, Frank, Frick, Doenitz, Schacht, Funk, Speer. These names had become a grim catechism of the Nazi regime. Hermann Göring, Reichsmarschall, first among equals, sat with a swaggering composure that seemed to defy the moment. He was still the decorated aerial ace of the Great War, the founder of the Gestapo, the strutting embodiment of the regime’s vanity and cruelty. And yet, the mask had slipped many months before once he was in allied captivity, when he had been stripped of his pocketful of morphine ampoules and costly uniforms. Now, in the courtroom, behind the bravado was a performer who knew the script was ending without him.

Which Is Better, One Long Walk or Many Short Ones?

Simar Bajaj
A new study suggests that going on longer walks may have more health benefits than taking the same number of steps a day over multiple short walks.

Hundreds of studies have shown that higher step counts are tied to lower risk of dementia, Type 2 diabetes and other health issues. But how best to get those steps is less clear. The new analysis, published Monday in the Annals of Internal Medicine, is one of the first to study whether spacing steps out or consolidating them was linked to better health outcomes.

The analysis looked at people who took fewer than 8,000 steps per day; most participants took fewer than 5,000. Those who regularly walked longer than 15 minutes were 80 percent less likely to die from any cause and nearly 70 percent less likely to develop cardiovascular disease over a roughly 10-year period, compared with those who got most of their steps in walks of five minutes or less. (The average age of the participants was 62, so the risk of dying was fairly low to begin with: about 4 percent in the shorter-walks group and less than 1 percent in the longer-walks group.)

This data shows only a correlation; it does not prove that taking longer walks is healthier than spacing your steps out over the day. But some evidence suggests that your body needs more time and continuity to fully tap into exercise’s health benefits, such as improved heart rate regulation, said Dr. Robert Gerszten, the chief of cardiovascular medicine at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center who was not involved with the study.

Pro-Kremlin Analysts Acknowledge Previously Hushed-up Problems

Kassie Corelli

At the end of October, Russian military analysts made a surprising admission. Writers at the website Military Review (Военное Обозрение, Voennoe Obozrenie), which is close to the Russian Ministry of Defense, noted that the Ukrainian economy is coping with the war better than expected. In particular, they point to Ukraine’s economic growth in 2023 and 2024 (2.9 percent GDP growth in 2024), its successful battle against inflation, and that Ukraine’s interest rate is currently 1 percent lower than Russia’s (Topwar.ru, October 27). This change in how the war is being covered highlights how it is getting more difficult to disguise how the war is negatively affecting Russian society.

The authors of this Military Review article admit that, largely due to foreign aid, both civilian and military production are growing in Ukraine. At the same time, independent journalists note that the only industrial sectors now growing in Russia are those directly connected to the war, and therefore, their development is at the expense of the civilian sector (see EDM, July 7; Topwar.ru, October 27).

Yet another peace plan?

Lawrence Freedman

There were reports yesterday that the US and Russia have agreed on a new peace plan that would soon be presented to Kyiv as a fait accompli although it would be tantamount to a Ukrainian capitulation. The story broke in Axios and was then picked up by the Financial Times and also Reuters and was soon being reported around the media. This was how the Financial Times described the plan:

‘According to people with knowledge of a document about the draft plan, it would require Ukraine to cede the remainder of the eastern Donbas region — including land currently under Kyiv’s control — and cut the size of its armed forces by half. Crucially, it also calls for Ukraine to abandon key categories of weaponry and would include the rollback of US military assistance that has been vital to its defence, potentially leaving the country vulnerable to future Russian aggression. Additionally, no foreign troops would be allowed on Ukrainian soil and Kyiv would no longer receive western long-range weapons that can reach deep inside Russia. The plan would also stipulate that Russian be recognised as an official state language in Ukraine and grant formal status to the local branch of the Russian Orthodox Church — provisions echoing long-standing Kremlin political objectives.’

What to Know About the Secret U.S.-Russia Peace Plan for Ukraine

Sam Skove

A staff writer at Foreign Policy, and John Haltiwanger, a staff writer at Foreign Policy.A Ukrainian flag is attached to a burned out car in front of what appears to be a large residential building that also shows burn damage.A Ukrainian flag is seen attached to a burned car after a Russian airstrike in the city of Ternopil, Ukraine, on Nov. 19. Yuriy Dyachyshyn/AFP Via Getty Images

The Russia-Ukraine peace process has largely been stalled since a high-profile August summit in Alaska between U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, but discussions appear to be gaining momentum again.

The United States and Russia have been secretly working on a new 28-point peace plan for Ukraine, according to a new report from Axios, and Politico reports that the Trump administration is optimistic that a deal could be reached in the very near future—possibly as soon as this week.

America’s Allies Should Go Nuclear

Moritz S. Graefrath ·

Few scenarios scare pundits and policymakers as much as the prospect of nuclear proliferation. Russia’s willingness to dangle the threat of deploying tactical nuclear weapons in its war against Ukraine, U.S. President Donald Trump’s ambiguous interest in nuclear testing, and the imminent expiration of the 2010 New START treaty (which limits the size of Russian and U.S. nuclear arsenals) have reminded the world of the abiding destructive potential of nuclear weapons and reanimated fears of their use. American leaders are convinced that the spread of nuclear weapons would deeply hurt U.S. strategic interests and further destabilize the already fragile global order. In recent months, they have doubled down on their commitment to preventing proliferation, and the June strikes against nuclear sites in Iran have shown that Washington will use force to prevent more countries from acquiring the bomb.

For decades, the United States invested in a nuclear order built around nonproliferation, even as Cold War disarmament agreements such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty expired. Opposing proliferation among unreliable states and adversaries makes sense, but a blanket opposition to the further spread of nuclear weapons obscures the significant benefits they can bestow. The United States would do well to reconsider its strict adherence to nonproliferation and encourage a small set of allies—namely Canada, Germany, and Japan—to go nuclear. For Washington, selective nuclear proliferation would allow these partners to take on larger roles in regional defense and decrease their military dependence on the United States. For these allies, in turn, acquiring nuclear weapons provides the most dependable protection against the threats of regional foes, such as China and Russia, as well as a United States less committed to its traditional alliances.

In Search of a Defense Doctrine

Mike Nelson

U.S. presidents often find themselves adapting their defense policy to balance what they envisioned during their campaigns with what events require once they’re in office. George W. Bush campaigned on a shift away from adventurism and nation-building, but the 9/11 attacks turned his focus and cemented his legacy, forever associating him with the kinds of foreign involvement he had previously criticized. Barack Obama attempted to disentangle the U.S. from the Global War on Terror to pursue a “pivot” to the Pacific, only to surge troops to Afghanistan and witness the spread of Sunni jihadism in the Levant.

Donald Trump is no exception. His 2024 campaign for reelection and early days back in office signaled a more restrained vision for the use of U.S. military might, but the Pentagon has painted a different picture entirely. Rather than offering a clear plan for how America can and should use its military power, the Department of Defense seems to dart from one shiny object to another. But unlike the Bush or Obama administrations, this departure seems less a result of real-world circumstances and more the product of the Trump administration’s lack of a coherent defense strategy.

Since taking the helm 10 months ago, the Trump administration has alternately advocated for a reduced military footprint overseas, wielded the military as a tool to strong-arm allies, used servicemembers as a de facto law enforcement or border force, and threatened to initiate large-scale combat operations in two countries. Even the limited and correctly decided strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities represented a shift from a stated desire to be less involved in the Middle East.

Why Hasn’t the EU Given up on Turkey?

Robert Ellis

There are no limits to the extent some people are prepared to go to hold on to power. This is more apparent in an autocratic system than in a democratic one. Russian president Vladimir Putin’s hold on power is determined by the outcome of his war on Ukraine, and his new nuclear-powered Burevestnik cruise missile and Poseidon drone are indicators.

In Turkey, the aging autocrat, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has his back to the wall, and now he has announced “a new juncture” in the Kurdish peace process. To hardened observers of the Turkish scene, this is old wine in a new bottle.

Turkey’s Kurds first became a problem with the Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925. Said was the head of an influential religious order, and Mustafa Kemal’s secular reforms (the abolition of the Caliphate and the abrogation of Sharia law) reduced their power.

The Treaty of Sèvres in 1920 partitioned Turkey and the creation of an autonomous Kurdistan. Still, after the War of Independence, this was superseded by the Lausanne treaty in 1923, which defined the borders of modern Turkey. Said called for an independent Kurdistan and the restoration of the Caliphate, but this incipient Kurdish nationalism consolidated Kemalist reforms and Turkish nationalism.