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2 December 2025

India’s Strategic Autonomy Is Now Reading as Aloof

Chietigj Bajpaee,

Nothing captures India’s long-standing commitment to strategic autonomy more than the country hosting the leaders of three major global powers—Russia, China, and possibly the United States—in short succession. Russian President Vladimir Putin is scheduled to visit India in December, making it his first visit to the country since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Chinese President Xi Jinping is likely to be in India next year when the country hosts the BRICS summit. This year’s summit of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—a grouping that includes the United States—was scheduled to take place in India this month but was postponed amid the downturn in India-U.S. relations. If the meeting is rescheduled to next year, U.S. President Donald Trump could also visit India.

There is a flip side to this narrative, however. India’s equidistant foreign policy is often perceived as distant or aloof. This became apparent when Trump levied 50 percent tariffs on India, punishing the country for its trade imbalance and purchases of Russian crude. Meanwhile, other countries that maintain a larger trade surplus with the United States or a significant dependence on Russian crude were not targeted to the same degree because of their importance to global supply chains (e.g., China) or their status as U.S. alliance partners (e.g., Japan, Turkey).

Domestic Military Manufacturing Is Essential for National Security

Scott Vadnais

For nearly a century, America’s military strength has come largely through self-reliance. We not only made the ships, airplanes and tanks, our country supplied the parts and materials for these complex systems. But a lot has changed in recent times.

Unfortunately, our military has increasingly relied on sourcing parts globally -- including from possibly unreliable places like China. It’s a disastrous side effect of globalization.

For example, while modern jet engines may typically include between 30,000 and 50,000 parts, ensuring they are “China-free” has proven to be incredibly difficult. We’ve already seen deliveries of F-35s delayed over this issue, revealing that supply chain risk and delays remain in the post-COVID era. For instance, in 2022, a magnet in the turbomachine used in engine start-up was discovered to contain a China-produced alloy of cobalt and samarium – figuratively becoming a “non-starter” for using the jets.

The real reason behind China’s fury toward Japan’s Takaichi

Simone McCarthy

Weeks into the job, Japan’s new leader has come face-to-face with what it means to cross China’s red line on Taiwan.

In the days since Sanae Takaichi suggested her country could respond militarily if China were to move to take control of Taiwan by force, Beijing has pulled out its economic pressure playbook: warning its citizens against travel and study there, suggesting there’ll be no market in China for Japan’s seafood exports, and unleashing a wave of wall-to-wall nationalist fervor pointed at the prime minister.

The furor appears carefully calibrated to send a warning to Japan – and other countries in the region – of what could happen if they even consider taking a stance at odds with China on Taiwan, the self-ruled democratic island that Beijing claims as its own territory.

Space-Guided Supremacy: How China’s Satellite Systems Strengthen its Missile and Hypersonic Forces

Tahir Azad 

A decade ago, talk of “space dominance” meant the United States and, increasingly, Russia. The strategic picture is now clearly three-polar, and in many mission areas, it’s even two-polar. The U.S. and China are now in a fast-paced race to control the high ground of orbit. Beijing’s growing satellite networks, which include navigation, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), communications, and missile early warning, are creating a “kill web” in space that makes it easier for the PLA’s missile and hypersonic forces to find and shoot down targets.

Beijing views space integration as the key to achieving information dominance and missile precision, giving it a decisive edge in both deterrence and strike capability. This matters because space superiority now underpins strategic stability, early warning, and real-time targeting, allowing China to combine cyber, electronic, and kinetic domains into a unified warfare network. The United States increasingly fears that China’s space-enabled precision warfare could neutralize traditional U.S. advantages in command, control, communications, intelligence, and missile defense. Top officials in the U.S. Space Force have warned about a “mind-boggling” Chinese military buildup that could upset the balance of deterrence and shorten decision-making times in a crisis.

China's Demographic Dilemma

Henrietta Levin

In this episode of Pekingology, CSIS Senior Fellow Henrietta Levin is joined by Philip O’Keefe, Professor of Practice at the University of New South Wales Centre of Excellence in Population Ageing Research and one of the world's leading experts on demographic trends in China and across Asia. They unpack the rapid aging of Chinese society, exploring the impact of a shrinking population on China's politics, economy, and innovation ecosystem, as well as its trade imbalances and Beijing's global ambitions.

Has China’s Power Peaked in Asia?

Bilahari Kausikan

By virtue of its size, contiguity, economic weight, and crucial role in the world economy, China will always enjoy considerable influence in Asia, particularly Southeast Asia. But for those same reasons, China will also always arouse anxieties in Asia and indeed the world. Deng Xiaoping’s approach of hiding China’s power and biding time stems from his awareness of this paradox. Big countries need to reassure small countries on their periphery. Deng recognized this and acted on it.

But by the end of the Hu Jintao era, Deng’s wisdom was either forgotten or ignored, perhaps because Beijing over-read the implications of the 2008 global financial crisis and, just as the United States had over-read the end of the Cold War, invested it with a universal significance as heralding Karl Marx’s long-predicted decline and eventual collapse of the West, specifically the United States.

The New Cold War is here

David Roche

The New Cold War is not a forecast. It’s here and now. Where the conflict takes us does need forecasting, however. For our destination I shall set out some scenarios for you to choose from. But first a bit of history.

We had a few misconceptions in 1989, when we welcomed the ‘end of history’, meaning the end of systemic confrontation between hegemonic great powers, after the Berlin Wall fell. And also in 2001, when we invited China to participate in the free world economy by joining the WTO. The idea was that the richer China got, the more Chinese society would become like us, espousing our democratic niceties. China actually became more dictatorial the more it succeeded in becoming a poverty-free, middle-income economy. A few bouts of liberalisation and social eruptions came to nothing. Since President Xi Jinping came to office in 2013, societal control and conformity have become increasingly systemic and ubiquitous. Anecdotally, a decade ago, China had a security camera for every ten citizens. Now there is one for every two.

Military forecasts went similarly awry. Accepted wisdom was that China would never seek to grow its military in step with its booming economy. One reason for this was the typical Marxist-Leninist fear that a big army could threaten the Party’s grip on power as much as protect it. China was expected to opt for a relatively modest military, heavy on boots and light on tech. The PLA would only develop a limited range of key weapons systems to keep foes like the Russians and the US at bay. But China would not rival or threaten them militarily, so the thinking went. Now, China’s military seeks to match that of the US both in mass and sophistication in the air, on sea and on land. China has all but succeeded in this goal – except for nukes. And China is rushing to close that gap. That is what lies at the heart of the New Cold War.

How the Army’s most tech-forward units are practicing for war

JENNIFER HLAD

SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, Hawaii—Inside a mud-splattered tent, the Army’s vice chief and the commander of the 25th Infantry Division watched on two giant TV screens as the division attempted to repel an enemy attack from the sea. Just outside, the service’s first launched-effects battery used an unmanned reconnaissance glider that arrived about a month before to provide a picture of the simulated assault, while the division’s new HIMARS rocket launchers shot down “enemy” drones.

“We have old stuff, we have new stuff, and we’re fighting in a new way,” said Col. Dan Von Benken, the division’s artillery commander.

It was the last day of a two-week Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center exercise, and this constructed amphibious battle was the end of a scenario in which the soldiers worked with partner forces to defend an archipelago and take back islands seized by the enemy.

The exercise involved 75 experiments and incorporated every U.S. service branch plus seven partner nations. It kicked off with soldiers from the 11th Airborne Division’s 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team flying from Alaska to the island of Hawaii, where they parachuted into a training area with close-air support from the Hawaii Air National Guard. It included a nighttime long-range maritime air assault mission and another mission that flew four HIMARS aboard C-17s from Hawaii to Wake Island, unloaded them for a simulated raid, and then flew them back again.

Moscow’s Offshore Menace

Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan

ANDREI SOLDATOV is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis and Co-Founder and Editor of Agentura.ru, a watchdog of the Russian secret services’ activities.

At the October meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club, an annual forum for Russian policy talks that has in recent years become a platform for Kremlin ideology, Russian President Vladimir Putin was asked an unusual question. “Mr. President, why are you sending so many drones to Denmark?” Putin initially dismissed it, joking that he would not send drones to “France, Denmark, or Copenhagen.” But the Russian leader did not stop there. He went on to say that “many eccentric characters,” especially young people, were capable of launching those drones over Europe—an enigmatic assertion that recalled his veiled comments about

Air Force Confirms SEAD Role of F-35s in Midnight Hammer

John A. Tirpak

The Air Force F-35As that participated in Operation Midnight Hammer—the June 22 strike against Iranian uranium enrichment and nuclear research facilities—conducted both suppression of enemy air defenses, also called SEAD, and provided fighter cover for the strike force as it departed Iran, the service acknowledged Nov. 24.

The SEAD aspect of the F-35’s role in the operation was implied but not officially detailed previously.

Fighters of the 388th Fighter Wing based out of Hill Air Force Base, Utah, “paved the way” for the flight of seven B-2s that dropped 14 GBU-57 bunker busters that penetrated the hardened, deeply buried targets in Iran, the wing detailed in a pair of press releases. The Air Force said the jets flew from several locations, implementing the Agile Combat Employment model.

The 388th and its reserve associate unit, the 419th Fighter Wing, deployed to the Middle East under U.S. Central Command in March and returned to Utah in September after a history-making six-month deployment

The Surge of Latino America And What It Means for the Country

Maggie Miller & The Miller Report

In this episode of The Miller Report: Real Clear Journalism, Maggie Miller sits down with Joel Kotkin and Jennifer Hernandez to discuss their new RealClearInvestigations piece based on their comprehensive report from the Civitas Institute examining one of the most significant demographic and economic shifts reshaping the nation: the rise of Latino America.

Latinos now make up about 20% of the U.S. population — up from just 5% in 1970 — and are responsible for more than half of all population growth. By 2060, they’re projected to drive nearly all of it. But the investigation shows this story isn’t just about demographic momentum; it’s about economic influence. Yet it also highlights real challenges getting in the way of the American Dream.

We explore what’s driving these trends, how concerns around immigration enforcement intersect with belief in the American Dream, and what their findings mean for policymakers and the country’s future. Their full investigation can be found here.

Europe divided as US pushes Ukraine-Russia peace deal

Ian Bremmer

In this Quick Take, Ian Bremmer breaks down the controversy around Trump's 28-point Ukraine-Russia peace plan.

He says the proposal was “mostly drafted by the Russians” and loaded with “complete non-starters” for Ukraine, from ceding more territory to reducing troop levels and granting blanket amnesty for war crimes.

Ian explains that while allies publicly “appreciate the American effort,” he notes that few are buying the plan’s substance. With Europe divided and Russia sensing momentum, he warns that “the war is not close to over,” and that the next phase will likely be shaped by battlefield realities, not diplomacy.

The next MAGA divide is Chinaby

Ransom Miller

It’s not the first time MAGA has turned on itself over U.S. support for Israel. In June, clashes over Trump’s Mideast policy pushed him to speak out, declaring: “I’m the one that developed America First. I’m the one that decides that.”

Trump still drives conservative politics, but his movement is no longer a monolith. Nor is Israel the only international policy issue that threatens the movement’s unity. The next fissure may be China.

On Israel, figures like Carlson, Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-Ga.) and other right-wing media personalities are calling for a restrained U.S. presence. Now, pressure is building from those who want a more aggressive approach to China.

More Trump voters disapprove of the president’s handling of China than any other foreign policy issue, according to a new public opinion poll by myself and my team at the Institute for Global Affairs.

Europe’s peace plan oozes with reliance on the US


If you’ve been on X over the past few days, and your algorithm is as politics-filled as mine, you may have seen an old video being passed around. The clip in question, which has garnered millions of views, is of now-former Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin being asked by a reporter what the way out of the Russo-Ukrainian War was. Her answer – “The way out of the conflict is for Russia to leave Ukraine” – was accentuated by a little giggle, as if she was proud of her foreign policy, as if her insight was self-evident.

I write this not to pick on the former prime minister, who is currently, in the midst of a book tour, lamenting to The New York Times about how difficult her life is. I do so because the clip of Marin, who governed Finland during the outbreak of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, was almost perfectly timed for a resurgence this past week.

That is because, after President Trump’s proposed 28-point Russo-Ukrainian War peace plan was released, the European Union released their own. And while it has more points than Marin’s single way out of the war (theirs has 24), it is spiritually identical to her pithy response. The document both underlines how badly the European Union still needs the United States and how totally fresh out of ideas Brussels really is.

EU countries seek urgent plan B to fund Ukraine

Tim Ross, Gregorio Sorgi and Bjarke Smith-Meyer

BRUSSELS — European countries are working on an emergency plan B to stop Ukraine running out of money early next year in case they cannot reach a deal on raiding Russia’s frozen assets to fund Kyiv’s war effort.

At a summit a month ago European Union leaders hoped to agree on a proposal to use Moscow’s immobilized reserves for a €140 billion “reparations loan” to Ukraine but the idea ran into fierce opposition from Bart De Wever, the prime minister of Belgium, where the money is held.

Now, with peace talks intensifying, and Kyiv running short of cash, the question of what to do with the Russian assets has taken on a new urgency. “If we don’t move, others will move before us,” said one EU official, granted anonymity like others cited here, to speak freely.

Eroding Global Stability: The Cybersecurity Strategies Of China, Russia, North Korea, And Iran

Evan Morgan |

In recent years, declarations like “no-limits partnership,” “comprehensive agreement,” and “security partnership” between the United States’ adversaries have become increasingly common. On May 16, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese Communist Party Leader Xi Jinping reaffirmed their comprehensive partnership during their historic 43rd meeting. Since Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Russian-Iranian collaboration has reached new levels, with Iranian drones becoming a familiar site over the battlefields. North Korea too, has upped its cooperation with Russia, working closely on schemes to avoid Western sanctions and even signing a mutual defense pact on June 19, 2024. The extent to which America’s adversaries cooperate on cybersecurity remains less understood but is a growing concern.

However, as unified Western actions against rogue and adversarial states have increased (e.g., sanctions, public shaming, etc.) and hot wars roil Ukraine and Israel, the agreements and cooperation among China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran have similarly grown stronger and more unified. In this context, the cybersecurity strategies of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran have emerged as significant and irregular threats to global stability, threatening the contemporary geopolitical landscape. Furthermore, each nation has developed sophisticated cyber capabilities designed to asymmetrically attack the international security frameworks established by NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and Western powers. It is, therefore, important to assess how US adversaries collaborate in cyberspace and are using asymmetric and irregular tactics to undermine the liberal world order

The Inevitable Logic of a Japanese Nuclear Weapon

Bilahari Kausikan

It is no longer a question of if but when Japan and South Korea will acquire independent nuclear deterrents within the U.S. alliance system. That system would otherwise loosen in East Asia as the United States’ extended deterrence—the so-called nuclear umbrella—erodes due to China’s and North Korea’s acquisition of second strike capabilities targeting the U.S. mainland. To acquire nuclear weapons will be a politically difficult and highly fraught decision—much more so for Japan than for South Korea, where opinion polls already show considerable support. But regardless of public opinion, changes in the global and regional strategic environment are inexorably pushing both countries in this direction. Resisting the logic of these changes could lead to very grave geopolitical consequences.

In democracies, security policy must rest on a foundation of public support. Such a foundation does not yet exist in Japan on the nuclear question. It is therefore imperative that Japan engage in an open, realistic, and timely public debate to build a national consensus on this vital issue. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi took a first step in this direction earlier this month, when she announced that her government is considering a review of Japan’s long-standing policy on hosting nuclear weapons.

The Wobbling of King Trump

Michael Hirsh

For an American, touring the grandiose monuments of ancient Rome and Renaissance Italy—as I did recently—is an oddly relatable experience these days.

From the triumphal arches of Constantine and Titus to the soaring St. Peter’s Basilica to the stunning Medici palaces of Florence, one sees a clear through line: a parade of giant egos down the centuries. For princes of the past—even many popes—self-glorification was the norm.

How Beijing Views Trump

Ravi Agrawal

Last week’s meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping was the most-anticipated summit between two world leaders this year. The presidents of the United States and China seem to have come away with things they can both describe as wins—and certainly, the two avoided their trade spat getting worse. But according to Elizabeth Economy, a China scholar and former advisor to the Biden administration, the agreement between the two sides was not only limited to just one year but also skirted around the more fundamental structural issues plaguing the relationship.

Economy is now a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the author of, most recently, The World According to China. I asked Economy to join me as a guest on FP Live, and we discussed takeaways from the summit, how Beijing is navigating Trump’s second term, and how, on balance, countries in Asia are viewing the biggest superpower showdown this century. Subscribers can watch the full discussion on the video box atop this page. What follows here is a lightly edited and condensed transcript.

The United States Is Moving Through the Stages of Grief Over China’s Rise

Robert A. Manning,

By most accounts, the outcome of the 90-minute meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in October was little more than a one-year truce in the trade war, rolling tariffs back to Jan. 19 levels, though final details are still being sorted out; a rare Xi-initiated phone call to Trump on Nov. 24 underscored his desire to implement the deal (while also raising the Taiwan issue). But what if the Washington cognoscenti and much of the press have it wrong? What if the meeting signaled the beginning of a new phase in U.S.-China relations?

Why? One metric I use to gauge U.S.-China relations is the five stages of grief—traditionally framed as denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance. After passing through the first two, Washington is hitting the third. These have unfolded in direct proportion to China’s emergence on the modern world stage, as its GDP grew from $310 billion in 1985 to $18.8 trillion in 2024 and it moved up the ladder of civilian and military technology to challenge U.S. global primacy.

House Republicans Slam Witkoff Over Handling of Russia-Ukraine Talks

Rachel Oswald,

Republican opposition continues to grow to the Trump administration’s handling of the chaotic Russia-Ukraine peace negotiations, with two senior House members heaping opprobrium on the lead U.S. envoy to the talks, Steve Witkoff, and slamming what they characterized as a lack of a professional and unified interagency process from the U.S. side.

On Tuesday, Bloomberg published a leaked transcript of an Oct. 14 call between Witkoff and Yuri Ushakov, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s top foreign-policy advisor, in which Witkoff suggested coming up with a 20-point peace plan to end the Russia-Ukraine war and offered advice on how Putin should pitch the idea to U.S. President Donald Trump.

The Yellow Line in Gaza Is Supposed to Be Temporary. Israel Is Digging in

Steven A. Cook

What is that old saw? Put two Israelis in a room and you get nine opinions on any given issue. This alleged truism, wrapped up in marginally amusing Borscht Belt humor, is intended to convey something both exasperating and heartwarming about Israeli society.

It is true that Israel is a polarized country and social trust has deteriorated, but on a variety of issues, from the prosaic to the consequential, Israelis seem to agree on quite a lot these days. Based on the 12 days that took me back and forth between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem recently, and to several points in between, here’s my non-scientific read on Israeli public opinion: Everyone hates the endless road construction in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem; most people believe that the Haredim (or ultra-Orthodox), who have traditionally been exempt from enlisting in the Israeli army so they can devote their lives to religious studies, must start serving or get off the government dole; and a consensus has formed around the so-called yellow line in Gaza and why Israeli troops are likely to stay on that line for a while. More on that in a

A Self-Defeating Reversal on Ukraine

Thomas Wright

The Trump administration’s new plan for Ukraine is apparently to reverse all the progress it has made there in recent months. And not just that—to create a much bigger strategic problem that will bedevil the administration for the next three years. The strangest part of all of this is that the plan emerged at a moment when Donald Trump’s Ukraine policy had finally found its footing after a very turbulent start.

Over the past 24 hours, multiple media outlets, citing several administration officials with direct knowledge, have published details of a new U.S. peace proposal that is tantamount to a Ukrainian surrender. As drafted, the plan would require Ukraine to give up territory and fortifications in the parts of the Donbas that it still controls, cut the size of its armed forces by half, abandon weaponry that Russia deems to be offensive (including long-range missiles), accept an end to U.S. military assistance, and agree to a ban on foreign troops on Ukrainian soil. The Trump administration is dangling a U.S. security guarantee for Ukraine in the event of future Russian aggression, but what that would entail is unclear and would almost certainly fall far short of a NATO-style mutual-defense commitment. The plan actually guts the one security guarantee that would make a real difference, namely a strong and capable Ukraine.

The Specter of Nuclear Anarchy: Rising Risks in a Modern Era" by Jeffrey D. McCausland, PhD

Jeffrey D

"The global landscape of nuclear security has become increasingly dangerous, reminding policymakers and the public that the threat of nuclear disaster, once thought to be only a Cold War risk, continues to shape international relations. While international norms established by foundational agreements like the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) have curbed the spread of nuclear weapons, recent geopolitical trends and startling rhetorical shifts suggest these norms are eroding. The evidence is clear: growing tensions between nuclear-armed states are encouraging proliferation and increasing the likelihood of nuclear conflict."

Southeast Asia's New Dilemma: Data Centers or the Environment

Luke Hahn

Following the 47th Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) Summit in Kuala Lumpur, Southeast Asia–along with several international nations–reaffirmed its commitment towards a sustainable future. In a declaration made on Oct 28, 2025, ASEAN announced its aims to improve its efforts to “reduce, mitigate and address the degradation of the natural environment, and continue to share good practices in fulfilling the right to a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment.” Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s goals towards a more sustainable future resonated with world leaders, alongside ASEAN’s efforts towards developing its technological advancements throughout the region, including artificial intelligence (AI) and data center storage. However, ASEAN’s burgeoning digital infrastructure industry runs the risk of hindering its environmental aims in the wake of international demand. In advancing the growth of domestic data centers, ASEAN member-states must not sacrifice their environmental goals at the expense of rapid industrial innovation.

The global AI industry in Southeast Asia has faced unprecedented growth this past year alone, with AI-related investment expected to surpass US$110 billion by 2028. In Malaysia alone, investment into data centers is projected to rise 185% by the end of 2025, with over 30,000 jobs being created by 2030. As a result of increased international demand from major powers, a growing population, and a rising role as a manufacturing hub, Southeast Asia is primed to become the next major outsourcing hub for scalable, high-performance data infrastructure for major investors. For member-states, this means short-term increased job growth and development towards financial technology (fintech) industries, while supporting both Chinese and American demands for data storage and AI energy reserves.