Will Modi Cozy Up to Putin?

Sumit Ganguly

Source Link

Russian President Vladimir Putin is scheduled to visit India on Dec. 5 for the countries’ 23rd annual bilateral summit. The trip, Putin’s first to New Delhi since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, is taking place at a particularly fraught time; India has expended considerable diplomatic capital as his arrival looms.

To that end, Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar visited Moscow this month, meeting with Putin on the sidelines of a convening of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation heads of delegation. In August, Jaishankar and Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval also undertook back-to-back visits to Moscow.

India’s Strategic Autonomy Is Now Reading as Aloof

Chietigj Bajpaee

Source Link

Nothing captures India’s long-standing commitment to strategic autonomy more than the country hosting the leaders of three major global powers—Russia, China, and possibly the United States—in short succession. Russian President Vladimir Putin is scheduled to visit India in December, making it his first visit to the country since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Chinese President Xi Jinping is likely to be in India next year when the country hosts the BRICS summit. This year’s summit of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—a grouping that includes the United States—was scheduled to take place in India this month but was postponed amid the downturn in India-U.S. relations. If the meeting is rescheduled to next year, U.S. President Donald Trump could also visit India.

There is a flip side to this narrative, however. India’s equidistant foreign policy is often perceived as distant or aloof. This became apparent when Trump levied 50 percent tariffs on India, punishing the country for its trade imbalance and purchases of Russian crude. Meanwhile, other countries that maintain a larger trade surplus with the United States or a significant dependence on Russian crude were not targeted to the same degree because of their importance to global supply chains (e.g., China) or their status as U.S. alliance partners (e.g., Japan, Turkey). The differing treatment reflects India’s lack of strategic indispensability in the international system.

India orders phone makers to preload devices with state-owned cyber safety app

Source Link

India’s telecoms ministry has privately asked smartphone makers to preload all new devices with a state-owned cybersecurity app that cannot be deleted, a government order showed, a move likely to antagonise Apple and privacy advocates.

In tackling a recent surge of cybercrime and hacking, India is joining authorities worldwide, most recently in Russia, to frame rules blocking the use of stolen phones for fraud or promoting state-backed government service apps.

Apple, which has previously locked horns with the telecoms regulator over development of a government anti-spam mobile app, is among the companies, such as Samsung, Vivo, Oppo and Xiaomi bound by the new order.

The 28 November order gives major smartphone companies 90 days to ensure that the government’s Sanchar Saathi app is pre-installed on new mobile phones, with a provision that users cannot disable it.

For devices already in the supply chain, manufacturers should push the app to phones via software updates, the ministry said in its order, which was not made public and was sent privately to select companies.

The illusion of deterrence: Why India isn’t buying Pakistan’s nuclear threats

Siddhant Kishore 

Source Link

For decades, Pakistan has exploited the paradox of nuclear stability, waging a perpetual low-intensity conflict against India while staying below the threshold of overt conventional war. Pakistan-backed terrorist groups operate under the assumption that India will not risk a nuclear escalation. This provides Pakistan, which does not have a no-first-use policy, the advantage of issuing nuclear threats to quell the prospects of a conventional conflict with India. However, Pakistan’s deterrence logic was undermined during the four-day conflict in May, when India ignored Islamabad’s nuclear signaling and established what Prime Minister Narendra Modi described as a “new normal”: He warned that conventional military strikes would follow if Pakistan-based terrorist groups launched another attack on Indian soil.

The new norm set by India’s Operation Sindoor military campaign has forced Pakistani strategic planners to reassess their long-standing doctrine of “bleeding India by a thousand cuts.” Speaking at a black-tie dinner in Florida on August 9, Pakistan’s Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir made a series of provocative remarks about India. Munir reportedly threatened to destroy “with 10 missiles” any Indian dam built to control the Indus River, addressing India’s decision to suspend the Indus Waters Treaty governing distribution of water in the river. Muinir further warned that Pakistan would “take half the world down with us” if faced with an existential threat from India.

Can Pakistan Adapt to Climate Disaster?

Betsy Joles

Source Link

Three years ago, at the 2022 United Nations climate conference (COP27) held in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, Sherry Rehman—then the Pakistani minister for climate change—appealed for an emergency fund so that rich countries could compensate poorer countries for climate damage.

Months earlier, Pakistan had experienced one of the worst flooding events in its history. The floods had turned much of the lower half of the country into a milky brown swamp, stranding farmers on the rooftops of submerged houses and drowning their half-grown crops.

Why China Didn’t Do a ‘Kissinger’ to Split Europe From America

Gabrielius Landsbergis

Source Link

China has thrown its weight behind Russia’s war in Ukraine, but this has not focused European leaders’ minds as much as it should. From Beijing’s financial lifeline to Moscow to its supplies of critical technology to the Russian arms industry, the China-Russia “partnership without limits” has very real implications for the war in Ukraine—and for all of Europe’s future security.

Early this year, I argued that Washington reducing its commitments to European defense would tempt Beijing to do a “Kissinger” on the trans-Atlantic alliance, showering the European Union with gifts to pull it out of the U.S. orbit. Some time has passed, so it is worthwhile to check how things turned out.

Could the PLA use long-range rockets against ships in an attack on Taiwan?

Liu Zhen

Source Link

The People’s Liberation Army’s long-range rocket launchers can hit moving targets at sea during island seizure operations, according to mainland Chinese state media.

In a report on Thursday, state broadcaster CCTV gave the first official confirmation that the PLA’s PHL-03 land-based rocket launchers could be a threat to moving surface vessels more than 100km (62 miles) away, indicating potential use against ships.

Previously, the launchers were thought to only pose a threat to land targets.

“Striking maritime targets not only significantly expands the operational reach of long-range firepower but also establishes a new tactical deterrent ability,” the report said.

As a cost-effective and potent addition to missiles, the PLA’s long-range rockets are widely seen as a key firepower element in any potential military operation in the Taiwan Strait.

CCTV aired the report soon after Taiwanese leader William Lai Ching-te proposed a record defence budget for the island, including funds for the new “Taiwan Shield”, or “T-Dome”, air defence system.

The “T-Dome” would be a multilayered air and missile defence system and has been proposed as a way to prevent PLA aircraft, drones and missiles – as well as rockets – from striking the island.

The CCTV footage showed truck-mounted PHL-03 rocket launchers firing 300mm (3.9-inch) rockets from the coast and hitting floating targets at sea.

The targets were 10 metres (33 feet) in diameter and positioned 150km offshore, simulating moving enemy transport ships and uncrewed boats, the report said, indicating the rockets could also be used for anti-ship purposes.

Taiwan’s plan to acquire drone ‘takeover’ technology sparks security debate

Lawrence Chung

Source Link

Taiwan’s plan to acquire Israeli “takeover” technology as part of a counter-drone network has set off a debate over its use and the island’s security strategy as it tries to keep pace with rapidly evolving unmanned threats.

At a briefing for suppliers on the procurement requirements earlier this month, Taiwan’s homeland security office outlined specifications for a new system to protect the island’s airports, power plants and other critical infrastructure from incursions by small commercial drones.

The system – separate from the military’s programme – would require equipment capable of electromagnetic jamming and spoofing as well as a takeover function that could seize control of an intruding drone and land it using hacking techniques.

Slides presented by the government-controlled National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST), Taiwan’s top weapons developer, at the November 14 briefing said equipment “must possess decoding functions” for OcuSync versions 2, 3, 4 and 4+ – the drone transmission system used by DJI.

Mainland Chinese company DJI accounts for an estimated 70 to 75 per cent of the global civilian drone market, including Taiwan.

complicated issue, but the way out is simple: ex-PLA colonel Zhou Bo

Shi Jiangtao

Source Link

Zhou Bo is a retired senior colonel in the People’s Liberation Army and a senior fellow at Tsinghua University’s Centre for International Security and Strategy. His military career included roles in the Ministry of National Defence’s Foreign Affairs Office and as a defence attaché. Zhou is the author of the recent book Should the World Fear China?

With the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party still in power in Taiwan and intensifying US arms purchases, how viable is peaceful reunification at this stage? What specific “red lines” or thresholds of “external interference”, in your view, would compel Beijing to consider non-peaceful means?

Now we’re talking about Taiwan, which is a billion-dollar issue. Of course, it looks very complicated. But for me, the way out is very simple: how to avoid a war in the Taiwan Strait?

The answer is to let Beijing believe peaceful reunification is still possible. If it believes peaceful reunification is possible, it will have confidence rather than impatience.

As China grows stronger, it could go in two different directions. One is that greater strength brings more confidence in eventual peaceful reunification because Taiwan will not move away, and time is on the side of mainland China. But it might also grow impatient and consider using force, especially if provoked. These are two very different directions.

So, which direction will China take? My argument, as I wrote in Time magazine recently, is that it depends on the Taiwanese authorities. Right now, Taiwan’s leader, William Lai Ching-te, is very provocative. Before his election, he described himself as a “practical worker” for Taiwan independence. Now he has called mainland China a hostile foreign force and said Taiwan must oppose China’s united front work. He has even outlined 17 strategies to intimidate people in Taiwan who support cross-strait exchanges.

Defense-Tech Nation': Israel prepares new spectrum of weapons for next Iran war

YONAH JEREMY BOB

Source Link

Speaking from the Defense Tech conference jointly sponsored by the ministry and Tel Aviv University, Baram warned that “Iran’s rapid force buildup in air defense and ballistic missile capabilities” driven by “its extremist ideology” means that “all fronts are still open” and the IDF must be ready for additional rounds of fighting.

“Enemies are learning and adapting. We are at a pivotal point before a new paradigm takes place,” said Baram.

Separately, Baram revealed for the first time what had led the ministry and the IDF to finally deploy the Iron Beam laser defense system in the field in October 2024.

On October 13, Hezbollah succeeded in killing a large number of Golani Brigade soldiers when the terror group launched a drone that struck the mess hall in their base in the North.

Private Tech Companies, the State, and the New Character of War

Emily Bienvenue, Maryanne Kelton, Zac Rogers, Michael Sullivan, and Matthew Ford

Source Link

The war in Ukraine affords a window into how private tech companies are reshaping states’ sovereign control over military power. State-centric models of war, where sovereign states control the battlefield and determine the technologies deployed within it, are being redefined by militaries’ growing reliance in the battlespace on commercial datafication software and hardware. The war in Ukraine signals a shift in the character of armed conflict. Militaries are simultaneously decentralizing distributed decisionmaking closer to the warfighter and centralizing command and control through dependence on private tech companies that produce essential tools, including cloud computing; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) analytics; and scalable machine learning platforms for AI.1

The war in Ukraine is forcing conflict analysts and others to reimagine traditional state-centric models of war, as it demonstrates that militaries are no longer primarily responsible for defining the challenges of the modern battlespace and then producing tenders for technological fixes. Instead, private tech companies increasingly explain the ideal battlespace to militaries, offering software and hardware products needed to establish real-time information edges. In the Russia-Ukraine war, private companies have sought to shape Ukrainian intelligence requirements. At the beginning of Russia’s invasion in February 2022, Ukraine’s armed forces could not manage essential intelligence tasks. Ukraine’s military lacked its own software and hardware for real-time information dominance and instead accepted support from private tech companies. These companies provide AI and big data tools that fuse intelligence and surveillance data to enhance the military’s situational awareness. As the war has progressed, however, the Ukrainians have sought to develop their own government situational awareness and battle management platform called Delta. The platform was developed as a bottom-up solution, “initially focused on a single, highly effective application: a digital map for situational awareness.”2 Over time, it expanded into a robust software ecosystem used by most of Ukraine’s military, from frontline soldiers to top commanders. This in part reflects Ukraine’s desire to retain direct sovereign control over what the U.S. military refers to as Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control infrastructure (CJADC2), which manages networked sensors, data, platforms, and operations to deliver information advantages across all military services and with allies.

The Minerals That Drive Trump’s Global Agenda

Ravi Agrawal

Source Link

What connects the White House’s approach to Pakistan and Panama, with a thread running through Canada, Greenland, and Ukraine? The answer could lie not in a grand theory of international relations but in the Trump administration’s realization that it is lagging behind China in the race for critical minerals—and its clear desire to catch up.

But what exactly are critical minerals? Why do they matter so much? Why does China dominate their supply chains and processing, and how long would it take for the United States to catch up? For answers, I turned to Gracelin Baskaran, the director of the Critical Minerals Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Subscribers can watch the full discussion on the video box atop this

The Russia-Ukraine peace deal is not a loss. Nor is it a victory

Stephen Wertheim

Source Link

No one should be satisfied with the unjust peace that Ukraine may be forced to accept. The aggressor would be rewarded with territory and other concessions from the victim it has brutalized. Yet the horrified reaction in Washington to recent peace proposals is troubling in its own right.

The Trump administration’s recent 28-point plan, roundly denounced in Congress and the commentariat as a “capitulation” to Moscow, actually offered Kyiv a remarkable strategic outcome. Under its terms, Ukraine would face no meaningful limit on its peacetime military, despite Russian attempts to impose draconian restrictions since 2022. (The only requirement, a cap of 600,000 personnel, probably exceeds the number of active-duty forces Ukraine would maintain anyway.) Moreover, Ukraine would receive a substantial security guarantee from the United States and Europe – the strongest in history, even if short of a Nato-style commitment.

Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, launched his invasion to break Ukraine’s alignment with the west and against Moscow. When the fighting stops, Ukraine will be militarily stronger, more hostile to Russia and better protected than ever before.

Trump’s Dizzying Ukraine Diplomacy

John Haltiwange

Source Link

Welcome back to Foreign Policy’s Situation Report, and a very Happy Thanksgiving week to all who celebrate! We’re coming to you a day early and with a shorter edition because we’re off for the holiday tomorrow, but we’ll be fully back in action next week.

Ukrainian Corruption Investigation Reveals Derkach’s Role

Taras Kuzio

Source Link

A high-level corruption scandal has been roiling Ukraine’s domestic politics and undermining trust in Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The scandal follows the president’s attempts in July to remove the independence of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor (SAPO), which have been investigating this corruption case since last year (Zmina, July 31).

Russia’s long-term involvement in Ukraine’s economy allowed it to collect kompromat (компромат, compromising material) on Ukrainian elites, sow internal strife to undermine national unity and morale in the army, and collect intelligence on Ukraine’s air defenses (Argument, November 13). Some of the funds stolen in the corruption scandal were meant to build defenses for Ukrainian utilities.

In November, evidence released by the NABU showed that $100 million from contracts for nuclear facility protection that was reported to have been stolen was laundered at a central Kyiv office owned by the family of Andrei Derkach, a former Ukrainian member of parliament and current Russian senator (NABU, November 10; Euromaidan Press, November 11). Ihor Myronyuk, an aide to Derkach for over a decade, handled the cash for the corruption scheme (Euromaidan Press, November 11). At least $2 million of the stolen funds were transferred to Derkach. NABU detectives found items in the office labeled “Federal Protective Service of the Russian Federation” (Euromaidan Press, November 11).

Politics and War. Reality vs Expectations

Valerii Zaluzhnyi

Source Link

The thought of this article came to me more and more often at the end of 2023, when my team and I tried to sum up the stormy year of 2023, and most importantly, try to form our strategy for the upcoming year of 2024.

It was a tough year. We still didn't understand why it was getting harder and harder every day, despite being in a completely different position compared to 2022. Something was wrong. Something had to be seen and foreseen in the future. Something that could change everything, or at least somehow keep things in a situation where anything was still possible.

War in 2023 has changed dramatically. And while its physical nature was completely clear to us, which allowed us to even influence its further development, for example, with a comprehensive approach to UAVs and space reconnaissance, it did not yet seem possible to form a full-fledged strategy for our future behavior.

The dependence and use of economic opportunities and their increasing involvement in the war process as a whole became even more obvious.

Finally, we also realized that it is impossible to constantly be dependent on weapons supplies from Western partners. And not even because sooner or later they will run out of such weapons, but primarily because the weapons themselves will change over time and our partners will no longer have them. Something fundamental was missing in the approach to building a quality strategy.

Running Estimate (Crawling When We Need to Run)

John R. Harrell,  James Villanueva,  Peter Farese,  Joe Hammond

Source Link

In Army headquarters, commanders frequently leave a meeting without the knowledge they need to know to make decisions. This is mostly the result of insufficient or incomplete running estimates. Staffs often present raw, unrefined data without analysis and are unable to provide the knowledge commanders need to make decisions. Staffs across the Army need to better facilitate commanders’ decision-making during large-scale combat operations by focusing running estimates on assessments, conclusions, and recommendations along with associated risk and opportunities. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 5-0 The Operations Process defines a running estimate as “the continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if planned future operations are supportable.” Field Manual (FM) 6-0 Commander and Staff Organization and Operations warns, “Failure to maintain running estimates may lead to errors or omissions that result in flawed plans or bad decisions.” Doctrinal publications emphasize the fact that running estimates must be current and relevant, must include analyzed information that is of value to the commander, and must provide recommendations for future decision. Most important, by providing accurate, relevant, and timely running estimates, a staff can assist their commander in identifying opportunities for exploitation which will be crucial to success in large-scale combat.

Refocusing Running Estimates

Staffs frequently present raw data, such as a combat power percentage, vehicle slant, or quantities of a class of supply, and believe that they are providing the commander what is needed to make a decision. Such items are merely data points often detached from current or future operations.

Haunted by History, Japanese Americans Fight Trump’s Immigration Crackdown

Jill Cowan 

Source Link

From the passenger seat of a sky blue Prius, Amy Oba craned her neck to get a look at the federal detention center, a hulking tower surrounded by a black chain-link fence and laced with barbed wire. On a recent evening, she was on patrol, part of a group of Japanese Americans who are keeping a watchful eye on the actions of immigration agents in Los Angeles.

“I definitely think about my family when we organize, when we go out on patrols, because that could have been my family in prison,” said Ms. Oba, 33. “It’s just a difference of what, like, 80 years?”

During World War II, Ms. Oba’s grandparents were among the more than 120,000 people of Japanese ancestry who were forced by the federal government to live for years in remote, hastily constructed internment camps across the West.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt, backed by the Supreme Court, treated the Japanese Americans as national security threats because of their ethnicity. Families left behind communities, businesses, homes and even pets. Some of them never returned. It wasn’t until the Reagan administration that the government apologized and said it would pay compensation to families who were affected.

Now, as the Trump administration carries out its immigration crackdown, Japanese Americans see chilling similarities to what their families experienced.

What Do Security Guarantees for Ukraine Mean?

Andreas Umland

Source Link

At the end of the day, Western promises of support for Ukraine cannot replace a strong Ukrainian military as an effective deterrent to Russia.

Since spring 2025, the term “security guarantee” has become a buzzword in international debates about future Western support for Ukraine. Following the conclusion of a ceasefire, ensuring Ukraine’s security is to be a central component of international engagement with the embattled country. However, the term is currently often used in a way that leaves important political and strategic challenges to the implementation of these guarantees unaddressed.

In general, the term “security guarantees” can be misleading: a complete security guarantee is an unattainable illusion, not only for Ukraine but also for every other nation. Expert discussions distinguish between guarantees and (weaker) security commitments, as well as between positive and negative guarantees. As a rule, a positive security guarantee—the type of promise Ukraine is seeking—implies strong commitments on the part of the guarantor to protect the beneficiary.

The different definitions and interpretations of security guarantees, as well as the ambiguities and contradictions implicit in their planning and implementation, pose a problem. Open questions must be clearly identified at the outset. Transparency can help move from purely discursive progress on Kyiv’s future defense needs to a real improvement in Ukraine’s security situation.

There is a risk that the promise that the term “security guarantees” seems to offer will ultimately not be kept. While security guarantees were the subject of intense debate in Europe and beyond in 2025, the specific future challenges they pose remain unclear. Inconsistent implementation of loudly proclaimed support and defense commitments would not only be dangerous for Ukraine but also undermine the already shaken European security order and the rules-based international system.

Lessons From Venezuela For the Indo-Pacific

Khanh Vu Duc

Source Link

The situation with Venezuela is entering a dangerous and uncertain phase. With the US closing Venezuelan airspace, the USS Gerald R. Ford strike group on high alert and covert operations intensifying against narcotics networks, Washington has made clear it is prepared to escalate.

This has important geostrategic implications because Beijing has already been making mischief in America’s backyard, as Asia Sentinel noted on November 28 with its foray in Brazil. Beijing has already become Venezuela’s most important economic lifeline, offering long-term oil concessions, a sweeping zero-tariff agreement, loan restructurings that cement dependency, and deep involvement in digital infrastructure and surveillance systems.

As these inroads occur, President Nicolás Maduro’s hold on power is now the most fragile it has been in years. Under mounting pressure, the Venezuelan military may soon remove him — not to restore democracy, but to save the regime. A “Maduro-lite” order, in which the man disappears but the system survives, is increasingly plausible.

This scenario raises a central question: Would President Trump accept a Venezuela without Maduro but still governed by the same authoritarian structures?

How I Got My Career in Foreign Policy: Inu Manak

Ivana Saric

Source Link

I actually wanted to be an actor. I was doing lots of musical theater and drama classes, and I just loved being on the stage—preparing, remembering lines, dressing up, and singing songs with my friends. So that’s what I always envisioned I would do. And then my parents said, “Well, you probably won’t make a living doing this, so maybe you should think about something else.” Which is why I studied hard and tried to find other things that I was interested in.

So when did you become interested in foreign policy, and I guess, trade and economics?

It started in twelfth grade, when I was taking an international history class. It was an AP elective where we were digging into Canadian and global history from the First World War to the present time. We were having discussions about some of the big questions, like: Why do we have the international system we have today? What were the factors that shaped it? What are the causes of conflict? And this really sparked a big interest in me to learn more about foreign policy.

How North Korea Has Bolstered Russia’s War in Ukraine

Molly Carlough and James Kennedy

Source Link

In the more than three years since Russia invaded Ukraine, North Korea has emerged as a significant ally for Moscow. By first providing ammunition and weapons, then sending thousands of its own troops to fight alongside the Russian military, North Korea has become essential to fueling Russia’s war machine. It has reportedly suffered heavy casualties yet also benefited by modernizing its military and anchoring itself more firmly in an anti-Western coalition led by China and Russia.

How many North Korean soldiers are in Ukraine?

Since the fall of 2024, North Korea has sent between fourteen thousand and fifteen thousand soldiers to fight alongside Russian troops, according to Western officials. This estimate combines the roughly eleven thousand to twelve thousand forces originally deployed in October 2024, and the additional three thousand reserve forces sent to the front lines in the months since to replace battlefield losses.

How Xi Played Trump

Jonathan A. Czin

Source Link

Although U.S. President Donald Trump promised to unleash an economic fusillade on China after his return to the presidency, Beijing has enjoyed a remarkably strong year of diplomacy. The Trump administration resurrected and expanded its first-term trade war with Beijing, claiming it would use trade negotiations with other countries to put pressure on China. Yet Beijing has hardly been isolated internationally: in the months leading up to his October meeting with Trump in South Korea, Chinese leader Xi Jinping hosted a gaggle of foreign heads of state for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit and a military parade. Nor has

Satya Nadella says he spends his weekends studying startups as Microsoft's size has become a 'massive disadvantage'

Thibault Spirlet

Source Link

Speaking with Mathias Döpfner, CEO of Axel Springer — Business Insider's parent company — Nadella said he's spending his weekends studying how startups build products. The reason, he said, is simple: Microsoft's vast size has become "a massive disadvantage" in the race to build AI at startup speed.

"This entire weekend, I spent all the time trying to get myself to understand how new companies are building products," Nadella said in an interview on the "MD MEETS" podcast, hosted by Döpfner and that aired on Saturday.

At young companies, he said, everyone involved in product development — from scientists to engineers to infrastructure teams — is "all sitting in one little table." It means they're able to make decisions on product, science, and infrastructure, and iterate instantly.

The Uncomfortable Truth About Climate AI

Ryan Biller

Source Link

Over the last two decades, climate change has contributed to instability around the world—bolstering the ranks of terror groups, sparking territorial disputes, and triggering mass migration. It’s no wonder that militaries and international security organizations increasingly see climate change as a formidable national security threat, and that they have in turn taken on greater roles in fighting it.

In recent years, new technology has transformed the tools available to mitigate the effects of climate change. Specifically, artificial intelligence (AI) has quickly become a widespread instrument in the climate fight—even as it consumes exceptional amounts of energy and water itself. Today, militaries and nonstate actors, including the United Nations, are leveraging AI to foretell climate-related disasters, optimize energy use, and monitor ecological degradation.