Lieutenant Colonel
Russia’s war in Ukraine has shattered long-held assumptions about air superiority. Events of the past four years have shown that even modern air forces may struggle to dominate contested skies as unmanned aerial systems (UAS) proliferate and aircraft losses increase on both sides.1 While the claims of air superiority’s demise are overstated, one lesson is clear: advanced Integrated Air Defence Systems (IADS) now underpin adversary Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategies and pose a direct challenge to how airpower is employed and sustained in future conflicts.2
NATO’s ability to deter and defend against a modern, IADS-equipped adversary requires a multi-domain suppression campaign that is continuous, adaptive, and resilient. Future suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD) missions cannot rely solely on the traditional air-domain-centric model of airborne SEAD platforms – such as dedicated electronic attack aircraft, Wild Weasel units, and fifth-generation strike fighters- that focus primarily on individual surface-to-air threats. SEAD must evolve to employ all available assets and effects capable of neutralising a sophisticated IADS.3 Persistent electronic attack (EA), cross-domain cyber operations (CO), and precision kinetic effects must be synchronised to create and exploit windows of opportunity at scale. NATO therefore needs a framework that enables these effects to be sustained, which is central to maintaining deterrence, freedom of action, and credibility in collective defence.4
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