February 23, 2015
The way America has waged war in the post-9/11 era is controversial. Conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere evolved into counterinsurgency missions. These efforts are “population-centric”, focused on winning locals to the coalition side. The Abu Ghraib prison abuses and the Senate Intelligence Committee’s report on CIA’s Enhanced Interrogation Program, among other controversies, revealed U.S. actions contrary to such efforts. Despite the focus on COIN and civil affairs operations over the last 15 years of war, there remains disagreement as to how America should be fighting these wars. Critics of the Petraeus-Nagl Doctrine argue that America would be better suited fighting enemies such as al Qaeda, the Taliban, and ISIS much as they fight against America — with “Total War.” Unable to rule out the possibility of fighting future population-centric wars, America must resolve this debate and discard Total War techniques, such as torture, and to respect human rights — both because it is the more effective way to wage modern war and because the military should demonstrate American values abroad.
Total War
Total War is the subordination of political goals to the prosecution of war. Its only options are total victory or total defeat, and it is acceptable to attack enemy states or organizations without moral or legal discrimination between combatants and noncombatants. Total War is “fought heedless of the restraints of morality, custom, or international law…The most crucial determinant of total war is the widespread, indiscriminate, and deliberate inclusion of civilians as legitimate military targets.”
In the current operating environment, total war is the use of violence that does not discriminate between combatants and non-combatants. This can be the punishment of whole populations for the actions of a few, creating free-fire zones in areas with known civilian populations, or the indiscriminate bombardment of urban areas to quell resistance. It includes taking the enemy’s family members prisoner to use as leverage or torturing detainees to gain information.
Rather than outright acceptance or rejection of total war based on philosophy or ethics, leaders should examine its effectiveness at the tactical, operational, strategic, and policy levels.
Limited Success to Total Failure
Rather than outright acceptance or rejection of total war based on philosophy or ethics, leaders should examine its effectiveness at the tactical, operational, strategic, and policy levels.
Tactically, total war techniques have had successes. French paratroopers fighting in the Algerian War of Independence saw tactical success from the use of torture. Their techniques, vividly depicted in The Battle of Algiers, helped identify and destroy the National Liberation Front, temporarily suppressing the insurgency. Similarly, Britain’s bombing of population centers and village burnings during the Iraqi Revolt of 1920 helped temporarily suppress an insurgency.
The United States has had more dubious results. Torture has been of questionable utility. Government spokesmen claimed CIA’s use of waterboarding and other “enhanced interrogation techniques” led to the killing of Osama Bin Laden among other successes, but the Senate Intelligence Committee’s report has cast doubt on this claim. In wars among populations, harsh interrogation techniques can produce short-term results, but may also result in the occupying force becoming isolated from the population it relies on to provide information about enemy forces.
Total war techniques have some utility at the operational level in wars among populations. The most successful forces in conflicts of this type usually focus on resolving the underlying cause of either the insurgency or the population’s support of the insurgency. But every conflict is different, so the effectiveness of indiscriminate violence and torture varies based on the particulars of the situation.
Total war loses its utility at the strategic level. Modern expeditionary forces are unlikely to experience battlefield defeats that threaten overall military failure. The internal center of gravity for states fighting expeditionary-style warfare is domestic support for the war. Domestic support is less reliable during expeditionary warfare–particularly counterinsurgencies–because these conflicts are usually wars of choice. When the American public learns its military is committing human rights violations, they lose faith in the righteousness of its efforts. The French population’s support for the war in Algeria foundered after the people learned their soldiers frequently tortured Algerians, contributing to the dissolution of the Fourth Republic. The US military experienced a milder version of this after evidence of the massacres at My Lai and Haditha and of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib emerged.
When the population loses faith in its military, the ability of the United States to successfully prosecute a war weakens as surely as if it were losing battles. Broadly speaking, harsh techniques are more effective when a government uses them against domestic actors than when an expeditionary force uses them. Domestic governments are less likely to fight wars of choice, and therefore receive stronger support from at least part of their population.
Total war truly fails at the policy level. Just War theory states that the only valid reason to go to war is to create a better peace. If America wants to create a better peace, it needs to live up to the values and ideals it champions. Deliberately violating America’s espoused values creates a different set of values, changing the national identity for the worse. The desired end-state of any military action is not just defined by what happens to America’s enemies–it is also defined by what America does to itself. If America’s national identity changes from a state that embraces freedom and human rights to that of a state willing to employ any means most convenient to win wars, the United States must question if it is a victory worth winning.
Total War’s Place
There are several arguments made to support total war. Some attempt to use history to demonstrate that it has worked in the past, citing Sherman’s march to the sea, the strategic bombing campaigns of World War II, or the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In each of these cases the United States military did not seek to avoid offending the cultural sensitivities of its enemies and instead got down to the real business of war: Destruction.
This is a deeply flawed argument. The military’s job is to use force or the threat of force to cause others to do what it wants, not just to break things and kill people. Disregarding the significant changes in media since these wars, during WWII and the Civil War the United States chose to achieve victory by destroying its enemies’ armed forces and production capacity, stripping them of the ability to resist.
The most effective methods included strategic bombing campaigns, nuclear weapons, and Sherman’s “scorched earth.” This differs from the now far more common wars among populations, particularly counterinsurgencies. In these fights, victory comes from convincing the population to stop supporting insurgents and start supporting the expeditionary force or its partner government. With victory dependent on the population’s choices, indiscriminate violence that alienates them interferes with progress. In the WWII and Civil War paradigm, America made war against an entire people. In the modern paradigm of war among populations, the United States fights a small segment of the population while trying to turn the rest into allies.
Others argue that Total War is the only way to defeat insurgencies, and America’s military could accomplish its mission if only the American population had the will to do what is necessary. This theory has at least two errors. First, little evidence exists to support the idea that a military unconstrained by rules of engagement or ethics will fight more effectively in today’s environment. Returning to the Civil War and WWII paradigm, destroying the production capacity of an insurgency usually proves insufficient given their limited logistical needs. Destroying an insurgency’s armed forces through attrition does not work. As long as there is a population and an appealing cause, there will be more insurgents.
The second error is that even if Total War works at the tactical and operational level–an uncertain claim–Americans will not support inhumane methods in a war of choice. Those proposing total war seem frustrated by restrictions and the ability of relatively weak states or organizations to defy major powers. Military and political leaders need to plan and work in the real world, not to make plans for methods that could work if only the military receives support it never will.
Total war may have its place in future state-on-state wars if the strategic calculus returns to destroying a state’s capacity to conduct war. Even in wars among populations, war is inherently violent and ugly. If it was not, it would be called diplomacy, not war. But insisting that war must be as violent and ugly as possible is as wrong as insisting that optimism and good intentions can make it nice. Wars among populations are difficult problems that America has not yet figured out how to solve efficiently. The military needs to focus doctrinal innovation towards solving these problems more economically and effectively. But the dialogue required for progress needs to focus on developing new techniques and theories for how to accomplish policy goals. Calls for Total War solutions that fail at the strategic and policy level will not help.
Captain Justin Lynch graduated from the United States Military Academy with a B.S. in Military History and commissioned in the Army. He has served as a platoon leader in Afghanistan, a company executive officer in Iraq, an assistant operations officer, a company commander, and is currently the training officer at the Northern Warfare Training Center. He has previously written for Infantry, Small Wars Journal, and War on the Rocks. The views expressed are his alone and do not represent those of the United States Army or Department of Defense.
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