Yu-cheng Chen, K. Tristan Tang
Since July 2024, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has further intensified its maritime incursions into Taiwan’s waters. For instance, on July 2, a China Coast Guard (CCG) vessel detained the Taiwanese fishing boat Dajinman 88 (倧ι²ζ»Ώ88θ) off the coast of Fujian (CNA, July 3). Additionally, on August 17–18, several official vessels, including the Hai Xun 06 (ζ΅·ε·‘06) under the PRC Ministry of Transport, conducted the “2024 Taiwan Strait Maritime Patrol and Law Enforcement Action (2024εΉ΄ε°ζΉΎζ΅·ε³‘ζ΅·δΈε·‘θͺζ§ζ³θ‘ε¨)” within the Taiwan Strait, crossing the median line (Xinhua, August 20). As analysts have observed, the PRC has increasingly engaged in gray-zone operations against Taiwan this year (see China Brief, March 29; July 26). The PRC’s objectives now extend beyond gray-zone incursions. The aim is to assert greater jurisdiction over the Taiwan Strait.
By unilaterally expanding its jurisdiction, the PRC seeks to enhance its administrative control and governance capabilities over the Taiwan Strait, establish customary practices, and legitimize its jurisdictional actions. Previous gray-zone operations mainly involved PRC harassment of other parties without escalating to formal conflict. Since July 2024, such operations have expanded to include harassment of Kinmen, interference with Taiwanese fishing vessels, and new patrol patterns from PRC official vessels.
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