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9 August 2025

A New Strategic Review for a New Age


Contemporary U.S. plans for the modernization of nuclear forces are an approximately 15-year-old legacy of the Obama Administration. They were not established in anticipation of the dramatic changes in the security environment since 2010—when it was assumed that a one-for-one replacement for the legacy nuclear delivery systems and the New START Treaty limit on nuclear weapon numbers would be more than adequate. Rather, the existing nuclear modernization program was established at a time when many U.S. officials continued to believe that U.S. 

relations with Russia and China were relatively benign and would remain so, or improve further. How the contemporary nuclear program, largely inherited from the Obama Administration, fares over the next few years, and how the new presidential administration entering office in 2025 decides to adapt the U.S. nuclear posture for the much more dynamic and dangerous contemporary threat environment will affect the US strategic and non-strategic nuclear posture for decades, and, correspondingly, U.S. deterrence strategies and options.

This study examines several key issues: developments in the international threat environment; U.S. deterrence goals in that contemporary threat environment; needed adjustments in U.S. deterrence strategies and force posture, and for the assurance of allies; and, near-term initiatives and decisions needed to enable the United States to move toward a force posture that is fit to address contemporary threats. Unfortunately, given the past four decades of deep U.S. strategic and non-strategic force reductions and the atrophying of the U.S. nuclear production infrastructure, the United States has a limited near-term capacity to strengthen its nuclear force posture in response to an unprecedentedly threatening security environment.

Given contemporary threats, whatever may be the preferred future U.S. nuclear force posture and characteristics for deterrence and allied assurance purposes, the reality is that U.S. options for adjustment are largely limited through the early 2030s to available nuclear systems and warheads. Uploading the existing Triad of nuclear forces is the only near-term option to strengthen U.S. deterrence force numbers to meet looming threats, pending the deployment of new U.S. strategic systems in the 2030s.

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