Seong-Hyon Lee
On September 4, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) published the readout of a leaders meeting between Xi Jinping and North Korea’s Kim Jong Un. The document highlighted the themes of “traditional friendship” (ไผ ็ปๅๅฅฝ), a “shared destiny” (ๅฝ่ฟไธๅ
ฑ), and “mutual vigilance and support” (ๅฎๆ็ธๅฉ). It called especially for deeper exchanges in the “governance of party and state affairs” (ๆทฑๅไธคๅ
ๆฒปๅฝ็ๆฟ็ป้ชไบคๆตไบ้ด) (MFA, September 4). Notably, it omitted “denuclearization.” Four weeks later, the official readout from the meeting between the two countries’ foreign ministers similarly omitted the term, instead elevating governance exchanges among socialist parties (MFA, September 28). When Premier Li Qiang (ๆๅผบ) met Kim Jong Un on October 9, People’s Daily coverage likewise celebrated “traditional friendship and cooperation” (ไผ ็ปๅๅฅฝๅไฝๅ
ณ็ณป) without reference to denuclearization (People’s Daily, October 10). The pattern has now hardened into a deliberate tifa (ๆๆณ)—a formalized policy wording.
This shift was further confirmed in Gyeongju during the November 1 APEC leaders’ summit. South Korean President Lee Jae-myung held his first bilateral meeting with Xi, in which he called for PRC assistance on denuclearization of the peninsula (YouTube/Yonhap News TV, October 29). Yet the PRC readout entirely omitted the words “denuclearization” (ๆ ๆ ธๅ), “Korean Peninsula” (ๅๅฒ), and “North Korea” (ๆ้ฒ) (MFA, November 1). This “split readout” was no clerical slip. In PRC political discourse, such formulation changes never occur by chance. A stock phrase dropped four times in three months across leader-, premier-, and minister-level texts signals deliberate recalibration. Beijing now acknowledges a nuclear Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) as reality, not aberration.
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