Indian Strategic Studies: 06/26/25

26 June 2025

India Turns East: International Engagement and U.S.-China Rivalry

The Elephant Looks around the Dragon Aparna Pande The belief in India as an Asian leader and a model for other countries in the region has been deeply ingrained in Indian thinking for centuries. The 1947 Asian Relations Conference and the 1955 Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung—which served as the launching pad for the Non-Aligned Movement—advanced India’s aspiration to emerge as the leader of formerly colonized nations. That hope, however, was never fulfilled. Instead, India remained bogged down in South Asian politics and security challenges, first from Pakistan and later from China.

Slow economic growth also impeded India’s efforts to play a greater role on the world stage and resulted in an inward orientation for more than four decades. In the early 1990s, the end of the Cold War triggered both domestic and international changes,

compelling New Delhi to implement economic reforms and rebuild relations with countries in Southeast and East Asia. India’s antagonistic relationship with China has always framed both its perception of East Asia and how countries in the region view India. As India opened its economy, it sought economic partners,

partly to offset the impact of growing Chinese economic and military prowess. Countries in East Asia turned to India as they looked for options beyond China. As India deepened ties with the primary military and economic power in the Asia-Pacific, the United States, it became easier to forge closer ties with countries that were U.S. allies. While the initial pillar of the Look East policy was economic, over the last three decades India’s relations with Southeast and East Asia have acquired strategic and military dimensions as well. Moreover,

most countries in Asia are beginning to consider China an economic and military great power that seeks to undermine the international liberal order established by the United States and its allies at the end of World War II. Washington and its allies see India as a like-minded democratic, free-market society that will help uphold this rules-based order. The 2015 U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision on the need for a free and peaceful Indo-Pacific and India’s participation in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—a strategic grouping of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States—reflect this view.

Cooperation, Coexistence, and Contestation in India’s and China’s Overlapping Strategic Spaces

By dint of their geographies, partnerships, development imperatives, and broader objectives, China and India have had overlapping strategic spaces since India became independent in 1947 and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) came into being in 1949. As their interests and capabilities—and thus reach—have grown,

the theater of their strategic interaction has expanded to encompass a wider geography and multiple domains. It has evolved from primarily the bilateral space and a focus on their borderlands to include regional and global spaces, as well as the diplomatic, geopolitical, economic, technological, and ideological spheres.

There has been some Sino-Indian cooperation in these spaces, but more often there has been competition—and it has become more intense over time. The phases of cooperation and contestation have been sequential, with both elements present but one dominant. This essay outlines these periods of early competition and collaboration, of coexistence and cooperation, and then a return to contestation.

Cooperation or coexistence has dominated when China and India have seen the other, on balance, as enabling their broader interests. That was the case in the 1950s and the 2000s. These were periods when there was a sense, as reflected in a 2010 joint statement, that there was “enough space in the world for the development of both India and China and indeed, enough areas for India and China to cooperate.”1 But when Beijing or New Delhi has seen the other as constraining its diplomatic,

geopolitical, or economic space—bilaterally, regionally or globally—this has led to contestation and even collision. That is the phase the countries are in today, and indeed have been in for the last decade and a half. There is not just one site of divergence (e.g., their border). Instead, the differences are about a sense of their own place and strategic space—and each country’s view that the other will impinge on rather than increase it.

Fortress America: India’s gateway to global innovation

Ananya Raj Kakoti

This article is authored by Ananya Raj Kakoti, scholar, international relations, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

Donald Trump’s return to the White House has reignited familiar fires: nationalist trade wars, stricter immigration, and a cold shoulder to international students and tech collaboration. But beneath the surface of this hardline resurgence lies a quiet irony—by closing its doors, America may be opening new ones elsewhere.PREMIUMUS President Donald Trump

For India, this is not just an economic opportunity. It’s a strategic moment to step into the vacuum and shape the next wave of global innovation.

Already, we are seeing signals of a shift. Canada, Europe, Australia, and even Southeast Asian nations are wooing researchers, startups, and students displaced by the US’s policies.

The idea of a multipolar innovation ecosystem—where talent circulates more freely between regional hubs—is gaining momentum.AI and deep tech: Build global research and development (R&D) partnerships and incubate indigenous solutions.

Green economy: Leverage India’s leadership in solar and emerging hydrogen capabilities.

Advanced manufacturing: Cement India’s place in the electronics and semiconductor supply chain.

Taiwan Adds New Export Controls on China’s Chip Industry

Megha Shrivastava

The recent salvo of export control measures against China’s semiconductor industry came not from the United States, but Taiwan. On June 14, Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs added a total of 601 entities to its trade blacklist – including China’s Huawei and Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), alongside organizations like al-Qaida and the Taliban. This move will require Taiwanese companies to obtain government licenses in order to ship to SMIC or Huawei. Though the International Trade Administration of Taiwan highlights larger national security considerations, the move signifies Taiwan’s rising position in the global chip supply chain.

Taiwan’s strategic value in the global semiconductor supply chain derives from its near-monopoly over cutting-edge chip manufacturing. For decades, its predominant position in the global chip value chain, especially through TSMC, has left both the United States and China economically and technologically dependent on Taiwan, arguably preventing cross-strait tensions from escalating to a forceful military occupation by China. The blacklisting of Huawei and SMIC signifies a conscious shift in Taiwan’s role from a neutral supplier in the tech ecosystem to an assertive actor holding a crucial position in the global supply chain.

In addition to that, there are two reasons why Taiwan’s move to restrict exports to SMIC and Huawei remains significant. First, this policy is unfolding at a time when the current U.S. policies appear to be more inward-looking, and Washington’s attention to tightening export controls remains low. Second, China’s two chip giants, Huawei and SMIC – specializing in the design and foundry sectors, respectively – are making coordinated strides at bypassing the controls and achieving breakthroughs in independent innovation.

Chinese companies’ breakthroughs – indicating rising indigenous chip development capabilities – often highlight their ability to bypass U.S. sanctions. TSMC’s business with Chinese companies, despite U.S. sanctions, was seen as a major loophole; TSMC chips are reportedly found in Huawei products. Taiwan’s blacklisting of exports to these Chinese firms now tightens the grip of U.S. policies, plugging a key gap in the export control regime that had previously allowed Chinese firms to access critical components via indirect routes.

Iranians Put Faith in Diplomacy. Israel and Trump Shattered Their Hopes | Opinion

Alex Shams

Every night for the last week, my family in Tehran wakes up to the Earth shaking as missiles strike and children scream. When the bombs go silent, they hear drones buzzing—a constant reminder they're being watched by the foreign army assaulting their city.

Last week, Israel launched a surprise attack on Iran. Over 600 people have died, the majority civilians, including entire families killed while asleep. It has bombed Iran's state TV live on air, killing at least one journalist. Israeli bombs have hit hospitals and ambulances, killing paramedics. Medical facilities are overflowing with the injured.

Smoke rises from the state media building targeted by Israel in the north of Tehran, Iran, on June 18, 2025, as the military confrontation between Iran and Israel escalates. NIKAN/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images

Israel says it targets military bases and nuclear sites. But its bombs have struck homes across the country. President Donald Trump said Tehran should evacuate—a threat to the entire civilian population. Tehran is a vast city of 10 million people. In June,

the flowers are in bloom and the rivers overflow with glacier water. Mountain hiking paths fill with people. Tehran is also a diverse city. I lived near a church, close to a synagogue and Zoroastrian temple. There are Sunni and Shiite Muslims, atheists and Baha'is, Afghan and Iraqi refugees.

Today everyone in Tehran is experiencing terror.

Israel gives evacuation orders, like in Gaza and Lebanon. But it's impossible for everyone to leave. Many orders go out at night, when Iranians are asleep. Israel has hit fuel depots, causing gasoline shortages. On Monday, Israel told residents of District 3 to leave—300,000 people live there, including my family. They have nowhere to go. Many of my friends have also stayed to take care of elderly relatives.

Under the mountain: what Israel needs and Trump must decide

Kurt Davis

As Israel escalates its confrontation with Iran, Donald Trump faces a defining foreign policy test. The choice before him is not between diplomacy and war. Diplomacy has largely been exhausted; war, in some form, is already underway.

The real question is more consequential and more concrete: should the United States supply Israel with its most formidable non-nuclear weapon, the 30,000-pound bunker buster, which only America has the air power capability to deliver?

These Massive Ordnance Penetrators (MOPs) are designed for a singular purpose: to destroy deeply fortified targets, such as Iran’s hardened nuclear facilities. Fordow, Iran’s mountain-buried enrichment facility, was built to survive conventional airstrikes.

For years, US policy rested on a mix of sanctions and diplomacy, backed by the unspoken threat of these weapons. That deterrent is now being tested.

Israel, having demonstrated its military capabilities in Gaza and against Hezbollah, is now striking Iranian nuclear scientists and sites and senior military commanders. There is growing confidence in Jerusalem that it can push further, potentially taking out Iran’s political leadership.

Trump himself recently claimed to have vetoed an Israeli request to target Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. From Israel’s perspective, Iran is advancing too close to nuclear breakout, and the margin for delay is vanishing. Yet Israel still lacks the means to destroy Iran’s most hardened assets. Only the US can fill that gap—and must now decide whether to do so.

Will Iran Surrender?

There is an update at the end of this post written on Sunday morning following the US bombing of Iran's nuclear facilities.

The first round of high-level diplomacy geared to persuading Iran that the game is up and that it should accept the strictest limits on its nuclear programme took place on 20 June in Geneva between European foreign ministers and their Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi.

The talks ended with European claims that the discussions had been constructive, Iranian insistence that nothing could be done until Israel abandons its aggression, and President Trump suggesting it was all a waste of time. It wasn’t that he was opposed to diplomacy, or even a ceasefire.

His point was that only direct talks between the US and Iran would make any sense. Israel was not involved in any of these discussions, although it did participate in a fiery debate at the United Nations. Otherwise its main contribution was to remind everyone, and in particular Iran, that it was prepared to keep up its campaign for some time.

If Trump had looked more carefully at what the Europeans were saying he would have appreciated that they were also urging the Iranians to talk to the Americans, and on a much broader agenda than before. Not only will they need to make major concessions on its nuclear programme, of the sort they were unprepared to make at the start of the month,

but they will also need to restrict their missile programme and activist role in the region. These concessions will only happen, if at all, when the Iranians are not only convinced privately that they are losing but that they are prepared to acknowledge it publicly. This moment may not come as long as they can keep firing missiles into Israeli cities.

u.s.-china competition

for Global Influence © 2020 The National Bureau of Asian Research restrictions on use: This PDF is provided for the use of authorized recipients only. For specific terms of use, please contact . To purchase U.S.-China Competition for Global Influence,

please visit . India Managing U.S.-China Rivalry: India’s Non-escalatory Reinforcement Frédéric Grare executive summary This chapter examines how India manages the tensions between the U.S. and China vis-à-vis its own independent efforts of balancing

China while maintaining some form of cooperation. main argument The intensification of the rivalry between the U.S. and China does not change the nature of the challenges to India’s interests. It does, however, exacerbate the tensions and potential contradictions within Indian foreign policy. This is particularly true with regard to India’s relations with China. China’s growing rivalry with the U.S. does not substantially alter its differences with India, but in a context of growing polarization, this rivalry tends to transform those differences into leverage points for China to try to weaken the links between India and the U.S. Similarly,

it does not affect the congruence between U.S. and Indian objectives but does strain the condition under which this congruence could be translated into actual cooperation. policy implications • India’s strategic, political, and economic interests converge with those of the U.S., and New Delhi will not do anything that may undermine Washington’s position vis-à-vis China so long as U.S. policies will not affect major Indian interests. It could therefore be counterproductive for the U.S. to be excessively transactional or try to coerce India into policies that are detrimental to its regional interests.

• Possible U.S. frustration will be subtly compensated for by India mobilizing capacity around U.S. objectives in places where the U.S. is quasi-absent. The inclusion of the East African shores in the Indian concept of the Indo-Pacific should be understood in this perspective.

• The slow pace of Indian economic reforms generates questions regarding India’s ability to manage its power asymmetry with China. The U.S. should therefore manage its own expectations and incentivize, rather than coerce, India to reform.

Iran’s Use Of Psychological Warfare Against Its Adversaries And Strategies For Deterrence – Analysis

Middle East Quarterly / Babak Taghvaee

The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB)—Iran’s state-controlled media corporation—holds a monopoly over the country’s domestic radio and television services. 1 Accordingly, it plays a central role in Iran’s psychological operations against political adversaries—operations commonly understood as components of the regime’s “soft war.” 2

The IRIB operates alongside news outlets affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as well as a network of IRGC-controlled psychological warfare units and front companies. Together, these entities form the core of Iran’s state-directed influence apparatus that target adversaries. As of March 13, 2025, the IRIB controls approximately 376 million U.S. dollars (about 35,000 billion tomans) that it allocates toward psychological warfare.3 In recent years, the U.S. Treasury Department has sanctioned the IRIB and affiliated media organizations for their involvement in human rights violations. 4 However, these sanctions have not significantly impeded the IRIB’s initiatives.

Over time, the regime’s propaganda warfare tactics have evolved into a comprehensive system of influence operations. 5 These activities have not only expanded Tehran’s reach beyond its borders but also endangered the national security of its adversaries. 6 They range from incitement and orchestrated unrest to the recruitment of foreign nationals who carry out acts of terrorism and sabotage, and engage in espionage across Europe and North America. 7

The U.S. Treasury Department’s sanctions8 have frequently targeted the financial arms of the IRIB, aiming to impose financial costs on the managers and authorities who oversee the regime’s propaganda apparatus. However, these measures have largely failed to disrupt the IRIB’s operations in any meaningful way. A key reason for this failure has been the active role played by Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in helping these entities to evade sanctions.9

This paper draws on six years of comprehensive research focused on identifying the threats posed by Iran’s propaganda warfare apparatus against regime critics. Its principal goal is to recommend effective strategies to fully neutralize these threats.

Advanced Weapons Alone Won’t Win Tomorrow’s Wars

The war in Ukraine has shown that success in modern combat depends less on superior equipment than on the ability to adapt quickly to changing conditions. To prevail in future conflicts, Western countries must maintain financial flexibility and combine advanced systems with scalable low-tech solutions.

PARIS – When we think about the future of warfare, it’s tempting to imagine a world dominated by advanced technologies: AI-powered drones, hypersonic missiles, and satellites coordinating every move. But the war in Ukraine has shown that high-tech capabilities alone don’t win wars. Victory also depends on low-tech solutions – and on rapidly and cheaply integrating the two.

Western powers have long assumed that their technological edge would guarantee victory in any future conflict. The reasoning is simple: if your weapons are smarter, faster, and more precise, you win.

But the Ukraine war has revealed the limits of this thinking. While high-tech systems can be devastatingly effective, they often provide only a temporary strategic advantage. “Stupid” tech – simple, cheap, and widely available – is just as important.

Drones are a prime example. Cruise missiles may be technological marvels, but in Ukraine, it’s swarms of low-cost commercial drones that are making headlines. This was evident in this month’s “Operation Spider’s Web,” in which Ukraine used low-tech first-person view (FPV) drones to destroy Russian aircraft worth billions of dollars.

Off-the-shelf quadcopters have transformed reconnaissance, targeting, and even direct attacks. Their effectiveness comes not from cutting-edge components but from sheer volume, low cost, and the ingenuity of thousands of innovators who can rapidly scale and modify production. Whenever Russia introduces new countermeasures, new drone variants emerge – a continuous cycle of innovation that keeps them effective.

The Quiet Crisis: How Do Arab States Currently View Israel?

During Israel’s ongoing war, the Arab peace states—especially Egypt, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates—have expressed deep mistrust, frustration, and even bewilderment over Israel’s conduct. These sentiments have recently intensified and appear to have reached a peak. While these countries acknowledge Israel’s military achievements and recognize that they could have a positive impact on the Middle East, they are also profoundly disturbed by what they perceive as Israel’s rigid, one-dimensional militaristic approach—namely, the persistent and exclusive use of military force. According to prevailing views in Arab diplomatic and policy circles,

Israel’s current strategy overlooks the opportunity to end the war and fails to translate military gains into diplomatic initiatives. This failure undermines the prospect of advancing a political process aimed at resolving the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and shaping a new reality of peace and prosperity in the region.

A related criticism from the Arab peace states focuses on the sheer magnitude of force Israel has used against the Gaza Strip and its civilian population. Images circulated in Arab media showing the suffering of women and children in Gaza—accompanied by accusations of genocide—are likely to weigh heavily on any future efforts to restore normal relations with Israel.

Despite this, the Arab peace states remain committed to their peace agreements with Israel and to the broader vision of normalization and regional integration—publicly as well. They have even proposed flexible frameworks for establishing a political horizon in the post-war period. However, there is growing concern that Israel’s current policy may cause multidimensional harm to bilateral relations: eroding trust between official leaderships,

fueling anti-Israel sentiment among the Arab public, and strengthening radical Islamist factions. This evolving reality not only undermines the potential for normalization but also impairs the actual progress made thus far, while reinforcing Arab tendencies to pursue regional strategies that deliberately exclude Israel.

The Campaign against Iran: Situation Assessment, Dilemmas, and Implications

Three days into the campaign between Israel and Iran, Tehran is approaching a crossroads regarding the continuation of hostilities, a potential exit strategy, and a possible post-conflict arrangement. For now, Iran remains focused on managing the war.

However, as the campaign continues and the damage accumulates, Tehran will need to choose between maintaining the current level of confrontation, ending the fighting through a political arrangement, or escalating further—potentially by withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

This decision will be guided by Tehran’s assessment of the best path to preserve regime survival, its nuclear program, and its broader strategic capabilities. A critical dilemma will confront the Iranian leadership once the campaign ends:

Whether to risk the regime’s short-term stability by prolonging the confrontation—especially given the potential for direct US involvement—or to abandon domestic uranium enrichment, which the regime views as a vital “insurance policy” for its survival.

Israel, for its part, faces two main options: to continue and expand the campaign in order to consolidate operational gains—despite the likely cost in casualties and damage to the home front—or to pursue a ceasefire once it determines that its key objectives, particularly those related to Iran’s nuclear program, have been met. In either case, Israel must remain prepared for ongoing conflict to preserve its achievements and, above all, to prevent Iran from restoring its nuclear capabilities—or worse, breaking out to nuclear weapons based on the capabilities it still retains.

What Can We Learn from Israel’s Attack on Iran

Israel’s swift strike on Iran was marked by precision and maximum surprise. While it has secured significant gains including degrading Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities, Israel must remain focused on its primary objective: delivering a decisive blow to Iran’s critical nuclear infrastructure. To achieve this, Israel should leverage its military campaign—alongside the credible threat of American involvement—to pursue a sustainable diplomatic outcome that denies Iran the capacity to have a nuclear weapon for many years to come.

On June 13, 2025, Israel launched a direct and sustained attack on Iran—a calculated and multi-layered military operation that marked the culmination of years of strategic buildup, intelligence assessments, and unheeded warnings. While the world debates the implications, the more important question is: What can we learn from this operation?

Why Now?

To understand the timing, one must recognize the growing urgency in Israeli assessments over the past year. Iran had been accelerating its nuclear enrichment program and advancing weaponization research at an alarming pace. At the same time, it became increasingly immune to deterrence. Iran dismissed US efforts to signal a credible military threat and interpreted international caution as strategic paralysis.

Most critically, Tehran misjudged Israel’s resolve. In the wake of the October 7th attack by Hamas—a day that fundamentally changed Israeli strategic thinking—it became clear that existential threats would no longer be managed with ambiguity. For Israel, the combination of unchecked uranium enrichment and Iranian defiance left no option but military action. War, at this point, was not a question of preference it was a matter of national survival.

How Did Israel Strike?

The Israeli campaign was defined by one crucial military principle: surprise. The initial phase of the operation targeted Iran’s ability to respond. Israel sought to decapitate both the leadership and the operational infrastructure that could enable a counterstrike. The groundwork for this was laid months earlier, on October 26, 2024, when Israel covertly dismantled key segments of Iran’s air defense systems. This preliminary strike created a corridor of vulnerability, enabling a stealth offensive when the time came.

Israel’s attack and the limits of Iran’s missile strategy

Israel’s attack on Iran has exposed critical weaknesses in Tehran’s broader military strategy. While Iran still has untapped shorter-range capabilities it could deploy in its immediate neighbourhood, its depleted medium-range missile arsenal and weakened regional allies leave it with limited options for retaliation against Israel.

On 13 June 2025, following months of escalating tension and limited reciprocal strikes, Israel launched a large-scale attack on Iran’s nuclear programme and conventional military capabilities. In addition to nuclear facilities, the initial strike waves appear to have prioritised time-sensitive targets such as nuclear scientists,

senior military commanders including Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Hossein Salami and IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh, as well as air defence systems.

As part of the opening campaign, Israel targeted ballistic missile assets expected to play a central role in Iran’s anticipated retaliation. Strikes were conducted against major missile sites in western Iran, including underground bases in Khorramabad, Kermanshah, and Tabriz. In parallel, Israel employed small uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs),

reportedly smuggled into Iran by its intelligence services, against air defence systems and road-mobile ballistic missile launchers. Israel has long pioneered the use of such UAVs for stand-off sabotage, previously deploying explosive-laden drones against critical nodes in Iran’s nuclear and missile programmes.

The operational freedom gained through the destruction of Iranian air defences then enabled the Israeli Air Force to conduct dynamic targeting of mobile missile launchers using more conventional strike assets. According to the Israeli Air Force, the service destroyed about 120 launchers as of 16 June, representing roughly a third of Iran’s pre-war inventory.

How Iran Lost

On June 12, Israel unleashed a series of strikes that damaged Iranian nuclear facilities and missile sites, destroyed gas depots, and, critically, killed scores of top regime officials. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei remains alive.

But his most important deputies—including Mohammad Bagheri, the chief of staff of the armed forces, and Hossein Salami, the commander in chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—are dead.

A few years ago, the sudden, near-simultaneous killing of Bagheri, Salami, and a host of other senior leaders would have been unthinkable. Over three decades, the hard-liners who control Iran’s regime had built

Only Democracy Can End Iran’s Nuclear Threat

Thanks to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran has spent almost four decades on a path to war with Israel, which he calls a “cancer” in the region that must be annihilated. Without a change of regime by the people of Iran, for the people of Iran, there can be no long-term stability and prosperity there and in the region.

STANFORD – When a madman throws a stone down a well, according to an ancient Iranian aphorism, ten wise men and women are needed to remove it. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s currently secluded supreme leader, was that madman, and now many people in Iran and around the world are trying to salvage the well.\

Thanks to Khamenei, Iran has spent almost four decades on a path to war with Israel, which he calls a “cancer” in the region that must be annihilated. At the same time, the regime managed to stave off a showdown unwanted by Iran’s people and unwarranted by Iran’s national interest. Iran’s rulers could rely on bluff and bluster, proxies like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Assad regime in Syria, many Israelis’ reluctance to risk full-scale war, and its ability to use its nuclear program to wring concessions from Western powers.

The regime had plenty of warning signs about its unprecedented weakness at home and isolation in the region. There was Donald Trump’s return to the White House, Israel’s brutal but efficient destruction of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, economic collapse – evident in sharp currency depreciation, a truckers strike, and widespread gas and electricity shortages – and a rising tide of women’s civil disobedience over forced veiling.

Enough is enough: Europe needs to oppose Israel’s aggression

Israel has become the Middle East’s leading destabiliser, threatening key European interests. Europe must avoid making the same mistakes that led to the 2003 Iraq invasion, prioritise diplomacy and urge the US not to get entangled in a war with Iran

Israel’s war of choice against Iran is quickly approaching the point of no return. If the United States joins the fray, as President Donald Trump is close to authorising, the war will become more destructive and could destabilise Europe’s regional allies with far-reaching consequences.

At this pivotal moment, European governments openly supporting Israeli strikes as “doing our dirty work” must come to their senses. Europeans should use their long-standing relationship with Israel to vocally demand it halts the war, while urgently ramping up diplomatic efforts with Arab powers to press Trump to not join the campaign.

This means not just withdrawing European political cover and longstanding military assistance but also adopting sanctions on Israel and suspending preferential trade deals, to ensure constructive movement on Iran, as well as wider regional issues where Israel is also pursuing conflict, most urgently in Gaza.

On the US-Iran front, there is still a narrow space to press for renewed diplomacy to ensure Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon and to secure regional peace. It is positive that the E3 foreign ministers—in coordination with the United States—will meet with their Iranian counterpart on June 20th. This is a critical moment which both the Iranian and European parties should view as a last chance to avert an Iran-US conflict.

The Israel-Iran war: Scenarios for the days — and years — ahead

Barely a week into Israel’s large-scale military campaign against Iran, the prospects for a diplomatic resolution are rapidly vanishing — if they have not already. What began as an effort to halt Iran’s nuclear program has morphed into a broader Israeli campaign aimed at degrading the regime’s security, economic, and political infrastructure in order to enable or encourage regime change.

This evolving confrontation places the Islamic Republic of Iran at a critical inflection point. Tehran faces choices that range from limited negotiation and strategic restraint to escalation and eventual collapse. The following analysis explores the key scenarios that could unfold in the coming days, weeks, and years.

I. A vanishing diplomatic off-ramp

Theoretically, a negotiated de-escalation is still possible. But the political and strategic costs for Tehran would be staggering. To satisfy President Donald Trump — and the new negotiator at the table, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — Tehran would likely have to offer: complete cessation of uranium enrichment down to zero; full dismantlement of enrichment infrastructure, including Fordow and Natanz, under stringent inspections led by the United States; and sharp reductions in its ballistic missile arsenal and manufacturing capacities, and maybe in its drone arsenal and factories as well. In addition, Israel would insist on the dismantling or disbanding of regional militias in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen.

The Lying Lion and the Hapless President – Has Netanyahu Put Trump in a Bind?

At last, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has crossed the Rubicon and unleashed the war on Iran it has relentlessly sought for thirty years. The onslaught on Iran’s leadership and nuclear programme is the latest act in a strategy to redraw the regional balance of power from the Levant to the Persian Gulf following Hamas’s attack on 7 October 2023. Although Israel’s offensive has been in the offing for quite some time, the manner and timing of it was dictated by the uncertainty and confusion of the US Administration under President Donald Trump.

Last act of a tragedy

Israel’s response to the 7 October shock has sprung out from a resolve to make full use of its technological and military superiority, as well as the political capital of Western governments’ solidarity, to change the rules of the game, in Palestine and beyond. Its actions, entirely based on military strength, have been unfolding in ever-widening circles.

While decimating Hamas – and pulverising and starving Gaza in the process – as well as turning the screw on Palestinians in the West Bank, Israel has proceeded to strike all its enemies in the region. In Lebanon, it did away with the leadership and severely downgraded the fighting capacity of Hezbollah, the pro-Iran armed group that used to control the south of the country. After Iran’s ally Bashar al-Assad’s fall in Damascus, it bombed what was left of Syria’s military assets and occupied a larger area of that country. In Yemen, it has repeatedly pounded the Iran-backed Houthis with heavy bombings. And now it has struck at the head of the ‘axis of resistance’, the Islamic Republic of Iran itself.

The blow has been massive. Israel has mauled the high command of Iran’s regular forces as well as of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), the paramilitary organisation that controls the Islamic Republic’s regional and security policy.[1] The list of the top brass killed is jaw-dropping: among the dead are armed forces chief Mohammed Baqeri, IRCG commander-in-chief Hossein Salami, and Amir Ali Hajizadeh, head of the IRGC Aerospace Force, in charge of Iran’s ballistic arsenal. Prominent nuclear scientists have also been targeted, as has Ali Shamkhani, the top diplomatic advisor of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, though he seems to have survived the attack.[2] Israel has hit dozens of targets across Iran,

What Big Tech's Band of Execs Will Do in the Army

When I read a tweet about four noted Silicon Valley executives being inducted into a special detachment of the United States Army Reserve, including Meta CTO Andrew “Boz” Bosworth, I questioned its veracity. It’s very hard to discern truth from satire in 2025, in part because of social media sites owned by Bosworth’s company. But it indeed was true. According to an official press release, they’re in the Army now, specifically Detachment 201: the Executive Innovation Corps. Boz is now lieutenant colonel Bosworth.

The other newly commissioned officers include Kevin Weil, OpenAI’s head of product; Bob McGrew, a former OpenAI head of research now advising Mira Murati’s company Thinking Machines Lab; and Shyam Sankar, the CTO of Palantir. These middle-aged tech execs were sworn into their posts wearing camo fatigues, as if they just wandered off some Army base in Kandahar, to join a corps that is named after an HTTP status code. (Colonel David Butler, communications adviser to the Army chief of staff, told me their dress uniforms weren’t ready yet.) Detachment 201, wrote the Army in a press release, is part of a military-wide transformation initiative that “aims to make the force leaner, smarter, and more lethal.”

The Army’s Executive Innovation Corps (EIC) commissioning ceremony in Conmy Hall, Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall, Va., June 13, 2025. Photograph: Leroy Council/DVIDS

Don’t blame Donald Trump for this. The program has been in the works for over a year, the brainchild of Brynt Parmeter, the Pentagon’s first chief talent management officer. Parmeter, a former combat soldier who headed veteran support at Walmart before joining the Department of Defense in 2023, had been pondering how to bring experienced technologists into service to update an insufficiently tech-savvy militia when he met Sankar at a conference early last year. The idea, he says, was to create “an Oppenheimer-like situation” where senior executives could serve right away, while keeping their current jobs.

Rising Lion: Escalation, Objectives, and the Logic of Targeting

Jay Pasquarette

Operation Rising Lion represents a significant moment in the ongoing confrontation between Israel and Iran. The consequences wrought by Iran’s persistent destabilization of the region through proxy groups for years and insistence on advancing their nuclear program – despite repeated warnings from the United States and Israel – are already severe.

Although it is early, there are three elements of Rising Lion to pay close attention to: (1) how escalation progresses and where it may lead, (2) what Israel’s true strategic objectives are given the means it has already committed and the risk it appears willing to assume, and (3) how the logic of targeting can shape an adversary’s decision-making. Each of these dynamics may influence not only the outcome of this conflagration but the possibility for a better peace when the fighting stops.

The fundamental question of how far this conflict could escalate may be a function of degraded Iranian capabilities and limited means available to Tehran. Iran’s ability to respond convincingly and in a way which preserves the legitimacy of the Ayatollahs is likely to be materially constrained. Years of sanctions, the degradation of military infrastructure at the hands of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and Mossad, and the weakened state of Tehran’s proxy network has done much to weaken Iranian strategy. However, a cornered Iran with limited options may escalate asymmetrically or worse. Tehran might feel forced to make unpredictable, drastic actions that are unforeseen by Israel and the United States.

This begs the question of off-ramps for both sides – and the degree to which they are already narrowing based on actions already taken. For Israel, an off-ramp could follow decisive operational success – such as the destruction of key Iranian nuclear infrastructure. A decisive military achievement paired with U.S. diplomatic assurances to maintain pressure on Iran through non-kinetic approaches might provide the opportunity to off-ramp and de-escalate the conflict. Alternatively, for Iran, a plausible off-ramp may include symbolic retaliation which seeks to preserve what little credibility Iranian leadership has left followed by a return to the negotiating table with the United States. However, in the absence of meaningful options, Iran’s leadership may perceive that de-escalation means capitulation – which further reinforces the increased risk that Iran may lash out in unpredictable ways.

Reviving the Professional Military Debate: A Call for Open Discourse in the U.S. Military

In the 1980s and 1990s, the Marine Corps Gazette became a vibrant forum for intellectual rigor and professional debate, led by figures like General Al Gray, the 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps,

and reformers such as Colonel John Boyd, William S. Lind, Colonel Mike Wyly, Dr. (then Captain and Major) Bruce I Gudmundsson, (then Captain) John Schmitt and Colonel (then Captain) G.I. Wilson. This era of open discourse challenged entrenched military thinking, fostering innovation and shaping concepts like maneuver warfare.

Today, as the U.S. military faces complex global threats, the need to revive this culture of fearless, professional debate—free from retribution and open to all ranks and backgrounds—is more urgent than ever. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth,

alongside Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs, should champion this revival, encouraging well-researched, fact-based arguments, even when they critique established culture or approved solutions.

The Right Path to Regime Change in Iran

ERIC EDELMAN is a Counselor at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. He served as U.S. Ambassador to Finland from 1998 to 2001, as U.S. Ambassador to Turkey from 2003 to 2005, and as U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy from 2005 to 2009.

There are many paths to regime change in Iran. In 2020, two of us (Edelman and Takeyh) wrote an essay in Foreign Affairs in which we outlined a way to topple the Islamic Republic. At that time, we assumed that the use of force was off the table and that outside powers could only gradually erode the regime’s sources of strength.

Israel’s attack on Iran this month has introduced a new and volatile element into the mix, but the underlying logic remains the same. In all cases of regime change, the indispensable preconditions for success are that the government

Spurred by US sanctions, China adapts Huawei’s HarmonyOS for microsatellites

China has successfully tested a home-grown operating system in space, marking a major step towards reducing reliance on foreign software and boosting the performance of future small satellites.

More than 1,000 hours of in-orbit testing were conducted aboard the Dalian-1 Lianli CubeSat to evaluate how satellite subsystems performed under the OpenHarmony real-time operating system (RTOS) – a lightweight version of Huawei’s open-source operation platform, according to a team of researchers from the Chinese cities of Dalian and Xian.

With OpenHarmony, the suitcase-sized satellite, which was released from China’s Tiangong space station last year, delivered faster data updates and improved stability compared with earlier set-ups using simpler firmware or foreign software, the researchers reported in the latest issue of the journal Space: Science and Technology.

“The Lianli satellite mission showed that using the OpenHarmony real-time operating system significantly improved the satellite’s response speed and reliability,” Yu Xiaozhou, the paper’s lead author and a professor at Dalian University of Technology, told Chinese media in May.

The Digital Euro: Everything You Always Wanted To Know But Were Afraid To Ask – Analysis

Thomas Moller-Nielsen

(EurActiv) –For those unfamiliar with the concept, the digital euro is likely to induce severe bewilderment – or a shrug. Isn’t a digital euro simply any euro that isn’t physical cash? And, if so, don’t we already use digital euros whenever I use my bank card?

In fact, the answer to both questions is ‘no’. The digital euro is not any euro that doesn’t take the form of coins or banknotes, and it doesn’t already exist.

Many European officials, however, wish that it did. Indeed, the topic is being debated with increasing urgency – and frequency – by EU policymakers. Eurozone finance ministers will discuss the matter in Luxembourg on Thursday, and MEPs argued over it Strasbourg on Wednesday.

Moreover, the European Central Bank (ECB) is currently just three months away from completing a two-year “preparation phase” ahead of the digital euro’s potential launch in a few years’ time.

So, what is the digital euro? Why is it being discussed so much? And is it actually a good idea?

The basic concept

Although the digital euro’s precise properties remain undefined, the core idea is to have a digital payment method that is as close as possible to cash.

In particular, the digital euro would, like cash, be issued and fully guaranteed by the ECB. This contrasts with ‘digital’ money in your commercial bank or cryptocurrency account. If your bank were to fail, you could lose all your savings above €100,000. The ECB insures deposits up to €100,000.

“The digital euro is ‘digital cash’, in the sense that it will always be honoured by the ECB,” said Maria Demertzis, who leads the Economy Strategy and Finance Centre for Europe at the think-tank The Conference Board. “This is not always true for other ‘digital’ types of money.”