Indian Strategic Studies: 07/11/25

11 July 2025

Reclaiming Air Superiority: The Urgent Case for Air Battle Management in Near-Peer Rivalry

Arlington, VA | June 26, 2025 — The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies announces a new entry in its Forum Paper series, Reclaiming Air Superiority: The Urgent Case for Air Battle Management in Near-Peer Rivalry, by Lt Col Grant M. Georgulis, USAF, a recent Air Force National Defense Fellow at the Mitchell Institute.

For twenty years, the United States Air Force (USAF) conducted counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in the permissive airspace of Iraq and Afghanistan, during which time air supremacy remained unchallenged, and the force-multiplying effect of air battle management was constant. That era has ended. In potential future conflicts with near-peer adversaries, particularly China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), the USAF can expect to face sophisticated integrated air defenses (IADs) and over 600 modern fighters.

In these non-permissive environments, U.S. air forces will need to actively pursue air superiority through kinetic air-to-air engagements and layered air battle management across the air and space domains. Fourth- and fifth-generation fighters rely upon the support of air battle managers on platforms like the E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), Control Reporting Centers (CRCs), other emerging ground-based air battle management capabilities, and soon the E-7 to successfully fulfill this mission. These professionals excel at managing air wars, and the Department of Defense (DOD) must regard them as a priority.

Mitchell Institute’s Forum Papers present innovative concepts and thought-provoking insight from aerospace experts here in the United States and across the globe. As a means to afford publishing opportunities for thoughtful perspectives, Forum Papers provide high visibility to writing efforts on issues spanning technology and operational concepts, defense policy and strategy, and unique interpretations of changing geopolitical relationships.

Bangladesh/Myanmar: The Dangers of a Rohingya Insurgency

What’s new? Since the Arakan Army’s seizure of much of Myanmar’s Rakhine State, Rohingya armed groups have paused their turf war in Bangladesh’s refugee camps and ramped up recruitment, using religious language to mobilise refugees to fight the Rakhine armed group. Meanwhile, the Bangladeshi government has started engaging the Arakan Army.

Why does it matter? A Rohingya insurgency against the Arakan Army is unlikely to succeed, but it would do grave damage to intercommunal relations in Myanmar. Rohingya in Rakhine State are likely to be caught between the armed groups, while prospects for the return of one million refugees living in Bangladesh would fade away.

What should be done? Bangladesh should step up informal cross-border aid and trade with Rakhine State while curbing the influence of Rohingya armed groups in refugee camps. The Arakan Army should strive to govern for all communities in Rakhine, while foreign donors – where possible – should limit aid cuts affecting refugees.

Executive Summary

The Arakan Army’s defeat of the Myanmar military in northern Rakhine State has shifted Rohingya armed groups onto the front foot. After years of bloody infighting in Bangladesh’s refugee camps, these groups, which claim to represent the Rohingya Muslim minority in Rakhine, agreed in November 2024 to work together to fight the Arakan Army, which draws support mainly from the state’s Buddhist majority.

Since then, violence has fallen sharply in the refugee camps, while the groups have expanded recruitment. At the same time, the Bangladeshi government has started engaging tentatively with the Arakan Army, which controls all of Myanmar’s border with the country. Mounting attacks by Rohingya armed groups in Rakhine are not only likely to undermine these talks, but could also heighten anti-Rohingya sentiment in Myanmar, damaging prospects for the repatriation of up to one million refugees. Bangladesh should curb the influence of Rohingya armed groups in the camps and step up dialogue with the Arakan Army, which for its part should take concrete steps to show it can govern in the interests of all communities.

Nascent Adoption: Emerging Tech Trends by Terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Rueben Dass

In the Afghanistan-Pakistan region’s evolving threat landscape, terrorist groups have been slow in adopting technologies such as drones and generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) for their operations. This is due to several factors, namely the availability of more lethal weapons such as small and light arms; the lack of technical expertise; and utilitarian considerations – the efficacy of more technologically advanced weapons versus the costs involved in developing and using them. However, this dynamic underwent a shift in 2024 as two key trends point towards the nascent adoption of drones and AI in the region.

Against this backdrop, this Insight explores how terrorist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan, namely the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its affiliates, Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), and Baloch insurgent groups, are incorporating these two technologies in their operations, the threat they pose, and implications for the region’s security landscape. It will also outline counter-terrorism recommendations for governments and technology companies to mitigate the threat without disrupting their permeation in the wider society.

The Technology Adoption Curve

Research by Gartenstein-Ross, Clarke and Shear highlight four phases in which terrorist groups adopt technologies: the ‘early adoption’ phase where terrorist groups’ adoption of emerging technologies is marked by a high rate of failure and underperformance; the ‘iteration’ phase where technological adoption is refined as it undergoes substantial commercial improvement; the ‘breakthrough phase’ where groups hone the use and adoption of a particular technology and significantly improve the success rate; and the ‘competition’ phase where terrorist groups innovate while showing resilience to persist with the use of technologies as countermeasures are enhanced, triggering a cyclical pattern.

Extremist communication capabilities in North Africa and the Sahel

Andreea Stoian Karadeli Terrorism Joint Analysis Group T JAG

The complex nature of the threat of terrorism caused by groups active in North Africa and the Sahel requires effective information to prevent, detect, and eventually investigate all criminal activities related to their areas of interest. In the Maghreb-Sahel region, more than in any other place, the boundary between the two main Salafi-jihadi groups – al-Qaeda and ISIS – is porous at best and non-existent at worst. While borders between these Salafist religious spheres can be hard to define, they are tangled with contextual and interest-based factors, thereby transforming the regional jihadi ecosystem into a challenging mosaic.

The main aim of this research is to map the communication capabilities of terrorist groups in North Africa and the Sahel, taking into consideration the local context as well as to identify and categorise the specific means used to disseminate propaganda in each country / region by contextualising the material produced in / for / about African Jihadism by both al-Qaeda and ISIS groups. Bearing in mind that terrorism functions as a communicative act,

the groups’ multilevel communication capabilities are a core element of the jihadi phenomenon in North Africa and the Sahel. Starting from the individual and transcending the jihadi ecosystem to the global level, jihadi-terrorist communication capabilities develop on a multilevel structure, adapting their main elements according to context, goal, and strategy.

While interests, views, and trajectories leading to extremist radicalisation and acts of terror remain highly diverse, intensive research on firsthand material has emphasised the correlation between communication capabilities and recruitment strategies for the jihadi ecosystem in North Africa and the Sahel, while pointing out similarities and contextual distinctions regarding four factors: ideological and religious, socio-political,

geopolitical, and the marketing of violence. To fully grasp both the similarity and diversity of these factors, it is necessary to examine the content of the numerous channels focusing on North Africa and Sahel, such as Geonews – a portal dedicated to Al-Qaeda on the Rocket chat platform. Recruitment patterns are identified and discussed for each factor, outlining the main themes, means, and terminological tools used by the jihadist groups in the region, based on the methodological framework of this research.

Taiwan Under Siege: How China’s Shadow War Is Penetrating Taiwan’s Military, Politics & Identity Without Firing A Single Shot: OPED

Shubhangi Palve

Mao Zedong once said, “If we want to destroy the enemy, we must have two kinds of wars: one is an open war, and the other is a covert war.”

It’s the second kind—the shadowy, silent battle waged through deception, infiltration, and manipulation—that has become a cornerstone of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) strategic playbook.

Known as the “covert front,” this form of warfare is not fought on battlefields but within the institutions, alliances, and societies of adversary states.

Its purpose is to create internal chaos, erode trust, and weaken nations from within.

Nowhere is this tactic more evident than in Taiwan.

A Silent Offensive

Over the past year, Taiwan has witnessed a troubling rise in espionage cases implicating not just rogue actors on the fringe but sitting legislators, political aides, and retired military officials, including figures from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).

The CCP is no longer merely watching from across the Strait; it’s already inside the house.

The CCP has moved well beyond traditional intelligence gathering. Its agents have reportedly funded and guided armed proxy groups tasked with preparing for “wartime internal support” operations—essentially sabotage and subversion from within if China ever launches an invasion.

Beijing, which sees Taiwan as a breakaway province to be brought under its control—by force if necessary—has ramped up military pressure alongside its covert operations.

For the first time, Xi is missing a China-backed BRICS summit. Why

Simone McCarthy

A summit of leaders from the BRICS group of major emerging economies kicks off in Brazil Sunday – but without the top leader of its most powerful member.

For the first time in more than one decade of rule, Chinese leader Xi Jinping – who has made BRICS a centerpiece of his push to reshape the global balance of power – will not attend the annual leaders’ gathering.

Xi’s absence from the two-day summit in Rio de Janeiro comes at a critical moment for BRICS, which owes its acronym to early members Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, and since 2024 has expanded to include Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Indonesia and Iran.

Some members are up against a July 9 deadline to negotiate US tariffs set to be imposed by US President Donald Trump, and all face the global economic uncertainty brought on by his upending of American trade relations – putting the club under more pressure show solidarity.

Xi’s absence means the Chinese leader is missing a key opportunity to showcase China as a stable alternative leader to the US. That’s an image Beijing has long looked to project to the Global South, and one recently elevated by Trump’s shift to an “America First” policy and the US decision last month to join Israel in bombing Iranian nuclear facilities.

But the Chinese leader’s decision not to attend – sending his No. 2 official Li Qiang instead – doesn’t mean Beijing has downgraded the significance it places on BRICS, observers say, or that it’s less important to Beijing’s bid to build out groups to counterbalance Western power.

China's Military Diplomacy

Phillip C. Saunders and Melodie Ha China Strategic Perspectives 19

Executive SummaryChinese military diplomacy serves both strategic and operational goals. The main strategic goals are supporting Chinese foreign policy and shaping the strategic environment; operational goals include supporting People’s Liberation Army (PLA) modernization and collecting intelligence on foreign militaries.

Military diplomacy is a tool for building foreign relations and an indicator of the quality of China’s bilateral relationships. When relations are strained, military-diplomatic engagements decrease or stop; when relations are good, engagements tend to increase.

Military activities are limited by partner willingness and capability, Chinese domestic constraints, and Chinese Communist Party control over the PLA. PLA engagements with foreign militaries often emphasize form over substance and do not necessarily build much trust or interoperability with military partners.

The total number of PLA senior-level visits, exercises, and port calls grew significantly from 2002–08, stayed relatively constant from 2009–19, and dropped dramatically in the COVID-19 years of 2020–22 before gradually beginning to rise again starting in 2023. Senior-level visits are the most common form of activity, but military exercises and port calls make up an increasing share of PLA foreign military engagements.

Asia is the highest priority region for Chinese military diplomacy, with Europe in second place and Africa a distant third. Southeast Asia has emerged as a battleground for U.S.-China competition in military diplomacy.

Russia, Pakistan, and the United States are the PLA’s top three partners, but the volume of U.S.-China engagements has declined significantly from its peak in 2015, while engagements with Russia and Pakistan have continued apace.

MERICS China Security and Risk Tracker 01/2025

China is a beacon of stability in uncertain times when the world is at a crossroads, facing multiple geopolitical pressure points and conflicts: this is the overarching theme of Beijing’s first white paper on national security. It was released in mid-May with great media fanfare to show the importance China’s leaders give the topic, and is titled “China’s National Security in the New Era”.

According to the white paper, China’s national security situation remains stable – a success credited to the concept of comprehensive national security coined by party and state leader Xi Jinping. The concept was introduced in 2014 and has since grown to encompass 20 areas of security (see exhibit 1). Its study is required at all levels of the party and state administration, and it guides policy choices across the board.

The framework tasks Chinese officials with responding to existing threats, and with proactively identifying and tackling new dangers, using all the tools at their disposal. Its impact was visible in recent suggestions that China might use the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law against companies that enforce US sanctions on Huawei and so could be viewed as threatening China’s economic growth. National security was also referenced in China’s imposition of new rare earth export restrictions.

The white paper showcases the changes that have taken place in Beijing’s conceptualization of national security and in its threat perceptions over the last few years:The international environment is now the source of some of China’s biggest challenges as relations with the United States and other Western nations are deteriorating.

Welcome to the Gray War

John West

You may quote from this text, provided you mention the name of the author and reference it as a new Strategic Assessment Memo (SAM) published by the Global Ideas Center in Berlin on The Globalist.

There is lots of speculation about the risks of China and the United States going to a hot war. But a close examination suggests that China has already been in a “gray war,” a cyberwar, with the United States for several years now.

What is the gray war? It is obviously between black and white. We should not think of war and peace in binary terms, but along a spectrum where there are degrees of war and peace.

Propaganda and disinformation, the key instruments of the grey war, have always been features of international relations. But China and other authoritarian regimes also buckled down on efforts to destabilize the United States and other democracies by propaganda disseminated through social and other media.

China’s narrative of dominance

China’s gray war narrative is that it is on an unstoppable path to overtaking the United States. It is trying to demoralize the United States and the West. The Chinese want the United States to believe it is in irreversible decline, and the United States should not even try to contain China. It should just accommodate China.

China is highly motivated because it sees the very ideas of democracy and freedom as a regime threat. China is keen to create a world that is safe for the Chinese Communist Party.

It is of course deeply ironic that China and other authoritarian governments are often using U.S. technology to defend and export autocracy around the world.

China Is Not Ready for Global Leadership

Jo Inge Bekkevold

U.S. President Donald Trump’s profound changes to Washington’s foreign policy during the past few months have unleashed a debate about the extent to which the self-destruction of U.S. global leadership is empowering China. The idea that U.S. retrenchment favors a rising China has been well and amply argued. What is less clear, however, is whether Trump is paving the road to a much more fundamental shift: Chinese global dominance in place of a shattered U.S.-led order.

Washington’s retreat is obvious. Trump has launched a systematic attack on the order and institutions built by U.S. presidents since World War II to benefit U.S. interests. Washington has taken an axe to global trade, slashed funding for the United Nations, downsized foreign aid, and antagonized many key allies. By hollowing out the national security apparatus, Trump risks diminishing Washington’s strategic capabilities. The future of NATO and other U.S.-crafted alliances is unclear. By declaring open season on universities and major scientific institutions, Trump may undermine the very foundation of U.S. power.

An Urgent Call to Close the Loopholes on Chips and China

RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgomery

The core lessons from the Cold War should guide us as we face the new “Axis of Aggressors” today. First among these, is that we need to win the technology race.

Advanced technology made in United States did more than just put an American on the moon, it also solidified our economic foundation, empowered long-term entrepreneurial American leadership, and protected our national interests.

Maintaining this technology leadership should continue to be our priority today. Despite the Biden and Trump Administrations trying to limit the sale of U.S. software used to design semiconductors to Chinese groups, the U.S. government simply has not taken enough meaningful action to actually protect America’s leadership position.

China is embracing loopholes and openly flaunting strategic workarounds in our export policy that allows for the continued development of high-quality semiconductor chips with U.S. technology in China, despite our efforts to restrict Chinese access to such tools.

Along these same lines, Beijing plans to expand the use of open-source chip technology such as RISC V, in order to ween off its reliance on the West and spur the development of advanced chips in China. By leveraging RISC-V, Chinese companies are using open source software derived in the West to design their own processors for AI, cloud computing, and even military applications without violating current U.S. export restrictions.

And this shift is happening now.

Chinese tech giants like Alibaba, Tencent, and Huawei have invested heavily in RISC-V research and development, looking to exploit this back-door access to western open source technology. Additionally, Chinese government-backed initiatives are pouring billions into this effort, positioning it as a national priority.

Digital threats from China unlike any ever encountered, top cyber firm warns

Ryan Lovelace

A top American cybersecurity company warns in a new report that the global scale and sophistication of Chinese threats are unlike anything its analysts have ever seen.

A June report from Palo Alto Networks, based in Santa Clara, California, shows that the speed and skills of Chinese state-sponsored cyberattackers have reached unprecedented levels.

China hackers attack “within hours, and in some cases minutes” of new vulnerabilities being identified for exploitation, said Wendi Whitmore, Palo Alto Networks’ chief information security officer.

“I have been conducting investigations in this space specifically toward nation-state actors for almost 25 years, it’s been [a while], and we have never seen during that time frame, the scale of persistent threat activity that we’re seeing today from Chinese nation-state threat actors,” Ms. Whitmore said in the report.

As a result, Palo Alto Networks said, businesses must rethink all their defensive strategies to counter the escalating campaign.

The scope of China’s attacks is massive.

Palo Alto Networks identified “whole-of-government scale operations,” such as a hack last year that hit 23 government entities in Cambodia nearly simultaneously.

“The unprecedented scale and sophistication of today’s cyber threats, particularly from Chinese nation-state actors, demands more than incremental improvements to existing defenses,” the report said. “Organizations need comprehensive strategies that combine advanced technology with strong human leadership, proactive relationship building, as well as cultural transformation.”

The US Army's done with Humvees and the Robotic Combat Vehicles. Here's what leaders want instead.

Chris Panella

The Army secretary and a top general gave BI some insight into this process.

The service is undergoing a major transformation initiative after a directive earlier this year.

US Army leaders say Humvees and Robotic Combat Vehicles aren't useful for future fights, but the Infantry Squad Vehicle is.

Ongoing decisions about what stays and what goes are part of a larger transformation initiative that has the Army reviewing its force structure and cutting certain programs it deems no longer necessary for the kinds of wars the US military wants to be ready to fight should worse come to worst.

Secretary of the Army Daniel Driscoll and Gen. James Rainey, the commanding general overseeing Army Futures Command, talked to Business Insider about some of what is getting axed and why.

Driscoll pointed to the Robotic Combat Vehicle, or RCV, program, which launched in 2019 with the goal of integrating autonomous and remotely operated capabilities into the Army's ground systems. Three versions were initially planned — an expendable light variant, a durable medium variant, and a lethal heavy variant designed for combat against an enemy armored vehicle.

But the development of the RCV hit snags. "We know we need autonomy, we know that we need the ability to move things in a way that is not controlled by human beings," Driscoll said.

Putin’s Narrative Power

How do countries cope when wars meant to be short and decisive turn out to be protracted and inconclusive? In such situations strategy needs to rethought to bring military means and political objectives into a new alignment – more appropriate means and more realistic objectives. The more a war drags on the harder this becomes for added to the original objectives comes an additional one, the need to avoid the humiliation of defeat.

This additional factor helps explain why Vladimir Putin persists with a war that he is not winning and cannot win. Limited territorial acquisitions do not mean that Putin is winning. Victory depends on achieving his political objectives and here he is not even close.

Putin has made no secret of his objectives. They were first set out as the full-scale invasion was launched in February 2022. Then he focused on the ‘denazification’ and ‘demilitarisation’ of Ukraine, along with constitutional changes to protect Russian speakers. In September 2022 he added to these the claimed annexation of four oblasts (Donetsk, Luhansk, Kerson, and Zaporizhzhia) in addition to Crimea, taken in 2014.

These objectives have been reaffirmed regularly, and since December in every statement describing what Russia wants from peace negotiations. The demand is for a subjugated, neutralised, disarmed Ukraine, not only resigned to some of its territory being under Russian occupation but also obliged to hand over extra that Russia has thus far failed to obtain through military action.

For Russia this is what winning means. That is why Russia would not accept Trump’s offer –Russia keeping what it holds and no NATO membership for Ukraine. Trump made his offer under the misapprehension that this would satisfy Putin sufficiently for him to agree a ceasefire. This was despite Putin and his foreign minister Sergey Lavrov insisting that they had no interest in a ceasefire until all their political objectives had been met.

Israeli spies ‘in Iran for years’ before war on nuclear sites

Israel’s spies infiltrated the heart of Iran’s missile and nuclear programmes to wage years of covert intelligence-gathering and assess that Tehran’s weapons-building infrastructure was far more extensive than previously thought.

Leaked intelligence documents shared with western allies, including the US and Britain, and seen by The Times, appeared to reveal the full extent of Iran’s nuclear and missile ambitions. The conclusion of Israel’s spy agency,

Mossad, as well as other military intelligence arms, was that the capability, knowledge and components of the regime’s development was racing ahead and it was far more extensive than just the main sites at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan.

An intelligence source told The Times on Friday that Israel had been monitoring multiple locations through intelligence agents for years, with each location having “boots on the ground beforehand”. Israel began readying its attack on Iran from as early as 2010, based on intelligence about its accelerating weapons programme.

Russia, AI and the Future of Disinformation Warfare

As generative AI technologies rapidly evolve, their implications for global information security are becoming more acute. This paper explores how Russian state-affiliated and state-aligned actors are discussing, conceptualising and framing AI within their online communications.

Drawing on original analysis of communications from Russian-linked online channels, the paper investigates how actors in the Russian influence ecosystem perceive the role of AI in information warfare and what their narratives reveal about evolving threat trajectories.

The report finds that a diverse range of Russian actors are actively engaged in conversations about AI. These actors are not only discussing the use of AI tools to automate and amplify content, but also exploring the role of AI as a narrative device, boasting of its effectiveness, warning of its dangers and framing it as both a strategic asset and a potential threat.

The analysis reveals a growing focus on AI as both an opportunity and a threat among various Russian actors, from those affiliated with groups like Wagner, to pro-Russian hacktivist collectives and online influencers. AI is often portrayed as a powerful tool for information manipulation,

capable of generating persuasive content, amplifying messaging and overwhelming adversaries with sheer volume. At the same time, many actors express significant anxiety about Western dominance over AI development, suggesting that these technologies could be used to subvert Russian public opinion, erode autonomy and destabilise the domestic information environment. Concerns about surveillance, deepfakes (digitally altered videos or images aiming to misrepresent a person as doing or saying something they did not say or do in the original version of the image or video) and algorithmic bias feature prominently in this discourse.

Keith B. Payne, Why Does America Need Golden Dome?, No. 628, June 18, 2025

President Trump’s January 27, 2025 Executive Order, The Iron Dome for America, calls for a versatile U.S. missile defense system to protect America’s citizens, territory, infrastructure, and military forces against all opponents’ “ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles, and other advanced aerial attacks.”[1] It also calls for the examination of cooperation with allies to protect their territories, populations and military forces.

This is a sweeping directive for the defense of the United States the likes of which have not been seen since Ronald Reagan’s 1983 Strategic Defense Initiative. That research and development program ultimately led to the rudimentary U.S. homeland defense system now deployed to protect against North Korea’s long-range ballistic missiles, but not against Russian or Chinese missiles.

The goal of defending American citizens, infrastructure and nuclear forces may seem self-evidently sensible. That, however, is a naïve view given long-standing U.S. missile defense policy. Since 1976, no Republican or Democratic administration has deployed missile defenses to ease or even challenge the condition of homeland vulnerability to Russian or Chinese strategic missiles. Americans typically react to this harsh reality with shocked disbelief;[2] why else should U.S. taxpayers spend hundreds of billions of dollars on defense every year if not—at a minimum—to protect the country from attack?

Washington’s archaic policy against deploying anything beyond a minimalist homeland defense against North Korean missiles is dangerous given the looming nuclear threats of a Russian, Chinese, and North Korean “axis of upheaval” that has the clear goal of overthrowing the liberal world order, by force if necessary. Russia has explicitly lowered its threshold for using nuclear weapons and frequently issues coercive nuclear threats;

China’s leadership has identified 2027 as a possible timeline for taking Taiwan,[3] and has not ruled out the use of nuclear weapons to do so, if necessary. Both have been engaged in an extensive expansion of their nuclear forces for well over a decade.

Forged Under Fire: Middle East Air Defense After Iran’s 2024 Attacks on Israel

The scene: Two combat jets race through the night sky on opposite sides of the Saudi-Jordanian border. In one cockpit, a pilot from the Royal Saudi Air Force. In the other, one of Israel’s top air commanders. For most of modern Middle East history,

this might have been the prelude to a mid-air dogﬁght waged by combatants in one of the region’s multiple wars pitting the Jewish state against its Arab neighbors. But on the evening of April 13, 2024, a radically diﬀerent scenario was unfolding. Rather than enemies, these pilots were part of a remarkable multinational coalition,

mobilized under American auspices, to defend Israel against a massive Iranian aerial assault involving more than 300 ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones—among the largest barrages in the history of warfare. Rather than ﬁring at each other, the Israeli and Saudi jets were on a shared mission of hunting down and neutralizing hundreds of incoming Iranian projectiles.

More than a year later, fully comprehending and assessing the monumental nature of what transpired that evening remains something of a challenge. Since the shocking Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, Israel has been at war for 20 months, ﬁghting at times on up to seven fronts against Iran and its network of heavily armed proxy groups in Gaza, Lebanon, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq.

The rush of daily events, battles, death, destruction, and geopolitical disruptions has been relentless and oftentimes overwhelming. No sooner does one extraordinary development occur only to be overtaken or overshadowed by the next day’s crisis. In the face of that kind of information onslaught, it’s all too easy, especially with the passage of time, to lose sight of the history-making nature of any given moment in the conﬂict’s extended timeline.

Post-Attack Assessment of the First 12 Days of Israeli and U.S. Strikes on Iranian Nuclear Facilities

Israel’s historic Operation Rising Lion and the United States Operation Midnight Hammer have targeted many Iranian nuclear sites, causing massive damage to its nuclear program and setting it back significantly. After 12 days of military operations, a survey of the resulting damage is appropriate. The Institute has obtained high-resolution commercial satellite imagery of the principal nuclear sites, including the Natanz Nuclear Complex, Fordow site, the Esfahan (Isfahan) Nuclear Complex,

Lavisan 2 (also known has the Mojdeh Site, the former location of the SPND HQ and other facilities), the new SPND HQ, TABA/TESA Karaj Centrifuge Manufacturing Site, the IR-40 Arak Heavy Water Reactor and Heavy Water (D20) Production Plant,

and Sanjarian (a former AMAD site that had recently shown signs of reactivation). The imagery shows various levels of damage and/or destruction at each site. This analysis is enriched by reporting from the International Atomic Energy Agency and the IDF, and by information in the Institute’s archive on Iran.

The attacks can be divided into two basic categories, those against Iran’s ability to make weapon-grade uranium (or plutonium) and those aimed at making the nuclear weapon itself utilizing weapon-grade uranium.

Overall, Israel's and U.S. attacks have effectively destroyed Iran’s centrifuge enrichment program. It will be a long time before Iran comes anywhere near the capability it had before the attack. That being said, there are residuals such as stocks of 60 percent, 20 percent, and 3-5 percent enriched uranium and the centrifuges manufactured but not yet installed at Natanz or Fordow. These non-destroyed parts pose a threat as they can be used in the future to produce weapon-grade uranium.

Post-Attack Analysis of Israel’s June 12/13 Military Attack on Iran’s Nuclear Program

On the night of June 12/13, 2025, Israel initiated a large-scale military attack on Iran’s nuclear program under the name “Operation Rising Lion.” Israel’s primary targets reportedly included defensive sites, key personnel, missile and air force sites, and preventative strikes on retaliation capabilities.

Other than the Natanz enrichment site, key nuclear facilities do not appear to have been targeted on Day One. In fact, nuclear sites in general were not targeted. The priority seemed to be to attack those targets and individuals that require surprise to succeed, figuring that the nuclear sites will be there tomorrow. The one exception is the fate of the 20 and 60 percent enriched uranium stocks; and nothing could be learned about these stocks.

This report focuses exclusively on the nuclear facilities targeted on the first night of the attack. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu announced that the stated goal of the operation is “to roll back the Iranian threat to Israel’s very survival” and states that the operation will “continue for as many days as it takes to remove this threat.” 1 As such,

this report will be updated as needed. Netanyahu further stated that Israel “struck at the heart of Iran’s nuclear enrichment program, at the heart of Iran’s weaponization program, targeted Iran’s main enrichment facility at Natanz, targeted Iran’s leading nuclear scientists working on the Iranian bomb, and struck at the heart of Iran’s ballistic missile program.”

Natanz Site

As of noon EST, June 13th, evidence is available that Israel targeted facilities located at the Natanz nuclear complex. Satellite imagery as well as ground imagery support that multiple above ground facilities were destroyed, apparently with the goal to render the site unusable by taking out the electrical supply in a first strike.

The Institute has obtained high-resolution satellite imagery of Natanz taken after Israel’s attack. The imagery shows extensive damage to the electrical power supply for the complex, including the main outdoor transformer substation, a concealed transformer substation, and two backup gas turbine generators, with smoke still rising when the image was taken around 11 AM local time. The above-ground Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) was also destroyed (see Figure 1 - 4).

Ukraine mess: finding a way forward

Stephen Bryen

The recent massive bombings on Ukrainian territory and advances by the Russian army are harbingers of the end game that will befall Ukraine unless that country can find a way out. One solution is to make Ukraine a flexible actor, meaning to insulate Zelensky. The best way to do that is a coalition government to carry the burden of negotiations with Russia.

Today we keep hearing from Zelensky and his cohorts that they can win the war without America, that they won’t yield even one meter of Ukrainian territory to the hated Russians, that they can buy American military equipment “on rental” or buy American hardware by using Germany as a front.

Does the Ukrainian leadership actually believes what they are saying?

My guess is they don’t believe any of it but are trying to reassure their people. But it is hard to be reassuring when missiles and drones are exploding everywhere and you are sleeping in a shelter or a cold basement.

Negotiations blunder

The great blunder came in on or about March 30, 2022. That is when Boris Johnson allegedly convinced Zelensky to back out of the peace deal agreed to by the parties in Istanbul. My own reading is that Johnson gave a sort of legitimacy to a Zelensky decision to walk away from a deal with Russia, fearing that his army would topple his presidency and maybe kill him.

Prior to that, as former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett reported, Zelensky was afraid the Russians would kill him, and Bennett secured a pledge from Vladimir Putin not to do so. But no such pledge was possible if the threat was from ultras in the Ukrainian army.

Central Asia’s Water Crisis Becoming Russia’s Problem

Water shortages in Central Asia are becoming a problem for Russia as the drought and its effects spread into Russian territories, and Central Asians call for Moscow to send water from Siberian rivers or face massive immigration.

Russians overwhelmingly oppose the revival of Siberian river diversion because of their own water needs and because Central Asia cannot pay as much as the People’s Republic of China could for water.

Tensions between Moscow and Central Asia are growing over water disputes, as is the prospect of large and uncontrolled Central Asian migration into Russia.

Water shortages in Central Asia are becoming a problem for Russia as the crisis, generated by climate change-induced drought and rapid, albeit slowing, population growth in Central Asia, spreads into Russian territory (see EDM, November 8, 2023; Federal City, June 19; The Times of Central Asia, June 26; Bugin Info, June 30).

Central Asian countries believe that the only solution is for Moscow to divert water from Siberian rivers and have threatened Moscow with the prospect of massive migration of Central Asians into Russia if the Kremlin does not agree. Despite technical changes on Soviet-era river diversion; Russia’s need to cultivate regional goodwill following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022; and the belief of some Russian scholars that river diversion would disproportionately benefit Russia,

most Russian officials are staunchly opposed to any Siberian river diversion. This aversion stems from concern about domestic Russian droughts brought into focus by increasing forest fires and falling water levels in Russian rivers (see EDM, June 3).

Russia Recognised the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: A New Great Game Started?

This report analyses the geopolitical consequences of Russia officially recognising the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in July 2025.

Following the Taliban’s removal from Russia’s terrorist list, this move shows Moscow’s intention to broaden collaboration in trade, infrastructure, and regional security.

Russia’s acknowledgment is part of a larger strategy to expand its influence in Central and South Asia, a region where competition from other powers is intensifying.

Key TakeawaysRussia has become the first country formally to recognise the Taliban government since August 2021.

Recognition encompasses planned cooperation on security, counter-narcotics, infrastructure, trade and energy.

The shift reflects Moscow’s strategy to increase geopolitical influence in Central and South Asia.

Introduction/Background

Since the Taliban regained control in August 2021 and declared the country the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan,” Moscow has adopted a practical approach, recognising Taliban diplomats and keeping its Kabul embassy open.

In April 2025, Russia’s Supreme Court removed the Taliban from its list of banned terrorist organisations. Taliban delegations attended the Kazan Forum “Russia – the Islamic World” (May 2025) and the St Petersburg Economic Forum (SPIEF 2025), raising the profile of Afghanistan within Russia-led economic frameworks.

On July 3, 2025, Russia officially recognised the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, and the Taliban flag hung over the Afghan embassy in Moscow.

Geopolitical Analysis

Moscow’s formal recognition of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan reflects a calculated pivot from informal engagement to full diplomatic endorsement.

Generative AI and Copyright Infringement: Lessons from past Fair Use Cases

The development of generative artificial intelligence (AI) models in recent years is transforming digital technology, with some even asking if current AI advancements represent a “fourth industrial revolution.”1 However, as we enter this new era of technological advancement, there are unanswered questions about how generative AI models are developed and what effect they could have on society. Specifically, copyright owners and creator communities have significant concerns about what materials are being ingested for training and whether AI companies will be held liable for the mass unauthorized use of copyrighted works to build their generative models.

Seeking answers and accountability, copyright owners have now brought over forty copyright infringement lawsuits against AI companies.2 These cases, which have mostly been filed over the past two years, are winding their way through various federal courts and are all leading to one pivotal question: Does the ingestion of copyrighted works for generative AI training constitute direct infringement of copyright owners’ reproduction rights, or does it qualify as fair use?3

Thus, fair use is not just a big question—it is the only question that really matters in generative AI copyright infringement litigation. AI companies and their supporters argue that copying protected works to train AI models constitutes a transformative purpose that tips the scales in favor of fair use and that past fair use cases clearly support their position. However,

as this policy memo will show (and as courts and the United States Copyright Office are already recognizing), the fair use cases AI companies rely upon (1) are significantly undermined by the Supreme Court’s recent Warhol v. Goldsmith decision, (2) are, regardless of Warhol v. Goldsmith, readily distinguishable and do not set a precedent that generative AI training is fair use, and (3) in fact demonstrate that in most cases generative AI training does not qualify as fair use.

Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems in Warfighting at Sea

Much of the debate surrounding the military use of artificial intelligence (AI) tends to focus on lethal autonomous weapons systems. Those are systems that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further human intervention;

sometimes pejoratively called “killer robots.” Moreover, debates often focus on their use and risks in land warfare. This land-warfare focus tends to invoke questions about the systems’ ability to distinguish between combatants and civilians on urban battlefields and the potential for mistakes. Legal debates about the lawfulness of AI and lethal autonomous weapons systems in warfare similarly tend to focus on land warfare and thus the law of armed conflict as it applies specifically to that setting.

Centering legal debates primarily on lethal autonomous weapons systems in land warfare, however, risks overlooking important nuances in naval warfare and its governing law, the law of naval warfare. Naval warfare and the law of naval warfare differ in substantial ways from their land analogs.

These differences may make naval warfare and the law of naval warfare more accommodating of AI and autonomous systems and mitigate some of the risks and concerns arising in debates about their use in land warfare. This article explores some of those nuances and differences in the law of naval warfare and how they can be conducive to AI and autonomous systems.

Military Bureaucracy and Decision-Making

Military Bureaucracy and Decision-Making takes an unusual perspective on military decision-making.

It is, first and foremost, about how military decisions are made at all echelons. It offers a way of thinking that explains many military decisions by using a framework that has rarely been applied to the military and the people who comprise it. Second,

it is about a microeconomic approach to military personnel, public choice theory, human agency, and individuals who each have their own unique and personal preferences. Third, it incorporates recent evidence that demonstrates an understanding of the fundamental human motivation to seek social status and reputation.