How Will New Delhi Navigate the Dalai Lama Succession Row?

Rushali Saha

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Just a few days ahead of his 90th birthday, the 14th Dalai Lama announced at Dharamshala in India, where the headquarters of the Tibetan exile government is located, that his trust, the Gaden Phodrang, would have the “sole authority” in deciding who his successor would be. This remark has not only sparked outrage in Beijing, but also generated some friction in China’s ties with New Delhi. The decision regarding the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation is inherently political and intricately linked with the Sino-Indian border dispute.

The PRC — which has ruled Tibet since 1950 — has consistently maintained that the next Dalai Lama incarnation will be born inside China and approved by the Chinese government, even introducing legislation in 2007 titled “Measures on the Management of the Reincarnations of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhis,” which lays out strict rules governing reincarnations. As a result, the Dalai Lama’s comments provoked a strong reaction from the Chinese government, which considers the 14th Dalai Lama a “splittist.”

Beijing also reacted sharply to what it viewed as Indian “interference in China’s internal affairs” after an Indian minister endorsed the Dalai Lama’s authority to choose his successor. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning warned New Delhi to “exercise caution in its words and actions….and avoid impact on the improvement and development of the China-India relationship.” Subsequently, India’s Ministry of External Affairs clarified that New Delhi “does not take any position or speak on matters concerning beliefs and practices of faith and religion,” effectively distancing itself from the Dalai Lama succession issue.

Historically, New Delhi has sought to emphasize predictability and worked on preventing the differences between Beijing and the Central Tibetan Authority (CTA), as the Tibetan government-in-exile is known, from derailing Sino-Indian ties. Back in 1954, New Delhi accepted Tibet as a “region” of China and in 2003, during Vajpayee’s visit to China, explicitly recognized that the “Tibet Autonomous Region is an integral part of the People’s Republic of China.” Since then, India has maintained a delicate balance between providing refuge to generations of Tibetan communities, while maintaining a strong economic and political relationship with Beijing.

Rubio’s Visit Sends Strong Message To China And The Region – Analysis

Collins Chong Yew Keat

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By reaffirming its commitment to the region through Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s attendance at this week’s ASEAN meetings in Kuala Lumpur, the United States has presented Southeast Asia a rare and urgent chance to correct past strategic drift and declare that Washington remains the region’s most essential economic and security partner.

We must no longer be in the denial mode to dismiss the reality of the trade imbalances and injustice that have prompted Trump to reset the tariffs, and with the new tariffs imposed, this clearly shows the failure for these countries and the region, including Malaysia, 

to project a renewed sense of trust in the US policymakers, and to address the concerns raised. This visit presents us the rare platform to send a new message of the commitment to reaffirm our ties with the most important defence and economic partner, as the most powerful economic and military player in the world by far.

The presence of Rubio and the choice of attending the regional meetings in Malaysia as the first stop in Asia sends a powerful message to both allies and adversaries, that the US is here to stay in its overarching agenda of maintaining a free and open Indo Pacific, despite Beijing’s actions in courting US allies and in sowing discontent on the tariffs in creating new pushback mechanisms in the region, and despite the distractions in the Middle East and in Ukraine.

This shows that the ultimate aim has never wavered, that is of China’s imminent threat and the biggest pacing and primary challenge to the US, from the bellicose actions in South China Sea to the intimidation of Taiwan, to the rising capacities in new kinetic and non kinetic warfare capabilities and in the chokehold of key resources.

This presence is meant to put a stop to the conventional worries of both allies and neutral players in the region, that the US under Trump has never wavered from the commitment to defend the rules based order, but contingent upon these players showing their sincere and reciprocal intent to play their part in increasing their own defence spending and commitment, and not taking Washington for a ride.

Chinese satellites complete groundbreaking mission 22,000 miles above Earth

Sophia Compton

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China's space program took a major stride this past week as two of its satellites seemingly docked together in what could have been the country's first high-altitude attempt at refueling a satellite while in orbit.

The Shijian-21 and Shijian-25 satellites appeared to dock with one another last week more than 20,000 miles above the planet in geosynchronous orbit, in which a satellite's orbital period matches the pace of the Earth's rotation, according to news outlet Ars Technica.

While Chinese officials have not recently released any updates about the two satellites, civilian satellite trackers showed Shijian-21 and Shijian-25 moving closer together before becoming indistinguishable from one another, Ars Technica reported.

A Long March-3B carrier rocket carrying Shijian-21 satellite blasts off from the Xichang Satellite Launch Center on Oct. 24, 2021 in Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan Province of China. (Li Jieyi/VCG via Getty Images)

These two satellites docking in geosynchronous orbit could indicate that China has the potential to disable another country's satellite in space, Ars Technica reported.

However, the U.S. Space Force has similarly been interested in orbital refueling as military satellites often have limited fuel supplies. The military branch is slated to perform its first-ever refueling of a U.S. military asset in orbit as early as next summer.

American officials may have taken note of the apparent docking by China last week, as two of the Space Force's inspector satellites appeared to move closer to Shijian-21 and Shijian-25 following the maneuver, Ars Technica reported.

Xi Jinping is waging a proxy war against Trump in Ukraine

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Beware of fiery Chinese dragons proffering peace proposals to end the bloody fighting in Ukraine. They are not what they seem to be.

In February, Chinese officials floated the idea of Xi Jinping hosting a peace summit with President Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Team Trump wisely rejected Xi as an intermediary, given the growing military and economic alliance between Moscow and Beijing.

Xi’s offer was indeed a Trojan Horse, designed, at best, to obtain Ukraine’s unconditional surrender at the expense of the U.S., and, at worst, calculated to buy Putin time as his military is bogged down in a war of attrition.

Now we are seeing China’s real intentions. Beijing increasingly views Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a useful proxy war against the U.S.

Team Trump admirably wants to end the senseless bloodshed. Xi, however, is now aiming to prolong the war so as to strategically deplete U.S. weapons and munitions stockpiles and to provide the Kremlin time to rebuild its badly mauled military.

Beijing’s participation in Putin’s war was indirect at first, coming in the form of cheap oil and gas purchases and then dual use technologies.

Why Europe is in a hurry to dismantle river-blocking dams and weirs

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Europe is on a river barrier-demolition spree. And it has to do it more vigorously to meet a target of making 25,000 kilometres of rivers barrier-free by 2030.

Twenty-three countries demolished 542 barriers in 2024, according to data compiled by the Dam Removal Europe (DRE), a coalition of six organisations like the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), The Rivers Trust, The Nature Conservancy and the European Rivers Network.

With one dam for every kilometre of rivers, European countries are increasingly joining this drive to enable rivers to flow free, and to restore back the original aquatic ecosystems.

The barrier removal number last year was the highest since the drive started in 2020. This year, 11 countries removed 101 barriers like dams, weirs, culverts and sluices on rivers. In the next three years, it picked up momentum: By 2023, 15 countries had removed 487 barriers.

The drive in Europe is happening in context of global concerns over ecological impacts of increasing blocking or damming of rivers. The human-made barriers on rivers are one of the earliest interventions in natural ecosystems to harness benefits for human societies.

On July 10, 2025, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) released its Frontiers 2025: The Weight of Time. The annual report flags emerging environmental issues. This year’s analysis identified ‘barrier removal for restoration’ as one of the issues.

“While dams have provided significant benefits, they have also disrupted indigenous and fishing communities, while damaging river ecosystems,” noted the UNEP flagship report. It called for a global effort to let rivers flow free.

“Removing dams and barriers is an increasingly accepted strategy to restore river health, and has gained momentum, particularly in Europe and North America, where large, older dams that have become unsafe, obsolete, or economically unviable are being removed,” the report noted.

As the trade deadline passes, the only certainty is more uncertainty

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The Seaspan Thames container ship at the APM Maersk Terminal at the Port of Los Angeles in Los Angeles, California, US, on Tuesday, July 8, 2025. President Donald Trump vowed to push forward with his aggressive tariff regime in the coming days, 

stressing he would not offer additional extensions on country-specific levies set to now hit in early August while indicating he could announce substantial new rates on imports of copper and pharmaceuticals. Photographer: Eric Thayer/Bloomberg via Getty Images

The July 9 deadline has come and gone with few tangible results to resolve disputes with America’s trade partners in place. The only deals that had been completed a week before the deadline were with the United Kingdom and Vietnam, and the U.S. had negotiated a tentative truce with China in May.

As of July 9, no new deals were announced this week.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent previously indicated that the administration is focusing on 18 countries that account for 95 percent of the U.S. trade deficit. As for countries that will receive letters, he said in a CNN interview on Sunday that countries that fail to reach trade agreements by August 1 will “boomerang back” to April 2 levels.

President Trump subsequently announced on Monday that he will impose tariffs of 25 percent on goods from Japan and South Korea that will go into effect on Aug. 1 if a deal has not been consummated by then. Twelve other countries also received pending tariff hikes of 25-40 percent that were close to the rates announced April 2.

On Thursday, Trump threatened Canada with 35 percent tariffs and floated higher global rates of 15-20 percent.

Another batch went out on July 9, the most noteworthy being a possible 50 percent tariff on Brazil that cited a “witch hunt” against former president, Jair Bolsonaro.

The 8-point buzzsaw facing any invasion of Taiwan

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For the better part of a decade, China has served as the “pacing threat” around which American military planners craft defense policy and, most importantly, budget decisions.

Within that framework, a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan has become the scenario most often cited as the likeliest flashpoint for a military confrontation between the two superpowers.

In Washington, “China is going to invade Taiwan” has devolved into little more than a talking point these days. While it remains the essential premise underpinning defense policy, very little is generally said about Taiwan itself and its suitability as a stage for major military operations. That seems like an odd omission considering how much energy and resources American officials have expended in preparing to defend the place, including sending billions in direct military aid.

Hundreds of billions have either been spent or pledged to defend Taiwan. Yet Taiwan’s greatest defensive advantage is the main island of Taiwan itself. The island’s terrain is wholly unsuited for the kind of massive military invasion policymakers use to justify defense budget increases resulting is more than $1 trillion American annual defense budgets. A careful study of Taiwan’s geography including on-the-ground observations reveal eight significant challenges an invader would have to overcome to successfully conquer the island.

The following draws from my recent research on the island and will be fleshed out in a forthcoming report from the Stimson Center.

First, an invader would have to cross the Taiwan Strait to reach the island. An invasion force would include huge numbers of people, vehicles, and supplies. The only way to transport the bulk of such a force is with surface shipping which would be extremely vulnerable to submarines, underwater mines, long-range missiles, and now uncrewed attack vessels.

Israel’s Iran Policy Endgame: How Begin Doctrine Shaped the Netanyahu Era

David Bastardo Martínez

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The ongoing war between Israel and Iran, which effectively began in June 2025, is not an isolated incident that escalated from the Gaza War, nor is the United States’ involvement the result of unforeseen escalation. It is also more than merely a goal pursued by Benjamin Netanyahu’s accelerationist government, 

but rather the culmination of a grand strategy to consolidate Israel as the main regional power in the Levant, a premise first conceived by the original founder of the Likud Party, Prime Minister Menachem Begin, in 1981.

Begin’s principle of pre-emptive defense, informally called the Begin doctrine, seeks to prevent any potential enemy state from developing weapons of mass destruction, primarily nuclear weapons. 

Rather than becoming a marginal strategy confined to the years following the Camp David Accords, the Begin doctrine informed Israeli defense policy to such a degree that no other state actor in the region would be allowed to potentially experiment with nuclear strategic interests.

During the 1990s, then Likud politician and former Sayeret Matkal commander, and system outsider, Benjamin Netanyahu, developed the idea that Iran posed the most significant threat to Israel’s national security if it acquired nuclear weapons. This thesis emerged as a result of the Shiite revolution of 1979 that overthrew Shah Reza Pahlevi,

 and it allowed Netanyahu political capital within Israel to oust more prominent politicians at the time, as well as a looming and escathological motivation for contemporary forms of Zionism to radicalize. At the same time, however, his own theory co-exists with the doctrine established by Menachem Begin, which had yielded tangible results in the past against Iraq and Egypt. As a result, Israel’s attitude toward Iran, and particularly during the escalating regular war that broke out in 2025, is far from aimless.

Begin Doctrine: How Israel Decided to Attack First

From national security to strategic leverage

Maria Shagina

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On 3 July 2025, President Donald Trump’s administration unexpectedly lifted restrictions on the sale of chip-design software to China. The reversal was a response to Beijing’s slowdown in licensing rare-earth minerals, which had disrupted a wide range of American industries – from automakers and aerospace firms to semiconductor producers and defence contractors.

When the electronic design automation (EDA) controls were introduced in late May 2025, the move was viewed as consistent with the United States’ goals to degrade China’s capabilities in artificial intelligence (AI) and semiconductors. It aligned with former president Joe Biden’s administration’s objective to maintain ‘as large a lead as possible’ and to leverage remaining chokepoints deeper in the semiconductor value chain. Western firms, such as Synopsys, Cadence, and Siemens, control approximately 80% of China’s EDA market, while Chinese domestic alternatives, like Empyrean Technology, significantly lag behind. Early signals from the administration suggested a hardening of the US export-control regime.

But just as quietly as they were introduced, the controls were lifted – again, via informal ‘is informed’ letters from the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). This behind-the-scenes rollback signalled a critical shift in US export-control policy: controls are no longer exclusively about national security – they are also instruments of strategic bargaining. Historically non-negotiable, export controls are now increasingly transactional.

This tit-for-tat ‘escalate-to-de-escalate’ tactic raises key strategic questions. Which export controls are non-negotiable and which can be used as leverage? How does US and Chinese strategic leverage compare? And how are chokepoints evolving?

Export controls as bargaining tools Initially, China’s rare-earth export restrictions were a response to the Trump administration’s tariffs. During trade talks in Geneva in May 2025, Beijing agreed to expedite the issuance of export licenses for critical minerals in exchange for a 90-day tariff truce. However, when Washington threatened extraterritorial measures targeting the third-party procurement of Huawei’s AI chips, China began to slow down license approvals. This prompted further retaliation from the US, including restrictions on EDA software, ethane and jet engine components.

Aimless Rivalry The Futility of US–China Competition in the Middle East

Jon Hoffman

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Great power competition is rapidly becoming the new justification for US involvement in the Middle East. Citing efforts by Moscow and Beijing to “challenge American power, influence, and interests,” Washington formally placed competition with Russia and China at the center of the National Security Strategy in 2017.1 Washington views great power competition—particularly with China—in strictly zero-sum terms, extending to a broad swath of issue areas and regional theaters. This approach encourages an already counterproductive foreign policy driven by an indefinite—and expansive—struggle to maintain American global primacy.

Many in the defense and foreign policy establishment view the Middle East as a major theater for US–China competition.2 Washington has come to view Chinese encroachment in the Middle East as a serious national security threat to the United States. According to this logic, China is driven by grand ambitions in the region: If the United States were to lessen its regional involvement, Beijing stands ready to fill a US vacuum in the Middle East, to the detriment of US interests.3

According to such thinking, China filling this vacuum would jeopardize Washington’s freedom to maneuver throughout the Middle East or could result in Beijing weaponizing the region’s resources against the United States.4 Others have gone so far as to claim that China actively seeks to oust the United States from the Middle East because it desires regional supremacy.5 Fearing Chinese inroads in the Middle East, Washington has increasingly issued warnings to its regional partners cautioning against ties with Beijing, claiming this could jeopardize their relationships with the United States.6 Such concerns are some of the most commonly cited justifications for continued deep engagement in the Middle East.

The War in Gaza Might Finally Be Coming to an End | Opinion

Daoud Kuttab

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Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu arrived at the White House this week to discuss a highly complicated issue: ongoing negotiations over the future of Gaza and Palestine.

Netanyahu's negotiators in Doha are waiting for instructions from their boss to finalize a much-delayed ceasefire agreement. The real challenge, however, will be to convert a temporary ceasefire into something permanent. While the Trump administration seems to favor a serious push for a temporary ceasefire, many are wondering whether to expect the end of this brutal war, or merely a two-month pause before violence resumes.

There are multiple reasons both Netanyahu and Donald Trump should be eager for a ceasefire. The U.S. president, despite opposition from many within his own party and traditional allies in the Gulf, took a risk by attacking Iran's nuclear facilities. As a former reality TV star, Trump understands the power of social media images of children in Gaza, starving and dying from the war. Such images resonate deeply with American viewers. This toll is not just humanitarian; it's also political, especially when amplified by the false claim that aid to Gaza is regularly stolen by Hamas.

For Netanyahu, a ceasefire is not a matter of alleviating the suffering of Palestinians, particularly in Gaza, but of managing pressures from Israel's own military establishment. Israeli soldiers are daily paying a price for this war, with resistance forces in Gaza mounting consistent challenges to the occupation. The same day Netanyahu and his wife Sara arrived in Washington, five Israeli soldiers were killed in Gaza. The Israeli military brass sees no point in continuing the war merely to appease a couple of radical cabinet members.

Moreover, Israeli citizens continue to protest daily, demanding an end to the war. They understand that the path to normalcy—one that includes the return of Israeli hostages and the eventual release of Palestinian prisoners—lies through a ceasefire and peace.

Ukraine war map: How Russia's drone strike strategy is evolving Story

Bidisha Saha

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Moscow has stepped up its attacks in the past two weeks, aiming to break Ukrainian morale and secure victory. But the situation on the ground suggests that goal remains far-fetched.

India Today's Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) team analysed comprehensive strike data from ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data) and other media reports to understand how the scale of the war has intensified over the past two weeks.

Ukraine war map: How Russia's drone strike strategy is evolving

Data reveals a consistent upward trend in the number of drone and missile strikes across March, April, May, and June 2025, indicating an escalation in the intensity of the conflict during these months. On July 9, Russia launched 728 drones and 13 missiles in a single day — the largest airstrike since the war began in February 2022.

Ukraine war map: How Russia's drone strike strategy is evolving

Ground reports analysed by the American non-profit Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and other publications also indicate Russia's intensified offensive over the past 30 days. ISW assesses that Russian forces seized a total of 498.53 square kilometers in May 2025 and 466.71 square kilometers in June 2025.

At this pace, Russia is advancing by just 15 square kilometres a day — roughly the size of Delhi's international airport. So far, it already controls 113,888 square kilometres of Ukraine's total 603,000 square kilometres.

How Netanyahu Prolonged the War in Gaza to Stay in Power

Patrick Kingsley, Ronen Bergman and Natan Odenheimer

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Six months into the war in the Gaza Strip, Benjamin Netanyahu was preparing to bring it to a halt. Negotiations were underway for an extended cease-fire with Hamas, and he was ready to agree to a compromise. He had dispatched an envoy to convey Israel’s new position to the Egyptian mediators. Now, at a meeting at the Ministry of Defense in Tel Aviv, he needed to get his cabinet onboard. He had kept the plan off the meeting’s written agenda. The idea was to reveal it suddenly, preventing resistant ministers from coordinating their response.

It was April 2024, long before Netanyahu mounted his political comeback. The proposal on the table would have paused the Gaza war for at least six weeks. It would have created a window for negotiations with Hamas over a permanent truce. More than 30 hostages captured by Hamas at the start of the war would have been released within weeks. Still more would have been freed if the truce was extended. And the devastation of Gaza, where roughly two million people were trying to survive daily attacks, would have come to a halt.

Ending the war would then have raised the chances of a landmark peace deal with Saudi Arabia, the Arab world’s most powerful country. For months, the Saudi leadership had secretly signaled its willingness to accelerate peace talks with Israel — as long as the war in Gaza stopped. The normalization of ties between the Saudi and Israeli governments, an achievement that had eluded every Israeli leader since the state’s founding in 1948, would have secured Israel’s status in the region as well as Netanyahu’s long-term legacy.

But for Netanyahu, a truce also came with personal risk. As prime minister, he led a fragile coalition that depended on the support of far-right ministers who wanted to occupy Gaza, not withdraw from it. They sought a long war that would ultimately enable Israel to re-establish Jewish settlements in Gaza. If a cease-fire came too soon, these ministers might decide to collapse the ruling coalition. That would prompt early elections that polls showed Netanyahu would lose. Out of office, Netanyahu was vulnerable. Since 2020, he had been standing trial for corruption; the charges, which he denied, mostly related to granting favors to businessmen in exchange for gifts and favorable media coverage. Shorn of power, Netanyahu would lose the ability to force out the attorney general who oversaw his prosecution — as indeed his government would later attempt to do.

Fighting with Robots: The Time to Prepare is No

Kevin Bradley

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On December 20, 2024, Ukraine’s successfully conducted an “all-robot” ground and air attack, with dozens of drones in the air and unmanned ground platforms coordinated in an assault against a Russian position in Kharkiv oblast. The remarkable achievement highlighted the rapid integration of robotic systems into current military formations. Human-machine integrated formations are no longer speculative concepts—they are operational necessities. US Army Futures Command, created to transform the Army to ensure war-winning readiness, is developing unmanned ground and aerial drones in order to not sacrifice the lives of soldiers in our next fight. Use of unmanned systems allows the Army to automate our riskiest tasks and to field robotic systems that enable leaders to make faster, better-informed decisions. The tactical formations of tomorrow will be hybrid in nature—comprised of soldiers and intelligent machines fighting together.

But fielding robotic platforms is not enough. The materiel component of this change in the character of warfare is paired with a cognitive element. To effectively command in the future, young leaders must understand robotic systems and how to employ them. Leaders must know what is required to win with robots, and the time to begin preparing is now.

Building the Skill Set: What Future Leaders Need to Know

If you polled senior Army leaders, the number one characteristic they would say a future leader must possess is adaptability. In doctrinal terms, they must be able “to influence conditions and respond effectively to changing threats and situations with appropriate, flexible, and timely actions.” To effectively lead a human-machine integrated formation, soldiers must develop technical and digital fluency that matches their physical endurance and tactical knowledge. Tactical decision-making will increasingly rely not only on the warfighting expertise honed by hard training, but also on the ability to operate and understand complex systems—both hardware and software.

Hegseth calls for extensive reforms to Pentagon drone-buying practices

Courtney Albon

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Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth on Thursday announced sweeping changes to the way the Pentagon buys and fields uncrewed air systems, or UAS, with a goal of establishing “UAS domain dominance” by 2027.

Hegseth announced the policy changes in a video recorded on the Pentagon’s front lawn. With Metallica’s “Enter Sandman” playing in the background, a quadcopter delivered a memo announcing the policy changes, which Hegseth then signed.

“While our adversaries have produced millions of cheap drones, before us we were mired in bureaucratic red tape,” he said in the video, which he posted from his official X account. “Not anymore.”

Unleashing U.S. Military Drone Dominance @DOGE pic.twitter.com/ueqQPc7rKI— Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth (@SecDef) July 10, 2025

The memo lists three broad goals: bolstering the U.S. drone manufacturing base, delivering thousands of low-cost systems to military units over the next few years and integrating drone operations into training programs.

“Next year I expect to see this capability integrated into all relevant combat training, including force-on-force drone wars,” Hegseth wrote in the memo.

The announcement builds on a June 6 White House executive order that calls for normalizing drone operations and integration into the national airspace as well as investment in production and emerging technologies across commercial, civil and national security sectors.