Indian Strategic Studies: 07/21/25

21 July 2025

A New Era in Health Security

The CSIS Bipartisan Alliance for Global Health Security has evaluated the policy changes unfolding in the past several months as a new era in national,

economic, and health security begins. This call to action is an appeal to the administration and Congress to protect and strengthen investments in health security programs, which make Americans safer, stronger, and more prosperous.

The first order of business is to restore confidence and trust in health security policies and their execution. To that end, the alliance calls on the administration and Congress to (1) stabilize and modernize core health security capabilities;

(2) secure and sustain U.S. leadership in science and biomedical research;

and (3) accelerate innovations in financing that enable efficient, effective, and accountable health security investments. Together,

these actions will ensure Americans remain protected, U.S. innovation remains competitive, and U.S. government programming is more efficient and sustainable going forward, assured of strong support among Americans.

Rebuilding Bipartisan Consensus

The CSIS Bipartisan Alliance for Global Health Security was launched in early 2023 to advance concrete, pragmatic policy to strengthen the health security of the United States and the world.

1 It recognizes that health security is an essential component of national and economic security and builds on a 60-year CSIS legacy of strong bipartisan analysis to inform policymakers in addressing U.S. national interests.

Weathering ‘High Winds and Stormy Waves’

Chinese leaders are deeply worried about threats to China’s economic security. For decades, China achieved breakneck economic growth that seemed to suggest the country was on an inexorable rise toward “national rejuvenation.” In recent years,

however, China’s economic prospects have come under question, and Beijing has grown increasingly concerned about the nation’s economic security (经济安全).

Central to these concerns are threats to the complex web of supply chains (供应链) that keep the Chinese economy humming. In 2020,

the Covid-19 pandemic wreaked havoc on global supply chains, prompting China to turn its attention to shoring up its economic security.

The end of the pandemic did not abate Beijing’s worries. The onset of the War in Ukraine in 2022, coupled with worsening U.S.-China relations and slowing domestic growth, convinced Chinese policymakers that they need to better fortify their economy against mounting threats.

In one of the most important speeches of Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s career—his report to the Communist Party’s 20th National Congress in 2022—he warned of “a new period of turbulence and change” in the world that threatens China’s quest for rejuvenation.

In that speech, he demanded of his party comrades that they “must enhance our sense of crisis, adhere to bottom line thinking, be prepared for danger in times of peace, and be prepared to withstand major tests of high winds and even stormy waves.”

How Severe Are China’s Food Security Challenges?

Food security is critical to the well-being and stability of all countries. Decades of economic growth have enabled considerable strides in increasing access to food across China, but this growth has also generated new demographic demands and environmental strains.

Global shocks like the COVID-19 pandemic, war in Ukraine, U.S.-China tensions, and the effects of climate change have left Chinese policymakers anxious about China’s food security issues.

This ChinaPower report lays out the most pressing threats to China’s food security as well as key areas of progress and resilience.

For Chinese leaders, food security (粮食安全) is an “important foundation of national security.” Chinese leader Xi Jinping famously remarked that “solving the food problem for more than one billion people has always been the top priority of our party in governing the country.”

Between 2013 and 2024, Xi mentioned food security in over 450 speeches, meetings, inspections, and other activities.1

China’s rapid economic growth has brought both enormous benefits and new challenges with respect to food security. On the upside, socioeconomic gains have fueled dramatic reductions in China’s undernourished population.

According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the rate of undernourishment in China’s population fell from 10.3 percent in 2001 to 2.5 percent (or less) by 2010.2 This decline coincided with a tripling of annual per capita disposable income from just 4,070 RMB to 12,520 RMB over the same period, according to Chinese government figures.

China’s increasingly well-off population has led to surging demand for food. In particular, the emergence of China’s urban middle class has corresponded with a shift away from a grain-oriented diet to a more expensive, meat-heavy intake. Today,

How Robust Is China’s Energy Security?

Energy security is a crucial pillar of the economic and national security of every country. Disruptions that upset the steady supply of power can cause cascading ripple effects throughout industries and society.

China’s energy security is characterized by a mix of vulnerabilities and strengths. It is by far the world’s largest consumer of energy, placing enormous pressure on policymakers to fuel the nation’s sprawling manufacturing sector.

China is also significantly reliant on foreign fossil fuels, leaving it exposed to disruptions stemming from instability and geopolitical competition.

Yet China has major energy security strengths. It is rapidly deploying renewable energy infrastructure to reduce its reliance on fossil fuels.

China also leads the world in producing critical minerals that are central to its energy security, and heavy investments in its energy grid are enabling China to prepare for a future powered by renewables.

Finally, China’s abundant supply of coal offers policymakers a safety net in the event of major disruptions to other energy sources.

This ChinaPower report explores these key strengths and vulnerabilities. It focuses not just on China’s absolute security needs but considers China’s situation in a global context—especially in comparison to the next-biggest energy consumer,

the United States. Overall, China’s energy security position is relatively strong, and its advantages are poised to grow

How Deep Are China-Russia Military Ties?

China’s decision to tacitly side with Russia despite its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine renewed fears of a China-Russia military alliance. The two countries have so far eschewed a formal alliance,

but they share deep military ties centering on arms sales and joint military exercises. Russian arms sales to China have been invaluable to China’s efforts to rapidly modernize the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Joint military exercises have likewise aided the PLA and offered Beijing a suite of other benefits.

Yet military ties between Beijing and Moscow have not been without considerable hiccups. China’s repeated theft of Russian technology is a major sore spot, and arms sales are becoming a less important focal point of the broader bilateral relationship.

With respect to joint exercises, shifting power dynamics between China and Russia are upsetting the status quo with mixed results for China.

Through the decades, cooperation on military technology has, at times, been an important and symbolic element of China-Russia relations. Politically,

Russian military aid and arms sales have helped undergird the broader diplomatic relationship. Militarily, arms sales have provided the PLA with equipment that it struggled to produce on its own, like advanced aircraft,

engines, and air defense systems. However, China has repeatedly stolen Russian technology and know-how, creating friction between Beijing and Moscow.

Going forward, however, the China-Russia defense-industrial relations may be reversed as the Russian defense industry becomes more dependent on Chinese supplies.

PRC Concepts for UAV Swarms in Future Warfare

This paper examines writings from 2020 to 2024 produced by subject matter experts (SMEs) in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and others in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) defense community discussing the growing use of uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs)—commonly called drones—in warfare.

It also provides preliminary insights into this community’s views on the use of uncrewed systems (UxS) and drone swarms as the next generation of warfare able to supplement, and even replace, many crewed platforms for combat missions,

as well as on the potential employment of drones in an amphibious assault or blockade of Taiwan.

A central finding of this paper is that the PLA is researching and developing autonomous drone swarm technology to solve one of the PRC’s most difficult challenges—a potential military invasion of Taiwan—and developing the capability to employ drone swarms in either an amphibious assault or blockade scenario.

An examination of PRC writings suggests that the PRC is learning from both sides in the Russia-Ukraine war on the use of drones and drone countermeasures and applying these lessons to a PLA-Taiwan military scenario.

Articles from PLA-produced and technical journals indicate that the PLA is researching, testing, and exercising with drones and drone swarms for a potential Taiwan invasion.

PRC SMEs observe that the world’s militaries are successfully using UxS for combat operations, including drone swarms, which they describe as providing the following advantages:Lower casualty rates because fewer soldiers need to deploy to the most dangerous combat operations.

Lower cost to produce medium and small drones, particularly for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and tactical strike missions.

Easier training for drone operators.

Surfacing Insta360: Strategic Infiltration, Cybersecurity Risks and National Security Implications of China's Action Camera Giant

1. Introduction to Insta360: Based in Shenzhen, Insta360 has gained global recognition for its cutting-edge 360-degree video technology, challenging GoPro in U.S. and international markets. Founded by Jingkang Liu,

a "40 Under 40" business elite with ties to the CCP through his role as a promotion ambassador for the 5th World Hakka Youth Conference, its products are widely used by 134 million individuals, businesses, government agencies, and the U.S. military.

2. Partnerships with Huawei and DJI: Insta360’s collaborations with Huawei and DJI— both scrutinized for ties to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its People’s Liberation Army (PLA)—highlight potential risks of integrating Chinese technology into critical sectors, given concerns about data security and espionage.

3. Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities: Insta360 products, including the Insta360 X4, exhibit significant cybersecurity flaws, such as weak hardware protections, unauthenticated data transmission, and excessive data collection, making them vulnerable to exploitation by malicious actors.

4. Overcollection of User Data: The Insta360 app collects a wide range of user information, including IMEI numbers, location settings, user profiles, and third-party account details, often without meaningful opt-out options, raising serious privacy concerns.

5. Audio Exfiltration Risks: Audio data captured through Insta360 devices is transmitted to Chinese iFlyTek servers without user notification or clear data usage policies, potentially enabling unauthorized surveillance or data misuse.

6. National Security Concerns: Insta360’s vulnerabilities present broader national security risks, particularly given its potential alignment with China’s Military-Civil Fusion strategy and the CCP’s ability to compel data access under Chinese law.

Crash (exploit) and burn: Securing the offensive cyber supply chain to counter China in cyberspace

Winnona DeSombre Bernsen

If the United States wants to increasingly use offensive cyber operations internationally, does it have the supply chain and acquisition capabilities to back it up—especially if its adversary is the People’s Republic of China?  

Strategic competition between the United States and China has long played out in cyberspace, where offensive cyber capabilities, like zero-day vulnerabilities, are a strategic resource. Since 2016,

China has been turning the zero-day marketplace in East Asia into a funnel of offensive cyber capabilities for its military and intelligence services,

both to ensure it can break into the most secure Western technologies and to deny the United States from obtaining similar capabilities from the region. If the United States wishes to compete in cyberspace, it must compete against China to secure its offensive cyber supply chain.  

This report is the first to conduct a comparative study within the international offensive cyber supply chain, comparing the United States’ fragmented, risk-averse acquisition model with China’s outsourced and funnel-like approach.  

Zero-day exploitation is becoming more difficult, opaque, and expensive, leading to “feast-or-famine” contract cycles.  Middlemen with prior government connections further drive up costs and create inefficiency in the US and Five Eyes (FVEYs) market,

while eroding trust between buyers and sellers.   China’s domestic cyber pipeline dwarfs that of the United States. China is also increasingly moving to recruit from the Middle East and East Asia. 

Hong Kong's Financial Evolution: China's Bid to Shape Global Capital Flow

Hong Kong has been China’s primary gateway to global markets, especially as a channel for inbound foreign capital. But the territory’s role is gradually shifting.

Hong Kong is increasingly emerging as a controlled outlet for Chinese households to invest their vast pool of savings in foreign assets through carefully calibrated liberalization mechanisms.

Hong Kong’s transformation comes as Beijing seeks to balance two competing imperatives: projecting financial power globally while preserving its strict controls over capital outflows.

At the same time, Hong Kong’s evolution is unfolding against a backdrop of profound political change.

In early 2025, Enodo Economics and the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis co-organized and co-chaired a closed-door roundtable on China’s deepening financial integration with Hong Kong and its impact on global markets.

The event convened senior policymakers and financial practitioners with expertise in Hong Kong’s financial system. The roundtable explored several key themes,

with discussions organized around five main areas of inquiry:Hong Kong’s present status in relation to the mainland

Hong Kong’s evolution toward a controlled channel for mainland investment outflows

The future of the Hong Kong dollar peg

Hong Kong’s position within the changing international financial order

Implications for the international community

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China’s Continental Conundrum: Nuclear Geopolitics and American Strategy in the Western Pacific

Kyle Balzer | Dan Blumenthal

While American policymakers and defense analysts have identified the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as the greatest threat to US national security, there is no consensus on the CCP’s ultimate political objectives and its strategy to achieve them. Moreover,

absent from this debate on China’s strategic intentions is an assessment of how the CCP’s ongoing nuclear force buildup fits into its grand strategy.

Analysts have generally focused on military-technical issues divorced from the broader geopolitical picture The nuclear debate has therefore centered on narrow issues such as weapons capabilities, employment strategies,

and arms-race stability at the expense of more fundamental political questions. Yet China’s vast nuclear buildup can be fully appreciated only in the context of the CCP’s geopolitics.

The Limits to China’s Transactional Diplomacy in Africa

Paul Nantulya

China has long hailed its noninterventionist strategy of engaging with any type of sitting government regardless of how they came to power. Yet, the legal authority of a government and its commitment to upholding the rule of law have fundamental implications for stability and prospective returns on investments. China’s experience in Niger provides an instructive illustration.

In March 2025, three Chinese oil executives working for the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and its subsidiaries were expelled from Niger. This represented the latest setback in China’s dealings with the military junta of General Abdourahamane Tchiani who seized power in July 2023.

The regime had previously terminated the license of a Chinese-owned hotel in Niamey after accusing it of “discriminatory practices and administrative violations.” Matters escalated in May when the military government ordered CNPC and its oil refinery, Soraz, to suspend the work permits of expatriate employees with more than 4 years of service.

There are inherent financial risks to transacting deals in contexts where constitutional rule has been overthrown.

These developments, coming on the heels of the junta’s strategy of resource nationalism, economic populism, and revolutionary fervor against perceived foreign domination,

threaten China’s sizable investments in Niger. This includes the development and operation of the Agadem oil field by CNPC and the 2,000-km (1,240-mile) oil pipeline that runs from the isolated southeast of the landlocked country to the Atlantic seaport of Sèmè in neighboring Benin.

High-Altitude Nuclear Explosions: Myths and Reality

Thankfully, no party has used nuclear weapons in war since 1945. Treaties limiting nuclear tests and weapon inventories during the Cold War highlighted the pragmatism of world leaders. As memories fade, and nascent nuclear states mature,

the potential for their use (or misuse) rises. In a strategic environment with multiple nuclear-armed states of various sizes and incentives, it is important to understand the science underlying the use of nuclear weapons in novel and unexpected ways.

As opposed to the ground bursts of World War II, their use in the sky has potential to achieve certain objectives without catastrophic loss of life. Due partly to the lack of testing and partly to a somber reluctance to consider this potentiality,

many misunderstandings persist. There is a need to address prevailing myths about the use of high-altitude nuclear explosions and provide realities rooted in the existing research on the subject.

Waging war against an enemy with dominant digital communications systems is a recipe for defeat. Modern digital communications structures enable lethal kill-chain targeting cycles, seamless command and control, and precision guidance that dominate the enemy.

This reality makes the space and cyber domains a primary target in future warfare. All tacticians seek to degrade their adversaries’ communications in war, but few consider the literal “nuclear option” that could fundamentally upend the current communications ecosystem.

High-altitude nuclear explosions (HANEs) allow an actor to degrade modern communications, either on the ground or in the sky. Closer to the ground, HANEs create a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) that could shut down power plants, cellular towers,

A Cyberattack Severity Classification Framework for the Republic of Korea

Despite deterrence efforts, cyber threats continue to escalate, highlighting the need for greater accountability from and cost imposition on malicious actors. The U.S. 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy

emphasizes imposing costs on malicious actors and reinforcing alliances; the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) 2024 National Cybersecurity Strategy also prioritizes offensive cyber defense and global cooperation. Since 2018, U.S. Cyber Command’s “Defend Forward” policy has resulted in 40 Hunt Forward operations across 21 countries,

exposing threats from major adversaries. Similarly, the European Union’s updated 2023 Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox stresses situational awareness and the importance of holding persistent threat actors accountable.

Attributing cyberattacks and formulating response strategies are inherently political processes shaped by national security priorities, diplomatic relations, and geopolitical considerations. Governments must balance deterrence with escalation risks,

ensuring proportionality and international legitimacy. It is therefore difficult to establish a single, uniform standard for response. Nevertheless, consistent policy is necessary, as the absence of clear frameworks increases political burdens, delays decisionmaking, and results in inconsistent responses that can confuse allies.

A national framework for classifying cyberattack severity enhances objectivity, guiding policy decisions and facilitating mutual understanding between nations. Although South Korea has shown strong political will to respond to malicious cyber activities,

it lacks a clear legal and policy framework for response procedures. To fill this gap, this paper proposes a Cyberattack Severity Classification Framework (CSCF) to objectively assess and categorize cyberattacks, supporting informed decisionmaking.

Sino-Russian Interactions Regarding the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Though not a mutual defense alliance, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) remains the most important multilateral security structure in Central Asia that includes both Russia and China.

Participating in SCO exercises provided the Chinese military with some of its first opportunities to rehearse power projection capabilities.

The SCO has ceased holding its large Peace Mission series of exercises; other drills occur but less regularly.

Despite differences regarding the SCO and the organization’s declining relative importance to Russia and China, the two countries have sustained a robust security partnership within the organization and in Central Asia.

Though the SCO is not a traditional mutual defense alliance, many Sino-Russian military exercises with Central Asian partners have occurred under its auspices. These drills helped develop contacts,

improve operational proficiency, enhance interoperability, and demonstrate deterrence capabilities to external observers. The SCO also established the first military confidence-building measures and multilateral counterterrorism networks among the Russian,

Chinese, and Central Asian governments. Yet, since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the SCO has ceased holding its biannual Peace Mission series of large multinational military exercises while continuing other drills on an irregular basis.

The Russian government welcomes the SCO as a prominent non-Western multinational structure that can advance its regional diplomatic, economic, and security goals. Participating in the SCO elevates Russia’s diplomatic status,

Aimless Rivalry

Jon Hoffman

Fear in Washington over China’s expanding regional presence is quickly becoming a new rationale for an expansive US foreign policy in the Middle East. But China remains an opportunistic actor in the Middle East,

driven by practical needs, not by aspirations to dominate the region. Beijing lacks the ability and desire to assume a dominant position in the Middle East, and its ability to jeopardize US regional interests is limited.

Centering US Middle East policy on competition with China is a recipe for disaster. It is an aimless rivalry divorced from concrete US interests. The United States has little to fear from China in the Middle East.

By viewing every development in the Middle East through the framework of zero-sum competition with China, Washington is operating on faulty assumptions that will result in counterproductive policies.

If navigated correctly, the return of multipolarity to the Middle East can be a net benefit for the United States, allowing Washington to disentangle itself from the region.

Great power competition is rapidly becoming the new justification for US involvement in the Middle East. Citing efforts by Moscow and Beijing to “challenge American power, influence, and interests,

Washington formally placed competition with Russia and China at the center of the National Security Strategy in 2017.1 Washington views great power competition—particularly with China—in strictly zero-sum terms, extending to a broad swath of issue areas and regional theaters.

This approach encourages an already counterproductive foreign policy driven by an indefinite—and expansive—struggle to maintain American global primacy.

The Fall of Assad: A Strategic Blow to Russia’s Ambitions?

This paper examines the strategic implications of the fall of Bashar al-Assad for Russian foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East. The analysis first explores the motivations behind Russia’s 2015 intervention in Syria and assesses the impact of Assad’s collapse across global,

regional, and domestic dimensions. Assad’s ousting represents a blow to Russia’s regional influence and global image, undermining years of political, military, and financial investment. While the HTS-led government has opened a short-term window for pragmatic cooperation with Moscow,

this relationship is driven by HTS’s need for legitimacy and technical expertise, and by Russia’s interest in preserving influence and maintaining its military installations. However, this alignment could prove temporary. In the long-term, ideological divergence,

competing alliances, and shifting regional dynamics may erode the foundations of the relationship and weaken Russia’s long-term positioning in Syria.

A US defense strategy to win the next conflict

Clementine G. Starling-Daniels

The next National Defense Strategy (NDS) is set to reshape US military strategy in an era of evolving global threats—from the rise of China as a primary competitor to emerging challenges in homeland security. At the same time,

it must correct the shortcomings of previous strategies, including the failure to clearly balance defense and power projection, as well as an overly narrow focus on nuclear missile and terrorist threats.

To sharpen its approach to national defense, the second Trump administration should center the forthcoming NDS around five critical priorities: defending the homeland, deterring strategic attacks on the United States through a resilient and modernized deterrent posture,

recognizing China as the primary competitor globally, modernizing US forces for combined arms operations in the age of AI and autonomy, and securing US military dominance in space.

Together, these five priorities form a comprehensive framework to protect the lives of US citizens, interests, and values in an increasingly contested world. In this sense, the next NDS is more than a policy document—it is an opportunity.

A bold strategic vision must be met with the necessary resources and capabilities to back it up. By embracing these priorities with clarity and commitment, the NDS can deliver a defense strategy that meets today’s threats and secures the United States’ future.

Second-order impacts of civil artificial intelligence regulation on defense: Why the national security community must engage

Deborah Cheverton

Civil regulation of artificial intelligence (AI) is hugely complex and evolving quickly, with even otherwise well-aligned countries taking significantly different approaches. At first glance, little in the content of these regulations is directly applicable to the defense and national security community.

The most wide-ranging and robust regulatory frameworks have specific carve-outs that exclude military and related use cases. And while governments are not blind to the need for regulations on AI used in national security and defense, these are largely detached from the wider civil AI regulation debate.

However, when potential second-order or unintended consequences on defense from civil AI regulation are considered, it becomes clear that the defense and security community cannot afford to think itself special. Carve-out boundaries can,

at best, be porous when the technology is inherently dual use in nature. This paper identifies three broad areas in which this porosity might have a negative impact, including market-shaping civil regulation that could affect the tools available to the defense and national security community;

judicial interpretation of civil regulations that could impact the defense and national security community’s license to operate; and regulations that could add additional cost or risk to developing and deploying AI systems for defense and national security.

This paper employs these areas as lenses through which to assess civil regulatory frameworks for AI to identify which initiatives should concern the defense and national security community.

A pivot to China—not Asia

Clementine G. Starling-Daniels, Edward Brady, and Theresa Luetkefend

In the National Defense Strategy (NDS) of the first Donald Trump administration and that of the Joe Biden administration, great-power competition played a central role.

However, both administrations considered China and Russia—and therefore the Indo-Pacific and Europe—as twin focal points of risk and strategic interest. The current Trump administration is shifting gears. Rather than balancing China and Russia,

the Department of Defense (DoD) will now organize around China as the principal threat and competitor.

This prioritization is welcome. After all, defense planners have long criticized that trying to manage too many threats to the United States without a corresponding increase in defense budget makes it difficult to address any of them effectively.

The problem is not whether the United States should engage globally—it must—but whether considering too many issues means that none of them are effectively prioritized.

But how can the Trump administration—through its upcoming NDS—successfully position China as the primary threat,

while rebalancing its engagement in other regions in a measured and responsible way? The answer lies in updating the US military’s force structure and rebalancing its force posture.

Moreover, to deter China in the Indo-Pacific, the US military should focus on long-range fires, the ability to move forces, the protection of critical defense infrastructure, and additional basing options.

The Shield and the Sword: A Practical Defense Concept for the Baltic

MAJ Robert Rose

In BriefNATO can credibly deter Russia using existing capabilities—if it establishes an appropriate operating concept to counter how Russia would approach a conflict.

The Baltic States are the most likely flashpoint between NATO and Russia. Russia would only gamble on a conflict with them if it could achieve strategic surprise.

Russia would seek to exploit surprise for a swift termination of the war by rapidly seizing terrain in the Baltic and then transitioning to defense-in-depth that would test NATO’s willpower and force a fait accompli.

The Baltic Defense Line provides the initial means to deny a fait accompli, but NATO must support it with units ready to parry a surprise attack and rapidly counterattack to decisively defeat Russian forces before they can solidify any gains.

On 24 February 2022, Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. While international attention was focused on the debacle of Russia’s stalled columns north of Kyiv, in just 48 hours,

Russia penetrated deep into southern Ukraine and crossed the Dnieper River. By 27 February, Russia had seized Mykolaiv, and by 2 March,

it had eliminated resistance in Kherson. Within three weeks, Russia had occupied territory equivalent to the entire area of Estonia and Latvia.

Russia revealed that the infamous 2016 RAND wargames on a Russian invasion of the Baltic, which predicted that their forces could reach Tallinn or Riga in 60 hours,

Books, Monographs & Collaborative Studies

Maintaining strategic advantage demands professional discourse from across the force. The Academic Year 2025–26 Annual Estimate of the Strategic Security Environment provides a framework for those aspiring to tackle the Department of Defense’s most pressing challenges.

This year’s authors highlight trending challenges and identify potential tension points across 15 sections organized into four enduring themes. This survey of regional,

domestic, and institutional challenges represents the collective expertise of the US Army War College. The narrative is supplemented by a tailored list of 100 command-sponsored questions from 43 different Army and Joint organizations from across the Department of Defense. Combined,

the distinct yet complementary narrative and question list offer unique insights into the vital matters impacting defense organizations and provide aspiring researchers with a necessary starting point.

Asia, People’s Republic of China (PRC), People’s Liberation Army, Xi Jinping, strategic competition, Indo-Pacific, Eurasia, Russia, Ukraine, arms control, arms race, Europe, NATO, military budget, European security,

Middle East, North Africa, Iran, Israel, Hamas, Saudi Arabia, Houthi, Latin America, Caribbean, strategic access, migration, terrorism, sub-Saharan Africa, Africa, protracted conflict, civil-military relations, defense industrial base, defense budget,

smart weapons, leader development, recruiting, retention, all-volunteer force, logistics, contested logistics, large-scale combat operations, survivability, polar regions, Arctic, natural resources, space, Space Force, Joint Force, artificial intelligence, technology, machine learning, nuclear deterrence, nuclear proliferation

Sentinel Brief: Evidence of CCP Censorship, Propaganda in U.S. LLM Responses Posted

Courtney Manning, Josey Walden / Monique Shum

The Chinese Communist Party’s aggressive censorship laws and disinformation campaigns have resulted in a proliferation of propaganda and censorship across the global AI data marketplace.

AI-powered chatbots in the United States now regurgitate CCP propaganda in Chinese and English when prompted on certain topics, posing significant ramifications for global AI development and U.S. national security.

Entity-Based Regulation in Frontier AI Governance

Dean W. Ball and Ketan Ramakrishnan

The Technology and International Affairs Program develops insights to address the governance challenges and large-scale risks of new technologies.

Our experts identify actionable best practices and incentives for industry and government leaders on artificial intelligence, cyber threats, cloud security,

countering influence operations, reducing the risk of biotechnologies, and ensuring global digital inclusion.Learn More

Dean W. Ball co-authored this piece before joining the U.S. Office of Science and Technology Policy. All views represented are purely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect U.S. government policy.

At the heart of frontier artificial intelligence (AI) policy lies a key debate: Should regulation focus on the core technology itself—AI models—or on the technology’s uses? Advocates of use-based AI regulation argue that it protects innovation by giving model developers the freedom to experiment,

free from burdensome licensing regimes and thickets of technical standards. Advocates of model-based regulation, on the other hand, argue that their approach concentrates the compliance burden on developers while granting users of AI the latitude to deploy the technology as they see fit, thus aiding technology diffusion in the long run.

Each of these familiar paradigms for regulating frontier AI faces serious objections. Use-based regulation can be just as onerous as model-based regulation—often much more so,

as suggested by the EU AI Act and a gaggle of successor bills in various U.S. states.1 Although the burden of use-based regulation does not fall on developers in the first instance,

it can nevertheless be expected to burden model development in serious ways, such as by deterring adoption through increased compliance costs for model users.

The Science vs. the Narrative vs. the Voters: Clarifying the Public Debate Around Energy and Climate

Roger Pielke Jr. | Ruy Teixeira

Key PointsThe relationship between voter opinion, scientific assessment, and media narrative is poorly understood, thereby reinforcing the current extremely partisan and tribal public discussions about energy and climate.

The public’s views and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s scientific analysis differ in important respects from the narrative that has come to dominate the mainstream media and public discourse on climate and energy.

The public broadly supports an “all-of-the-above” approach to energy policy and does not generally support a rapid elimination of fossil fuels. Instead, they support increased domestic production of fossil fuels.

The public is most interested in the cost and reliability of the energy they use and the convenience and comfort of their energy-using products. They are unwilling to sacrifice much at all financially to address climate change or significantly change their consumer behavior.

With the abrupt changes in energy and climate policy promulgated by the second Trump administration, it is more vital than ever to understand what voters actually think about energy and climate; how those views align (or don’t align) with scientific evidence,

as summarized by the most recent assessment reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC); and how both match up with the dominant mainstream media narrative about these crucial issues.

Right now, the relationship between voter opinion, scientific assessment, and media narrative is poorly understood. Our report aims to clarify this underlying confusion to better inform policy initiatives and proposals, in both policy and political terms, in the context of American public opinion.

OFFICERS, MILITARY PROCESS AND PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

Staff and war college graduates play a pivotal role in the military. They must possess the skills necessary to employ the three steps of the military process, i.e.,

understand the task objectives correctly, analyze the available courses of action with accuracy to develop a plan,

and execute the plan with efficiency to meet the objectives. To prepare students for this challenge, professional military education (PME) should put more emphasis on practice than theory.

Students generally learn the military process in two parts. The first part is education in the art of warfare, its theory and historical analysis, besides application of research methodology in analytical writing.

The second part is (or should be) training to understand the art of warfare through rigorous practice by way of role-playing during map exercises. In this training, just like in war, the process is not bound by class schedules;

rather the exercise unfolds in a way that creates rigor and uncertainty for the students. The leadership, advising, and staff skills of the students are enhanced as they get to play different roles in varied scenarios.

But many PME courses tend towards the theoretical and academic. The trend of awarding a civilian degree in PME courses,

which are then subjected to a higher education regulatory body’s guideline, is perhaps the reason for “civilianizing” courses for military leaders at premier military institutes.