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27 July 2025

China’s Brahmaputra dam is also a military asset. It raises alarm for India


Chinese Premier Li Qiang, on 19 July, presided over the groundbreaking of what is set to become the world’s largest hydropower dam, on the so-called ‘Yarlung Zangbo’, as China refers to the Brahmaputra River. Within hours, Chinese online platforms erupted in celebration. A Weibo hashtag marking the occasion—#Construction begins on lower Yarlung Zangbo Hydropower Project—amassed over 73 million views.Beyond the spectacle of scale, the Chinese online discourse quickly turned the project into a symbol of strategic ascendancy. India, the downstream neighbour, is cast as anxious and reactive. China, in contrast, is portrayed as visionary and unyielding—a master of its geography and architect of a new regional order.

In contemporary geopolitics, infrastructure has become a strategic language of its own, one that Beijing is speaking fluently.The Medog Hydropower Station is projected to cost $167 billion and boasts a planned capacity of 70 to 81 million kilowatts, roughly triple that of the Three Gorges Dam. Once completed, it is expected to generate 300 billion kilowatt-hours annually. The project will take a decade to build, but its signalling to the region, especially India, is immediate.

Hu Xijin, former editor-in-chief of the Global Times, a daily Chinese tabloid, criticised Western media for focusing on India’s ecological and geopolitical concerns while ignoring what he called an “engineering miracle”. For Hu, the dam is not just about electricity; it is also a declaration of China’s ability to tame the Himalayas and reshape geography.One Chinese commentator claimed that India’s objections stem not from technical concerns, but from its deeply entrenched “security-first” mindset. New Delhi, the commentator argued, has long prioritised control over collaboration, building its own dams while accusing others of weaponising water. “India’s alarmism,” another wrote, “comes from its own guilty conscience.”
China’s dual narrative

Officially, Beijing is presenting the dam as a developmental initiative, aimed at energy security, poverty alleviation, regional integration, and transforming Nyingchi into the “Little Sichuan” or “Jiangnan of Tibet.” Talk of water weaponisation is being brushed aside as paranoia. Commentators invoke “non-zero-sum” logic and portray China as a responsible upstream actor.

India’s Dalai Lama Reincarnation Dilemma

Ivan Lidarev

The 14th Dalai Lama announced his reincarnation plans on July 2 – and, in doing so, confronted India with the prospect of a huge crisis in its relations with China after his passing. For India such a prospect is hardly new. What is new, however, is the international context. It is this context that is likely to make New Delhi’s policy choices after the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation more difficult.

The Dalai Lama’s reincarnation plans, presented in his July 2 statement, and their strategic implications have long been expected. Despite years of public musings that he might not choose reincarnation or identify an external emanation to succeed him, there was little doubt that the Dalai Lama will be reincarnated. All other options would have undermined both the institution of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan movement he leads. His public musings about alternative plans likely sought to disorient Beijing and pressure it to negotiate.

The only surprises in the Dalai Lama’s announcement were its mildness, compared to his 2011 statement, and the fact that it did not say that he will be reincarnated outside China. These surprises might be part of an effort to seek a negotiated agreement with Beijing but are unlikely to change the big picture.Two claimants are likely to emerge after the passing of the current Dalai Lama: one supported by Beijing in China’s Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and one supported by the Tibetan movement and the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) in Dharamsala, India.

This prospect presents New Delhi with a huge dilemma. If two Dalai Lamas emerge, the Indian government will have to recognize one of them, either officially or in practice. And India will have to choose the Dalai Lama in Dharamsala for moral, domestic, and strategic reasons. Not only is the Dalai Lama deeply revered inside India, with many Indians feeling that their country has a moral obligation to help both him and the Tibetan movement, but New Delhi likely recognizes that the Dalai Lama represents an important lever vis-à-vis China, India’s so-called “Tibet card.”

Hypersonic Arms in South Asia: Racing Toward Instability?

Zohaib Altaf

On July 16, India reportedly tested its most advanced hypersonic cruise missile under the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO)’s classified Project Vishnu. Powered by an indigenous scramjet engine, media reports said the missile reached Mach 8 (around 11,000 km/h), demonstrated low-altitude maneuverability, and struck its target with precision. Designed for deployment from land, sea, and air platforms, the missile is dual-capable – able to carry conventional or nuclear payloads.

While India has not officially confirmed the test, and some later reports denied a test had taken place, there is no doubt that India is moving toward development and testing of such a missile under Project Vishnu.India’s hypersonic trajectory began with the Shaurya missile, tested in 2008 and 2020, which reached Mach 7.5 and laid the early groundwork for India’s maneuverable strike systems. 

The Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle (HSTDV) followed in 2020, reaching Mach 5.9 at 30 km altitude. The upcoming BrahMos-II, developed with Russia, is expected to achieve Mach 8 over 1,000-1,500 km, with flight trials due by 2027. India is also developing hypersonic drones like the RHH-150, reportedly capable of Mach 10 and mid-flight directional agility, potentially transforming regional strike and surveillance dynamics.

These hypersonic platforms are not just technological upgrades; they reflect a broader doctrinal evolution in Indian thinking. Precision strikes at blistering speed are increasingly central to India’s response options under a time-constrained escalation window. During the recent India-Pakistan conflict, India reportedly targeted six major airbases inside Pakistan, including a surface-to-air missile (SAM) site near Mailer base. Drones were used to locate and attack air defense batteries ahead of time, an indication of India’s evolving emphasis on suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) and kill-chain integration.

This operational logic mirrors Israel’s recent campaign against Iran, where coordinated air, missile, and drone strikes systematically neutralized Iran’s air defense networks before penetrating strikes were executed. Israel’s experience in 1973, where it lost over 100 aircraft largely to SAMs, has shaped a doctrine of pre-emptive suppression. Indian defense officials appear to be embracing similar lessons.

Illicit Liquidity as Battlespace: Rethinking Finance in Asymmetric Conflict

Adam Rousselle 

Illicit liquidity has emerged as the hidden scaffolding of modern conflict – a decentralized architecture enabling covert influence, conflict financing, and strategic evasion on a global scale. This report examines the continued operation of Huione, a Chinese-language criminal marketplace that facilitates large-scale financial laundering across Southeast Asia, despite public claims of shutdown. It further explores digital laundering tools more broadly, building toward a working typology. Leveraging encrypted messaging apps and informal financial networks, Huione enables the movement of billions of dollars in illicit funds through fiat-to-stablecoin conversions, card transfers, and in-person cash exchanges–critical infrastructure for state-aligned criminal actors, proxy networks, and scam-industrial complexes.

While often treated as a cybercrime or compliance issue, Huione and networks like it reflect a new reality: decentralized financial platforms now function as logistics and influence infrastructure in irregular conflict.This article argues that the U.S. and its allies should view this laundering ecosystem not just as a criminal threat, but as a strategic enabler of adversarial statecraft. Without a shift in how threat finance is integrated into operational planning, on-chain laundering infrastructure like Huione will continue to outpace enforcement, undermine deterrence, and fuel irregular conflict below the threshold of war.
Introduction

Starting in early 2024, blockchain analysts began tracing a set of suspicious transactions flowing out of Shwe Kokko–a lawless border town in Myanmar known for its Chinese-backed casinos and scam compounds. The money trail wound through obscure stablecoin swaps, informal brokers, and encrypted Telegram channels before disappearing into the digital void. According to open-source intelligence, the proceeds, originating from online fraud and forced labor, are ultimately linked to the financial wing of the Karen National Army (KNA), a militia currently engaged in armed resistance against Myanmar’s military regime.


China’s New Mega-Dam Raises the Stakes for Sino-Indian Hydrodiplomacy

David Tingxuan Zhang

On July 19, Chinese Premier Li Qiang officially announced the start of construction on a long-planned hydropower project on the lower reaches of the Yarlung Tsangpo River. Billed as a centerpiece of China’s clean energy drive, the dam marks a new chapter in the country’s infrastructure history – one with profound implications not only for domestic development, but also for regional stability in South Asia.

This is no ordinary project. First proposed in the 1990s and later elevated to national priority in China’s 14th Five-Year Plan, the Yarlung Tsangpo hydropower station is widely seen as the country’s most ambitious hydro initiative since the Three Gorges Dam, with Li framing it as a “project of the century.”

The dam’s installed capacity will reportedly exceed 60 gigawatts – roughly triple that of the Three Gorges – generating electricity for tens of millions of homes. State media underscored its strategic importance in helping China reach its 2060 carbon neutrality target, ensure energy security in western regions, and promote high-quality development in the Tibet Autonomous Region. It is also part of China’s 2035 long-term development strategy, which calls for the creation of multiple clean energy hubs along major river basins.

But the project’s magnitude also heightens its geopolitical sensitivity. The Yarlung Tsangpo, known as the Brahmaputra once it enters India, originates in Tibet and flows east before making a dramatic U-turn at the Great Bend and descending into Arunachal Pradesh – a territory claimed by both India and China. It eventually reaches Bangladesh and empties into the Bay of Bengal. The river sustains agriculture, fisheries, and livelihoods for over 130 million people downstream. That China’s newest dam is located just upstream of this bend – before the river crosses into Indian-administered territory – has renewed long-standing concerns in New Delhi about Beijing’s leverage as an upper riparian state.

Who Will Rule Crypto? The China-US Battle for Global Financial Leadership

Yingfan Chen and Dingding Chen

In May, Hong Kong passed landmark legislation to regulate fiat-referenced stablecoins, underscoring its ambition to become a digital finance hub and align with Beijing’s broader strategy to promote the digital yuan (e-CNY) as an alternative to the U.S. dollar.

Meanwhile, U.S. policymakers and fintech firms are ramping up efforts to expand the reach of dollar-backed stablecoins, reflecting a growing competition over who sets the rules of the emerging digital monetary order.China’s Push for a Multipolar Currency System

China has been actively promoting the e-CNY, with the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) announcing plans to establish an international operation center for the digital yuan in Shanghai. This initiative aims to enhance the global presence of the e-CNY and reduce reliance on the U.S. dollar in international trade. The PBOC aims to integrate the e-CNY into supply chain financing and cross-border payments – particularly between mainland China and Hong Kong – where projected usage is expected to reach $8 billion in 2025.

Yet, analysts at J.P. Morgan maintain that the e-CNY is unlikely to erode the U.S. dollar’s dominance in global transactions, and the data tells a clear story. In 2022, the U.S. dollar accounted for 88 percent of global FX transactions, 70 percent of foreign currency debt issuance, and 48 percent of cross-border liabilities, while the Chinese yuan made up just 7 percent of FX turnover.

However, the e-CNY’s role in facilitating trade within the BRICS bloc and other emerging markets could gradually erode the dollar’s influence in specific regions. At the 2025 BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro, leaders reaffirmed their commitment to de-dollarization, calling for alternative payment systems and criticizing unilateral dollar-based trade measures. The bloc has condemned unilateral tariffs, viewing them as harmful to global economic stability.

BRICS is actively exploring alternative payment systems, a strategy reflected in several concrete mechanisms. The New Development Bank has issued more than $2.1 billion in local currency loans to finance infrastructure and sustainable projects, reducing reliance on dollar funding, while the $100 billion Contingent Reserve Arrangement provides member countries with liquidity support in currencies other than the dollar, enhancing financial resilience.

US Security Partner Deepens Military Ties With China


Vietnam—a United States security partner in Southeast Asia—is set to participate in a joint army exercise with China for the first time, a neighboring country with which it has maritime disputes.Newsweek has contacted the Vietnamese Defense Ministry for further comment via email.Vietnam and China claim sovereignty over two island groups in the South China Sea—the Spratlys and the Paracels. In response to Beijing's growing presence in the region, which has often led to standoffs and clashes, Hanoi has followed its rival's example by consolidating its presence on islands it controls through land reclamation and the construction of military infrastructure.

Once adversaries during the Vietnam War, the U.S. and Vietnam have gradually expanded their defense partnership since normalizing diplomatic relations in 1995. This includes the transfer of former U.S. Coast Guard vessels and the delivery of U.S. military training aircraft, enhancing the Southeast Asian nation's capacity to protect its sovereignty in disputed waters.A Chinese soldier participates in a mine sweeping training exercise at a minefield along the China-Vietnam border in southwest China's Yunnan Province in late August 2018. Peng Xi/Chinese military

Chinese and Vietnamese ground forces will conduct a training exercise in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region—located in South China and bordering Vietnam—in mid to late July, focusing on joint border patrol, China's Defense Ministry said in a statement on Sunday.According to Beijing, the joint exercise aims to enhance what it calls "mutual learning and exchange of border patrol experiences" and deepen cooperation between the two militaries.

This marks the third cooperative engagement between Chinese and Vietnamese forces since April, when their naval forces and coast guards conducted two separate joint patrols in the Beibu Gulf—also known as the Gulf of Tonkin—off the coasts of Vietnam and China.While the Chinese military did not reveal the duration of the exercise, the state-run Vietnam News Agency reported that the drill began on Monday and is scheduled to end on July 30.

Citing Chinese military expert Zhang Junshe, the report stated that the exercise is essential to maintaining peace and stability along the China-Vietnam border and in the broader region.Beijing and Hanoi agreed in 1999 to clearly define their 900-mile-long land border. Border demarcation and marker placement were completed in 2008, and the two neighboring countries signed three legal documents on land border management the following year.

Full Stack


China wants to become the global leader in artificial intelligence (AI) by 2030.[1] To achieve this goal, Beijing is deploying industrial policy tools across the full AI technology stack, from chips to applications. This expansion of AI industrial policy leads to two questions: What is Beijing doing to support its AI industry, and will it work?

China’s AI industrial policy will likely accelerate the country’s rapid progress in AI, particularly through support for research, talent, subsidized compute, and applications. Chinese AI models are closing the performance gap with top U.S. models, and AI adoption in China is growing quickly across sectors, from electric vehicles and robotics to health care and biotechnology.[2] Although most of this growth is driven by innovation at China’s private tech firms, state support has helped enhance the competitiveness of China’s AI industry.

However, some aspects of China’s AI industrial policy are wasteful, such as the inefficient allocation of AI chips to companies.[3] Other bottlenecks are hard to overcome, even with massive state support: U.S.-led export controls on AI chips and the semiconductor manufacturing equipment needed to produce such chips are limiting the compute available to Chinese AI developers.[4] Limited access to compute forces Chinese companies to make trade-offs between investing in near-term progress in model development and building longer-term resilience to sanctions.

Ultimately, despite some waste and conflicting priorities, China’s AI industrial policy will help Chinese companies compete with U.S. AI firms by providing talent and capital to an already strong sector. China’s AI development will likely remain at least a close second place behind that of the United States, as such development benefits from both private market competition and the Chinese government’s investments.

Chinese Engagement with Africa


The authors of this report present a brief historical overview of the relationship between African countries and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since its inception in the middle of the 20th century. In this overview, the authors cover economic, humanitarian, and political aspects; highlight trade and investment flows; and summarize Chinese medical and military aid to Africa.

The authors also cover Chinese interests in Africa and African countries’ concerns about Chinese engagement on the continent. In addition, three country case studies are presented to highlight how Chinese engagement differs from country to country on the continent. The authors conclude with recommendations for policymakers and propose areas for further research.

A decline in relations between the West and Africa at the end of the Cold War and the drop in Western approval because of undemocratic practices and human rights abuses in African countries have created an avenue for China to expand its relationships with African countries. While the West attached conditions to loans and assistance offered to African countries, China presented a no-strings-attached alternative, which only required African nations to respect China’s core sovereignty interests. China has also taken advantage of disinvestment by Western companies in Africa to increase its investments. 

Chinese economic engagement declined in the second half of the 2010s but is now enjoying a revitalization. This economic engagement has paved the way for greater political and security engagements with African countries.The PRC’s engagement with African countries has gained widespread attention in the past decade because of increased Chinese engagement and influence.Historically, Chinese interests in Africa have been mainly economic and political but now include security interests.

How U.S. Forces Should Leave Europe


For decades, collective European self-defense was merely an aspiration. Today, the time to realize this goal is finally at hand. Momentum in Europe is building: years of marginal steps to bolster European defenses gave way to meaningful action after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, and these efforts have accelerated in the six months since U.S. President Donald Trump came into office. European leaders promised a sharp increase in defense and defense-related spending at the NATO summit in June, raising members’ overall budget commitments from two percent to five percent of GDP. To make good on those crucial new pledges, Europe is introducing new financial mechanisms and breaking down barriers to cooperation in its defense industry.

The danger now is that Europe will lose its momentum—and that the United States, by delaying an expected drawdown of forces from the continent, will let it. Both sides have good reason to see Europe’s defense buildup succeed. The United States would be able to free up forces now stationed in Europe for other missions, or simply make cuts and pocket the savings. A more capable Europe would become the kind of partner that Washington wants and needs, and it would gain the freedom to set its own strategy as a global power.

To ensure that this necessary rebalancing proceeds, the Trump administration must withdraw substantial numbers of U.S. forces from Europe, starting now, and truly shift the burden of the region’s conventional defense onto the continent. Hesitating would undermine Europe’s progress and risk locking in a suboptimal security structure for years to come. To encourage Europe to follow through on its own promises, Washington must lay out a realistic, targeted, and phased plan that cuts U.S. troop levels in Europe roughly in half over the next four years while keeping in place forces vital to U.S. security interests or forces that Europe cannot reasonably replace in that time. If a drawdown is executed well, there is little reason to fear that it would end the transatlantic partnership or leave either side less safe.
THE OPPORTUNITY

The best window for Europe to take on a greater share of the burden for its defense is now—not in five or ten years when political will may have faded or an emergency elsewhere forces a sudden U.S. withdrawal. The reasons for making the change are not going away. Competition with China and the emergence of other global powers have altered the United States’ strategic reality. Washington can no longer maintain the global military primacy it enjoyed after the end of the Cold War. To avoid overstretching, the United States must allocate its assets prudently—which means withdrawing from or downsizing in some parts of the world.

India’s ancient knowledge could save the future of AI. Build with wisdom, not just engineering


I am frequently asked, “Do you believe artificial intelligence will take over humans one day?” It’s a substantial question, and I used to provide the standard responses: that AI would automate some work, that we require robust ethics, and that creativity remains a human advantage. However, I respond differently now. Because something more is on the move. What’s happening today in AI labs — at OpenAI, Google DeepMind, Meta, and countless high-flying startups — is not merely about replacing humans. It’s about creating something completely new.

Big tech is not merely writing code or constructing tools. It’s, unwittingly or otherwise, birthing a new form of intelligence — one that will be able to become smarter, quicker, and maybe even more powerful than us when it comes to designing the world. It sounds sensational, perhaps, but the reality is that the first non-human mind might be under development. The machines being created now don’t merely execute instructions. They learn, develop, and change. And one day, they might start thinking in ways that we can’t even dream of.

It’s like carving a new life form — but we don’t yet know if it’s going to be an angel or a devil. At the centre of all this is not emotions or consciousness — it’s something much simpler, and yet stronger: calculation. In every corner of the globe, governments and businesses are investing trillions of dollars in the construction of gigantic computing complexes. They are no longer simply “data centres”. They are akin to the digital nervous systems of an imagined future being: thousands of processors wired together, memory chips, cooling apparatus, and high-speed interconnects.

They cooperate around the clock, training AI models that now compose, sketch, code, and even reason. This isn’t evolution by nature but by money. Species in biology change slowly, over millions of years, through experimentation and error. But this new mind — let’s refer to it as the Digital Brain — is being constructed on fast-forward. This brain does not reside within a skull. It inhabits industrial parks, server farms, and cloud networks. Its blood is electricity. Its learning is not from experience but from data tokens, simulations, and mathematical optimisation.

Trump’s Self-Defeating Trade Agenda

ANNE O. KRUEGER

US President Donald Trump claims that his chaotic trade policies will bring back manufacturing jobs, boost government revenue, and strengthen national security. In reality, they are far more likely to stifle investment and trade, hurt exports, and breed cronyism and corruption.WASHINGTON, DC – While US President Donald Trump pursued a range of protectionist policies during his first term, the economic chaos and uncertainty he has unleashed since returning to the White House and launching his global trade war make those earlier efforts look mild by comparison.

Railing against countries that run trade surpluses with the United States, Trump has vowed to impose “reciprocal tariffs” until all of America’s trade deficits are eliminated. Yet he has imposed sweeping tariffs even on countries with which the US runs a trade surplus, such as Australia.The Trump administration has cited a wide range of reasons for its tariff hikes beyond reducing bilateral trade deficits, including national security, job creation, and raising government revenue. Trump and his advisers claim that other countries will be forced to negotiate and ultimately lower their own tariffs on US goods. But the recent deal between the US and the United Kingdom, which imposes a 10% levy on most British exports, shows that even Trump’s “reduced” tariffs remain historically high.

The unpredictability of Trump’s trade policies poses a grave threat to the global economy. Trump’s tariff announcements have been followed by numerous delays and revisions, and his deadlines for finalizing new trade deals have come and gone, only to be extended again. This erratic trade policy, combined with his apparent reluctance to follow through on his threats, has given rise to the nickname “TACO,” or “Trump Always Chickens Out.”Sign up for our weekly newsletter, PS EconomicsEvery Thursday in PS Economics, we offer a concise selection of essential reading on the most important issues related to economics and finance.

Trump Releases AI Action Plan: ‘National Security Imperative’ for ‘Technological Dominance



Today, a new frontier of scientific discovery lies before us, defined by transformative technologies such as artificial intelligence… Breakthroughs in these fields have the potential to reshape the global balance of power, spark entirely new industries, and revolutionize the way we live and work. As our global competitors race to exploit these technologies, it is a national security imperative for the United States to achieve and maintain unquestioned and unchallenged global technological dominance. To secure our future, we must harness the full power of American innovation.

David Sacks, the White House AI czar, said on Wednesday, “It’s a global competition now to lead in artificial intelligence. And we want the United States to win that race.” Sacks continued, “AI is a revolutionary technology that’s going to have profound ramifications for both the economy and for national security, so it is just very important that America continue to be the dominant power in AI.”

The plan would consider a state’s AI regulatory environment when choosing to dole out federal funds for AI development.The Big Beautiful Bill contained a provision that would bar states from receiving $500 million in additional broadband funding if they chose to regulate AI on a state level. However, it was removed after Sen. Marsha Blackburn (R-TN) led a movement to allow states to regulate AI based on concerns about child safety, exploiting content creators, and censoring conservatives.

Some have criticized the Trump AI plan for prioritizing the interests of big tech over privacy advocates and labor organizations that have issues with the plan. A coalition of privacy advocates, labor unions, and others wrote to Trump on Wednesday, saying the plan should not move to set a moratorium on AI regulation.The letter stated, “Congress’s inability to enact comprehensive legislation enshrining AI protections leaves millions of Americans more vulnerable to existing threats described above such as discrimination and all of us exposed to the unpredictable safety risks posed by this nascent industry.”

US Military Plans Reaper Drone Operations Near China, North Korea


The United States will reportedly deploy the MQ-9 armed reconnaissance drone, commonly known as the Reaper, to South Korea amid growing threats from China and North Korea.The U.S. Seventh Air Force—which commands air operations in South Korea—told Newsweek that it could not discuss potential or planned operations as a matter of policy.Newsweek has contacted the Chinese Defense Ministry for comment via email. The North Korean Embassy in China did not immediately respond to a written request for comment.

Following the Korean War and the signing of a mutual defense treaty, the U.S. military has approximately 28,500 personnel—along with associated armaments such as fighter aircraft—in South Korea to deter provocations and attacks by nuclear-armed North Korea.While facing North Korea's growing military threat—including through the development of a drone that closely resembles America's Reaper aircraft—South Korea has also been challenged by China's maritime activities in the disputed waters between the two countries.

Citing military officials, South Korean newspaper The Chosun Daily reported on Monday that, beginning in September, the MQ-9 drone is scheduled for a three-month extended rotational deployment in South Korea, during which it will be stationed at Kunsan Air Base.The Reaper drone, which is designed to conduct a range of missions—from intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to precision strikes—has been featured in exercises held in South Korea, including its first live-fire drill on the Korean Peninsula in April 2024.

A United States MQ-9 Reaper drone approaches the runway at Kunsan Air Base in South Korea on October 23, 2024. Staff Sgt. Daniel Brosam/U.S. Air Force"Our personnel are equipped and prepared to carry out their missions with precision and professionalism," the U.S. Seventh Air Force told Newsweek, adding that the unit remains in a state of readiness while sustaining and strengthening the alliance with South Korea.

How 12 days have changed Iran


All parties are claiming victory in the ‘12-day war’, which ended on 25 June. United States President Donald Trump, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the Iranian leadership have all made claims, in their widely different idioms, that they won. But those claims, and Trump’s additional assertion that he will bring peace to the Middle East, require qualification. The strategic outcome of the war is likely to prove inconclusive, bringing neither peace nor an end to military action. It may instead, as previous conflicts have done, simply mark a new phase in the institutional hostility between Iran and Israel.

The Revolution survivesThe most important post-conflict continuity is the survival of the Iranian Revolution in Tehran. The 30 commanders and 19 nuclear scientists killed by Israeli strikes did not include leading religious figures who, more than officials and commanders, embody the Iranian Revolution. Their survival represents the survival of the regime’s character, if not its executive capability. Neither did the attacks expose critical cracks in the regime’s cohesion, spark the emergence of a credible, alternative leader and programme, or mobilise widespread opposition.

The Iranian leadership may indeed have unexpectedly benefited from the war: the historic irony of aerial bombardments is that while they weaken an adversary’s capabilities, they can strengthen its resolve. The Iranian people, under fire, found a new, nationalist voice, which the leadership was quick to exploit as an indication of national unity.

The regime has also retained control of its key instruments of power, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – despite the death of its commander-in-chief, Hossein Salami, in the attacks – and the Basij militia. These will enable Tehran to secure itself against internal threats and to launch a counter-espionage campaign against Israel.

Speculation on the regime’s vulnerability will continue and invite comparisons with other fallen regimes in the region. But Iran’s circumstances are unlike those of Bashar al-Assad’s Syria, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq or Muammar Gadhafi’s Libya. In Syria and Libya, the incumbent regimes were opposed by armed internal opposition groups backed by external powers. In the case of Iraq, opposition was diffuse and less well-organised, 

Why Azerbaijan Is Turning Away from Moscow

Taras Kuzio

The deterioration in Azerbaijan’s relations with Russia has led to a deep crisis in relations between the two countries that is unprecedented since the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. This article explores the multifaceted and deep roots of a crisis that came to the forefront with Russia’s shooting down of Azerbaijan Airline Flight 8243 in December 2024 and recent mass arrests and killings of Azerbaijanis in Russia.

The Azerbaijani-Russian crisis needs to be understood within five interrelated contexts.
Why Is Azerbaijan Angry with Russia?The first is that we should not be surprised at Russia’s dismal treatment of its neighbors. Democratic and imperialistic Russians have both viewed the former Soviet space, Eurasia, as Russia’s exclusive sphere of influence, where the Kremlin does not tolerate UN peacekeepers, outside powers, NATO membership, or EU membership. As Putin recently said, ’There’s an old rule that wherever a Russian soldier sets foot, that’s ours.’

The second is that Russian leaders do not view their neighbors, who, together with Russia, constituted the USSR, as fully sovereign states. The roots of the Azerbaijani-Russian crisis lie in Baku’s insistence that Moscow treat it as an equal and not as a subordinate. Vasif Huseynov wrote that Azerbaijan was ’no longer willing to tolerate Russia’s perceived arrogance and imperial tone.’The third is that, as I have written in The National Interest, only Russia and Armenia refused to abide by the December 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration, where post-Soviet era republican boundaries became international borders. Armenia’s irredentism towards Azerbaijan came to an end in 2020, when it was defeated in the Second Karabakh War, and in 2023, when it lost Karabakh.

The fourth is that Moscow has lost its main budgetary revenue after Europe ended the purchase of Russian energy following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Azerbaijan is one of several countries, including Norway and the US, that have stepped in to supply Europe with energy.Further, Kyiv and Baku signed a vast number of agreements, including Ukraine offering its ample gas storage, ironically built during the Soviet era, in Western Ukraine for the storage of Azerbaijani gas to be supplied to Europe. Ukraine’s infrastructure could be used for Azerbaijani gas transported to Europe through the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) and the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP).

A Deal with the Houthis Is No Deal at All

Mark Dubowitz, Koby Gottlieb

While Iran and Hezbollah are licking their wounds after costly clashes with Israel, one of Tehran’s deadliest proxies continues to rain down missiles on the Jewish state. On July 22, the Yemeni Houthis fired a ballistic missile at Ben Gurion Airport, following another launch just four days earlier

These are not isolated provocations. They are a clear signal: the Houthis are not deterred.Washington’s response has followed a now-familiar pattern—one that has failed time and again. Like Saudi Arabia before it, the United States has pursued a diplomatic track, offering ceasefires and incentives in the hope that the Houthis will stop. However, history tells us otherwise: the Houthis treat every pause as an opportunity to rearm, regroup, and return to the battlefield stronger.

Instead of appeasement, the United States should adopt a persistent campaign of sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and, when necessary, military force. Anything less invites more bloodshed.This is not just Israel’s problem. The Houthis have launched dozens of attacks on civilian shipping in the Red Sea, causing chaos in global supply chains and threatening one of the world’s most vital maritime corridors. These attacks challenge the US commitment to defend freedom of navigation—a cornerstone of global prosperity since the end of World War II.

In May, Washington helped broker a ceasefire through Oman. The goal was straightforward: end attacks on international shipping. But within weeks, the Houthis shattered the agreement. On July 7 and 9, they struck two cargo vessels, killing three sailors and reportedly taking six others hostage.Saudi Arabia, too, once believed it could negotiate with the Houthis. After entering Yemen’s civil war in 2015 to defend the internationally recognized government, Riyadh found itself locked in a grinding stalemate. The conflict devolved into one of the world’s worst humanitarian disasters, and the backlash was swift.


What Are the Limits of U.S.-India Security Burden-Sharing in the Indian Ocean?

Nilanthi Samaranayake

When viewing U.S. partnerships in the maritime domain, relations with India, in particular, have thrived — especially over the past decade. Moreover, the partnership enjoys bipartisan support in the United States. Indications after Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the White House in February 2025 are that U.S.-India security relations will continue to be strong in the second Trump administration.

The U.S. approach for roughly 25 years toward the wider Indo-Pacific has been to cultivate India as a critical, non-allied partner to serve as a counterweight to the rise of the People’s Republic of China. Security burden-sharing with India, from low-end maritime capacity-building in smaller Indian Ocean countries to high-end anti-submarine tracking of China, has been a long-term goal of deepening bilateral ties.

A logical extension of this military cooperation during peacetime would be seeking India’s support during a crisis involving China. At the upper limits of security burden-sharing, U.S. officials could request India’s assistance in combat along the lines of a treaty ally. Many experts believe such a request solely to assist the United States in a crisis against China would likely be rejected. Yet, there are many other options for advancing defense technological and operational cooperation in service of greater interoperability.

Another possible future, however, is one in which India as a rising Indo-Pacific and global power does not welcome the U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean, or even actively undermines U.S. interests. This less likely scenario at present is rarely discussed but should at a minimum be considered as a thought exercise, alongside other scenarios, as the Trump administration develops its strategy toward a critical Indian Ocean partner.
U.S. History in the Indian Ocean: Past as Prologue?

Although the United States does not have territory in the Indian Ocean, it historically has held clear interests in the region’s security. Due to distance and military requirements in Europe and East Asia, the United States adopted a different approach for the Indian Ocean in the Cold War era, relying on regional pillars of strength for stability and access. The UK was the main pillar for the United States in the region after World War II. Yet, the UK’s withdrawal of costly overseas basing in the late 1960s and early 1970s forced Washington to look for other regional pillars of strength.

What It Takes to Stop the Next Salt Typhoon

Morgan Peirce

Nearly a year after U.S. agencies identified one of the most severe cyber breaches of U.S. telecommunications companies, domestic cybersecurity is weaker, not stronger. In September 2024, media reports confirmed that Salt Typhoon, a People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-backed cyber group, infiltrated nine major telecommunications providers, compromising data from thousands of users, including U.S. President Donald Trump, Vice President JD Vance, and associates of former Vice President Kamala Harris.

To date, there is no indication that the intrusion has been fully mitigated. Worse, Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem recently testified that the administration “still [does not] necessarily know how to stop the next Salt Typhoon.” As Washington dithers, Beijing is wasting no time probing weaknesses in U.S. critical infrastructure. The Trump administration urgently needs a comprehensive cyber defense strategy to raise the cost of intrusions by PRC-backed hackers.

The Trump administration claims it is addressing the PRC cyber threat, even as it moves to implement policies that undermine cyber defenses. In January 2025, the Trump administration dismissed all members of the Cyber Safety Review Board (CSRB) before it completed its investigation into Salt Typhoon, hindering the government’s ability to address systemic cybersecurity vulnerabilities that led to the breaches. The CSRB previously consisted of multi-agency and multi-sectoral experts and was established by a 2021 executive order to investigate major cybersecurity incidents. 

As of July 2025, there is no indication the Trump administration has reconstituted the members of the CSRB. While the Federal Communications Commission announced in March that its new Council on National Security will launch an investigation into PRC-backed hackers, it will not consist of multi-agency or industry experts, and is not expected to release a public after-action report. Similarly, the FBI’s April 2025 announcement of a $10 million reward for information on individuals linked to Salt Typhoon is a welcome but insufficient step to ensure both the government and public understand the factors that led to the large-scale compromises in the telecommunications sector.

The Administration Wants Military Women to Know Their Place

Tom Nichols

President Donald Trump and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth seem to be on a mission to erase women from the top ranks of the U.S. armed forces. Last week, they took another step along this path by removing the first female head of the United States Naval Academy, in Annapolis, Maryland.

The Naval Academy was founded in 1845, but didn’t admit its first class of women until 1976. The head of the school is known as the superintendent, and Annapolis would not get its first female admiral in that position until 2024. Now the first woman to serve as the “supe” has been reassigned and replaced by a man, and for the first time in the academy’s history, the role went to a Marine. Last week, the Navy removed Vice Admiral Yvette Davids from her post and replaced her with Lieutenant General Michael Borgschulte. (Maybe Hegseth thinks Marines are more lethal, to use his favorite Pentagon worship word.) Davids has been sent to the Pentagon, where she will be a deputy chief of naval operations, a senior—but relatively invisible—position.

No reason was given for reassigning Davids. Superintendents typically serve for three to five years, but Davids was pulled from the job after 18 months. (A short tenure can be a sign of some sort of problem; for what it’s worth, the secretary of the Navy, John Phelan—who has never served in the Navy and has no background in national-defense issues—offered rote praise when announcing her de facto firing as the supe.)

Trump and Hegseth have been on a firing spree throughout the military, especially when it comes to removing women from senior positions. This past winter, the administration fired Admiral Lisa Franchetti, the first female chief of naval operations; Admiral Linda Fagan, the first female Coast Guard commandant; and Lieutenant General Jennifer Short, who was serving as the senior military assistant to the secretary of defense, all within weeks of one another. I taught for many years at the U.S. Naval War College, where I worked under its first female president, Vice Admiral Shoshana Chatfield. In 2023, she became the U.S. military representative to the NATO Military Committee—and then she was fired in April, apparently in part because of a presentation she gave on Women’s Equality Day 10 years ago.

The climate change cult is encountering more resistance these days

Gary Abernathy

The devastating Texas flooding over the July 4 weekend was a natural disaster of immense proportions. The lives lost brought unthinkable heartache for families. Especially difficult to fathom is that so many victims were young children.Adding to the grief was the irresponsible blame game that almost immediately arose in the wake of the tragedy. Many on the left couldn’t wait to point fingers at Republicans, from President Donald Trump to Texas Gov. Greg Abbott.

Of course, the climate cult again demonized fossil fuels, global warming and other predictable villains from the days of yore (or Gore). The group Climate Central could only contain itself until July 8 before rushing out to hold a press briefing to reiterate its dogma that “climate change drives more extreme weather,” and that the Texas storms were “made more likely and powerful in a warmer climate.”

Leftwing climate groups often accuse anyone who disagrees as being a “climate denier.” But few actually deny that the climate indeed changes, often dramatically. The archeological record makes clear that the earth has warmed, cooled, experienced flooding and undergone a number of other climate-related upheavals through the centuries, long before human activity could be faulted. But groups like Climate Central identify the manmade practice of burning fossil fuels as the modern culprit.

Any brave soul who dares to challenge the extent to which carbon emissions and greenhouse gases impact climate change is shouted down by the cult and buried under an avalanche of “scholarly” papers produced by “the overwhelming majority of the scientific community.”The good news is that the same day that Climate Central was regurgitating its tried-and-true rhetoric, the New York Times reported (in what it likely considered an expose), “The Energy Department has hired at least three scientists who are well-known for their rejection of the overwhelming scientific consensus on climate change, according to records reviewed by The New York Times.”

No, Trump Did Not Start the Global 'Trade War' | Opinion


After strong growth in 2024, global trade will take a hit this year. Many point the finger at President Donald Trump. That's a mistake.The World Trade Organization said the volume of merchandise trade this year will contract by 0.2 percent. Its revised forecast "is nearly three percentage points lower than it would have been without recent policy shifts."

The culprit? The trade body blames "a surge in tariffs and trade policy uncertainty." That, of course, is an indirect reference to Trump's series of tariff hikes, pauses, and pullbacks.Just about everyone thinks Trump is responsible for the breakdown of the global trade system.A banner showing a picture of President Donald Trump is displayed outside of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) building on June 3, 2025, in Washington, D.C. Kevin Carter/Getty Images

The Associated Press, for instance, wrote that the American president declared "a trade war on the rest of the world." By doing so, he has "panicked global financial markets, raised the risk of a recession and broken the political and economic alliances that made much of the world stable for business after World War II."That narrative is superficial. It's far more accurate to say the post-war rules-based trade order is dead, but China killed it, and Trump stopped pretending it continued to exist.

There had been great hope at the turn of the century that China would end long-standing predatory and criminal trade practices by joining the World Trade Organization. By and large, however, Beijing did not abandon those practices after accession in December 2001.Trump, in response to Chinese intransigence, changed the world, irrevocably. As POLITICO wrote, "The Trump administration has dealt a lasting blow to much of the post-World War II consensus around free trade and long-term cooperation." Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, at the just-concluded Aspen Security Forum said, "We have to recognize that we're probably not going back to exactly that system."

What Donald Trump’s Japan Deal Means for the US Economy

Desmond Lachman

Today’s announcement of a Japanese trade deal offers some good news and some bad news. The good news is that trade deals are finally being struck with a small number of our major trade partners. The Japanese deal will prevent Trump from carrying out his threat to impose a 25 percent tariff on Japan and will likely spare Japan from a recession.

The bad news is that the deal was still struck with a high basic tariff level of 15 percent. That can leave little doubt that Trump intends to maintain the highest average import tariff level since the Second World War. This will not be good for the US inflation and economic growth outlook. And it will certainly not be good for the rest of the world’s economic outlook, and especially for export-intensive economies like Japan.

On April 2, when Trump threatened reciprocal import tariffs on all of our trade partners, he indicated that this threat would force our trade partners to the negotiating table and soon result in 200 completed trade deals. Almost four months later, Trump has managed to finalize only five trade deals, with many of their details still to be negotiated. Those trade deals include pacts with the United Kingdom, Japan, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Trump has indicated that if trade deals are not negotiated with the rest of our trade partners by August 1, he will unilaterally announce punitive import tariffs on those countries.

By now, it should be clear that Trump is taking us to a permanent state of damagingly high import tariff levels. The many countries that do not have trade deals by August 1 will face the high sort of tariff levels that were threatened by Trump in his early April “liberation day” tariff announcement. The European Union, for instance, is being threatened with a 30 percent across-the-board tariff if it does not come to a trade deal.

However, judging by the trade deals struck to date, even if those remaining countries secure trade deals, the tariffs they will face will likely remain at a relatively high level. The Japan trade deal has a basic tariff of 15 percent. Indonesia and the Philippines have basic tariffs of 19 percent. Vietnam, on the other hand, has been subject to import basic tariffs ranging from 20 to 40 percent.

US tries to claw back influence in Middle East after crisis in Syria - analysis


US special envoy for Syria, the ambassador to Turkey Thomas Barrack attends a flag-raising ceremony at the US ambassador's residence in Damascus on May 29, 2025 for the first time since 2011.(photo credit: RAMI AL SAYED/AFP via Getty Images)BySETH J. FRANTZMANJULY 22, 2025 10:32Updated: JULY 22, 2025 18:28US Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack, who is also the special envoy for Syria, met with Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander Gen. Mazloum Abdi on Saturday, the US embassy in Syria reported.

They had met “to discuss the current situation in Syria and the need for urgent steps to restore calm and stability,” the embassy said. “They also discussed practical steps toward integration into a unified Syria for a peaceful, prosperous, inclusive, and stable future for all Syrians. They agreed the time for unity is now.”

US pushes for warm relations with SyriaBarrack traveled to Lebanon on Sunday for talks with Lebanese leaders. He has made many trips around the region over the past three months in an effort to advance US President Donald Trump’s policy on Syria.Trump has pushed for Washington to end sanctions on Syria and engage with President Ahmed al-Sharaa after he met with him in Saudi Arabia in May.French President Emmanuel Macron shakes hands with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa after a meeting at the Elysee Palace in May. 

Sharaa is a potential threat to Israel’s security but possibly prepared to normalize ties with Israel, says the writer. (credit: STEPHANIE LECOCQ/REUTERS)Barrack has been tasked with that important task. He has been under the spotlight for the past two weeks as US policy on Syria continues to face challenges.First, there is growing concern about Sharaa and his ability to control parts of Syria. The fighting in Sweida and Israel’s intervention and bombing of Damascus have raised eyebrows. Can Sharaa sort things out in Sweida and also not provoke more Israeli attacks?