Paul Zgheib
Powerful militaries can lose wars to weaker opponents, and small states can deter stronger ones. These outcomes contradict the conventional theory of force and show that military power alone does not guarantee political success. Modern conflicts reveal that this is not an anomaly but a recurring pattern. Great powers possess advanced platforms and precision weapons yet often struggle to achieve their political outcomes against less capable adversaries. Where small states cannot force victory, they can impose deterrence by shaping the costs and uncertainties that make aggression politically unattractive. Understanding why the weak endure, and how they deter, is a central problem for contemporary strategy.
Scholars provide explanations for parts of this puzzle. Andrew Mack argues that asymmetric conflict is shaped by interest and survival. Jeffrey Record demonstrates that strong powers lose limited wars when domestic patience collapses. Ivan Arreguin-Toft shows that weaker actors prevail when they adopt methods that undermine the stronger. Gil Merom explains how democracies defeat themselves when moral costs rise. Yarger links success to a coherent strategy that aligns ends, ways, and means. However, most of this literature focuses on irregular warfare and insurgency. There is less attention on how the same logic now appears in deterrence, especially at sea and in multi-domain competition.
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