Ian Whitfield
During the Cold War, American defense planners expected the primary fight to break out along clear front lines in Europe. The Fulda Gap became shorthand for the central risk: a decisive fight in a defined place and an institutional planning archetype, despite the uncertainties of escalation and duration. While the Taiwan Strait is not a direct analogy to the Fulda Gap, it has become a comparable focal point for U.S. planning. This kind of focal point invites planning for concentrated effort and early decision.
In the event of a conflict over Taiwan, both the United States and China would likely seek to pursue a short, sharp war. The American preference for such outcomes aligns with a familiar strand of broader American strategic culture. The 1992 National Military Strategy’s “Decisive Force” embodies this theory of victory: “Once a decision for military action has been made, half-measures and confused objectives exact a severe price in the form of a protracted conflict which can cause needless waste of human lives and material resources, a divided nation at home, and defeat.
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