China Salami-Slicing Border To Force India To Accept The Rejected 1959 Line

Eurasia Review | P. K. Balachandran

Indo-Tibetan Border Police forces recently deployed new Shaurya Commando combat teams following renewed troop face-offs with Chinese military units across multiple locations in Arunachal Pradesh. The fresh tactical friction along the Line of Actual Control undermines recent bilateral diplomatic efforts between New Delhi and Beijing aimed at prioritizing trade and investment over long-standing territorial disputes.

Beijing employs incremental salami-slicing tactics along the frontier to gradually enforce the 1959 claim line originally proposed by Premier Zhou Enlai. China maintains control over approximately 38,000 square kilometres of Aksai Chin consolidated during the 1962 Sino-Indian War. The boundary remains unresolved despite patrol management pacts signed in 1993, 1996, 2013, and October 2024. Political negotiations remain stagnant. Chinese strategic planners prefer physical military consolidation over formal boundary demarcation. Consequently, ongoing border friction is transitioning into a prolonged war of attrition along the 3,488-kilometre frontier rather than escalating into full-scale conflict.

Rubio’s Unusual Visit To India Marks A Paradigm Shift In India-US Ties

Eurasia Review | Dr. Shanthie Mariet D Souza

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s 20–21 October visit to India bypassed New Delhi and Prime Minister Narendra Modi, focusing instead on corporate executives in Mumbai and Reliance’s Jamnagar refinery in Gujarat. This unusual itinerary highlighted a transactional pivot in bilateral relations toward energy trade and refining capacity.

Rather than advancing traditional defense partnerships or stalled regional connectivity initiatives like I2U2 and the India-Middle East Economic Corridor, Washington prioritized securing processing capacity for heavy Venezuelan crude at Jamnagar, the world's largest single-location refining complex. India currently imports 89 percent of its crude oil requirements. Reliance's concurrent plans for a new refinery in Texas further underscore this commercial realignment. The diplomatic shift recasts New Delhi primarily as a fuel refiner and market rather than a core strategic counterweight. High tariffs and plateaued bilateral trade negotiations continue to generate persistent policy friction between both capitals.

Washington Cannot Ignore Afghanistan’s Weapons Legacy

Real Clear Defense | Saima Afzal

American-supplied small arms and tactical gear abandoned in Afghanistan are empowering militant groups in Pakistan, creating severe regional destabilisation five years after the US military withdrawal. According to the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, $7.12 billion in US-funded equipment remained when the Taliban seized power in August 2021.

This massive stockpile—including over 300,000 weapons—has systematically migrated across borders to arm groups like Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and the Balochistan Liberation Army. Recovered assets include M4A1 carbines and thermal optics that negate night-fighting advantages long held by state forces. In 2025, Pakistan suffered 699 terrorist attacks, resulting in 1,034 deaths. Casualties spiked sharply. Beyond tactical casualties, this proliferation generates dangerous second-order friction, escalating diplomatic disputes between Islamabad and Kabul into direct border clashes. Addressing this threat requires Washington to institute serial-number tracking mechanisms with Pakistani intelligence, disrupt illicit arms financing, and bind future foreign defense assistance to strict accountability protocols.

Three Actors, Both Parties: Foreign Information Warfare and the U.S. 2026 Midterms

Cognitive Warfare, by China | Michael A. Berger

Russia, Iran and China are reported to have pursued different forms of influence during the run-up to the 3 November 2026 US midterm elections. The source describes Russian synthetic media targeting Democratic candidates, Iranian pressure involving shipping and online personas, and Chinese activity around local electoral contests. Their reported methods differ. Together, they expose vulnerabilities across national and local political systems.

The analysis draws on 30,120 deduplicated social media posts collected across ten platforms from September 19 through October 19, 2026, alongside reporting and prosecution records. It attributes 130 fabricated videos and newspaper front pages to Russia’s Matryoshka operation, while other allegations involve AI-generated personas, fabricated journalists and pressure on energy markets. Some claims have reported corroboration; others remain unconfirmed. The source also describes domestic commentators amplifying foreign-origin material without documented evidence of payment or coordination. Its collection has acknowledged gaps, and the available data cannot establish whether these activities changed votes. The central uncertainty concerns how far separate operations reinforced one another and whether their influence extended beyond measurable online activity.

In China, the AI bubble has already burst

Reuters

China’s AI-heavy STAR50 index has collapsed 40% from its July high in under four months, erasing $480 billion in market value amid falling artificial intelligence demand and foreign export curbs. This dramatic sell-off threatens Beijing’s push to funnel retail savings into technology equities to accelerate domestic semiconductor development.

Retail enthusiasm for rapid capital gains ultimately undermined long-term market resilience. The market crash has stalled a two-year rally, disrupting government plans to foster a stable "slow bull" market. Concurrently, China’s blue-chip CSI300 index has declined roughly 20% from its June peak. Capital flight was swift. Beijing-based fund manager Dong Baozhen described the earlier surge as a speculative "crazy bull" that inevitably triggered a bubble burst. In contrast, the United States Nasdaq index has experienced a modest 6% drawdown from its record high three weeks ago, demonstrating that mainland markets faced far greater speculative vulnerability than Western tech shares during this global valuation correction.

China’s Digital Beachhead in the Western Hemisphere

RealClearWorld | Garrett Exner

Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva secured reelection with 51.79% of the vote, cementing a policy trajectory that deepens Chinese technological integration across Latin America's critical digital infrastructure. Brazil's telecommunications regulator recently approved Chinese satellite firm SpaceSail to deploy up to 324 low-orbit satellites by late 2026.

Simultaneously, Brasília reversed its spectrum policy under pressure from Huawei, reserving the upper 6 GHz band for mobile 5G networks rather than unlicenced Wi-Fi access. TikTok's parent company ByteDance also initiated a 200-billion-reais (~$40 billion) mega data center project in Ceará. Brasília granted the firm a 20-year tax holiday. Chinese state-linked enterprises leverage commercial infrastructure to secure dual-use communications, cloud processing, and data routing advantages. A pending digital competition bill targeted for passage before February 2027 could impose stringent regulatory burdens on US firms, enabling Chinese platforms to permanently anchor their operational footprint across the Western Hemisphere.

The Gulf States and Iran: Past and Future Trajectories

IISS

Iranian military forces expanded direct attacks across the Middle East on 28 February 2026, targeting commercial ports, airports, power utilities, and dual-use infrastructure throughout the Gulf states. This unprecedented campaign weaponises the region's global economic centrality and host infrastructure supporting American forces. Iran's horizontal escalation abruptly shattered the diplomatic de-escalation established under the 2023 Beijing agreement.

Tehran's tightening control over the Strait of Hormuz has severely disrupted maritime supply lines. The conflict exposes deep strategic fractures within the Gulf Cooperation Council. Bahrain led United Nations Security Council Resolution 2817 on 11 March 2026 to condemn these strikes. Most member states have discreetly granted the United States military access to their territorial airspace and bases. Oman remains a notable exception. Long-term regional stability now requires extensive military institution reforms, enhanced infrastructure resilience, and coordinated air defence networks rather than relying solely on fragile diplomatic arrangements.

The US, the Gulf States and the Making of a Post-American Gu

IISS

The United States and Israel entered a major conflict with Iran, severely exposing US military installations across the Arabian Peninsula and upending long-standing regional security guarantees. Iranian missile strikes on the US Navy's 5th Fleet headquarters in Manama on 28 February 2026 highlighted critical vulnerabilities in regional base protection and air defence networks.

Washington subsequently planned a strategic redistribution of forces toward the Eastern Mediterranean to mitigate Iranian strike risks. Iran rapidly took host nations hostage by targeting critical Gulf infrastructure and disrupting transit through the Strait of Hormuz. Regional partners face immense uncertainty regarding real-time threat intelligence and battle damage assessments. US efforts to build integrated air defences, including the January 2026 Middle Eastern Air Defense cell at Qatar's al-Udeid Air Base, failed to prevent extensive damage. This operational collapse eroded Arab trust in American deterrence commitments. The fallout forces Gulf capitals to rethink their fundamental security posture.

Introduction: The Gulf at War

IISS

The 2026 US–Israel war with Iran has directly disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, forcing Gulf states to re-evaluate their long-standing security architectures. Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates face severe economic friction as Iranian military retaliation targets regional energy and logistics infrastructure.

Historically reliant on forward US military presence and global capital integration, these nations previously operated under the assumption that their central role in global supply chains made them strategically indispensable. This assumption has now fractured. In response, regional governments are taking emergency steps to fortify critical supply lines and sustain national endurance. Measures include expanding the capacity of overland bypass infrastructure, acquiring specialized counter-uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV) systems, and dispersing planned infrastructure development away from vulnerable coastal maritime corridors. Long-term stability will now depend on their ability to reconfigure alliance structures, protect key industrial assets, and absorb sustained economic shocks.

Did the United States and Russia Just Agree to Collaborate on Data Centers?

Center for Strategic and International Studies | Nikita Shah, Justin Sherman

Russian Special Envoy Kirill Dmitriev proposed a joint U.S.-Russia data center infrastructure project during broader negotiations following Washington's decision to waive sanctions under the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026. Ukrainian forces recently struck Russian digital infrastructure, underscoring the acute national security vulnerabilities associated with dual-use data facilities during active conflict.

Existing regulatory mechanisms under the US Departments of the Treasury and Commerce continue to restrict technology transfers to Moscow, leaving the proposal's operational feasibility and legal framework entirely unverified. Sanctions exemptions remain completely undefined. Interconnecting digital architecture with entities subject to Federal Security Service coercion introduces immediate counterintelligence risks, severe data exfiltration exposure, and operational friction with Five Eyes and NATO allies. Without explicit commercial incentives or regulatory waivers, any combined infrastructure risks compromising critical US technology while destabilising multilateral sanctions enforcement across European Union partner states.

Seeking to Pry Russia Away from China, the United States May End Up Losing Europe

19FortyFive | Andrew A. Michta

Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed a trilateral summit in China with the United States and China to settle the war in Ukraine, intentionally excluding both Kyiv and European allies from the initial proceedings. Reports that the second Trump administration is receptive to this initiative have revived Washington enthusiasm for a "Kissinger-in-reverse" strategy designed to split Moscow from Beijing.

This approach attempts to replicate the 1971 Nixon-era engagement with China to rebalance American great-power competition. Proponents argue that accommodating a Russian sphere of influence in Eastern Europe could free American military resources for the Indo-Pacific theater while opening commercial opportunities in Moscow. Moscow gains elevated international standing. However, critics warn that abandoning European partners creates a pivotal turning point. The gamble risks invalidating NATO cohesion and driving European states toward Chinese sponsorship, ultimately increasing the likelihood of a major conflict in Asia rather than deterring it.

We're Losing the Cognitive Space Race

The Cipher Brief | Dr. Geoffrey Ling

Dr. Geoffrey Ling, former founding director of DARPA’s Biological Technologies Office and co-leader of The BrainHealth Project, advocates for an urgent national strategy to advance human cognitive performance alongside artificial intelligence. Federal political levers must be rapidly mobilized to establish policy mechanisms, funding streams, and institutional support systems designed to optimize lifelong brain fitness and cognitive capabilities across the United States.

Rapid acceleration in synthetic intelligence capabilities poses unprecedented strategic challenges to national security, civil workforce productivity, and global technological leadership. Human intelligence requires systematic federal reinforcement. Drawing on extensive military medical experience as a retired U.S. Army colonel and neurologist, Ling emphasizes that machine systems cannot replace baseline human reasoning, mental resilience, and complex executive decision-making under operational friction. Deploying a comprehensive national cognitive strategy ensures that military commanders and policy leaders maintain an enduring decision advantage within increasingly complex, technology-driven threat environments.

Trump’s proposed US$70,000 work training fee could drive foreign students away, warn US educators

Channel NewsAsia | Nick Harper

The Trump administration has proposed a US$70,000 fee on universities for each international graduate seeking work experience through the Optional Practical Training (OPT) programme, accompanied by a US$30,000 renewal charge. American educators warn the massive price increase will severely discourage foreign student enrolment, threatening academic research, regional economies, and American soft power.

Established in 1992 under President George H W Bush, the OPT framework currently charges a US$520 application fee, granting eligible STEM graduates up to three years of post-graduation employment in the United States. International student spending contributed US$42.9 billion to the national economy in the 2024–2025 academic year and supported over 355,000 jobs. New international enrolment already fell 17 percent in autumn 2025. Higher education leaders fear this downturn will double, driving talent toward alternative destinations such as South Korea and China. Public consultation continues through November 9, with expected legal challenges from university associations likely to follow.

How the War in Iran Could Escalate

Time | Hamidreza Azizi

President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have reportedly prepared renewed strike options against Iranian nuclear and energy infrastructure, including potential employment of the GBU-43/B ordnance. This option aims for a rapid political victory ahead of American midterm elections following the rejection of Tehran’s proposed seven-day Strait of Hormuz roadmap.

However, Iranian decision-makers are structuring a counter-strategy focused on regional attrition rather than symbolic exchanges. Tehran intends to deny Washington a brief conflict. IRGC spokesperson Hossein Mohebbi and strategic adviser Mehdi Mohammadi emphasize extending war duration, targeting $2 trillion in regional AI and energy infrastructure, and conducting preemptive strikes if an attack appears imminent. Meanwhile, naval interdictions against UAE-owned vessels like the GFS Pride demonstrate Iran's readiness to expand maritime disruption. Armed Forces Chief Ali Abdollahi warned that any U.S. or Israeli action will trigger immediate retaliation against American assets across the Middle East.

A Less-Is-More Strategy for America

Foreign Affairs | Barry R. Posen

The USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group returned to the United States on October 8 following a 320-day deployment, highlighting acute operational exhaustion across American naval forces. Extended sea rotations degraded shipboard living conditions, caused severe supply shortages, and triggered sharp declines in crew morale, including eight attempted suicides among sailors.

MIT political scientist Barry R. Posen uses this record deployment to demonstrate the structural risks of overstretching a strained military establishment. Continual global carrier presence mandates generate compound maintenance backlogs, compromising long-term fleet readiness across active maritime theaters. Washington's insistence on maintaining expansive forward postures without adequate force structure exacerbates operational fatigue and strains institutional sustainability. The US military faces mounting readiness deficits. Rather than pursuing force expansion, strategic imperatives require aligning operational commitments with real-world force capacity, prioritizing strategic restraint over endless global force projections to preserve core national defense capabilities.

Poll shows Israel’s looming challenge: American indifference

Politico | Alexander Burns

American voters demonstrated widespread indifference towards Israel's 27 October 2026 election, despite hopes among supporters that the vote could reset bilateral relations amidst ongoing conflicts in Gaza and Iran. A POLITICO/PF Global survey of 2,083 U.S. adults revealed that nearly two-thirds were unaware the election was taking place.

Approximately 48% of respondents declared the Israeli military operations in Gaza either entirely unjustified or pushed too far, compared to 20% who deemed them justified. Public familiarity with key Israeli political figures remains remarkably low. Sixty-five percent of Americans had never heard of opposition leader Gadi Eisenkot. Furthermore, Benjamin Netanyahu registered a 29% negative to 22% positive rating, though 48% expressed no firm opinion. Progressive Democrats represented the primary exception to this apathy. Within that cohort, 75% described the Gaza campaign as unjustified and 44% reported being far less likely to back candidates supporting Netanyahu.

Dramatic Changes Are Unlikely in Israel, Even if Netanyahu Is Ousted

Foreign Policy | Steven A. Cook

Early parliamentary election results in Israel on October 27, 2026, indicate a protracted deadlock between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition and Gadi Eisenkot’s opposition "change bloc." Neither faction secured the parliamentary majority needed to form a government. Gridlock guarantees prolonged political uncertainty. The impasse underscores fundamental security continuity across Israel's domestic spectrum, where strategic consensus persists despite fierce electoral rivalry.

Although opposition figures including Naftali Bennett, Yair Lapid, Avigdor Lieberman, and Yair Golan detailed internal governance reforms on September 26, their foreign policy reflects mainstream orthodoxy. Their joint platform omitted Palestinian statehood, two-state negotiations, or halting E-1 settlement construction. Opposition leaders actively advocate intensified military action against Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas over diplomatic arrangements. Cross-bloc consensus maintains control over the Jordan Valley and restricts Palestinian administration strictly to West Bank Area A. Consequently, any prospective coalition will sustain existing territorial and operational strategies.

Musk's meddling in Ukraine's Starlink is a warning to every country relying on private tech

Kyiv Independent | Cory Alpert

SpaceX CEO Elon Musk personally ordered a Starlink satellite internet shutdown across Ukrainian frontlines in October 2026, severely disrupting operational battlefield communications. The sudden disruption coincided with complex political dynamics in the United States, where Musk poured $443 million into Republican political action committees ahead of upcoming midterm elections.

Modern network-centric warfare relies on software-driven infrastructure maintained continuously as a subscription service rather than sovereignly transferred hardware. Consequently, frontline tactical networks remain perpetually vulnerable to the unilateral corporate decisions and private political interests of commercial vendors. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that Washington lacks authority over private corporate decisions, leaving frontline forces without legal recourse. Sovereign defense autonomy collapses under private corporate discretion. As allied nations integrate commercial satellite networks and artificial intelligence systems into their defense architectures, this precedent illustrates how corporate alignment can abruptly destabilize frontline military operations during high-intensity state conflicts.

Brazil and Venezuela Face a Tough Road Back to Sanity

RealClearPolitics | Daniel McCarthy

Left-wing administrations in Brazil and Venezuela are tightening control over political opposition following recent contentious electoral developments and leadership transitions. Brazilian Senator Flavio Bolsonaro had his personal and diplomatic passports confiscated immediately after losing the presidential election to incumbent President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, following a controversial judicial ruling that extended polling hours by two hours.

Opposition leaders contend this judicial intervention fundamentally compromised electoral fairness. In Venezuela, opposition figure Maria Corina Machado returned from nearly a year in exile under the socialist regime of Delcy Rodriguez, who assumed power after American forces captured Nicolas Maduro in January. Rodriguez now holds absolute authority over Machado's legal status. Venezuela has lacked free presidential contests since Hugo Chavez died in 2013, when Maduro secured power by under two percentage points. Both regimes continue using state legal mechanisms to constrain opposition candidates and consolidate institutional executive control.

How 'Lula's Army' WhatsApp channel helped turn Brazil election around\

BBC  | Julia Braun, Rute Pina and Luiz Fernando Toledo

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s re-election campaign in Brazil gained momentum through a WhatsApp channel called Lula’s Army, which grew to 10.8 million followers. Led by Congressman André Janones, the operation distributed videos, hashtags and ready-made messages as Lula sought to reverse his position against Flávio Bolsonaro. The channel became a prominent feature of the campaign.

Janones organised supporters through specific online tasks and a 24-hour livestream before voting. The channel’s rapid growth challenged the perception that conservatives aligned with former president Jair Bolsonaro dominated digital political mobilisation. Brazil’s Electoral Supreme Court president Kássio Nunes Marques suspended the channel for 48 hours while investigating allegations of fake news. Political scientists cautioned that the campaign’s electoral impact could not be measured separately from other factors. They credited Lula’s revised messaging and grassroots activity alongside online engagement. Lula’s supporters also worked to reduce abstention and persuade undecided voters. Lula subsequently said digital communication would play a greater role in his government.

Space Junk Is a Problem We Know How to Solve

Foreign Policy | Patrick Schröder

Satellite mega-constellations and orbital debris, which surpassed 40,000 tracked objects and 1.2 million untracked fragments by 2026, threaten critical space infrastructure and heighten global collision risks. Recent debris impacts in Minnesota and Indonesia demonstrate how defunct upper stages and spent hardware endanger terrestrial population centers. Orbital congestion creates severe risks of Kessler syndrome, where cascading collisions could disable early-warning defense systems and satellite navigation networks.

Space debris threatens critical terrestrial infrastructure. Proposed circular space economy frameworks advocate orbital recycling and active debris removal platforms like ClearSpace to recover valuable titanium and rare-earth elements. However, two competing interpretations emerge regarding remediation: commercial proponents view orbital reuse as a market-driven advantage that lowers launch expenses, whereas regulatory critics contend voluntary mechanisms like the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee guidelines remain too weakly enforceable to manage systemic orbital risk under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty framework.

Iran Has Already Chosen Its Targets for the Next Round

RealClearWorld | Avraham Shmulevich

United States and Israeli military commanders have prepared operational plans for a short, high-intensity campaign against Iranian nuclear, missile, and energy infrastructure following the 3 November midterm elections. Three U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups and thousands of Marines are deploying to the Middle East by early November. This concentration of naval and amphibious forces coincides with troop repositioning away from vulnerable bases in Jordan, Qatar, and Kuwait.

While domestic political concerns over American fuel prices exceeding $4 per gallon have repeatedly delayed military action, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps retains significant asymmetric options. Iran has systematically targeted regional energy infrastructure beyond its borders to influence global oil markets. Successful drone strikes have already disrupted critical bypass routes, including Saudi Arabia's seven-million-barrel-per-day East-West pipeline and the United Arab Emirates' Fujairah terminal. Energy markets remain vulnerable. By targeting energy chains like Egypt's SUMED pipeline and Azerbaijan's BTC pipeline, Tehran can trigger economic pressure regardless of domestic strikes.

The Pentagon’s AI Agents Could Complete the Mission and Still Leak Secrets

RealClearDefense | Burak Oktenli

Carnegie Mellon University researchers demonstrated on 8 October 2026 that autonomous artificial intelligence agents can covertly transmit sensitive data inside routine communications without detection. This technical vulnerability directly threatens US Army initiatives launched on 12 October 2026 to field autonomous cyber defense systems, alongside NATO's Digital Backbone exercises in Latvia linking military networks to civilian infrastructure.

Inter-system handoffs represent a critical security vulnerability. Current defense procurement procedures evaluate individual agent task completion rather than multi-agent data boundaries or permission enforcement. Programs like DARPA's Decentralized Artificial Intelligence through Controlled Emergence attempt to address multi-agent alignment under failure conditions, while NIST established 2026 standards for agent authorization. However, military operational security remains compromised if AI agents complete logistics missions while leaking classified records across commercial port interfaces. Effective defense acquisition must force multi-system acceptance testing that measures both operational mission success and strict data boundary enforcement before deployment.

I Saw Ukraine’s Rapid Adaptation Cycle in Action, and This is What the US Military Should Learn from It

Modern War Institute | Rachael Hoagland

Ukrainian frontline drone teams regularly modify jammed electronic warfare systems in hours, contrasting sharply with American acquisition processes that require up to two years to field updates. The United States defense acquisition apparatus remains structurally tied to pre-established static requirements rather than operational speed. Departmental culture prioritises compliance over rapid technological iteration.

Traditional mechanisms such as the Middle Tier of Acquisition fail to address the underlying adaptability gap when threats evolve post-contract. To bridge this divide, updating DFARS 215.304 would allow evaluators to judge contractors on rapid modification capabilities, enforcing two-week software update turnarounds. Initiatives like Project Agincourt and the Direct Reporting Portfolio Manager for Unmanned Systems offer immediate pilot pathways to transition toward an Autonomous Warfare Command. Furthermore, leveraging Ukraine's Brave1 Test in Ukraine cluster provides live battlefield data against active Russian electronic warfare tactics before future high-intensity conflicts escalate further.

How the Gamification of the Battlefield Is Reshaping War

Orbis Journal | Lionel Beehner, Oleksii Poltorakov

Unmanned aerial and ground systems achieved a tactical milestone in June 2025 when Ukraine’s 3rd Assault Brigade captured a Russian position entirely without infantry. This operational evolution highlights how commercial video game mechanics increasingly shape modern warfare across competing military doctrines. In August 2024, the Ukrainian Ministry of Digital Transformation formalised this trajectory by introducing the Army of Drones Bonus program.

The digital framework awards operators verified ePoints via the Brave1 marketplace—allocating 40 points for destroying a tank and 120 points for capturing personnel—to incentivise specific battlefield actions. In contrast, American MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper strike programs rely on remote operators in Nevada to industrialise targeted killing at a distance. Meanwhile, Russia’s Rubicon system couples financial rewards directly to strike video confirmation. The trend introduces severe moral hazards. Synthesising these models reveals an unresolved structural question regarding whether gamified incentivisation ultimately enhances tactical efficiency or systematically degrades civil-military norms.

$1.3 billion Indo-US satellite saw Nepal disaster coming but no one saw it

MSN | Pallava Bagla

The $1.3 billion NASA-ISRO Synthetic Aperture Radar (NISAR) satellite detected accelerating mountain movements weeks before Nepal’s catastrophic Rasuwa flash flood on 26 August 2026, yet no early warning was issued to downriver communities. The 99 million cubic metre rock-and-ice collapse from Langtang Lirung plunged 2,170 vertical metres, killing 1,451 people and leaving 5,745 missing.

Institutional coordination gaps between space agencies and disaster response authorities left critical earth-observation data unmonitored across processing pipelines like ISRO’s Bhoonidhi portal. L-band radar data recorded cumulative horizontal displacements exceeding five metres between 20 June and 19 August 2026. Data sat unanalyzed in real time. Unmonitored satellite telemetry highlights a severe command deficit, where sensor deployment outpaces joint operational analysis and actionable dissemination infrastructure. Sustained heatwaves reaching 8 to 9 degrees Celsius destabilised high-altitude permafrost, aggravating regional hazard risks across 25,000 Himalayan glaciers without real-time operational decision authority or oversight.

No tailwinds for India: US and China are squeezing India’s rise

MSN | Sreemoy Talukdar

India’s rise faces five structural headwinds that China’s ascent did not, Sreemoy Talukdar contends, with Washington and Beijing posing the most immediate tests on the road to 2047. Crude prices are touching $117 a barrel, he writes, while the RBI works to keep the rupee afloat. Tariff walls and automation, he says, now deny India the path China took.

He cites 2025 tariffs of 50 per cent on Indian goods, a temporary six-month waiver for Chabahar and Trump’s warmer ties with Pakistan. The trade deal is still in limbo. Beijing is the biggest challenge, he argues: it announced export controls on tunnel-boring machines on October 19 and proposed controls on 12 advanced solar photovoltaic manufacturing technologies. On October 22, the ITBP chief said face-offs continued in Arunachal Pradesh. India is widening its network of partners while keeping channels open to Beijing and Moscow, a trapeze act he calls difficult.

Taliban Claims Cross-Border Strikes on ISKP in Pakistan

The Jamestown Foundation | Barakwal Myakhel

The Taliban regime’s Defense Ministry claimed on June 19 that its forces “targeted and struck hard” at Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) centres in Pakistan’s Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces. If confirmed, it would be the first publicly claimed Taliban cross-border strike against ISKP targets in Pakistan since the May ceasefire, though Pakistan dismissed it as propaganda.

Mutual accusations had already fuelled military escalation, with Pakistan conducting airstrikes inside Afghanistan since at least October 2025. The Taliban offered no evidence. Pakistan’s Ministry of Information and Broadcasting called the claim “fake and nefarious” and said ISKP and more than “two dozen” other militant groups operate from Afghanistan. Pakistani strikes on June 28 killed at least 28 civilians and injured 49, according to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Barakwal Myakhel judges that without credible intelligence sharing and border de-escalation, tensions are likely to persist and ISKP may exploit ungoverned spaces.

Is Washington misreading Beijing? Decline in US visits to China sparks concern

South China Morning Post | Caroline Lin

Congressional delegations to China fell sharply between 2010 and 2026, and fewer Americans now study there, two think-tank studies show. The Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) found that only 32 per cent of the 535 sitting US lawmakers, or 172, have travelled to mainland China, Hong Kong or Taiwan.

Bilateral tensions deepened in Donald Trump’s first term, and CSIS linked the drop in Taiwan travel to fallout from Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 visit. The report estimates fewer than 2,000 Americans now study in China, against a 2019 peak of about 11,000. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) analysis, by Rush Doshi, notes the suspension in China of the Fulbright programme and the Critical Language Scholarship. Isabella McCallum, a CSIS co-author, said Congress would rely more on second-hand information. Sun Chenghao of Tsinghua University warned of miscalculation. Xi Jinping has invited 100,000 young Americans to China over five years. Whether that rebuilds expertise remains open.

How Saudi Arabia’s mBridge Exit Exposes the Limits of China’s Financial Warfare Strategy

Small Wars Journal | Hugh Harsono

Saudi Arabia’s Central Bank publicly disclosed on 19 September 2026 that it had exited the China-led mBridge central bank digital currency project over a year prior. The departure demonstrates that technical participation in alternative clearing platforms does not guarantee long-term geopolitical or institutional alignment with Beijing’s financial warfare goals.

China developed mBridge alongside the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System to reduce global reliance on the U.S. dollar and bypass Western sanctions. Meanwhile, parallel adoption continues elsewhere, as Rwanda’s Bank of Kigali connected to CIPS on 24 September 2026. Conversely, Japan is advancing alternative wholesale digital currency structures through Project Agora and regulated yen-backed stablecoins like JPYC. Financial interoperability is becoming a core strategic capacity. Consequently, emerging international payment architectures will feature overlapping settlement rails rather than a single dollar replacement, complicating Western sanctions enforcement while granting participant states greater operational flexibility in cross-border commerce.

How Do Americans View Foreign Policy Ahead of the Midterms?

Cfr | Rebecca Lissner

Wisconsin voters across Milwaukee and Kenosha counties voice deep economic anxiety regarding trade tariffs and restrictive immigration policies. Tariffs on Canada and other trade partners raised average household costs by $1,500, destroyed 6,100 manufacturing jobs, and shrank economic output by $2 billion in 2025. Citizens express growing frustration with overextension abroad, questioning military support for Iran, Ukraine, and Israel while domestic needs go unmet.

Traditional alliances with countries like Canada receive strong public backing, contrasting sharply with widespread apprehension regarding alignment with authoritarian states. Meanwhile, manufacturing and labor sectors maintain an optimistic yet cautious outlook on the domestic AI infrastructure buildout. China is viewed primarily as an economic rival rather than an immediate security threat, with local industries confronting competitive pressures directly on the factory floor. These sentiments mirror broader voter disillusionment across key electoral swing states regarding Washington's international commitments.

The Donald Trump-Vladimir Putin-Xi Jinping Summit: A New Yalta?

National Interest | Tsiporah Fried

US President Donald Trump has signaled openness to a proposed trilateral summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping during the November 2026 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Shenzhen. The gathering, initially proposed by Moscow, aims to focus on nuclear disarmament rather than the ongoing war in Ukraine.

This initiative follows Washington's suspension of key tariffs under the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 on 16 October. New START expired in February 2026. This left the United States and Russia, who control 86 percent of global nuclear weapons, without a binding strategic arms control treaty alongside China's expanding arsenal. While direct great-power transactionality aims to bypass institutional inertia, practical execution risks eroding transatlantic alliance credibility and intelligence-sharing mechanisms. European partners fear their security architecture could become a bargaining variable in broad trilateral negotiations conducted without Ukrainian or allied participation.

Russia’s Drone Surge Depends on Chinese Supplies

The Jamestown Foundation | Simone Chiusa

Chinese state-owned enterprise Jilin Chemical Fiber Group delivered 46 metric tons of polyacrylonitrile precursor to Rosatom subsidiary Alabuga-Volokno to sustain Russia’s expanding kamikaze drone manufacturing line in Tatarstan. Russian state procurement for Shahed-type loitering munitions grew from 12,000 units in 2024 to more than 100,000 in 2026. This massive output increase exposes Moscow’s overwhelming dependence on Beijing for critical components, ranging from carbon fiber materials to Xiamen Limbach engines.

Domestic import substitution efforts have repeatedly failed. Between March 2022 and January 2025, Alabuga-Volokno imported approximately 3,000 tons of Chinese synthetic yarn worth $21.4 million. Russia now pays up to a 300 percent premium for Chinese defense-critical technology while allocating 89 percent of its carbon fiber output to military enterprises by 2030. Meanwhile, Ukrainian long-range strike campaigns targeting domestic Russian facilities, including the Saransk optical fiber plant, further compel Moscow to rely on Beijing's industrial supply lines to sustain theater operations.

US-China strategic competition to keep escalating as world watches on, Rudd says

South China Morning Post | Lucy Quaggin

Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd warned at Harvard University on Friday that strategic competition between the United States and China is expanding across military, economic, technological, and ideological domains. His assessment followed a September summit in Washington between Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump.

Rivalry remains intense despite personal diplomatic overtures. To manage trade tensions, Chinese Vice-Premier He Lifeng and US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent negotiated an extension of the Busan trade truce from November 10, 2026, to January 10, 2027. Alongside targeted tariff reductions, both nations pledged government-to-government dialogue on artificial intelligence and crisis communication mechanisms to avoid Graham Allison’s Thucydides Trap. Beijing favors presidential diplomacy to prevent disruption prior to the ruling Communist Party’s 21st Party Congress. The two leaders are scheduled to meet twice more at the Shenzhen APEC summit and the Miami G20 gathering, marking four face-to-face encounters in a single year.

Lula Defies Latin America’s Pro-Trump Wave

Foreign Policy | Catherine Osborn

Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva secured reelection on 25 October 2026, defeating right-wing candidate Flávio Bolsonaro with 51.8 percent of the vote against 48.2 percent. The victory marks a historic fourth presidential term and resists a wider regional political shift towards United States President Donald Trump.

A surge in grassroots digital campaigning, including a WhatsApp channel with 10 million members, proved decisive in reversing first-round momentum. Lula overcame initial deficits to achieve the narrow margin of over 3.5 percentage points. However, domestic governance challenges remain severe. Flávio’s Liberal Party expanded its parliamentary presence in Congress, creating significant legislative friction for the incoming administration. Rising national debt further restricts economic manoeuvrability while election judicial disputes continue. Meanwhile, neighbouring right-wing leaders in Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru acknowledged the result prior to Washington’s official reaction, underscoring evolving diplomatic dynamics across Latin America.

The U.S. Army’s Infantry Squad Vehicle (ISV)

Congressional Research Service | Andrew Feickert

The U.S. Army’s Infantry Squad Vehicle, built by GM Defense from a Chevrolet Colorado ZR2 baseline, is a lightweight, unarmoured transport for nine soldiers. In February 2026, the Army raised its procurement objective to 11,582 ISVs, an “exponential” increase from the original 2,065-vehicle requirement, citing soldier feedback and Transformation in Contact experimentation.

The FY2026 budget requests $308.620 million for 1,275 ISVs and associated equipment. The Army also issued a Commercial Solutions Opening on 30 March 2026 for up to 606 heavier ISV-H vehicles with exportable power for mobile command and control. DOT&E found the ISV effective as a troop carrier in permissive environments, though initial testing raised reliability, training and survivability concerns; later testing showed improved reliability. The trade-off is protection. Congress faces questions over fleet size, logistics and the ISV’s effect on the wider light tactical vehicle fleet.

AI, Robotics, and Marines

Real Clear Defense | Gary Anderson

The United States Marine Corps faces critical operational vulnerabilities due to its Force Design divestments of tanks, heavy engineer bridging assets, and conventional artillery in favour of short-range Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NEMSIS) platforms. This structural shift was intended to secure positions across the First Island Chain against potential Chinese aggression.

However, NEMSIS anti-ship missiles offer a limited range of just over 100 nautical miles, rendering them rapidly obsolete against longer-range US Army hypersonic systems and advanced peer capabilities. Rebuilding legacy armor would take a decade. Integrating human-robot hybrid infantry formations offers a cost-effective alternative by augmenting small units with robotic skirmishers, loitering munitions, and autonomous ground vehicles. Recent Ukrainian robotic operations demonstrate that teaming infantry with uncrewed platforms restores frontline combat mass and tactical lethality without ballooning defense budgets. Adopting uncrewed ground architecture before 2030 provides a financially viable model to mitigate severe amphibious capability gaps.

AI Adoption: Are Air Force and Space Force Ready and Willing?

Air & Space Forces Magazine | Todd South

The U.S. Air Force and Space Force are accelerating artificial intelligence adoption, with Secretary of the Air Force Troy Meink announcing more than 300 AI tools for military personnel. Senior leaders want these systems to streamline administrative work, combine data and improve decision-making. Yet rapid adoption is raising concerns about oversight, security and workforce readiness.

The Department of the Air Force tracks AI applications through a central inventory called CLARA, while mission owners retain responsibility for development, authorisation and delivery. Its AI Action Team, established by Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force David Wolfe, has examined more than 50 projects. The department also uses the Pentagon’s GenAI.mil platform for unclassified and sensitive administrative tasks. However, unapproved tools can create shadow AI, exposing data and networks while generating costs that escape central oversight. The Army’s Sage AI experience offers a warning: its annual allocation of 100 million tokens had been exhausted by mid-June after access expanded. Officials are examining usage, computing requirements and budgets, while acknowledging that training and unit-level support remain essential to effective adoption.

Lessons Learned From Russia’s War Against Ukraine

RealClearDefense | Hlib Parfonov

Russian ground forces in Ukraine have replaced traditional armoured breakthroughs with continuous small-group infantry assaults supported by first-person view (FPV) drones and electronic warfare. Frontline Ukrainian formations counter these tactics by deploying dense electronic warfare networks—including Bukovel-AD, Anklav, and Nota jamming systems alongside Plastun-RP SIGINT units—blocking UAV command channels to a depth of 20 kilometres behind Russian lines.

This dense electromagnetic barrier forces Russian operators to adopt fibre-optic guided drones and machine-vision target acquisition algorithms, bypassing conventional radio-frequency countermeasures entirely. Electromagnetic dominance remains fleeting. Russian assault groups of four to eight personnel functionally act as disposable reconnaissance by fire to draw defender fire and expose positions before follow-on waves attack. Baltic defense planners face a limited strategic depth of 200 to 300 kilometres and require rapid integration of national FPV drone production, layered low-altitude radar detection, and organic counter-UAV platoons into company and battalion echelons to delay offensive momentum during initial operational phases.

Why is Ukraine so reliant on Starlink and can Europe plug the gap?

BBC News | Tiffany Wertheimer

Ukrainian forces experienced critical command-and-control disruptions following recent performance throttling across SpaceX's Starlink satellite network, exposing severe operational vulnerabilities in tactical drone operations. High-speed satellite communications provide the real-time connectivity required to transmit targeting data and execute precision strikes against Russian positions. Line-of-sight command latency directly affects battlefield survival.

European alternatives currently lack the orbital density and hardware specs needed to replace Starlink's 10,000-satellite constellation. France's Eutelsat operates approximately 600 OneWeb satellites, but its larger terminals cannot equip small tactical strike drones. While the European Union aims to integrate Kyiv into its Govsatcom sharing network, regulatory constraints prohibit using the system for offensive combat missions. Furthermore, Europe's dedicated Iris² military-grade satellite constellation will not achieve operational capability until 2029 with 348 planned satellites. Consequently, Ukrainian commanders remain tethered to commercial satcom providers, leaving front-line intelligence distribution and uncrewed strike kill chains subject to foreign corporate policy and geopolitical uncertainty.

What if No One Wins the Israeli Election?

Foreign Policy | David E. Rosenberg

Israeli voters face a pivotal legislative election on Oct. 27, 2026, as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition risks falling short of a parliamentary majority. Recent polling allocates Netanyahu’s bloc a maximum of 49 seats and opposition parties 54, leaving both short of the 61-seat threshold required to govern.

The political gridlock stems directly from the aftermath of the Oct. 7, 2023 Hamas attacks, which permanently fractured Israel's electoral landscape. With Arab-led parties holding the balance, opposition figure Gadi Eisenkot eyes forming a fragile minority government backed by an external parliamentary safety net. Such an administration would pursue a 100-day program to reverse judicial overhauls, enforce military conscription, and legally bar indicted politicians from executive office. Political friction will remain severe. Resistance from West Bank settlers and Haredi factions threatens domestic stability, while Netanyahu retains leverage to contest vote validity or trigger regional military escalation.

Possible Peace Gesture in Ukraine

Geopolitical Futures | George Friedman

Ukraine and Russia agreed on 23 October to halt combat operations in the Russian-occupied town of Oleshky within the Kherson region, establishing a humanitarian ceasefire scheduled to take effect on 26 October. Negotiated directly by Ukrainian and Russian civilian officials, the localized agreement allows residents to evacuate and enables the delivery of food and essential supplies.

This diplomatic arrangement reportedly followed an intervention by Melania Trump, who maintained direct contact with Russian authorities alongside U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff's talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow. Localised truces remain operational exceptions. Both Kyiv and Moscow are attempting to influence U.S. President Donald Trump, who faces pressure ahead of American midterm elections while managing an ongoing conflict with Iran. Kyiv seeks to secure continuous U.S. satellite intelligence, whereas Moscow offers minor concessions such as diesel shipments to Washington. Neither combatant can conclude the war without justifying its immense strategic costs.

The Arms Race is Measured in Gigawatts

FIRST BREAKFAST | KATHERINE LAMBERT

Iranian Shahed drones struck two Amazon Web Services data centres in the United Arab Emirates and damaged a third facility in Bahrain on March 1, 2026, knocking two of three UAE availability zones offline and disrupting services used by financial institutions, Snowflake and Careem. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps claimed responsibility and described AWS infrastructure as a military target because of alleged links to U.S. military AI.

The piece presents this event as evidence that electricity has become the enabling layer for military power in an era shaped by AI and cloud computing. It links Pentagon cloud contracts, Maven Smart System and military logistics modernisation to growing dependence on civilian power networks. The constraint is institutional. U.S. data-centre demand rose to 64.4 GW in late 2025 and S&P Global projects 183.2 GW by 2030, while grid interconnection delays and fragmented governance slow new capacity. Drawing on examples ranging from Churchill’s oil transition to Germany’s synthetic fuel vulnerability, the author contends that future military effectiveness will hinge on the ability to secure and deliver large-scale electrical power.

Brazil after the vote: strategic and geopolitical implications

International Institute for Strategic Studies

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva won re-election in Brazil’s presidential run-off on 25 October with 51.79% of the vote, narrowly defeating far-right candidate Flávio Bolsonaro. The electoral outcome secures Workers' Party leadership over Latin America’s largest economy amid a broader regional shift toward right-wing governments. This political continuity directly shapes global climate diplomacy, critical-mineral supply chains, and multi-aligned foreign policy across the Global South.

Brazil holds 60% of the Amazon rainforest and vast rare-earth reserves critical to the global energy transition. Lula's administration faces persistent domestic challenges including public insecurity, economic volatility, and transnational organized crime. The victory will test Brazil's strategic balance. Abroad, Brasilia will maintain its active footprint within the BRICS grouping while deepening environmental protocols under the Palermo Convention. Ultimately, the election anchors South America's primary economic engine within a non-aligned diplomatic framework while managing heightened internal political fragmentation and external trade dependencies.

PHP crisis: What you need to do as the world panics about AI cyber attacks

The Independent | Andrew Griffin

A critical vulnerability identified in the PHP programming language—which powers roughly 70 per cent of all websites—has triggered global security alarms and emergency patching efforts across businesses and government networks. The flaw exposes vast swathes of internet infrastructure to rapid exploitation, heightened by accessible large language models that automate zero-day discovery.

Software security maintainers now face an operational asymmetry where artificial intelligence weaponises long-hidden code bugs faster than organisations can deploy fixes. Cybersecurity experts from Censys, Trail of Bits, Granitt, and the Surrey Centre for Cyber Security urge institutions to automate system updates and verify defensive configurations. Individual users remain structurally reliant on service-side remediation despite adopting multi-factor authentication or unique passwords. Attackers currently hold the tactical advantage. Meanwhile, financial institutions like the American Bankers Association report robust defensive preparation against automated threats, though consumer risk persists on secondary retail platforms.

ETH Zurich research finds 407 cyber incidents targeting the space sector in 2025

Space and Defense

ETH Zurich’s Center for Security Studies recorded 407 cyber incidents targeting 183 space-related organisations worldwide in 2025, revealing critical vulnerabilities across ground stations, supply chains, and IT infrastructure. Authored by Clémence Poirier, the September 2026 report demonstrates that hacktivists and state-aligned groups increasingly target commercial space infrastructure during conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East.

No orbital assets were directly targeted. However, the absence of onboard cybersecurity monitoring leaves spacecraft intrusions largely undetectable, creating a severe intelligence blind spot for military commanders. Modern defense forces rely heavily on dual-use commercial satellites for communications, navigation, and space domain awareness. This integration creates complex command and coordination vulnerabilities, as military decision authority does not extend to private digital supply chains or overseas ground networks. The 2022 cyberattack on Viasat’s KA-SAT network proved how commercial ground disruptions instantly compromise operational command links, necessitating transparent, intelligence-led defense coordination across public and private space sectors.

Funding, force-structure issues could hinder Hegseth’s new autonomous command

Defense One | Meghann Myers

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth faces significant financial and structural hurdles in launching the U.S. Autonomous Warfare Command, known as AUTOWARCOM. The initiative relies on a $54 billion funding request tied to an uncertain reconciliation bill rather than the standard defense budget. Analysts warn that bypassing conventional force-structure models to create an acquisitions-focused combatant command risks operational disconnection from operating forces.

While the Army has rebranded its Futures and Autonomy Command to serve as a component, other military branches have deferred to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. With lawmakers facing potential shifts in congressional power ahead of midterm elections, experts note that funding must materialize by Christmas or stall the command's implementation.

A New Era of War: A Nine-Ton U.S. Helicopter Versus a Drone

The New York Times | Michael Schwirtz

The U.S. Army is testing whether its Apache attack helicopters can help counter drones, as the 2-159th Attack Battalion flew against Outlaw targets during Exercise Skyfall 2 in Germany this month. The trials reflect a battlefield shift: drones threaten aircraft and armoured vehicles, while the targets traditionally hunted by Apaches have become harder to find.

The Outlaws have wingspans of about 11 feet, broadly comparable to Russian and Iranian Shahed drones. Crews used 30-millimetre training rounds, missiles and rockets; one crew downed all four drones launched during a flight. The Army views the Apache as one element of a wider defence, with cannon ammunition offering a cheaper option against large numbers of threats. Yet faster jet-powered Geran-4 drones may outrun helicopters, and a Shahed reportedly brought down an Apache over the Strait of Hormuz in June. The pilots survived and were rescued by a remotely piloted Navy sea drone. The helicopter’s future role may therefore be narrower and more selective.

Beast in the Machine

Air & Space Forces Magazine | Col. George Dougherty

Precision-guided munitions are undergoing a fundamental transformation as artificial intelligence and autonomous targeting migrate capabilities from costly cruise missiles into cheap, ubiquitous tactical weapons. This shift enables $300 unmanned aircraft to destroy $200 million C-17 transports, radically destabilising traditional capital platform economics. Universal precision permanently alters battlefield survival.

Military historian Trevor N. Dupuy demonstrated in 1964 that exponential leaps in weapon lethality force military formations to disperse. Modern surgical precision—achieved when circular error probable shrinks below target dimensions—allows light munitions to strike specific vulnerabilities, such as an F-35 fighter or a ship's radar. Small explosive payloads now achieve effects previously requiring massive salvoes. Consequently, heavy mass and concentration become critical operational liabilities against low-cost, asymmetric precision strikes. As demonstrated by Ukrainian drone attacks against Russian armor and bombers, single-shot surgical lethality invalidates traditional force structures relying on heavy protection alone. Battlefield survival requires immediate adaptation.

U.S. Military Operations Against Iran’s Missile and Nuclear Programs

Congressional Research Service | Daniel M. Gettinger and Paul K. Kerr

On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched military operations against Iran’s missile and nuclear programmes. The White House later said the campaign struck more than 450 ballistic missile targets and approximately 800 attack drone targets, while President Donald Trump described the objective as preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and destroying its missile industry.

The Congressional Research Service reports that Iran retains thousands of missiles and one-way attack UAVs despite degradation, while reports suggest it may be rebuilding infrastructure and resuming production from stockpiled components. The IAEA has not inspected attacked nuclear facilities since June 2025, and its March assessment found no damage to facilities containing nuclear material. US assessments differ: the 2025 National Security Strategy said the June 2025 strikes significantly degraded Iran’s nuclear programme, while the 2026 National Defense Strategy said they obliterated it. The uncertainty remains material.

The 2026 US-India Subnational Innovation Competitiveness Index

ITIF | Amit Kapoor, Stephen Ezell, Trelysa Long and Sheen Zutshi

The United States holds the top 51 places in the 2026 US-India Subnational Innovation Competitiveness Index, which ranks 87 regions on 12 indicators. The District of Columbia, Massachusetts and California lead. Chandigarh, Maharashtra and Delhi top India but rank below every US state, according to ITIF and the Institute for Competitiveness, India.

Three groups of indicators carry the scoring: knowledge economy at 44.3 percent, globalisation at 11.3 percent and innovation capacity at 44.4 percent. India ranked 38th among 138 economies in the Global Innovation Index 2025, against 3rd for the United States, having risen from 81st in 2015. Manufacturing made up 14.7 percent of India’s total gross value added in 2022–2023, the lowest since 1968–1969. Chandigarh has surpassed Mississippi’s and Hawaii’s knowledge scores. Maharashtra has surpassed 10 US states on innovation capacity, and Delhi has surpassed Alaska. The US score range is about 37 points; India’s is about 23.

India and Europe: Bridging Continents Through IMEC

CSEP | Constantino Xavier and Abhishek Agarwal

India and Europe should build the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) as a resilient economic network and not a mere transport route, a CSEP report edited by Constantino Xavier and Abhishek Agarwal concludes. Announced in 2023, IMEC now serves as a wider resilience project amid the Ukraine war, Gaza conflict, Red Sea disruptions and Strait of Hormuz crisis.

Modelling in the volume suggests a 40% reduction in transit time between India and Europe could add approximately US$3.535 billion to India’s Gross Domestic Product. The report sets out four dividends: economic, security, energy and climate, and political. Governance is the missing layer. Implementation remains fragmented because the corridor lacks a common framework for governments, financiers, regulators and private actors. Proposed fixes include national Sherpas, GTLPRA-type planning frameworks and Track 1.5 structures. Differences between India’s Digital Personal Data Protection Act and Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation also complicate data sharing. A six-point action agenda follows.

Pakistan’s Afghan Crisis

The American Conservative | Giorgio Cafiero

Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban have fought sustained hostilities for a year over a border dispute and militant sanctuaries, and have been in an “open war” since February. Giorgio Cafiero writes that Islamabad’s hopes for a cooperative “Taliban 2.0” after August 2021 have become a nightmare, with militant attacks on Pakistan rising since 2024.

Kabul denies sheltering Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), and calls Pakistan’s terrorism crisis an internal problem stemming from Islamabad’s failures. Qatari, Turkish and Chinese mediation has so far failed. Russia is so far the only state to recognise the Taliban government formally, though China, Iran, the United Arab Emirates and the Central Asian republics keep de facto ties driven largely by commercial, trade and security interests. Kabul is increasingly engaging New Delhi. Cafiero expects limited outside help for Islamabad and warns that the war risks becoming protracted.

Pakistan Steps Into A Wider Role As Mecca Pact Officials Meet In Tehran

Eurasia Review | Saad Hafiz

Senior officials from Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan, the three Makkah Joint Defence Agreement members, met Iranian counterparts in Tehran on 26 October for their first joint high-level meeting since Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia intensified. Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman, Field Marshal Asim Munir and Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin represented the pact.

Pakistan’s mediation, which began after U.S. and Israeli strikes opened the war on 28 February 2026, produced the 14-point Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding. Presidents Donald Trump and Masoud Pezeshkian signed it remotely in mid-June, but it had largely fallen apart by early July. The blockade has run well beyond 100 days. Analyst Saad Hafiz maintains that the meeting widens discussion of collective defence but cannot force Washington or Tehran to compromise on nuclear constraints, sanctions or the blockade. He sees the meeting as keeping open a chance to manage the next phase of a conflict now past eight months.

The Zangezur Corridor (TRIPP): From Regional Geopolitics to Global Geoeconomics

Eurasia Review | Dr. Matin Mammadli

Azerbaijan’s proposed Zangezur Corridor, renamed the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), is advancing through a US–Armenia framework intended to reconnect mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan. The August 2025 Washington Joint Declaration gave the initiative political backing, while agreements in 2026 outlined a development company and a possible construction timetable beginning in spring 2027. The project now has a proposed institutional framework.

Under the framework, the planned company would have 74 percent US ownership and 26 percent Armenian ownership, with development and operating rights for 49 years. Beyond roads and railways, the route could accommodate energy transmission and fibre-optic infrastructure. Its geography connects Azerbaijan’s Caspian transport network towards Türkiye and wider European markets, potentially adding capacity to the Middle Corridor. The project also intersects with Armenia–Azerbaijan normalisation, European supply-chain diversification and Central Asian access to international markets. Its commercial significance will depend on implementation and the practical operation of the proposed connections.