Indian Strategic Studies: 01/26/26

26 January 2026

ALLFARE: CHINA’S WHOLE-OF-NATION STRATEGY

Michael Margolius

Current paradigms of understanding the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) actions against the West typically use the DIME framework or even the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP)’s own “Three Warfares.” However, these frameworks that bin actions into discrete categories fail to encapsulate the totality of the PRCs activities targeting the west. While the United States hesitates to admit its “competition” with the PRC is conflict, the PRC appears to leverage all forms of warfare short of kinetic operations in daily affairs. To analyze how states exert their influence, scholars often compartmentalize actions into rigid analytical frameworks, which obscures the holistic scope of the challenge. By decomposing actions and analyzing them through the common frameworks, analysts fail to appreciate the interconnectedness across all elements of national power, particularly clandestine and sub-state illicit activities. These disadvantages call for a new model of analysis.

Adopting the concept of “allfare,” which captures every potential vector of malign action, provides a better appreciation for the strategic scope of PRC activities. Allfare encourages perceptions of linkages and cross-organizational intentions across the entire network, including official party and state instruments, proxies, and even seemingly disparate criminal actors. This last element, the illicit actors that ultimately advance CCP interests are entirely absent from traditional analytical frameworks. These activities are, at minimum, accepted by the party, and are very probably intentionally exploited. Since 2015, U.S. national security strategies have identified a rising Communist China as a threat to the liberal international order and continued American influence, yet policymakers still fail to grasp the broader whole-of-society grey-zone warfare the CCP conducts against the United States. Though they call for countering Chinese actions, the PRC continues their malign actions with no symmetrical or discernable asymmetrical response.. Allfare provides that aperture to see and then eff

Why China is playing the long game in Iran despite Trump’s fresh threats

Cao Jiaxuan

“This is not limited to Iran,” Zhang said, pointing to China’s responses to America’s military operation in Venezuela to abduct leader Nicolas Maduro and his wife to face narcoterrorism charges in the United States. “Beijing mainly condemns hegemonic behaviour verbally – actions that violate international law and infringe on other countries’ sovereignty – while also making it very clear that it believes solutions ultimately depend on cooperation between governments and their own people.”

That approach, analysts said, reflected China’s long-held principle of non-interference in internal affairs, a cornerstone of its diplomacy since the early years of the People’s Republic of China. According to Li Weijian, a researcher at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, China’s policy towards Iran “does not hinge on whether hardliners or reformists are in power because these are domestic matters”.

Can China Win Round Two of the Trade War?

Salman Rafi Sheikh

For nearly a decade, Washington has bet that economic pressure could slow China’s rise. Tariffs were supposed to discipline Beijing, weaken its export engine and restore US leverage. That bet failed. China, driven to export partly by domestic over-investment and weak internal demand, absorbed the shock and adjusted, recording an unprecedented US$ 1.19–1.20 trillion trade surplus, the largest ever for a major economy.

But the more important story is what comes next. As trade barriers lose their coercive power in a fragmented, multipolar economy, the US is shifting the battlefield. Power is moving away from tariffs and toward force, from trade rules to direct control over geography, resources and security. This shift exposes a deeper imbalance between the two powers. China’s strengths remain overwhelmingly economic; America’s comparative advantage lies elsewhere. The first round of competition was fought with tariffs. The second will be fought with force.

ALLFARE: CHINA’S WHOLE-OF-NATION STRATEGY

“Current paradigms of understanding the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) actions against the West typically use the DIME framework or even the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP)’s own “Three Warfares.” However, these frameworks that bin actions into discrete categories fail to encapsulate the totality of the PRCs activities targeting the west. While the United States hesitates to admit its “competition” with the PRC is conflict, the PRC appears to leverage all forms of warfare short of kinetic operations in daily affairs.

To analyze how states exert their influence, scholars often compartmentalize actions into rigid analytical frameworks, which obscures the holistic scope of the challenge. By decomposing actions and analyzing them through the common frameworks, analysts fail to appreciate the interconnectedness across all elements of national power, particularly clandestine and sub-state illicit activities. These disadvantages call for a new model of analysis.

How Chinese drone components are shaping the war between Russia and Ukraine

On large stretches of the battlefield in Ukraine, drones now matter more than tanks. Small, fast, relatively cheap and endlessly adaptable, they are used for surveillance, targeting and direct attack. Ukrainian officials estimate that drones account for the majority of recent casualties on both sides. As their role has expanded, so has the race to secure the parts that make them work.

That race does not run through Washington or Brussels. It runs through industrial parks in southern China.

From motors and sensors to cameras, processors and flight controllers, the components that determine how far a drone can fly and how clearly it can see are overwhelmingly made in China. Both Russia and Ukraine now depend on the same suppliers, often the same factories, and sometimes the same production lines, the Financial Times reported.

China’s 7 Simultaneous Crises of 2026

Reuben Johnson

China Could Face 7 Crises at Once in 2026: Deflation, Property, Debt, and Banks

Beginning in January 2026, analysts familiar with the current developmental and political tensions in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) predict the country will face a convergence of deepening economic and structural crises. The primary bellwethers will be a worsening deflationary spiral, a prolonged property market slump, and mounting financial risks.

The conclusions of these Chinese analysts, along with a brief discussion of the fallout, were published in an article at the end of December 2025 on the Canada website 51.ca.

China tried the 'sell America' trade. Here's how that worked out.

Martin Baccardax

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent betrayed his usual calm on Wednesday, insisting that a note from a Deutsche Bank analyst that mooted the idea of European investors using U.S. financial assets as political leverage, was little more than “fake news.”

Bessent claimed during a panel at the World Economic Forum in Davos that Deutsche Bank CEO Christian Sewing contacted him directly and told him that Europe’s biggest bank “does not stand by that analyst,” but his prickly response, alongside his dismissal of a Danish pension fund (as well as the nation itself) as “irrelevant” suggests a level of concern for the so-called Sell America trade he isn’t quite willing to admit.

The Greenland Episode Must Be a Lesson for Europe and NATO

Sophia Besch

President Donald Trump has stepped back from his most explicit threats over Greenland. At Davos on Wednesday, he ruled out military action and dropped plans for tariffs against European allies. That retreat should not be mistaken for closure. The president has not abandoned his determination to acquire Greenland. He has merely adjusted his tactics.

The episode matters because it crossed a line that cannot be uncrossed: The most powerful member of NATO openly challenged the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political agency of another. Even without force or sanctions, that breach weakens the alliance in a lasting way. The easing of immediate pressure does not close the matter. It sharpens the question of what Europe learns, and whether it is willing to act on it.

Trump’s Golden Dome Is No Silver Bullet

Alexandra Sharp, and John Haltiwanger

U.S. President Donald Trump claims to have accomplished more than any of his predecessors in less than a year. But one of the biggest proposals of Trump 2.0—the Golden Dome missile defense system—remains little more than a concept nearly 12 months after it was first unveiled. Although Trump has said that Golden Dome will be completed before the end of his second term, that’s looking increasingly unlikely. He has even tied in his pursuit of Greenland to the initiative, saying in his speech in Davos, Switzerland, this week that the Danish territory is the “land on which we’re going to build the greatest Golden Dome ever built.”

There are many open questions as to whether such a system is truly worth the cost, both in terms of the funds it will take to build and maintain—with some estimates placing the cost as high as trillions of dollars—and its potential to fuel a new arms race. While some experts agree that current U.S. missile defense capabilities are subject to vulnerabilities that could be exploited, they also have doubts about whether Golden Dome is truly the

Trump’s Year of Anarchy

Daniel W. Drezner and Elizabeth N. Saunders

For most Americans and Europeans alive today, a world of anarchy probably never felt quite real. Since 1945, the United States and its allies crafted and maintained an order that while neither fully liberal nor fully international, established rules that kept the peace among the great powers, promoted a world of relatively open trade, and facilitated international cooperation. In the decades that followed, the world became more stable and prosperous.

Before that long great-power peace, however, anarchy was far from an abstraction in the developed world. The first half of the twentieth century alone featured two world wars, a global depression, and a deadly pandemic. With weak global rules and weaker enforcement mechanisms, most states had little choice but to fend for themselves, often resorting to military force. But there were still limits to what sovereign states might do in a conflict. Countries were only just beginning to project military power beyond their borders, and information, goods, and people traveled less rapidly. Even during periods of international disorder, states could do only so much to one another without risking their own demise.

Timeless Leadership, Timely Expertise: Winning Tomorrow’s Wars Starts Here

Shane R. Reeves

In 1779, General George Washington, looking to stifle British attempts to divide the colonies, chose to headquarter the Continental Army at the “West Point” of the Hudson River, just below the town of Newburgh. The geography was perfect for defending the river. The river narrowed, allowing for a great chain to be pulled from one shore to the other, steep hills provided for artillery overwatch, and the tidal waters forced ships to slowly navigate the channel. Today, West Point retains its strategic importance—not because of its unique place on the Hudson River—but because it is home to the United States Military Academy.

The United States Military Academy at West Point is often called the premier leadership institution in the world. Academy graduates have led our Army, helped build the nation, explored space, and mastered industry. But what is often overlooked about West Point is its equally critical and historic obligation to provide professional military expertise in areas of strategic importance. In fact, this was one of the primary reasons for the creation of a military academy. During the Revolutionary War, the fledgling United States demonstrated little proficiency in several critical fields, such as military engineering and artillery. The lack of technical know-how led to a reliance on European experts. So while Washington understood the geographic advantages of West Point, it took the Polish General Thaddeus Kosciuszko to fulfill Washington’s vision by designing and overseeing construction of West Point’s fortifications.

Greenland meltdown: what does Trump’s quest mean for the global order and China?

Shi Jiangtao

Greenland’s mineral wealth, especially in rare earth deposits, has long generated interest, with Trump saying in 2019 that the territory’s acquisition would be “strategically nice” for the US. But realising this potential has been impeded by logistical challenges, environmental considerations and opposition from residents.

People attend a protest in Nuuk, Greenland, on Saturday against US President Donald Trump’s push for acquiring the autonomous territory from Denmark for America’s use and control. Photo: Reuters Overlooking key North Atlantic and Arctic shipping lanes, Greenland’s importance has grown as Washington and its Group of Seven partners have sought to reduce their dependence on China’s dominance in processing critical minerals.

The Real Reasons Greenland Matters

Coleman Hughes

Greenland—a vast, frozen island most Americans could barely place on a map—has suddenly found itself at the center of a rapidly intensifying global contest. In this episode, I’m joined by Heather A. Conley, an authority on Europe, NATO, and Arctic security, to discuss how Greenland became one of the most strategically important places on Earth.

Heather explained to me how the island’s location made it indispensable during World War II and the Cold War—and why that same geography has become increasingly important as melting ice opens new shipping lanes and exposes vast mineral wealth. What was once a remote outpost is now a linchpin in the emerging competition between the United States, China, and Russia.

An Opportunity for Success: Don’t Repeat Iraq’s Catastrophic Mistakes in Venezuela

Scott Rutter

In April 2003, I commanded Task Force 2-7 when we destroyed the Iraqi Republican Guard at Baghdad International Airport and reinforced 2nd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division in their decisive attack into Baghdad. After the invasion, my task force secured downtown Baghdad and Iraq’s Al Rashid banking district during those critical early weeks, giving me a front-row seat to both America’s swift military victory and the catastrophic failures that followed.

The lessons from Iraq offer crucial insights into risks that may not be immediately obvious from Washington.

As Venezuela transitions to new leadership under President Edmundo González Urrutia, I’m watching with cautious optimism but growing concern. The Trump administration has orchestrated a remarkable diplomatic achievement: Nicolás Maduro’s departure with limited shots fired, existing Venezuelan government structures remaining largely intact, and no American boots on the ground. But as someone who witnessed how quickly political transitions can collapse into chaos, I see warning signs that demand attention.

The Davos Crowd Gets the World Wrong Again

Tyler Cowen

Tyler Cowen is Holbert L. Harris Professor of Economics at George Mason University and also faculty director of the Mercatus Center. He received his PhD in economics from Harvard University in 1987. His book The Great Stagnation: How America Ate the Low-Hanging Fruit of Modern History, Got Sick, and Will (Eventually) Feel Better was a New

The big story from Davos is that globalization is in swift retreat. And that may well be what the insiders are saying to each other in speeches and at exclusive private parties. From the world outside the peaks of Switzerland, though, what I am seeing is that globalization, all things considered, is likely accelerating.

Despite Trump’s Pressure, $40 Billion in Military Money Is Stalling in Taiwan

Chris Buckley and Amy Chang Chien

A political quagmire in Taiwan has stalled plans by its president, Lai Ching-te, to sharply increase military spending, even as President Trump has pressed the island to pay more for its own defense against China’s campaign to bring it under its control.

Opposition lawmakers who dominate the legislature have blocked Mr. Lai’s ambitious proposal to spend $40 billion across eight years on military equipment from moving forward without concessions from Mr. Lai.

For Taiwan, the impasse is more than just a domestic political fight. It could raise questions about Taiwan’s ability to strengthen its defenses at a time when Mr. Trump is urging America’s allies and partners to shoulder more of the burden for their own security. Mr. Lai has pledged to lift military and security outlays to more than 3 percent of Taiwan’s economy this year to mollify the United States, the island’s chief security backer against Beijing.

The Greenland Crisis Won’t Break NATO: But It Could Weaken It Where It Matters Most

Andrew Latham

Greenland is unlikely to fracture NATO as an institution, but it could weaken what matters most: deterrence credibility. If Washington applies visible pressure on Denmark over access, basing, or authority—especially in a way that looks coercive inside the alliance—partners may begin to treat collective defense as politically conditional rather than automatic. That shift wouldn’t announce itself through treaty drama; it would appear in quiet hedging: slower planning timelines, more reassurance-seeking, more cautious signaling, and greater hesitation in crisis decision-making

Greenland Won’t Break NATO, But It Could Make Article 5 Feel Conditional

NATO will not fracture over Greenland. Framing this issue as an existential showdown is misguided. The Alliance is too entrenched to unravel over one disagreement—even one connected to Arctic strategy and territorial sovereignty. The real danger lies elsewhere and is easy to miss.

AI-driven war game analysis projects catastrophic US losses in a high-intensity conflict with China

Morgan Phillips

FIRST ON FOX: The Trump administration asked for redactions to a sweeping new Heritage Foundation report modeling a potential U.S.–China war over Taiwan, even though the analysis relied entirely on publicly available, unclassified data, according to the report’s authors.

The redacted report, TIDALWAVE, warns that the United States could reach a breaking point within weeks of a high‑intensity conflict with China — conclusions that the authors say prompted senior national security officials to seek redactions over concerns adversaries could exploit the findings or use them to identify U.S. and allied military vulnerabilities.

Inside the covert operation that captured Maduro

When US forces moved swiftly to seize Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro earlier this month, the public explanation focused on military precision and surprise. What remained largely out of sight was the role played by a covert CIA team operating inside Venezuela for months beforehand.

According to people briefed on the operation, the CIA did far more than quietly observe. Its officers carried out sabotage, recruited sources close to Maduro, tracked his movements in real time, and fed intelligence directly to US military commanders as the raid unfolded. The result was an operation that reflected not just close coordination between intelligence agencies and the Pentagon, but a broader shift in where and how the CIA is choosing to operate, the New York Times reported.

We Are Witnessing the Self-Immolation of a Superpower

Imagine you were Vladimir Putin or Xi Jinping and you woke up a year ago having magically been given command of puppet strings that control the White House. Your explicit geopolitical goal is to undermine trust in the United States on the world stage. You want to destroy the Western rules-based order that has preserved peace and security for 80 years, which allowed the US to triumph as an economic superpower and beacon of hope and innovation for the world. What exactly would you do differently with your marionette other than enact the ever more reckless agenda that Donald Trump has pursued since he became president last year?

In fact, the split-screen juxtaposition of three events this week—Trump’s own nearly two-hour commemoration of his one-year anniversary as president; the gathering of defiant, rattled global elites in snowy Davos; and the spectacle of Denmark and its European allies building up a military force in Greenland with the express purpose of deterring a US military takeover—might someday be seen as heralding the official end of the grand experiment in a rules-based international order that has kept watch since World War II.

US allies won't forget Trump Greenland crisis

Paul Adams

What on earth has the last fortnight been all about?

In the wake of a successful military operation in Venezuela earlier this month, a buoyed-up Donald Trump started to ratchet up the rhetoric on Greenland. Day after day, the world was treated to claims of ownership, threats of military action and tariffs against traditional allies in Europe.

Now, in an apparent puff of smoke, it may all have gone.

Nato Secretary General Mark Rutte, arguably the Trump whisperer-in-chief, seems to have talked the president down from his dangerously high hobby horse.

What we know about Trump's 'framework of future deal' over Greenland

Paulin Kola

US President Donald Trump has announced there is a "framework of a future deal with respect to Greenland". Wednesday's statement came as a surprise after days and weeks of mounting tensions - even a threat to use military force to seize the semi-autonomous territory of Nato ally Denmark.

So what could this deal entail and will it be acceptable to Denmark and Greenland - both of which have made it clear they will not relinquish sovereignty of the world's largest island in the Arctic?

Planning Beyond First Contact

Ian Whitfield

During the Cold War, American defense planners expected the primary fight to break out along clear front lines in Europe. The Fulda Gap became shorthand for the central risk: a decisive fight in a defined place and an institutional planning archetype, despite the uncertainties of escalation and duration. While the Taiwan Strait is not a direct analogy to the Fulda Gap, it has become a comparable focal point for U.S. planning. This kind of focal point invites planning for concentrated effort and early decision.

In the event of a conflict over Taiwan, both the United States and China would likely seek to pursue a short, sharp war. The American preference for such outcomes aligns with a familiar strand of broader American strategic culture. The 1992 National Military Strategy’s “Decisive Force” embodies this theory of victory: “Once a decision for military action has been made, half-measures and confused objectives exact a severe price in the form of a protracted conflict which can cause needless waste of human lives and material resources, a divided nation at home, and defeat.

How to Win the Shadow War With Russia

Samuel Greene and Christopher Walker

Russia is prosecuting a war that knows no borders. Ukraine is the open front, but the objective is larger: to defeat a coalition of adversaries, including all of Europe and the Russian opposition figures that have taken refuge there. As a result, Moscow is carrying out repeated attacks on both people and infrastructure within NATO’s borders. What might once have been described as “hybrid operations” or “active measures” across Europe have become nakedly kinetic, aimed not to persuade but to destroy critical systems and the continent’s willingness to fight. Welcome to shadow warfare: a concerted campaign of physical assaults designed to degrade an adversary without provoking military reprisals.

The list of Russian shadow attacks grows longer each month. Moscow’s drone fleets have shut down busy airports in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, and Norway and forced these countries to scramble their jets. Downed Russian drones have damaged property in Poland. Russian-linked ships have dragged their anchors across the Baltic Sea, disrupting vital energy and telecommunications links. Explosive devices planted by Russian operatives have disrupted European railways and logistics depots. Senior European defense-industry leaders have only narrowly escaped assassination attempts. Several Russian exiles have been less fortunate.