Arran Hope
On Tuesday, March 11, the “Two Sessions” (ไธคไผ) wrapped up in Beijing. These are the annual meetings of the National People’s Congress—the unicameral legislature of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that comprises nearly 3,000 delegates from across the country—and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, a political advisory body of a similar size. The headline event is the delivery and approval of the “Government Work Report” (ๆฟๅบๅทฅไฝๆฅๅ), which summarizes the legislature’s work over the previous year and sets the agenda for the year ahead. The Two Sessions are also an opportunity for a host of other meetings. For instance, President Xi Jinping met with the delegation from Jiangsu Province, various government leaders held press conferences, and groups from different policy constituencies held plenary sessions (Xinhua, March 7, March 8).
Holes in the Process of Democracy
If this year’s keystone political event was notable for one thing, it was the absence, for the most part, of politics. The Two Sessions have long been characterized in Western media as a vehicle for “rubber stamping” the Chinese Communist Party’s agenda with a show of what the Party terms “whole process democracy” (ๅ
จ่ฟ็จไบบๆฐๆฐไธป). This label has been increasingly apposite in Xi’s so-called new era, leading to a waning in the importance of the Two Sessions. The meetings in Beijing have largely ceased to be a platform for major policy announcements, instead becoming avenues for confirming a pre-agreed trajectory. For instance, in this year’s government work report, Premier Li Qiang (ๆๅผบ) begins laying out economic plans for 2025 by encouraging officials to “comprehensively implement the spirit” (ๅ
จ้ข่ดฏๅฝป่ฝๅฎๅ
็ … ไธไธญๅ
จไผ็ฒพ็ฅ) of the Third Plenum last July and to deploy policies in accordance with December’s Central Economic Work Conference (GWR, March 11). In other words, to continue on the course outlined in previous months.
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