Indian Strategic Studies: June 2025

4 June 2025

Lessons From Operation Sindoor

NEW DELHI – Just three weeks after “Operation Sindoor,” during which India’s military struck nine known terrorist basecamps and other facilities in Pakistani territory, an analysis of the military and operational dimensions of the strikes provides some preliminary but clear conclusions.

For starters, India hit hard, but its strikes were carefully targeted and calibrated, even taking place at night to avoid collateral damage to civilians. In fact, Operation Sindoor was a remarkable logistical and military achievement. Although Pakistan was on the highest alert, India succeeded in breaching the country’s defensive lines, striking its intended targets, and eliminating some known terrorists (whose funerals were attended by high-level Pakistani military and police officials).

While Operation Sindoor targeted a wider set of targets than any previous Indian counter-terrorist action, India deliberately avoided striking military and governmental targets at first. This sent a clear signal: India’s actions were a reprisal against terrorism, not the opening salvo in a war against Pakistan. It was the Pakistani military’s decision to respond with escalation that invited additional retribution.1

The second conclusion is that the terms of India’s engagement with Pakistan have irrevocably shifted, as India has shed its hesitations regarding military action. For too long, fears of “internationalizing” the Kashmir issue led India to pursue the same futile diplomatic processes, presenting dossiers and evidence to the world but getting little in return. Even the terrorism sanctions committee of the UN Security Council has long allowed Pakistan to find shelter behind one of its permanent members.

China’s Cryptocurrency and Blockchain Journey

Bonnie Girard

In 2017, the Chinese government was the largest cryptocurrency market in the world. It is estimated that as many as 80 percent of all Bitcoin transactions were taking place in Chinese currency, the yuan (also known as the renminbi), at that time. Cryptocurrency exchanges in China were busy and proliferating. The availability of cheap electricity, particularly in regions like Sichuan, made Bitcoin mining a lucrative business.

However, at the height of what seemed like an unqualified success for China’s adoption and use of digital currencies, on September 17, 2017, Coindesk reported that a document leaked on social media “appeared to confirm rumors that all local Bitcoin exchanges must close by the end of the month.”

Indeed, that’s exactly what happened. With no public consultation, no advance notice, and no appeal mechanism, the Chinese government shuttered an international financial product that had gained acceptance and then thrived among everyday Chinese investors. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had let the Bitcoin party run for as long as it was expedient. Once the venture became too strong for its own good, and therefore too risky should it fail, the government had no choice but to eliminate it before either eventuality played out.

There are three reasons that China has a problem with cryptocurrencies.

‘The keyboard has become a weapon of war’: John Healey explains decision to splash £1 BILLION on cyberattacks against Russia and China

Ben Chapman

Healey said Labour will focus on delivering a supercharged cyber force

Labour Defence Secretary John Healey has explained why the UK Government is seeking its biggest defence expansion since the Cold War.

Speaking on GB News, Healey said Labour will focus on delivering a supercharged cyber force to target ‘hostile states’ like Russia and China.

He told Camilla Tominey: “I’ve been quite shocked by this. I took over as Defence Secretary 10 months ago and defence has been the subject of 90,000 cyber attacks linked to other states.

“With that level of aggression, with that level of threat, it is quite clear that the keyboard has become a weapon of war.

TRENDING

China in the Indian Ocean: A stronger Indo-Pacific presence

Since its first continuous deployment to the Indian Ocean in 2008, China has significantly increased its regional activities. Along with securing its interests, Beijing has established itself and its capabilities in the area, anticipating any potential future conflict in the Western Pacific.

The Indian Ocean is an important theatre for China’s energy imports from the Middle East. It is also critical for Beijing’s broader maritime ambitions and to continue engagements with Africa, Europe, the Middle East and South Asia. While there is a growing debate on a potential Taiwan Strait crisis and China’s increasing capabilities in the Western Pacific, what is the role of the Indian Ocean, if any?

These infographics review China’s engagements across the Indian Ocean between 2007 and April 2025 through military exercises, arms sales, infrastructure development and a seabed-exploration contract.

China conducts a range of air, land and maritime exercises with partners along the Indian Ocean coastline.

China’s exercises (which do not include port visits or passing exercises) are primarily bilateral, with some being trilateral or multilateral.

China’s military exercises have expanded across the Indian Ocean, from the Red Sea to the Malacca Strait.

China has held maritime exercises with Iran and Russia every year between 2022 and 2025.

China has deployed assets with anti-submarine warfare capabilities. These assets are located close to key chokepoints.

Myanmar, Pakistan, Thailand and the United Arab Emirates are the primary recipients of China’s arms sales.

Since 2017, most of China’s infrastructure projects in the Indian Ocean have focused on the eastern coast of Africa and the western Indian Ocean islands.

China has a seabed-exploration contract for critical minerals in the southwest Indian Ocean.

Can Japan fill the leadership void as America steps back from Asia?

The presidency of Donald Trump posed serious challenges to the legitimacy of America’s global leadership. A recent Lowy Institute Poll found that 64 per cent of Australians expressed diminished trust in the United States. In Japan, a Yomiuri Shimbun survey conducted on 18 May reported that 73 per cent of respondents were concerned about the future of US–Japan relations. These numbers point to a broader reputational deficit facing the United States among key allies.

China has sought to exploit this credibility gap. President Xi Jinping has portrayed Beijing as a defender of global multilateralism in contrast to Washington’s unilateralism. The Global Times cited the Democracy Perception Index, which suggested that a significant proportion of surveyed countries viewed China more favourably than the US. While the veracity of these claims is questionable, they underscore a perceptual shift that Beijing is actively encouraging.

However, China’s effort to position itself as a responsible stakeholder is complicated by its assertive behaviour in the South and East China Seas, the Taiwan Strait, and its opaque alignment with Russia. For many countries in the Indo-Pacific – particularly Southeast Asian nations – these actions have raised serious concerns. Despite scepticism about Washington’s global conduct under Trump, the US remains a key security partner and a symbol of the rules-based order. Regional states, therefore, face a dilemma: growing wariness of both great powers but continuing dependence on US strategic assurances and China’s economic relations.

Peak repayment: China’s global lending

Riley Duke

Soaring debt repayments and a sharp reduction in lending have transformed China’s role in developing country finances from capital provider to debt collector. Mounting pressures from Chinese debts are especially severe for many of the world’s poorest and most vulnerable countries. A retrenchment in Western aid and trade is compounding these challenges while undermining any geopolitical advantage for the West.

Key findings

In 2025, the world’s poorest and most vulnerable countries will make record high debt repayments totalling $22 billion to China. Beijing has transitioned from capital provider to net financial drain on developing country budgets as debt servicing costs on Belt and Road Initiative projects from the 2010s now far outstrip new loan disbursements.

China continues to finance strategic and resource-critical partners despite a broader collapse in its global lending. The largest recipients of new lending include immediate neighbours, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, and Mongolia, and developing countries that are critical mineral or battery metal exporters, such as Argentina, Brazil, Congo DR, and Indonesia.

China is grappling with a dilemma of its own making: it faces growing diplomatic pressure to restructure unsustainable debt, and mounting domestic pressure to recover outstanding debts, particularly from its quasi-commercial institutions. But a retrenchment in Western aid and trade is compounding difficulties for developing countries while squandering any geopolitical advantage for the West.

The End of Erdogan

How the Turkish Leader Has Engineered His Own Undoing

HENRI J. BARKEY is Cohen Professor of International Relations Emeritus at Lehigh University and Adjunct Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Turkey’s populist authoritarian leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is now fighting for his political survival. His predicament is entirely of his own making: in the early hours of March 19, Erdogan orchestrated a raid on the home of Ekrem Imamoglu, Istanbul’s popular mayor, deploying some 200 police officers. Imamoglu, a political rival who was widely seen as a future presidential contender, was arrested and indicted on highly dubious charges, including baseless accusations of corruption and terrorism. Despite bans on public gatherings, the arrest triggered Turkey’s largest antigovernment demonstrations in more than a decade, which spread throughout the majority of the

Europe Tried to Trump-Proof Itself. Now It’s Crafting a Plan B.

Rosa Balfour

This piece is part of a Carnegie series examining the impacts of Trump’s first 100 days in office.

At some point between February 12, when U.S. President Donald Trump spoke to Russian President Vladimir Putin, and the televised humiliation of Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky on February 28, Europe realized it could no longer rely on its longtime ally, the United States.

The shocking depth and breadth of this realization cannot be overemphasized. Political leaders in European states, the European Union, and NATO displayed composure and coordination, but behind the scenes, the soundtrack was a frantic free jazz jam session with dramatic thuds and a long pause—the silence at the realization that the European comfort zone was over.

This revelation shattered the “Trump-proofing” preparations, which included a mix of appeasement, “cheque book diplomacy,” flattery, and moves to dodge direct hits. Some countries were—or thought they were—better placed to seek a relationship with the new president, but the U.S. administration has displayed widespread antagonism toward the EU. The deep entanglement between the two sides of the Atlantic (worth $9.5 trillion and 16 million jobs) means that the dramatic changes in policy have an existential impact on the continent. But the building blocks of a response strategy are coming into focus in three key areas.

Does Europe feel the urgency, or does it sink into defeatism?

Steven Everts

This opinion piece by Steven Everts was originally published in Dutch in NRC on 2 May 2025 under the title 'Voelt Europa de urgentie, of zakt het weg in defaitisme?'. It is reproduced here in English with the permission of NRC.

“Chaos, capriciousness, and amateurism. One day there’s rapprochement and an agreement on raw materials; the next we hear shameless Russian propaganda—straight from the White House. But the trend is clear: Donald Trump wants to get rid of the Ukraine file. How that happens, what others think about it, or the reputational damage for the US—it all seems to matter little. As long as there's a ‘deal’ and relations with Russia can be restored.

This is the moment of truth for Europe. It's easy to criticise Trump, but what are we going to do? The hard truth is that Europe, despite tough rhetoric and numerous emergency summits, risks failing the test.

The Franco-British plan for a deterrent force on Ukrainian territory appears to be floundering—due to the lack of an American ‘back stop’. Even the Poles have little enthusiasm for joining such a force. And the political unity of the 27 EU member states to extend sanctions against Russia will be even harder to sustain, if the US lifts its own sanctions.

Thus, Europe—including Ukraine—risks being presented with a fait accompli. And not about something marginal, but about the core of our own security.

Scientists Looking to Leave the U.S. for More Welcoming Environments

Claus Hecking, Kerstin Kullmann

The administration of U.S. President Donald Trump is making life difficult for academics and scientific researchers. Many are looking to leave the country as a result. We spoke with four of them.

Marion Schmidt had actually traveled to one of the most important gatherings of researchers to present recent developments at her university. The annual event held by the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) is one of the most prestigious scientific conferences in the world, with AI researchers, astrophysicists, biologists and others making the pilgrimage to Boston.

Together with her colleagues from the Center for Tactile Internet at the Technical University of Dresden, Schmidt was eager to share their recent results, including smart gloves with the ability to recognize early on the next object a person is likely to grab.

Ultimately, though, says Schmidt, the podium discussion focused less on her research results and more on possible career opportunities in Germany. She says she felt almost like she was at an academic recruiting event: "Young students wanted to know how university studies in Germany work. Professors were asking how they could get an appointment at a university.”

Trump’s attack on science is growing fiercer and more indiscriminate

SCIENTISTS IN AMERICA are used to being the best. The country is home to the world’s foremost universities, hosts the lion’s share of scientific Nobel laureates and has long been among the top producers of influential research papers.

Generous funding helps keep the system running. Counting both taxpayer and industrial dollars, America spends more on research than any other country. The federal government doles out around $120bn a year, $50bn or so of which goes towards tens of thousands of grants and contracts for higher-education institutions, with the rest going to public research bodies.

d 2025

The Cost of Defunding Harvard

Atul Gawande

It did not take long for Harvard’s leadership to realize that the university would have to stand up to the Trump Administration. On March 31st, the White House announced that the status of nine billion dollars in multiyear federal funding to the university and its affiliated hospitals was in question, pending review of alleged antisemitism on campus. A week and a half later,

the Administration delivered an ultimatum that dispensed with that pretense: it issued no findings on the university’s antisemitism response but instead issued far more extensive demands.

In order to “maintain Harvard’s financial relationship with the federal government,” the letter stated, it must agree to, among other things:

share with the government all hiring and admissions data through 2028, including on rejected student applicants; submit to the government an external audit of the views of all faculty, staff, and students, to show that every department and unit has established “viewpoint diversity”; reduce the power held by selected faculty members based on their “activism”; and audit numerous departments, including in the medical school, the school of public health, the divinity school, and the school of education, for alleged antisemitism.

Who Pays the Price in Trump’s Crusade Against Universities?

Christina Lu

a reporter at Foreign Policy.Two people stand in front of a crowd as they hold up signs at a rally in support of international students on the Harvard University campus.

One woman wears a tube top and holds a sign above her head reading: "Harvard is NOT Harvard WITHOUT International Students." Another person, wearing glasses,

holds a sign reading: "We stand with international students."People hold up signs during the “Harvard Students for Freedom” rally in support of international students at the Harvard University campus, just outside of Boston, Massachusetts, on May 27. Rick Friedman/AFP

In its crusade against American universities, the Trump administration now appears intent on choking off incoming flows of international students—a group that has long driven scientific innovation in the United States and pumped tens of billions of dollars into the U.S. economy.

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced on Wednesday that the Trump administration would “aggressively revoke” the visas of Chinese students, “including those with connections to the Chinese Communist Party or studying in critical fields.” Nearly one-quarter of all international students pursuing higher education in the United States come from China.

Navigating the AI frontier: Insights from the Ukraine conflict for NATO’s governance role in military AI

As artificial intelligence (AI) becomes increasingly integrated in the military domain, calls for its regulation are growing. In this paper,

I argue that although civil society, academics and citizens support the strong regulation of military AI, such regulation is unlikely to materialise, even less so via formal organisations such as NATO. The current war,

in which Ukraine is defending itself against a Russian invasion, underscores three key reasons for this: blurred borders with the civilian sector; the weaponisation of civilian life; and meaningful steps towards autonomy.

Given these factors, the paper argues that behavioural steps are most likely to be feasible in the short term.

With the increasing use of different applications of artificial intelligence (AI) in the military domain, calls for their regulation have intensified among civil society and policymakers alike. Formal discussions have taken place within the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), while more informal talks have taken place within the framework of major diplomatic conferences such as the Summit on Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain (REAIM). Civil society,

Understanding Escalation

Understanding the potential sources of escalatory risk is an increasingly important priority for U.S. policymakers. If rivalries produce a series of crises or even proxy or limited conflicts, the danger of those confrontations escalating to higher levels of violence will be an ever-present concern for U.S. decisionmakers.

To support current planning, U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command and U.S. Army Pacific requested that the RAND Arroyo Center investigate potential sources of escalatory risk from U.S. policy actions and build a tool to assess such risks. This report summarizes that work and concludes with the components of the framework.

The analysis combines theoretical and historical research with a current assessment of Chinese and Russian views of escalation and a recognition of the way emerging technologies are changing the context for escalatory dynamics.

Escalatory pressures can be highly unpredictable and derive from many independent factors. The tool developed in this research can help decisionmakers think more broadly about such risks. However, an actual crisis or wartime situation will involve a complex and nonlinear interaction of these and other factors, including mistakes and accidents, that can be very difficult to control

Will Europe Rebuild or Divide?

The Strategic Implications of the Russia-Ukraine War for Europe’s Future

The Russia-Ukraine war has compelled European leaders to ask fundamental questions about European security and defense, confront the realities of modern interstate conflict, and reassess the tools available to manage the current emergency and defend against future threats. Since the war began, European nations working collectively through the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and sub-regional coalitions have come together in opposition to Russia’s invasion and in defense of Ukraine’s sovereignty.

It remains to be seen, however, whether the war will drive broader changes in European understandings of the threat to their collective interests and what is required to ensure their collective defense.

RAND researchers examined the consequences of the Russia-Ukraine war and how U.S. allies in Europe understand and pursue their security. To assess whether the conflict is likely to drive long-lasting changes in European security priorities, investments, and relations,

the researchers analyzed the conflict’s effects on (1) European attitudes toward relations with Russia; (2) European collective security strategies, institutions, and resources; and (3) prospects for increased integration with Ukraine.

Implications of Russia's War on Ukraine for the U.S. and Allied Defense Industrial Bases

The Russia-Ukraine war has begun to shape U.S. and European policies on defense industrial investment, procurement, and production and likely will have consequences for future production capacities. This report presents an analysis of U.S. and European defense industrial bases (DIBs) before the war, challenges that have been identified because of the war, and ongoing efforts to respond to those challenges and improve the DIBs. Studying U.S. and European DIBs in tandem contributes to an understanding of the shared and distinct challenges that these DIBs face, including structural issues, supply chain vulnerabilities, workforce matters, and government procurement and competition policies.

With governments aiming to improve their DIBs, RAND researchers identified potential future indicators of progress for U.S. policymakers to consider. Also, given that the Russia-Ukraine war is ongoing, researchers identified factors that may change their conclusions. These insights may contribute to future decisionmaking on transatlantic DIB cooperation. Although this research was motivated by the Russia-Ukraine war, its findings and implications extend beyond the ongoing conflict and may inform how the United States approaches potential future conflicts.

Key Findings

Transatlantic reforms have been positive but modest.

Key production lines still face challenges.

Sustained funding for U.S. and European DIB modernization and production is essential to overcome persistent constraints on production capacity but is not guaranteed.

DIB growth could create new coordination challenges.

Ongoing investments in Ukraine’s DIB offer promise for a new defense industrial power in Europe, especially if initial joint production agreements meet expectations.

DIB requirements are evolving with the changing character of war.

The Consequences of the Russia-Ukraine War

This volume presents findings from a series of RAND reports examining the Russia-Ukraine War’s geopolitical and military consequences and identifies cross-cutting implications for U.S. policymakers. In the series of reports and in the present volume, the authors employed a threefold approach. First, they surveyed historical wars of similar size, duration, and scope to bound expectations for the Russia-Ukraine War’s likely effects and aftermath. Second, they identified diplomatic, military, economic, and normative changes that have occurred as a result of the war using government documents and senior leader statements; discussions with subject-matter experts; and prior open-source research. Third, because the war is ongoing, they highlighted plausible future events or changes that could alter states’ responses to the conflict and, in turn, affect the report’s preliminary findings.

Key Findings

The war’s primary geostrategic effect has been to strengthen the relationship between the United States and its European allies while simultaneously weakening relationships between Europe and Russia and, to a lesser extent, Europe and the People’s Republic of China.

Russian and Chinese incentives to undermine the transatlantic alliance have increased.

U.S. and allied adaptations are necessary to prepare for future large-scale protracted conflicts and preserve extended deterrence.

The U.S. defense community may be neglecting the implications of the war in Ukraine for future contingencies beyond the Indo-Pacific region, including in Europe.

Trump Wants Big Tech to Own the Dollar

Two parallel monetary systems – one based on public monies issued in China, India, and maybe the eurozone, and the other comprising private money, increasingly dominated by dollar-pegged stablecoins – appear to be emerging. Central bankers are not the only ones who should feel anxious.

ATHENS – The Spring Meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are usually placid, forgettable affairs. Not this year. Several central bankers returned home with a visceral sense of dread. The reason? The specter of the GENIUS Act – the stablecoin bill barreling toward passage by the US Congress hot on the heels of President Donald Trump’s March 6 executive order establishing a strategic cryptocurrency reserve.

Free Market Involvement in AI Is the Key to the US Military’s Future Success

Pat Fallon

US military success depends on tapping free market innovation to rapidly develop AI systems and outpace emerging threats.

Houthi Attacks Expose a Costly Gap

For the better part of two years, Houthi drone and missile attacks threatened commercial shipping and US naval assets in the Red Sea. And while Houthi attacks on US assets have subsided for the time being, US Central Command has raised the alarm that the current status quo in terms of recognizing and deterring these threats is unsustainable in the long term.

Not only is it not fiscally possible to continue to spend millions of taxpayer dollars on expensive countermunitions to take down cheap, mass-produced Houthi drones and missiles, but the US military currently lacks a means to develop the AI software needed to quickly locate and counter these attacks.

Funding Delays Hinder AI Progress

As part of its acquisitions process, the Department of Defense needs a way to be able to access different “colors” of money—the varied forms of funding, including research and development, procurement, operations and maintenance, and BA-8—at the speed of relevancy. The DOD needs to be able to quickly access each of the colors to use for AI development when and where it is needed most.

To develop critical AI architecture, we first need access to high-quality data and the software applications to process it. Unlocking varied forms of funding would accelerate private sector development of these essential tools.

Ukraine teaches us how to build a tank which can survive and win on a drone battlefield

An Israeli Merkava tank manoeuvres towards the southern Gaza Strip border near Khan Yunis. Merkavas equipped with Active Protection Systems and backed by sophisticated electronic warfare and drones have operated against Hamas and Hezbollah without trouble Credit: Atef Safadi/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock

The Strategic Defence Review, which should shape the UK’s military capability for the next decade, is set to drop at last next week. It is critical that the Review incorporates the lessons being learned in the Ukraine war, which is probably the most intense and prolonged “warfighting”-level conflict since WWII. It must drive much of our thinking when it comes to major combat operations in future. The delay to the Review is, I expect, due to the complexity, density and pace of change of modern war fighting, rather than political dithering and confusion amongst the Review team.

The key factor today is the electromagnetic spectrum – he who controls this, controls the battle space and will win the war. The ability to jam the enemy’s signals, and to push your own signals through enemy jamming, confers the ability to operate the most common kinds of drones in any given area. Often a nearby transmission relay – perhaps carried by a “mothership” drone higher above the battlefield – will let drones operate even inside the enemy jamming envelope, as the relay is nearer to the drones than the jammers are and has line of sight to them. In general the Ukrainians have tended to have the upper hand in this electromagnetic struggle, aided at times by harder-to-jam satellite communications such as Elon Musk’s well-known Starlink. But that doesn’t mean they’ve had things all their own way.

The BRICS and the Emerging Order of Multipolarity

Raoul Bunskoek

Expansion of the BRICS, coupled with shifts in US policy, have accelerated the emergence of a multipolar global order.

This new reality prompts the EU to diversify its strategic and economic partnerships to remain a competitive and effective global actor.

To do so successfully, the EU will have to engage with BRICS-countries, collectively accounting for some 41 percent of global GDP (PPP).

Such engagement requires the EU to accept diverse worldviews, prioritise shared utility over shared values, and support (some of) the BRICS’ diversification efforts.

For the BRICS group – originally consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – 2024 has been a year of enormous and sudden expansion.

First, the BRICS welcomed four new member countries – Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – in its midst on January 1, 2024. Then, the group announced the adding of ten new ‘partner countries’ during its most recent Summit, held in Kazan, Russia in October 2024. According to Russian presidential aide Yury Ushakov, the term ‘partner countries’ is meant to evaluate “how ready [countries] are for full-fledged or any other BRICS membership.” Indonesia then joined as full member on January 6, 2025, bringing the group’s official number of members to ten. Additionally, Saudi Arabia is listed on the website of the BRICS as a full member, but has yet to formally accept the membership. There is yet more potential for expansion, since some 40 more countries have voiced their interest in joining the group. The rapid expansion of BRICS prompts the need to address several key questions.

Governing the impact of emerging technologies: Actors, technologies, and regulation

The rapidly growing impact of emerging technologies has spurred calls to reign in their proliferation and use. How and to what end are different international actors governing and capitalising on the impact of emerging technologies,

and what regulatory strategies are successful? This special issue focuses on governance strategies to deal with emerging technologies, ranging from multilateral and bilateral regulation to unilateral deterrence policies.

Employing historical and comparative case studies and leveraging novel data sets, the authors find that the success of technology governance depends on a complex mix of actors involved, the timing of regulation, and the nature of technology.

Loyal Wingmen, Artificial Intelligence, and Cognitive Enhancement: A Warning Against Cyborg-Drone Warfare

Some states are planning to acquire armed drones that incorporate artificial intelligence (AI) and fly alongside inhabited aircraft. The use of drones according to this “Loyal Wingman” concept is an example of tactical human-machine teaming, and it could be militarily advantageous in future aerial warfare.

Incorporating AI into the operation of a weapon system’s critical functions (selecting and engaging targets) nevertheless carries an ethical risk: that a human will be unable to exercise adequate control over the use of force and unable to take responsibility for any injustice caused. To reduce this risk,

one potential approach is to pursue “meaningful human control” over armed and AI-enabled drones by increasing their human supervisors’ cognitive capacity. The use of brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) to achieve such an increase might be beneficial from the perspective of military ethics if it enabled faster human interventions to prevent unjust,

AI-associated harms. However, as this article shows, that benefit would be outweighed by the ethical downsides of waging cyborg-drone warfare: the undermining of pilots’ hors de combat noncombatant status and of human moral agency in the use of force.

Lessons from the EU on Confidence-building Measures Around Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain

Integrating artificial intelligence (AI) into the military domain presents a number of significant challenges that have contributed to a deadlock in global governance deliberations.

The rapid evolution of AI, its dual-use nature and its impact on the strategic calculations of actors promote the perception that trade-offs are required between security imperatives and ethical and legal considerations.

Fortunately, a diverse toolbox of confidence-building measures (CBMs) offers a way forward for governance processes and initiatives by fostering trust and reducing uncertainty. Drawing on lessons from the content of and processes that led up to the European Union AI Act, this report examines how global governance deliberations might benefit from a focus on risks and risk mitigation in order to operationalize high-level principles,

as well as multi-stakeholder engagement and investment in an information-based oversight body to ensure that the outcomes of deliberations are relevant and implementable. At the same time, this report also emphasizes the value of EU actorness and the role of European small and middle powers in the global governance arena around AI in the military domain,

as well as the need to harmonize civilian and military regulation within the EU. By leveraging CBMs and drawing on the structured regulatory approach of the EU AI Act, global governance efforts can move beyond the current deadlock to foster a more coherent, risk-informed and practical framework for the responsible development, deployment and use of AI in the military domain

3 June 2025

The United States’ Role In The Recent India-Pakistan Crisis – Analysis

Sandeep Bhardwaj

In early May 2025, triggered by the shocking Pahalgam terrorist attack, India and Pakistan engaged in an intense and wide-ranging four-day conflict. On 10 May 2025, the two sides agreed to a ceasefire that the United States (US) claimed it had brokered. New Delhi denied American role in the ceasefire negotiation.

The back-and-forth between Washington and New Delhi has obscured the strategic implications of the US’ role in the whole crisis. This time, Washington threw away the well-established playbook for managing South Asian crises that successive administrations has developed over decades. The result was confused signalling and ad hoc measures that exacerbated the risks and weakened US ability to intervene in future crises. While thankfully a ceasefire was achieved this time, the long-term dangers for the subcontinent have substantially increased.

Since the 1998 India-Pakistan nuclear tests, one of the central goals of the American policy in South Asia has been to prevent any crisis spiralling out of control. The US has activated its crisis management mode during the 1999 Kargil War, 2001-2002 Twin Peaks Crisis, 2008 Mumbai Terror Attacks, 2016 Indian LoC strike and 2019 Balakot airstrike. Although American crisis diplomacy has had varying degree of influence on different crises, it has always been present. The central challenge for Washington has been to contain escalation while avoiding the moral hazard of encouraging India or Pakistan to engage in risky behaviour by signalling that the US will always step in to defuse the crisis.

Since the President Donald Trump’s first term, the US’ South Asia crisis diplomacy has destabilised because of two contradictory impulses in Washington. On one hand, Trump has signalled his desire to withdraw the US from its traditional role as the guarantor of international order, especially its commitment to maintain stability and security in various parts of the world. On the other hand, the knee-jerk instinct to prevent crisis escalation in South Asia beyond nuclear threshold still persists in the Washington establishment.

Breaking the Ice: India’s First Ministerial Engagement with the Taliban

On 15 May 2025, India and the Taliban reached a pivotal moment in their diplomatic relations when External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar engaged in a telephone conversation with Amir Khan Muttaqi, the Acting Foreign Minister of Afghanistan’s Taliban administration.[i] This marked the first Ministerial-level contact between the two since the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021. The conversation took place just days after India and Pakistan agreed to halt their military strikes in the wake of Operation Sindoor,

which followed the Pahalgam terror attack of April 22, which left 26 innocents dead and dozens injured[ii], an incident condemned by the Taliban regime.

India-Taliban Ministerial Talks

India’s Foreign Minister, in a message that was posted on X (formerly Twitter), wrote, “Good conversation with Acting Afghan Foreign Minister Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi this evening. Deeply appreciate his condemnation of the Pahalgam terrorist attack.”[iii] During the telephonic conversation,

Dr Jaishankar underlined India’s traditional friendship with the Afghan people and reiterated India’s continued support for their development needs and “welcomed his firm rejection of recent attempts to create distrust between India and Afghanistan through false and baseless reports.”[iv] This appeared to be a response to allegations made by Pakistan’s military spokesperson, Lieutenant General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry,

who claimed during a May 10 press conference that India had “fired missiles at Afghan soil and conducted drone attacks inside Afghanistan.”[v] In reaction, Afghan Defence Ministry spokesperson Enayatullah Khwarazmi dismissed the accusation as baseless[vi].

How the India-Pakistan Crisis Became a Profitable Spectacle Online

Dr. Fizza Batool is an Assistant Professor at SZABIST University, Karachi, with expertise in South Asian Studies and Comparative Democratization. Connect with her on LinkedIn or read her works on ResearchGate

In late April 2025, a terrorist attack in Pahalgam in Indian-administered Kashmir led to escalating tensions between India and Pakistan. After four days of intense conflict, a ceasefire was agreed on May 10, 2025, following US diplomatic intervention. This conflict wasn’t just fought on diplomatic and strategic fronts—it was fiercely contested in the digital space, where the battle continues even after military tensions have cooled.

The crisis revealed a profound shift in the information hierarchy, with YouTube channels and TikTok accounts often generating more engagement than official government statements or traditional news broadcasts. Piers Morgan’s viral debate featuring social media influencers alongside traditional experts perfectly captures this new reality— individuals who once would have been mere spectators now sit on equal footing with government representatives and veteran journalists in shaping public understanding of international conflicts.

Behind this digital conflict lies a troubling economic reality: content creators on both sides of the border have transformed geopolitical tensions into a profitable business model. While their strategies differ dramatically as per the socio-political context in each country—Pakistani creators predominantly use humor and satire, while Indian counterparts amplify nationalist narratives—both narratives operate within the same attention economy that rewards emotional engagement over factual accuracy.

After The India-Pakistan Crisis, US Should Focus on China

Samir Kalra, and Akhil Ramesh

It is high time that US policy treats India and Pakistan for what they are: an emerging global power on the one hand and a bankrupt Chinese vassal state on the other.

There are few countries in the world that can dial both Beijing and Washington for support. One of them is Pakistan. The country has come to embody the phrase “running with the hare and hunting with the hounds.”

During the Global War on Terror, Pakistan simultaneously provided tacit support to the terrorist forces seeking refuge in its territories, fleeing American forces while at the same time supporting Washington as a non-NATO strategic ally.

Fast-forward to a post-Afghanistan world, Islamabad has maintained ties with both Beijing and Washington to leverage them when needed. This is particularly important during times of crisis like the recent one that arose after Islamist terrorists (likely sponsored by Pakistan) massacred mostly Hindu tourists in India’s Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir.

The terrorist attack by “The Resistance Front,” an offshoot of Lashkar-e-Taiba, a State Department-designated foreign terrorist organization, elicited a military and non-military response from India, including strikes on terrorist infrastructure deep in Pakistani territory. Pakistan subsequently escalated the conflict by launching drone and missile attacks on civilians, places of worship, and military installations in India, drawing a stronger Indian response that destroyed several Pakistani air bases.

For its part, the United States has publicly avoided taking sides between India and Pakistan. As a matter of fact, it has gone so far as to draw false equivalencies between the two countries, angering New Delhi and emboldening Pakistan. Pakistani military and government officials have even gone to the extent of holding celebratory rallies despite clear evidence that India dominated the short military conflict.

Pakistan and the Latest Reincarnation of Lashkar-e-Taiba

Kunwar Khuldune Shahid

Indian Army Colonel Sofiya Qureshi speaks as Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri looks on during a press conference regarding Operation Sindoor, May 7, 2025. Behind them, a map shows the locations struck by India, purported “terrorist camps” in Pakistan-administered Kashmir and Pakistan.Credit: Government of India

The clashes between India and Pakistan in May – the closest the two nuclear-armed neighbors have come to a full-blown war since 1999 – hinged over the status of India-bound jihadist groups in Pakistan, led by the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). India struck various sites in Pakistan, which it claimed were training camps of the LeT, the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM). Together, these groups form the jihadist umbrella dedicated to “liberating Kashmir from Indian occupation.”

New Delhi’s strikes came as reaction to last month’s attack in Pahalgam town of Indian-administered Kashmir, claimed by the LeT-allied The Resistance Front, in which 26 civilians, nearly all tourists, were gunned down. Islamabad denies any connection with the militant raid and points to the fact that both Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed are banned in Pakistan.

The LeT was founded by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed in 1990 out of former anti-Soviet jihadists. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the LeT remained aligned with regional jihadist outfits, notably al-Qaida and the Taliban, but dedicated its focus to the Kashmir jihad in the 1990s. The group carried out numerous raids in India with the backing of Pakistan’s security agencies. After being designated as a terror outfit by the U.S. post-9/11, the LeT, along with the JeM, was banned in Pakistan in 2002. However, some of the group’s deadliest maneuvers in India came in the aftermath of the ban, including the Delhi bombings in 2005 and the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

Pakistan’s TTP Problem: Why Military Solutions Continue to Fail

Maqbool Shah

The resurgence of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) since the Afghan Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 has exposed fundamental flaws in Pakistan’s counterterrorism strategy. Despite decades of military operations, billions in defense spending, and significant tactical successes during operations like Zarb-e-Azb and Radd-ul-Fasaad, Pakistan finds itself confronting an emboldened insurgency that operates with virtual impunity from Afghan territory.

As someone who commanded troops in counterinsurgency operations on contested border regions, I witnessed firsthand how conventional military thinking often proves inadequate against asymmetric threats. The current TTP resurgence demonstrates that Pakistan’s military establishment has learned few lessons from previous campaigns. It continues to pursue tactical solutions to what is fundamentally a strategic and political problem with regional implications extending far beyond Pakistan’s borders.

The Taliban’s Gift to the TTP

The Afghan Taliban’s victory in August 2021 fundamentally altered the strategic landscape for the TTP. Within months of the Taliban takeover, TTP attacks inside Pakistan increased dramatically, with the group claiming responsibility for over 100 attacks in 2022 alone – a significant increase from previous years when the organization appeared weakened and fragmented.

The sanctuary provided by Taliban-controlled Afghanistan has allowed the TTP to rebuild organizational structures, enhance training capabilities, and coordinate operations with a freedom of movement not enjoyed since the peak of the insurgency in 2008-2010. Unlike the fragmented organization that Pakistani forces degraded through sustained military pressure, the current TTP appears more centralized, strategically focused, and tactically sophisticated.

How SE Asia can break China’s rare earth monopoly

Patricio Faundez

Southeast Asia has the resources to challenge China's rare earth element monopoly. Image: Facebook

Last week, Australia’s Lynas Rare Earths produced heavy rare earth elements (HREEs) at a commercial scale in Malaysia, marking the first time this has ever happened outside of China.

This breakthrough, which includes elements like dysprosium and terbium, is no small feat in a market dominated by China, which is responsible for around 60% of global rare earth production and virtually 100% of the world’s HREE supply.

Rare earth elements (REEs) are critical for the US and other advanced economies: they power technologies from electric vehicles to defense systems. The US Department of Defense, for instance, has identified HREEs as vital for missile systems, radar and advanced communications.

Yet, the US itself produces only about 12% of global REEs—and almost none of the heavy types. Without secure access to these materials, Western industries risk supply chain disruptions that could slow the clean energy transition and compromise national security.

Russia’s Hybrid Warfare Tactics Target the Baltics

Eitvydas Bajarūnas

We are publishing this piece because Ambassador Eitvydas Bajarūnas has a wide range of governmental experiences that give him unique insight into modern political warfare. Among his many overseas postings, Ambassador Bajarūnas served as the Ambassador of Lithuania to Russia and as Deputy Ambassador of Lithuania’s delegation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). He previously served as Ambassador-at-Large for Hybrid Threats and regularly provides analysis on Russian informational warfare against the Baltics. In 2016, when he finished his posting as the Lithuanian Ambassador to Sweden, the then-Minister for Foreign Affairs nominated him as Ambassador-at-Large for Hybrid Threats. His main tasks were, first, to serve as the focal point within the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on this topic, and second, to promote understanding of hybrid threats and the need to counter them among EU and NATO allies.

Ambassador Bajarūnas participated in various EU and NATO working groups and initiatives (e.g., the NATO-Ukraine Hybrid Platform, the EU Working Group on Countering Hybrid Threats). He also negotiated and signed the memorandum establishing the European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats on behalf of Lithuania. Additionally, Bajarūnas took part in numerous seminars and working meetings, wrote numerous articles, and gave interviews to promote understanding of this phenomenon. Ambassador Bajarūnas’s piece helps place these developments into a larger context and explains why Russian political warfare is a decisive threat to frontline states. This essay builds upon Beniamino Irdi’s previous Perspectives article “Hybrid Threats and Modern Political Warfare: The Architecture of Cross-Domain Conflict,” highlighting the themes of dispersion across domains and gradualness in timing.

Executive Summary:Hybrid threats describe a complex strategy combining military tools with unconventional methods. Addressing hybrid threats in the Baltics is a continuous, never-ending process centered around developing resilience at the societal, national, European, and trans-Atlantic levels.

Army 2.0: UK cyber hackers to fight drones on the battlefield in new era for warfare

Cyber experts will be deployed on the battlefield alongside the regular Armed Forces as part of a major modernisation of the British military to prepare for drone warfare, The i Paper can reveal.

A new “digital warfighting group” with skills in hacking and cyber operations will work alongside infantry soldiers to scramble enemy drone signals, take down drone “swarms” and launch counter-attacks, if the UK is engaged in another war.

The plans, to be unveiled in the long-awaited Strategic Defence Review (SDR) on Monday, mark a new era for military capabilities and are in response to the war in Ukraine, where more soldiers have been killed by drones than traditional weapons and artillery.

Figures revealed by Western officials earlier this year showed that 80 per cent of battlefield casualties in Ukraine were due to drones, often deployed at short range.

The new digital warfighting unit will consist of personnel with basic military training but they will not be traditional soldiers, and will be employed instead for their cyber expertise.

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) is expected to fast-track recruitment of cyber experts to create the unit ready for the front line if Britain ever goes to war again.

The plans, which are being recommended by the SDR but have been endorsed by the Government, are part of enabling the British military to “adapt to a new style of warfare”, a Whitehall source said.