Indian Strategic Studies: June 2025

2 June 2025

Have Bangladesh-India Ties Reached a Point of No Return?

Rushali Saha

When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met Bangladesh’s interim leader Muhammad Yunus at the sidelines of the BIMSTEC summit in April — their first official meeting since Sheikh Hasina’s government collapsed in August 2024 — hopes rose for a breakthrough in strained bilateral ties. However, relations have since hit a new low, especially with Dhaka abruptly canceling a $21 million contract for an advanced ocean-going tug with an Indian state-run shipbuilding firm, Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers Ltd (GRSE), reportedly without any explanation.

Dhaka’s move comes at a time when India and Bangladesh have been implementing reciprocal trade restrictions, since New Delhi withdrew its transshipment facility for Bangladesh three days after the Bangkok meeting. More recently, as part of the tit-for-tat measures, New Delhi announced its decision to impose restrictions on the export of readymade garments and other specified commodities from Bangladesh via land ports. Roughly a month earlier, Dhaka had banned yarn and rice imports from India through the same land routes.

Bangladesh is the world’s 26th largest arms buyer. Several countries, including India, have been eyeing the Bangladesh defense market, as Dhaka procures almost all its medium-sized and heavy war equipment from foreign countries. Much to New Delhi’s discomfort, China has long been a dominant player in this space, with Beijing accounting for 82 percent of the total arms imported by Bangladesh between 2009-2013.

Under the Hasina government, some progress was seen in defense ties with India, notably the signing of an MoU on the framework for defense cooperation in 2017. New Delhi also reassured Dhaka of support for the modernization and capacity-building of the Bangladesh armed forces as part of its Forces Goal 2030 program. Bangladesh’s former Foreign Minister Hasan Mahmud had indicated that Dhaka was keen to continue purchasing defense equipment from India. According to Indian reports, citing unnamed official sources, Bangladesh had even shared a “wish list” of military platforms and systems that its armed forces wanted to procure from India.

India’s Geopolitical Position After ‘Operation Sindoor’

Akhilesh Pillalamarri

India and Pakistan engaged in a military conflict between May 7-10 following a terrorist attack in the Indian union territory of Jammu and Kashmir on April 22, which killed 25 tourists and a local pony handler. India subsequently suspended the India-Pakistan Indus Waters Treaty, which governs the sharing of waters of the Indus River between the countries. It then launched strikes on Pakistan on May 7 in order to target terrorist infrastructure it believed was responsible for the April 22 Pahalgam attack.

While the precise nature of the link between the terrorist attack and the Pakistani state are not known, a report from the Brookings Institution states that “the Pakistani military has allowed a welter of militant and terrorist groups to operate largely unimpeded on its soil…the patterns of state cooperation with these groups are strikingly visible, but the details of any single operational partnership are often difficult to trace.”

After four days of fighting, India and Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire — which the United States claimed to have brokered — on May 10. Much ink has been spilled about what the conflict reveals about India’s and Pakistan’s military capabilities, though much of what happened is still opaque, clouded by the fog of war, or misinformation and disinformation.

What is known is that India demonstrated clear, but not overwhelming, military superiority over Pakistan, as would be expected on the basis of its size, military spending, and economy. In particular, India demonstrated it had the technological capability to strike targets all over Pakistan with precision and to defeat Pakistani missiles and drones.

On the other hand, Pakistan performed better than expected, particularly on the diplomatic and military fronts: it shot down several Indian aircraft, while preventing any country from taking India’s line in condemning it. Even countries that India has cultivated close ties with, such as the United States and Japan, took balanced stances. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump equated India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, despite the long, warm relationship between Modi and Trump.

Crisis Without Closure: India-Pakistan Confrontation in an Era of Fragile Deterrence

Mohmad Waseem Malla

Before the announcement of a “ceasefire” by U.S. President Donald Trump on May 10, the likelihood of India and Pakistan entering extended kinetic military activity, and potentially a conventional full-scale war, appeared more real than it has been at any time in recent years. The prelude to the ceasefire saw a marked military escalation that triggered a troubling erosion in the deterrence architecture that has governed India-Pakistan military behavior for decades, especially since their 1998 nuclear tests. However, with fighting now suspended, at least for the time being, the dust has settled on a notable moment of calibrated brinkmanship by both nations.

Following India’s “precision” strikes on the night of May 6-7 under Operation Sindoor – which targeted at least nine sites that India claimed to be militant logistical hubs in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir – Pakistan’s military establishment, widely regarded as the de facto authority on national security and regional policy, came under institutional and public pressure to respond. The retaliation came on May 10 under Operation Bunyan-un-Marsoos, with Islamabad claiming targeted strikes on several Indian military installations, some of which were later acknowledged by New Delhi.

In the ensuing tit-for-tat escalation, India launched a second wave of strikes, initially claiming to have hit three Pakistani Air Force (PAF) bases: Nur Khan (Chaklala) near Rawalpindi, Murid (Chakwal), and Rafiqui (Shorkot, in Jhang district). Subsequently, the Indian government raised its claims of targeted PAF sites to eight, in addition to other military assets.

Now that the hostilities have stopped and the mutual “understanding” to halt the violence appears to be holding, it has raised some pertinent questions. One such question concerns the evolving military doctrines of both India and Pakistan and what this recent conflagration means for the two sides. While a broader conflict was averted, the May 6-10 engagements suggest an intensifying contest not just on the battlefield, but in the realm of military signaling and strategic posturing between these nuclear-armed countries. While New Delhi’s actions reflect an apparent shift toward establishing and enforcing an “escalation dominance” framework as a normative to dictate the tempo and terms of engagement, Islamabad’s response appeared seemingly calibrated to reassert the pre-crisis status quo.

India’s War Against Maoist Rebels Reaches Decisive Point

Snigdhendu Bhattacharya

Gyanendra Pratap Singh, director general of the Central Reserve Police Force, and Arun Dev Gautam, director general of the Chhattisgarh Police, brief the media on the anti-Maoist “Operation Black Forest” in Chhattisgarh, May 14, 2025.Credit: Facebook/Central Reserve Police Force

Over May 17 and 18, hundreds of Indian security forces began encircling Gundekot village in the hilly and densely forested Abujmarh region of central India’s Chhattisgarh state. A group of 35 Maoist guerillas, including the top leader of India’s largest outlawed organization, was camping there. Security forces were accompanied by some of the rebels who had surrendered in recent weeks and had knowledge of the difficult terrain.

Gun fights started from the morning of May 19. The guerillas tried to break the encirclement throughout May 20. But the number of security forces only increased. While the guerrillas started running out of resources, Indian Air Force choppers kept the security forces supplied with food and other resources.

One team of seven guerrillas managed to break the security encirclement and escaped. But heavy shelling pinned down the rest. By the morning of May 21, all of the remaining fighters were killed.

The same day, Indian security forces announced that among the dead was Nambala Keshava Rao, alias Basavaraj, on whose head India’s premier anti-terror body, the National Investigation Agency, had announced its highest cash reward.

Hegseth warns Asia allies that China threat is ‘imminent’

Paul McLeary

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth delivered a stark warning to Asian allies on Saturday, portraying the threat China poses to the region as “real, and it could be imminent.”

In his first speech to the annual Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Hegseth was blunt about Washington’s view of the Chinese military buildup in the region and the threat it poses to Taiwan, calling on allies to spend more on defense while pledging continued American partnership and support.

“There’s no reason to sugarcoat it. The threat China poses is real, and it could be imminent,” Hegseth said. Any Chinese military move on Taiwan “would result in devastating consequences for the Indo-Pacific and the world,” he added.

The secretary’s comments were delivered in front of a packed room of Asian diplomats, military officials and business leaders, who heard the most fulsome comments on the threat of China delivered by any member of the Trump administration to date. It comes after President Donald Trump delivered a speech in Saudi Arabia this month outlining his vision of a reduced American military footprint around the world, while pushing allies to invest more heavily in their own security.

Disasters, Conflict, and Myanmar’s Uncertain Future

Shelli Israelsen, Andrea Malji

A powerful earthquake struck central Myanmar on March 28, 2025, leaving thousands dead and tens of thousands more displaced—but the most profound impact from this disaster may be on the country’s already fragile political future. In a nation already torn by civil war, the disaster has become a new front in the junta’s attempt to maintain control.

Despite a temporary ceasefire declared by opposition forces, the military delayed its own response and resumed airstrikes within hours of the quake. Aid convoys have been attacked, medicine blocked, and supplies confiscated—mirroring the junta’s obstruction during Cyclone Nargis (2008) and Cyclone Mocha (2023). But unlike in 2008, the regime is more isolated and militarily weakened.

A highly coordinated resistance now controls more than 40% of Myanmar’s territory, as morale within the Tatmadaw weakens amid a growing number of defections and forced conscriptions. Internationally, China is engaging with both the junta leadership and the opposition. Meanwhile, several ASEAN neighbors are growing increasingly frustrated with the military’s failure to honor basic peace commitments. General Min Aung Hlaing’s recent rare appearance at the BIMSTEC summit reflects a bid to revive the regime’s legitimacy through disaster diplomacy. However, with shifting power dynamics and mounting global scrutiny, the junta’s old playbook may no longer be effective. In fact, we argue that it is more likely that this earthquake may lead to a further unraveling of the military’s decades-long rule over Myanmar.

This piece draws on exclusive sources and historical comparisons to examine whether the earthquake will entrench authoritarian rule — or hasten its collapse. As Myanmar approaches pivotal elections in December 2025, the regime’s response to this crisis could prove decisive. At stake is not just recovery from a natural disaster, but the possibility of a political turning point in one of the world’s most protracted conflicts.

Dien Bien Phu: Underdog’s Triumph Over An Empire — Lessons And Encounters With General Giáp And Colonel Việt, the Strategic Minds Behind Victory – OpEd

Felix Abt

Between March and May 1954, one of the most decisive battles of the 20th century unfolded in the rugged valley of Điện Biên Phủ in northern Vietnam.

This confrontation not only marked the collapse of French colonial rule in Southeast Asia but also cemented Vietnam’s legacy of resilience and strategic brilliance. Điện Biên Phủ was far more than a clash of armies—it was a masterclass in ingenuity, determination, and the changing global order.

The Illusion of an Impenetrable Fortress

Nestled in a remote valley and encircled by steep, forested hills, the French military believed Điện Biên Phủ to be unassailable. Confident in their air superiority and fortified positions, they aimed to lure the Viet Minh into open combat and overwhelm them with superior firepower. This overconfidence, however, would prove to be their undoing.

Turning Terrain into a Weapon

While the French relied on static defense, the Viet Minh transformed the surrounding landscape into a strategic asset. An intricate network of trenches, tunnels, and hidden pathways allowed them to maneuver undetected and launch persistent surprise attacks. What initially appeared to be an isolated, well-secured valley fortress soon turned into a trap.

Perhaps the most astonishing achievement of the Viet Minh was transporting heavy artillery through unforgiving terrain. Thousands of soldiers and porters—including many from ethnic minorities—hauled dismantled 75mm and 105mm howitzers up jungle-covered slopes, avoiding exposed roads. These individual components, often weighing 50–100 kg, were moved with ropes, pulleys, and wooden sleds, then reassembled in camouflaged bunkers to deliver devastating precision strikes from elevated positions.

Beijing’s Political Machine Makes Inroads in New York Politics

Audrye Wong and Francis de Beixedon

The united front operates abroad as a political machine, helping to get people elected by fielding candidates, mobilizing votes, and building power bases.

Asian-Americans are growing in numbers yet remain key swing voters. Beijing’s role in shaping the political leanings of this demographic could have an enduring impact on who the United States’s leaders are.

In New York City, individuals and networks connected to the Party’s united front system have helped elect at least three local politicians in the last three years.

John Chan, a power broker whose networks span U.S. and Chinese officials, supported a 2022 proposal that would have created New York City’s first majority-Asian district, opposing established Asian-American community groups in the process. This likely would have given united front-linked groups a more dependable way to select and back elected representatives.

In April, the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) newly-appointed Deputy Consul General in New York met with overseas Chinese community leaders from across the city (World Journal, April 28). The meeting was hosted by BRACE (Asian-American Community Empowerment; 美国亚裔社团联合总会), a grassroots organization founded by John Chan, a prominent power broker with extensive connections to the PRC government (Washington Post, September 3, 2024; The New York Times [NYT], December 9, 2024). The Deputy Consul General praised BRACE for providing community services and safeguarding the rights and interests of overseas Chinese, while Chan thanked the consulate for its continuing support.

Just one month earlier, Chan’s close connections were on display once more—this time with New York politicians. Chan successfully persuaded two representatives to petition the U.S. Consulate in Guangzhou to revisit a previously rejected visa application, in order to facilitate a crucial medical procedure for a local resident he met through BRACE (Huaren Toutiao, April 23). Chan’s position as a power broker, with his close ties with U.S. and PRC officials, as well as to a network of local community organizations, is illustrative of a key strategy underpinning Beijing’s influence efforts: cultivating individuals with links to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at the core of ethnic Chinese communities with a view to building up a political influence machine over the long term.

On Iran, Don’t Let A Perfect Deal Stop A Good One

Ariel E. Levite

For the United States, Iran, and Israel a negotiated deal is a far better outcome than preventive war or nuclear proliferation.

Several short rounds of US-Iran nuclear negotiations have sufficed to demonstrate that a great deal is not in the cards, certainly not soon. But not all is lost if we consider a creative way to bridge the gap between the negotiating goals all key parties have set for themselves.

President Trump aims for a perfect agreement in which Iran’s nuclear weapons program is fully dismantled—an achievement that eluded President Barack Obama. Such a deal would ensue now only because Trump dared to apply maximum pressure on the Ayatollahs, threatening them with a military attack while also extending them a generous diplomatic hand.

He aims for an accord that would win him a Nobel Peace Prize for averting war and burnish his credentials as the master negotiator and peacemaker. Operationally, he seeks an accord that the Europeans could not claim credit for, one that Congressional hawks would endorse and even Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would not dare undermine.

The Iranians, on the other hand, harbor serious misgivings about the United States in general and President Trump in particular as a negotiating partner. Yet, they are now weak militarily, feeble economically, and bereft of their traditional proxies like Hezbollah that would have dissuaded and retaliated against US-Israeli military action.

Accordingly, Iran’s leadership has grudgingly agreed to “indirect negotiations” in order to end the stifling sanctions. Above all, they fear an economic meltdown, an uprising, a war, or normalization with the West that could spell the end of the Islamic regime. Toward these ends, they are determined to preserve Iran’s nuclear option and power projection capabilities like ballistic missiles and regional proxies.

Dispersed, Disguised, and Degradable

The Implications of the Fighting in Ukraine for Future U.S.-Involved Conflicts

Wars between states—particularly protracted, high-intensity conflicts (such as the Russia-Ukraine war), which involve the commitment of significant resources—have the capacity to reshape how states fight by providing both the opportunity and the pressure to use and adapt novel capabilities. In this report, the authors closely examine the tactical and operational levels of the fighting in Ukraine to make eight novel or notable observations about contemporary warfighting. These observations include insights about the use of uncrewed aerial and naval systems in combat, the transparent battlefield and the problem of persistent surveillance, the effectiveness of air defenses and electronic warfare against uncrewed systems, the need for low-cost expendable systems in a protracted conflict, the accessibility of commercial space-based assets for military purposes.

The authors also use these observations to forecast the character of future wars by evaluating whether and how their observations might translate to two potential U.S.-involved conflict scenarios: a war in Eastern Europe between North Atlantic Treaty Organization members and Russia and a war in the Indo-Pacific between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. The authors conclude by highlighting the implications of their observations and providing recommendations for the Department of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, and U.S. government policymakers.

British Military Invests £1B in AI To Combat Cyber Warfare

With modern wars no longer fought only on battlefields, the UK has just announced a £1 billion investment in AI, designed to supercharge their ability to engage in digital combat.

The announcement by the UK Ministry of Defence marks a new era for UK cybersecurity and will include a Digital Targeting Web and a newly established Cyber and Electromagnetic Command to help the Armed Forces combat cyber treats faster (and better!) than ever before.

Defence Secretary John Healey MP commented that “The keyboard is now a weapon of war…We are under daily attack, and this new command will allow us to defend and strike back more effectively.”

What Is the Digital Targeting Web?

A big part of the new defence plan is a system called the Digital Targeting Web. This will be designed to better connect all of the UK’s military tools, like satellites, aircraft and drones.

Through this, threats will be able to be detected faster, allowing soldiers, cyber units or fighter units to respond quicker.

For example, if a threat is spotted by a satellite, the Digital Targeting Web can instantly alert a cyber or nearby naval, aircraft or fighter team, allowing them to stop it faster than before.

The system has been developed in response to lessons from the Ukraine War, where soldiers are already using tech and AI to identify and hit Russian targets faster.

The Ministry of Defence says this new system will be fully operational by 2027.

“We will give our Armed Forces the ability to act at speeds never seen before,” said John Healey, “connecting ships, aircraft, tanks and operators so they can share vital information instantly and strike further and faster.”

What About The Cyber and Electromagnetic Command?

Running alongside the Digital Targeting Web is the new Cyber and Electromagnetic Command, led by General Sir James Hockenhull.

The unit will act as a troop of cyber-soldiers, focusing specifically on defensive and offensive cyber operations, working alongside the current National Cyber Force (NCF).

The Ministry of Defence commented that this unit would be in charge of electromagnetic warfare, with the ability to jam drones and missiles, intercept communications and attack enemy control systems from afar.

Why Now?

Modern wars are no longer only fought on the battlefield. In fact, the UK’s military has been hit with more than 90,000 cyber attacks in the past 2 years, mostly from countries like Russia and China.

These attacks have not only tried to affect larger military systems, but also smaller devices with malware.

In recent months, UK businesses like M&S, Harrods and Co-op have all announced their own cyberattacks, putting civilian data at risk. With crime online on the rise and both countries and businesses at risk, deploying this new unit is surely a step in the right direction.

Experts Who Warn of Risks Posed by Chinese Students Are Skeptical of Trump Plan

Devlin Barrett

The F.B.I. has spent decades investigating some professors and students from China suspected of using their studies to secretly spy for their home country. As the Trump administration tries a new, more aggressive effort to stop such activity, experts fear it will do more harm than good for American research.

The plans the State Department announced this past week to revoke visas of some Chinese college students strike even some former spy-hunters as a heavy-handed attempt to solve a more complicated problem.

“The overall number of People’s Republic of China students that actually pose some type of national security risk is relatively low compared to the number of students that will continue to support and further U.S. research,” said Greg Milonovich, a former F.B.I. agent who managed the counterintelligence division’s academic alliance program as well as the national security higher education advisory board.

In announcing the move late Wednesday, Secretary of State Marco Rubio gave few specifics, offering only that the U.S. government would “aggressively revoke visas for Chinese students, including those with connections to the Chinese Communist Party or studying in critical fields.”

How that vaguely defined standard will be enforced is not yet clear, but the directive is part of a broad campaign by the Trump administration to force major changes in American higher education. College campuses, administration officials say, are in crisis, and only the federal government is willing and able to fix the problems.

Why DOGE Faile

Joe Nocera

After serving as John F. Kennedy’s West Virginia campaign manager, he arrived in Washington to join a brand-new agency, the Peace Corps, where he was handed one of the most unusual positions ever in the federal government. His title was “director of evaluation,” and his job was to travel to Peace Corps locations, spend enough time there to get a read on what was working and what wasn’t, and then report back to the agency’s director, Sargent Shriver. Charlie’s tough-minded reports didn’t exactly endear him to his fellow Peace Corps officials, but it gave Charlie insight into how bureaucracies worked—or more precisely, how they didn’t work.

I often thought of Charlie—my first boss in journalism—and his expertise in government bloat in the months since the inauguration, as I watched Elon Musk and his merry band of DOGE minions try—and fail—to get their arms around the federal leviathan. Now Musk has returned to Tesla while complaining that Trump’s “big, beautiful bill” undermined DOGE’s work. Like Trump, he’s not one to admit failure, but the rest of us can see that he failed.

Is DOGE Dead?

Gabe Kaminsky

Elon Musk was back at SpaceX this week, planning to update the world about the company’s plans “to make life multiplanetary” right after launching the latest test flight of its Starship rocket. The update was canceled after the rocket spun out of control, but at least it didn’t explode after liftoff like SpaceX’s last two flights. Notwithstanding the two failed launches, Musk is back to doing what he does best.

But now that the world’s richest man has returned to a mission he had long before Donald Trump tapped him to lead DOGE, what will become of the bureaucracy-hunting, cost-cutting attack dog that Musk unleashed on the federal government?

Musk, who said this week he is back to “spending 24/7 at work” for X, xAI, Tesla, and SpaceX and “sleeping in conference/server/factory rooms,” might find more success in his quest to reach Mars than he did as the leader of DOGE. His exit followed a chaotic five months that spurred a conveyor belt of legal challenges and resistance from top Trump officials, as well as pushback from Republicans to what looked like DOGE’s inflated estimates of how much in federal spending it helped cut. DOGE’s website puts the total at $175 billion, but outside budget experts and some conservative critics have said the actual savings are much smaller due to DOGE overcounting grants and contracts awarded by the government.

“Musk made himself a total pariah,” Steve Bannon, the former chief strategist in Trump’s first White House, told The Free Press. “He had access, admiration, unlimited resources—and by his own actions toward people, blew it all.”

On Wednesday night, Musk thanked the president in a post on X and wrote that DOGE’s mission “will only strengthen over time as it becomes a way of life throughout the government.”

While Musk is gone, he is leaving behind dozens of DOGE staffers that he helped install at federal agencies across the bureaucracy to cut the waste, fraud, and abuse that Musk said was rampant. They have backgrounds in software engineering, human resources, law, finance, and real estate. Many are young and had no prior government experience.

Trump Is Destroying America’s Technological Lead

CARL BENEDIKT FREY

Liberal democracies like the United States are not guaranteed continuous technological progress. Innovation depends on openness, impartial rules, and vigorous competition, but the new administration is systematically dismantling these pillars of American economic and technological dominance.

OXFORD – From Sputnik in the 1950s to Japan’s electronics boom in the 1980s, Americans have repeatedly feared losing their technological edge to foreign rivals. Each time, though, the United States responded by doubling down on its strengths – attracting global talent, investing in cutting-edge research, enforcing competition (antitrust) law – and ultimately emerged stronger. Today, however, the gravest threat to America’s tech leadership isn’t another Sputnik or Sony; it’s the internal erosion of core advantages. President Donald Trump’s policies almost seem designed to dismantle the very pillars of US innovation.

Trump Wants Big Tech to Own the Dollar

YANIS VAROUFAKIS

ATHENS – The Spring Meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are usually placid, forgettable affairs. Not this year. Several central bankers returned home with a visceral sense of dread. The reason? The specter of the GENIUS Act – the stablecoin bill barreling toward passage by the US Congress hot on the heels of President Donald Trump’s March 6 executive order establishing a strategic cryptocurrency reserve.

Central bankers have hitherto seen cryptocurrencies as a nuisance that, thankfully, lacked the capacity to cause serious ruptures in the monetary systems under their care. But now they think that Trump’s team are counting on cryptocurrencies pegged to the dollar as part of their strategy to rejig the global monetary system (and make the boss and his family a fortune in the process).

What unsettled central bankers this spring was the policy’s implications: a deliberate, chaotic unraveling of the twentieth century’s monetary order, under which central banks reigned as the sole architects of money. While the GENIUS Act allows private stablecoins, another bill would bar the US Federal Reserve from issuing a central bank digital currency (CBDC), thereby anointing corporate-issued tokens as the new guardians of dollar hegemony.

This isn’t innovation; it’s a hostile takeover of the money supply. Lacking anything resembling serious regulation, stablecoins are neither stable nor merely an alternative dollar payment option. They are a Trojan horse for the privatization of money.

The European Central Bank sees the danger. If securities migrate to the blockchain, with bonds, stocks, and derivatives becoming tokenized, then settlement must follow. The ECB’s solution is a tokenized euro, ensuring public money remains the bedrock of finance. So far, the ECB has faced resistance to this plan from German and French private banks. Now, the ECB has another, bigger headache: the United States is racing in the opposite direction. By banning CBDCs and green-lighting stablecoins, Trump’s team are not just rejecting public digital money; they are outsourcing dollar supremacy to the darkest forces within Big Tech.

The US Army Doesn’t Really Need a New Abrams Tank

Brandon J. Weichert

No matter how awesome the AbramsX will be, it will likely never be worth the cost in the age of advanced drone warfare and anti-tank weapons.

The United States Army is quite proud of itself as it shows off its designs for a new version of its iconic M1A2 Abrams Main Battle Tank (MBT). To be clear, the Abrams MBT is the Army’s greatest tank ever conceived. The tank single-handedly defeated Saddam Hussein’s Soviet-armed army during the ground campaign of the 1991 Gulf War.

Yet, those days are over—and the Ukraine War shows how muddled the record of MBTs are in the age of drones. So why is th Pentagon blowing through so much of its massive budget to build systems that, no matter how advanced, will not perform as well as their designers claim?

The History and Specs of the “AbramsX” Tank

General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) unveiled the so-called “AbramsX” at the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) conference in 2022. Designed to address the limitations of the current M1A2 Abrams while incorporating cutting-edge technologies, AbramsX aims to ensure American armored dominance well into the 2050s. But it is extremely dubious that the hype surrounding the AbramsX will result in a tank that can stand up to the AI-driven drones and hypersonic weapons of the future battlefield.

Originally, the Army had intended to simply make another upgraded variant of the original Abrams. But the Pentagon chose to cancel the proposed M1A2 SEPv4 in favor of the more ambitious M1E3 Abrams, the precursor to the AbramsX.

Preserving the U.S. Technological Republi

John West

Alexander Karp and Nicholas Zamiska make a strong case for strengthening the United States’ standing in the tech world. In their recent book—The Technological Republic: Hard Power, Soft Belief, and the Future of the West—they argue that:

The United States since its founding has always been a technological republic, one whose place in the world has been made possible and advanced by its capacity for innovation. But our present advantage cannot be taken for granted.

Both authors are executives at Palantir Technologies, a prominent US-based software and artificial intelligence company. Karp is chief executive and co-founder (entrepreneur Peter Thiel is the other co-founder), while Zamiska is head of corporate affairs and legal counsel to the CEO.

Karp and Zamiska are committed to defending the West and see this defence as a key mission of Palantir. They also believe that the new era of advanced AI provides geopolitical adversaries with a great opportunity to challenge the US global standing.

A key argument of the book is that ‘Silicon Valley has lost its way’. The initial growth of Silicon Valley—a region in California associated with technological development—came from Pentagon funding during the 1950s and 1960s. The subsequent boost to technological innovation strengthened US security during the Cold War.

Today, the sector should be refocusing its efforts on helping the US retain its global edge in the technological arms race with China. Instead, it is fixating on the consumer market, prioritising projects such as video-sharing apps, social media platforms, advertising algorithms and online shopping websites.

Leadership at the Tip of the Spear

Jameson “J.R.” Johnson

This year, I had the privilege of attending Special Operations Forces (SOF) Week in Tampa, Florida—a convergence of the global special operations community that evolved from a showcase of cutting-edge technology into a reaffirmation of what makes SOF truly exceptional: its people.

I was reminded that the true strength of the SOF community lies not in technology, but in leadership. Representatives from United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) stood alongside elite counterparts from Europe, the Pacific, Latin America, East Asia, and Africa. The impressive displays of technology were only part of the story. The deeper narrative was about leadership—authentic, grounded, and visionary leadership that remains the bedrock of special operations success.

With over four decades of experience inside and around the Department of Defense, I’ve worked with extraordinary leaders. Yet what I encountered at SOF Week 2025 was exceptional. I spoke with individuals ranging from battalion commanders to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the USSOCOM Commander, and other key leaders.

These were not figureheads. They were humble, mission-focused leaders with an unwavering commitment to their people. Whether in formal discussions or chance hallway conversations, I encountered consistent depth of experience, integrity, and care for the force. Leadership, I realized, remains the decisive advantage in special operations.

The Human Factor

This people-first ethos is embedded in SOF culture. SOF culture has long recognized that technology can enable, but never replace, human judgment and resilience. At SOF Week, this ethos was unmistakable. Leadership excellence was not the exception; it was the standard.

The U.S. special operations community is undergoing a generational shift, guided by leaders who are both guardians of tradition and pioneers of future capabilities. Their professionalism and shared sense of purpose left me encouraged about the direction and future of the enterprise.

Israel's dilemma: How to end a war with a jihadist death cult? - opinion

How do you permanently end a war with a Jihadist death cult deeply embedded in a population of 2.2 million people, dedicated to your annihilation, which openly proclaims its objectives?

A death cult that, having committed barbaric atrocities over 19 months ago, followed by indiscriminately targeting your entire population with many thousands of missiles, promises, when given the opportunity, to replicate both?

A death cult willing to enter into a cease-fire as a temporary pause but intent on retaining its munitions and renewing its war when its military capabilities are fully restored. That is Israel’s dilemma.

For Hamas and its Iranian sponsors, no sacrifice is too great. They are the vultures of humanity, political scavengers dedicated to maximising Palestinian civilian casualties to generate political support from the well-intended, politically naive, and ideological and political opportunists.

They have also learnt, like the conductor of an orchestra, how to play on the heart strings of international political leaders to recruit them as unconscious allies in their war to demonise and delegitimise Israel and undermine its capacity to win the war Hamas initiated and continues to fight.

Like the carnivorous Venus Flytrap of botanical fame, Hamas essentially embraces, entraps, and digests the Palestinians it purports to represent and then spits out their names, exploiting their deceased martyrdom to demonise its adversaries and justify its atrocities. The demonisation is then inflated by international organisations, which choose to adopt the Hamas-created narrative.

Hamas’s success in persuading many throughout the world that this is Israel’s, not Hamas’s, war is facilitated by not just Israel’s malign adversaries but also by some of its supposed friends and allies who ignore Hamas’s readily observable conduct and strategy intended to maximise and also exaggerate Palestinian casualties.

Time is not on Russia’s side in Ukraine

Alexander J. Motyl

Who is winning, Ukraine or Russia? And whose prospects are better in the long run?

In other words, whose side is time on?

The Quincy Institute’s Anatol Lieven states matter-of-factly that, “as everyone now seems to agree, time is on Russia’s side.”

But is it? At one time, everyone also agreed that the Ukraine War would be over in a few weeks — an alert to the perils of groupthink. And now, as then, the reality is rather more complicated.

As with everything, there are two opposing schools of thought: the optimists who think Ukraine will prevail and the pessimists who bet on Russia.

The bottom-line pessimist case is based on numbers. Russia’s population, economy and military-industrial complex are much bigger than Ukraine’s. The numbers will therefore decide ultimate outcomes, even though Russian battlefield losses are exceptionally high and its economy has been battered by sanctions and Vladimir Putin’s anti-consumerist economic policies.

Expert analysts Collin Meisel and Mathew Burrows explicitly adopt this approach in a piece titled, “Russia Can Afford to Take a Beating in Ukraine.”

Russia's Summer Offensive Campaigns in Ukraine

Mick Ryan

Apparently Ukraine and Russia will meet in Istanbul next Monday for another round of peace talks, but only if the Kremlin produces its promised memorandum of terms for an agreement. We should not hold high hopes for anything of substance to emerge from the meeting however. For Putin, this is just a smoke screen to allow him the opportunity to undertake another series of major military campaigns in Ukraine during the summer and autumn months.

In my latest weekly update, I examined the potential for the Russians to undertake an offensive in northeastern Ukraine in this northern summer. But it is also important to examine this topic in the context of the wider ground offensive that is already underway, the broader Russian campaigns that will take place over the northern summer, as well as Putin’s political objectives for the coming months.

Over the past few weeks, I have been examining some of the key elements of the ongoing Russian offensive in the east and north east of Ukraine. You can read some of these here, here and here. These provide a useful foundation for this article.

This article examines the evolution of the political environment surrounding the war since January this year, and how (if at all) this has impacted on Putin’s political aims for his war. I will then explore the various Russian campaigns that will be executed in the following months in the hope of achieving Putin’s goals, and what this might mean for the overall direction of the war.

Putin’s Calculus and the Political Environment

Putin has, so far, successfully strung the American president along without any negative impacts. While Trump has acknowledged this might be the case on a couple of occasions, including his comments in Washington DC in the past 48 hours (read the full report on this here), he is yet to actually take any action against Russia. Indeed, in the wake of his last phone call with Putin, which I examined in this article, Trump appeared to give up on trying to negotiate peace in Ukraine and accepted that Putin did not want the war to end.

More Missile Drama: What to Make of the Latest German-Ukrainian Long-Range Strike Deal?

Fabian Hoffmann

On 28 May, during President Zelensky’s visit to Berlin, German Chancellor Merz announced that Germany would finance the production of “long-range weapons” manufactured inside Ukraine.

Later that day, the German and Ukrainian Defense Ministers signed a memorandum of understanding to formalize the agreement. A press release from the German Ministry of Defense states:

The defense ministers of Germany and Ukraine have signed a declaration providing for the financing of long-range weapons production in Ukraine. This marks a step toward Germany’s plan to increase direct investment in Ukrainian defense manufacturing. A significant number of these weapons are expected to be produced within this year. The first systems can be deployed by the Ukrainian armed forces within weeks. As they are already in use, no additional training will be required.

This episode is the latest in what seems to be a never ending dispute over the delivery of German long-range strike weapons to Ukraine. This post explores the potential implications of the deal and the possible next steps.

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What will be financed?

Ukraine currently produces a wide range of long-range strike systems, including various types of long-range drones and cruise missiles. It is also developing short- and potentially medium-range ballistic missiles, though these are not yet known to have entered serial production.

You Need Allies to Win a Trade War

Ricardo Hausmann

The founder and director of Harvard University’s Growth Lab, and Eric Protzer, a senior research fellow at Harvard University’s Growth Lab.U.S. President Donald Trump holds up a chart showing foreign tariff rates, later shown to be false, and new U.S. rates during an event in the Rose Garden at the White House in Washington on April 2.U.S. President Donald Trump holds up a chart showing foreign tariff rates, later shown to be false, and new U.S. rates during an event in the Rose Garden at the White House in Washington on April 2.

Financial markets and U.S. businesses relying on imports have forced U.S. President Donald Trump to significantly climb down from his recent tariff broadside against most of the world but especially Western allies and China. However, he could have extracted more concessions from Beijing if he had pursued a strategy of all against one, rather than one against all.

The United States may account for more than half of global stock market capitalization and roughly a quarter of world GDP, but it only produces 9 percent of global good exports and takes in 14 percent of global goods imports. No single country—not even the United States—is a unipolar superpower when it comes to trade in goods, which is where Trump wants to fight his war. A coalition of countries could have more seriously challenged China, but collective action now looks impossible, given the extent to which Trump has alienated Washington’s traditional allies.

Tip of the Spear, Edge of the Mind: Neurotechnology’s Roles in the Future of Special Operations

Anna M. Gielas, PhD

DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in this work are entirely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, United States Special Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations University.

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Rapid advancements in neurotechnology, including brain- computer interfaces, could revolutionize cognitive and physical enhancements for Special Operations Forces. These technologies aim to amplify operator strengths, enhance mission capabilities, and redefine the future of warfare through precise, adaptive, and deniable operations. Source: Author- supplied Canva stock image

Rapid technological advancements are revolutionizing human augmentation, making cognitive and physical enhancements for military personnel not only feasible but also a priority for global superpowers such as the United States and China. As technology advances and global competition intensifies, military scholars explore ways to enhance U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) through emerging technologies such as brain-computer interfaces (BCIs). However, current debates on cognitive and physical enhancement tend to focus on mitigating perceived operator limitations, rather than exploring the full potential of both the human and the technologies.

Instead of merely compensating for weaknesses, enhancement technologies should be leveraged to amplify operator strengths. BCI technologies offer the potential to harness operators’ inherent resources, such as tacit knowledge, and unlock latent human capabilities while reinforcing the SOF ethos that humans are more important than hardware. Additionally, to fully realize the technological potential, it is important to distinguish between enhancing the operator and augmenting the mission —two closely interrelated yet distinct goals that demand tailored strategies. This dual focus is explored through a series of practical examples, illustrating the transformative and nuanced applications of emerging BCI technologies. Ultimately, these capabilities could enable more precise, adaptive, and deniable special operations within the evolving context of strategic competition and integrated deterrence.

The Algocracy Agenda: How AI And The Deep State Are Digitizing Tyranny – OpEd

John and Nisha Whitehead

The Deep State is not going away. It’s just being replaced.

Replaced not by a charismatic autocrat or even a shadowy bureaucracy, but by artificial intelligence (AI)—unfeeling, unaccountable, and immortal.

As we stand on the brink of a new technological order, the machinery of power is quietly shifting into the hands of algorithms.

Under Donald Trump’s watch, that shift is being locked in for at least a generation.

Trump’s latest legislative initiative—a 10-year ban on AI regulation buried within the “One Big Beautiful Bill”—strips state and local governments of the ability to impose any guardrails on artificial intelligence until 2035.

Despite bipartisan warnings from 40 state attorneys general, the bill passed the House and awaits Senate approval. It is nothing less than a federal green light for AI to operate without oversight in every sphere of life, from law enforcement and employment to healthcare, education, and digital surveillance.

This is not innovation.

This is institutionalized automation of tyranny.

This is how, within a state of algorithmic governance, code quickly replaces constitutional law as the mechanism for control.

We are rapidly moving from a society ruled by laws and due process to one ruled by software.

Free Market Involvement in AI Is the Key to the US Military’s Future Success

Pat Fallon

US military success depends on tapping free market innovation to rapidly develop AI systems and outpace emerging threats.

Houthi Attacks Expose a Costly Gap

For the better part of two years, Houthi drone and missile attacks threatened commercial shipping and US naval assets in the Red Sea. And while Houthi attacks on US assets have subsided for the time being, US Central Command has raised the alarm that the current status quo in terms of recognizing and deterring these threats is unsustainable in the long term.

Not only is it not fiscally possible to continue to spend millions of taxpayer dollars on expensive countermunitions to take down cheap, mass-produced Houthi drones and missiles, but the US military currently lacks a means to develop the AI software needed to quickly locate and counter these attacks.

Funding Delays Hinder AI Progress

As part of its acquisitions process, the Department of Defense needs a way to be able to access different “colors” of money—the varied forms of funding, including research and development, procurement, operations and maintenance, and BA-8—at the speed of relevancy. The DOD needs to be able to quickly access each of the colors to use for AI development when and where it is needed most.

To develop critical AI architecture, we first need access to high-quality data and the software applications to process it. Unlocking varied forms of funding would accelerate private sector development of these essential tools.

The Free Market Can Move Faster

Should You Take a Vitamin D Supplement?

Erica Sweeney

Vitamin D does a lot for your body, supporting strong bones, muscle movement, your immune system, and more. Taking a vitamin D supplement may seem like a quick and easy way to boost these benefits—but doctors say there are a few things to know first.

“There’s no question that vitamin D is essential for good health,” says Dr. JoAnn Manson, chief of the division of preventive medicine at Brigham and Women’s Hospital who researches vitamin D supplementation. “The question is: Do we really need to take supplements?”

Vitamin D supplements are mostly recommended when you’re deficient. In the U.S., 35% of adults are vitamin D deficient, according to the National Library of Medicine. People who are obese, over 65, or have darker skin may be more at risk for deficiency—and about 50% to 60% of nursing home residents and patients in hospitals are vitamin D deficient.

Here’s what experts say about taking vitamin D.

The many sources of vitamin D

Vitamin D is a “nutrient that the body can actually make itself” from sunlight exposure, says Dr. Clemens Bergwitz, associate professor of medicine specializing in endocrinology at the Yale School of Medicine.

“Everything in moderation,” though, especially with sun exposure, says Dr. Kseniya Kobets, director of cosmetic dermatology and assistant professor of dermatology at Montefiore Einstein. Too much ultraviolet radiation can cause skin cancer and speed up skin aging.

Make Them Fight! If You Want a More Lethal Military, Have Generals Compete in Wargames

Benjamin Jensen

The lights dim, and the screens flicker to life. Across the room, a dozen general officers lean over virtual terrain maps, eyes scanning for anticipated enemy movements tied to intelligence feeds as they look for candidates for possible pulse strikes. Each general is fighting another general, guided by only an AI staff assistant and a playbook with decision points and tailored options in lieu of a long operational plan. There is no staff circus churning out endless amounts of PowerPoint briefs. No legion of contractors running white cells and resurrecting their inner dungeon masters as they throw dice and debate overly complicated combat adjudication tables. It’s more Thunderdome than Title 10 and global games of old.

One general tries to pull the enemy out of position using deception. Another gambles on a high-risk, high-payoff multidomain deep strike against command-and-control nodes. There are no referees—just results. A publicly visible leaderboard ranks all officers in the room by their ability to synchronize effects and outfight a thinking opponent.

This isn’t science fiction. It’s what should happen when we talk about preparing our senior leaders for war. It describes a modern kriegsakademie built not on endless seminars, lectures, and games too big to fail, but actual competition. In this professional fight club commanders are forced to prove they can actually fight against someone trying to beat them.

While Washington is filled with calls to cut the number of generals and consolidate headquarters, these measures will prove insufficient to increasing lethality barring a deeper change to modern military culture. Cutting billets won’t make the joint force better at its core mission—fighting and winning wars—if the officers who remain don’t regularly compete, rehearse, and prove they can outthink and outfight a capable adversary. The core question we should be asking is simple: Do our senior leaders fight enough to understand advantage in modern war? Being the best marksman or top gun graduate when you’re young is no guarantee you have what it takes to fight large formations in multiple domains.

The sad truth is that senior officers spend more time navigating policy meetings than practicing the art and science of war. Without a culture of competition—of trial by simulated fire—we risk fielding a military led by assistant managers of violence rather than warfighters. Lethality isn’t a budget line or a briefing slide; it’s a habit built through pressure, repetition, and the humility of losing in a safe-to-fail environment.

5 ways the military industrial complex is a killer

William Hartung

Congress is on track to finish work on the fiscal year 2025 Pentagon budget this week, and odds are that it will add $150 billion to its funding for the next few years beyond what the department even asked for. Meanwhile, President Trump has announced a goal of over $1 trillion for the Pentagon for fiscal year 2026.

With these immense sums flying out the door, it’s a good time to take a critical look at the Pentagon budget, from the rationales given to justify near record levels of spending to the impact of that spending in the real world. Here are five things you should know about the Pentagon budget and the military-industrial complex that keeps the churn going.

#1 The military-industrial complex (the MIC) is a special interest lobby on steroids.

In many ways the denizens of the MIC — the Pentagon, the uniformed military, the weapons makers, and their allies in Congress — are more concerned with lining their own pockets and deriving political benefits than they are with crafting well-considered plans for how best to defend America and its allies.

Unfortunately, since Eisenhower warned us about the military-industrial complex in his January 17, 1961 farewell address, the military-industrial complex is more powerful than ever. The companies are larger, the budget is larger, and its influence is greater, so advocates of a more affordable, effective approach to defense have even a higher hill to climb than they did six decades ago.

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