A Time for Cool Heads and Firm Resolve

Irregular Warfare Initiative | Oleg Dunda

NATO summits in The Hague and Ankara have pushed European member states to increase defence spending targets to 3.5–5% of GDP, yet escalating financial commitments fail to address fundamental operational shortfalls. High defence budgets perpetuate outdated Cold War force structures rather than modern battlefield realities. Reliance on legacy platforms ignores recent combat dynamics demonstrated in Ukraine.

Ukraine maintains battlefield parity against Russia’s $190 billion defence budget while spending only $84.1 billion annually. Meanwhile, European NATO members expend $550 billion annually without achieving proportional technological adaptation across domain environments. Overreliance on nuclear umbrella coverage psychologically weakens possessors by starving conventional military development of funding. Strategic dominance across maritime, air, and space domains remains underutilised while adversaries deploy cheaper, highly asymmetric counter-capabilities. Spending levels do not guarantee combat capability. Alliance security requires shifting resources away from legacy capital assets toward agile research, rapid procurement, and unmanned technologies across all operational theaters.

Comment

European defence budgets suffer from a structural misallocation where high-capital procurement yields diminishing tactical utility against low-cost asymmetric threats. When NATO nations commit long-term capital to high-maintenance platforms like the Type 26 frigate or Eurofighter Typhoon, fixed sustainment costs absorb funding required for rapid technological iteration. High unit replacement costs force commanders to hoard assets rather than risk them in contested operational environments. In high-intensity combat, this cost asymmetry allows cheap uncrewed systems to impose unsustainable financial attrition on Western defense budgets.

This imbalance mirrors the Royal Navy's capital ship dilemma during the 1930s, when massive expenditure on King George V-class battleships diverted funds away from carrier aviation and coastal escorts. Heavy naval armor proved economically inefficient once inexpensive aerial torpedoes demonstrated the vulnerability of capital platforms in contested waters. Modern procurement programs like the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter risk a similar economic trap when confronted by rapidly iterated, low-cost attritable strike systems.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If low-cost attritable drones continue to invalidate high-value capital platforms, which side of the budget equation breaks down first for European allies—the operational viability of major systems like the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter or the fiscal capacity to absorb continuous attrition?

The available evidence points toward the operational viability of high-capital platforms breaking down long before fiscal reserves are exhausted. When multi-million-euro systems like the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter face constant attrition from low-cost uncrewed threats, military commanders naturally restrict asset deployment to avoid irreplaceable losses. This defensive risk aversion renders major procurement programs strategically inert during high-intensity conflict.

Share your assessment in the comments below.

Read the original article