Russia and the United States have fought non-nuclear adversaries without achieving decisive military victories, exposing a long-standing usability gap in modern warfare. Ukraine has resisted Russian forces since February 2022 using deep drone strikes and Western support, while Iran has rebuilt its uranium enrichment capacity after US and Israeli conventional campaigns.
These contemporary conflicts unfold as the international arms control architecture collapses, following the expiration of the last US-Russian strategic arms treaty in February 2026 and repeated failures within the NPT review conferences. Nuclear weapons remain active instruments of coercion directed primarily at nuclear-armed backers rather than direct warfighting tools. Doctrinal and normative constraints are eroding, leaving restraint dependent on military and strategic calculations. This reliance on rational deterrence remains vulnerable during crises where a nuclear power faces potential defeat, risking escalation.
Nuclear weapons remain fundamentally unsuited for tactical coercion against non-nuclear adversaries lacking vital territory of immediate existential value. The structural asymmetry between holding thousands of strategic warheads and achieving localized military objectives on the ground creates a persistent usability gap. During the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russian strategic signaling failed to deter Western conventional transfers or halt Ukrainian counter-offensives.
This limitation stems from the escalatory trap inherent in first-use doctrines against protected non-nuclear states. When conventional interventions stall, nuclear threats risk provoking direct escalation with peer competitors rather than compelling surrender from the target state.
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