Iran’s Maritime Threat And The Conflict In Yemen – Analysis

Eurasia Review | Can Kasapoğlu

Iranian security officials threatened to target Middle East undersea cables if US or Israeli military strikes against Tehran resume. The Red Sea maritime corridor carries approximately 90 percent of Europe–Asia internet capacity and 3 percent of global bandwidth demand. A previous February 2024 Houthi missile attack on the bulk carrier MV Rubymar caused a dragging anchor to sever three undersea cables.

To support seabed operations, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is developing underwater platforms including Nazir-series unmanned vehicles and Sabehat-15 swimmer delivery craft. Operational deployment remains unverified. Concurrently, the Guards conducted at least 23 maritime attacks near the Strait of Hormuz in October 2026, including five engine-room strikes disabling commercial tankers. United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations recorded 135 total incidents by 16 October 2026. Engine strikes disable ship propulsion. These persistent asymmetric attacks highlight growing Iranian capabilities to disrupt critical maritime transit while operating under technical constraints and unproven deployment capacities.

Comment

Iran's precision targeting of merchant ship engine rooms around the Strait of Hormuz marks a doctrinal shift toward operational disruption rather than catastrophic destruction. By pairing infrared-guided munitions like the Shahed-238 with commercial vessel heat profiles, the IRGC Navy substitutes mission-kill tactics for total hull loss. This approach minimizes immediate military escalation while generating severe economic attrition across the Bab al-Mandab and Hormuz chokepoints.

This operational logic mirrors Operation Praying Mantis in 1988, where naval engagements in the Persian Gulf were calibrated to inflict targeted functional paralysis rather than open fleet destruction. In both instances, sea denial relies on degrading critical maritime machinery to force systemic logistical friction across the Strait of Hormuz.

Strategic Question for Discussion

Which factor will prove more decisive in countering IRGC Navy engine-room strikes using platforms like the Shahed-238 — shipboard point-defence tactical adaptations by merchant vessels, or multi-national convoy escort operations through the Strait of Hormuz?

The available evidence points toward shipboard technical counter-measures having a more immediate effect on mitigating infrared-guided munitions than broad convoy escorts. While naval escorts cannot continuously screen every commercial transit across the Strait of Hormuz, integrating thermal signature suppression and localized electronic countermeasures onto tankers directly degrades the targeting seeker of the Shahed-238. However, long-term disruption will persist as long as shore-based launcher networks remain intact along the Iranian coastline.

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