Indian Air Force close to becoming a near-space power

Martand Jha

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As the nature of warfare evolves, so too must the capabilities of those entrusted with defending national sovereignty. For the Indian Air Force (IAF), this means looking beyond traditional airspace and venturing into the largely untapped domain of near space—a strategic zone stretching from 20 to 100 kilometers above the Earth’s surface.

This region, often referred to as the “ignored middle,” lies above the reach of conventional aircraft and below the orbits of satellites, offering a unique opportunity for extended surveillance, communication and defense applications.

In an era of multi-domain operations where seamless integration of land, air, sea, cyber and space is critical, near space is a vital enabler. With advances in high-altitude platforms, reusable vehicles and hypersonic technology, the IAF is beginning to establish its presence in this emerging domain.

Near space offers several strategic advantages. It allows for persistent surveillance over contested or remote regions, supports reliable communication links in difficult terrain and enables early detection of missile threats.

Unlike satellites, which follow predictable orbits and are vulnerable to anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, near-space platforms can be maneuvered, recovered and redeployed quickly and cost-effectively.

Moreover, the growing military applications of near space align with India’s broader security priorities, particularly with regard to monitoring China’s activities along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), protecting the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and countering the growing missile capabilities of neighboring countries.

Decoding India’s Outreach to the Taliban

Rushali Saha

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On May 15, India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar held a telephone conversation with the Taliban’s acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi, marking the first ministerial-level contact between India and the Taliban leadership since the latter came to power in August 2021.

In a post on X (formerly Twitter), Jaishankar appreciated the “good conversation” with Muttaqi and shared that both sides discussed “ways and means of taking cooperation forward.” According to the Taliban readout, the conversation focused on “strengthening bilateral relations, trade, and enhancing diplomatic relations.”

While the Taliban statement made no mention of the Pahalgam terror attack on April 22 or the recent India-Pakistan military clashes, in his post, Jaishankar appreciated the Taliban’s “condemnation of the Pahalgam terrorist attack.” In the immediate aftermath of the attack at Pahalgam, the Taliban condemned the killings and highlighted how such incidents “undermined efforts to ensure regional security and stability” — but fell short of describing it as an act of terrorism.

In a thinly veiled reference to Pakistan, Jaishankar further noted that New Delhi “welcomed his [Muttaqi’s] firm rejection of recent attempts to create distrust between India and Afghanistan through false and baseless reports.” Previously, Pakistani military spokesperson General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry alleged that during India’s Operation Sindoor, several Indian missiles had landed in Afghan territory, a claim that was swiftly dismissed by both New Delhi and the Afghan defense ministry.

Notably, on the same day, Muttaqi organized the fifth round of the China-Pakistan-Afghanistan trilateral talks in Kabul, which focused on closer economic integration and deepening counterterrorism cooperation. Just days later, another informal meeting was held between Muttaqi, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, in Beijing, where they reportedly agreed to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor to Afghanistan.

Restraint at Risk: The Anatomy of India-Pakistan De-escalation

Chiara Cervasio and Nicholas J. Wheeler

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The world breathed a sigh of relief following the news that effective mediation efforts led by the Trump administration had facilitated a ceasefire between India and Pakistan. Recurring crises, especially in the wake of terrorist attacks, are a defining feature of India-Pakistan relations. However, the recent Pahalgam crisis has witnessed – for the first time between two nuclear armed states – the use of missiles and drones targeted at key air bases. Both sides have operated on the assumption that this level of military conflict can be maintained without triggering deliberate or inadvertent nuclear escalation. Yet, once again, third party intervention – especially from the United States – was necessary to manage escalation and find a diplomatic off-ramp.

A critical question then remains: how stable is a nuclear dyad in which each successive bilateral crisis sees heightened kinetic military activities, with both sides continuing to rely on third-party intervention to prevent full-scale conflict?

Pahalgam may well mark the consolidation of a playbook for crisis management between India and Pakistan that began to emerge in 2016, with India’s “surgical strikes” against suspected Pakistani terrorist training camps across the Line of Control (LoC), and was fully established with the 2019 Pulwama-Balakot crisis. Earlier crises – the 1999 Kargil conflict, which remained confined to the mountainous region of Kashmir and where Indian airpower was not used across the LoC; the 2001-2002 standoff, which was resolved without the use of force; and the 2008 Mumbai crisis, where India exercised military restraint – exhibited a consistent pattern of caution, in which neither side pushed the other into a choice between a humiliating defeat or nuclear escalation.

Modi’s Escalation Trap

Vaibhav Vats

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Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has forged a new counterterrorism doctrine during his decade in power: Any terrorist attack emanating from Pakistan will face a scorching Indian-military response. The policy carries inherent risk, both internationally and domestically.

That it can easily commit India to a spiral of escalation was demonstrated during the exchange of hostilities with Pakistan two weeks ago. On the domestic side, the counterterrorism policy is of a piece with Modi’s effort to project himself as a strongman, which carries its own escalatory risks because it depends on both stoking ultranationalism and keeping it under control.

For four days starting earlier this month, exchanges of fire between India and Pakistan gathered intensity and scope, with the theater of engagement extending deeper into both countries than it had in five decades. At home, Modi had encouraged a climate of heightened emotion among his followers. Pro-government networks and broadsheets portrayed Pakistan as an archenemy that Indian forces would soon vanquish. Media outlets reported, for example, that the port of Karachi, Pakistan’s largest city and financial capital, had been destroyed—one of many breathless stories that did not turn out to be true.

Then, on the evening of May 10, President Donald Trump announced a cease-fire between the two countries on Truth Social. The American intervention came as a surprise—one that did some damage to the Indian prime minister, who has projected himself not only as a fierce advocate for India’s strategic interests but also as a global statesman deliberating on weighty geopolitical questions, such as the war in Ukraine.

Many of the Indian prime minister’s followers felt that allowing the Trump administration to broker a deal was a humiliation and a capitulation to a foreign power. For that reason, New Delhi did not acknowledge the American intervention in its public statements on the cease-fire, even as the Pakistani side hailed Trump’s role in ending the fighting. Still, right-wing social-media accounts turned on the Modi government and its officials with expletive-laden tirades, many of which assailed the personal life of their intended targets. They attacked India’s foreign secretary as a traitor and doxxed his daughter.

Operation Sindoor: India’s new normal dominance of Pakista

Jyotishman Bhagawati

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The recently announced ceasefire – referred to as an “understanding” by New Delhi – has drawn considerable criticism within India. Many argue that it failed to impose a sufficient cost on Pakistan, particularly when India held a dominant position across multiple domains – land, air, naval, cyber and informational.

Critics saw the move as yet another example of India’s historical tendency to forgo strategic advantages in favor of political or diplomatic expediency. Concerns were also raised over the nature of the agreement, especially its oral format and perceived openness to third-party mediation in what India considers a strictly bilateral issue.

While such critiques are understandable, a more careful examination of the post-Pahalgam attack timeline, patterns of escalation and actions by both militaries reveals a more nuanced and compelling picture.

A deeper analysis of the sequence of events reveals a calibrated Indian response that has redefined both the deterrence equilibrium and the normative boundaries of regional conflict.

First, India’s response adhered to its doctrine of limited war under the nuclear threshold, but the scale and precision of strikes, extending from Karachi to Rawalpindi, marked a departure from previous patterns.

By targeting key military and terrorist infrastructure across Pakistan’s heartland, India expanded the operational bandwidth of conventional force within a nuclear context. This reset the escalatory ladder, tilting it in India’s favor and exposing the limitations of Pakistan’s nuclear posturing.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s statement on May 13 – that Operation Sindoor represents a “paradigm shift” in India’s approach – was not a rhetorical flourish. India’s ability to dictate the terms of engagement, maintain escalation dominance, and avoid international backlash represents a substantive change in regional deterrence dynamics.

The Truth About TTP And The Poison Of Takfir – OpEd

Ali Hassan

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Noor Wali Mehsud, the leader of the so-called TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan), once again exploited Islamic terminology and concepts to justify violence and mislead vulnerable people in a recent audio message that went viral on social media. In addition to being a grave misrepresentation of Islamic teachings, his assertion that political cooperation with non-Muslims is equivalent to kufr (disbelief) runs directly against the consensus of Islamic academics throughout history. This dangerous misinterpretation has already resulted in a great deal of violence and social unrest, permanently damaging Islam’s reputation and the security of Muslims around the world.

The most serious of religious transgressions is accusing Muslims of kufr. “If a man accuses his brother of kufr, it will return upon one of them,” the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ said (Bukhari). This harsh warning emphasizes how serious takfir (excommunication) is when it is carried out without sound, academic justification. Political alliances or diplomatic cooperation do not constitute disbelief. On this point, Islamic scholars from all acknowledged schools of thought, classical and modern, agree. TTP’s attempts to turn this idea into a weapon to instigate violence against other Muslims are a betrayal of Islam, not a defence of it.

The sanctity of human life is one of Islam’s core principles. “Whoever kills a person, unless for a just cause, it is as if he had slain all of humanity” (5:32). When it comes to innocent life, this heavenly principle does not discriminate on the basis of nationality, ethnicity, or religious heritage. However, TTP and other extremist organizations still carry out targeted killings and bombings while disguising them as acts of jihad. In reality, Islam strongly condemns these behaviors as fasad fil-ardh, or corruption and harm on Earth.

Prominent Islamic jurists have expressly forbidden such acts. An internationally renowned leader, Mufti Taqi Usmani, has stated clearly that “Suicide attacks and rebellion against a Muslim state are absolutely haram.” His fatwa is not an isolated viewpoint; rather, it represents the consensus of both modern Islamic organizations like Al-Azhar, Darul Uloom Deoband, and Jamia Binoria, as well as traditional scholars like Imam Nawawi and Ibn Taymiyyah. According to these experts, jihad cannot be started by people or organizations operating outside of the bounds of lawful governmental authority or without adhering to stringent moral and legal requirements.

The Truth About TTP And The Poison Of Takfir – OpEd

Ali Hassan

Source Link

Noor Wali Mehsud, the leader of the so-called TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan), once again exploited Islamic terminology and concepts to justify violence and mislead vulnerable people in a recent audio message that went viral on social media. In addition to being a grave misrepresentation of Islamic teachings, his assertion that political cooperation with non-Muslims is equivalent to kufr (disbelief) runs directly against the consensus of Islamic academics throughout history. This dangerous misinterpretation has already resulted in a great deal of violence and social unrest, permanently damaging Islam’s reputation and the security of Muslims around the world.

The most serious of religious transgressions is accusing Muslims of kufr. “If a man accuses his brother of kufr, it will return upon one of them,” the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ said (Bukhari). This harsh warning emphasizes how serious takfir (excommunication) is when it is carried out without sound, academic justification. Political alliances or diplomatic cooperation do not constitute disbelief. On this point, Islamic scholars from all acknowledged schools of thought, classical and modern, agree. TTP’s attempts to turn this idea into a weapon to instigate violence against other Muslims are a betrayal of Islam, not a defence of it.

The sanctity of human life is one of Islam’s core principles. “Whoever kills a person, unless for a just cause, it is as if he had slain all of humanity” (5:32). When it comes to innocent life, this heavenly principle does not discriminate on the basis of nationality, ethnicity, or religious heritage. However, TTP and other extremist organizations still carry out targeted killings and bombings while disguising them as acts of jihad. In reality, Islam strongly condemns these behaviors as fasad fil-ardh, or corruption and harm on Earth.

Prominent Islamic jurists have expressly forbidden such acts. An internationally renowned leader, Mufti Taqi Usmani, has stated clearly that “Suicide attacks and rebellion against a Muslim state are absolutely haram.” His fatwa is not an isolated viewpoint; rather, it represents the consensus of both modern Islamic organizations like Al-Azhar, Darul Uloom Deoband, and Jamia Binoria, as well as traditional scholars like Imam Nawawi and Ibn Taymiyyah. According to these experts, jihad cannot be started by people or organizations operating outside of the bounds of lawful governmental authority or without adhering to stringent moral and legal requirements.

The End of Extended Deterrence in Asia?

David Santoro

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For more than five years, Chinese vessels operating in the South China Sea have repeatedly collided with Philippine ships, sometimes dousing them with water cannons and injuring personnel. In response, the United States deployed a Typhon intermediate-range missile system to the island country last year. It was the first time since the end of the Cold War that the United States had supplied an ally with a weapon of such magnitude—and it kicked off a diplomatic storm. China’s foreign ministry argued that the installation “disrupts regional peace and stability, undermines other countries’ legitimate security interest, and contravenes people’s aspiration for peace and development.” China, the ministry continued, would “not sit idly by” if the Philippines refused to remove it.

Beijing’s actions and threats against the Philippines are part of a broader attempt to counter the United States’ policy of “extended deterrence,” a strategy that commits Washington to defending its allies against aggression, including, in certain cases, with U.S. nuclear weapons. Beijing has long been critical of U.S. extended deterrence, on the grounds that it is a way for the United States to advance its interests against China. Chinese officials are now ramping up their efforts to undermine it. They have portrayed the United States as a destabilizing force in the region, made attempts to peel off U.S. allies using economic enticements and penalties, and engaged in ever more confrontational military operations. Such acts are intended to sap the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence, which is predicated on trust in Washington and faith in the United States’ capabilities.

For the Trump administration, maintaining extended deterrence in the Indo-Pacific should be a priority. It should challenge Beijing’s rhetoric in diplomatic forums and counter Chinese gray-zone tactics, as well as strengthen military cooperation with regional allies. Otherwise, Washington’s power and influence in the region will soon be eclipsed.

Beijing’s blurred red lines and the strategy of ambiguity

Tang Meng Kit

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A screenshot from the military drill video released by the Eastern Theater Command of the Chinese People's Liberation Army on October 13, 2024. Photo: CGTN / Official WeChat account of the PLA Eastern Theater Command

When Lithuania let Taiwan open a diplomatic office in Vilnius in 2021, China froze trade overnight. Goods were blocked, supply chains snarled and European firms with Lithuanian ties faced pressure. The message was clear: a red line had been crossed. But what line, exactly? Beijing never said.

That is the logic of strategic ambiguity.

China has dellineated four red lines that anchor its foreign polilcy:Taiwan,

democracy and human rights,

its political system and

the right to development.

But those lines are rarely clear. They shift, vanish and reappear without warning. This is not a flaw; it’s a feature. And it’s a strategy that demands closer attention in the Indo-Pacific.

Ambiguity as strategy

Ambiguity means keeping thresholds vague, language flexible and reactions unpredictable. It lets China adjust its stance without appearing inconsistent. More importantly, it deters others. Foreign actors must weigh the risk of crossing a line they cannot see.

This is not new. The US also uses ambiguity on Taiwan. But Beijing applies the tactic more broadly. Its red lines cover sovereignty, values and development. And they come with consequences.

The Tariff War Revealed the Depth of China-US Trade Dependence

Chen Li

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Since the outbreak of the China-U.S. trade war in 2018, the conflict has emerged as one of the defining issues in the global economic landscape. Despite numerous attempts at negotiation over the years, no resolution has been reached. With Donald Trump’s return to the White House, U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods have escalated significantly, prompting China to retaliate with its own tariffs.

After a recent meeting in Geneva, both sides agreed to adjust – although not entirely remove – these tariffs and resume talks. The detente remains temporary, however, and further discussions are ongoing.

The tariff war has effectively served as a “stress test” of the mutual trade dependence between the two nations. Before it began, the depth of this interdependence was widely underestimated. However, once the conflict unfolded, it became strikingly clear that, despite China’s long-standing emphasis on self-reliance, the country remains heavily reliant on the U.S. for a broad array of products. The abrupt disruption in trade exposed significant vulnerabilities. On the American side, there was also a lack of awareness regarding the extent to which Chinese manufacturing and products are embedded in the fabric of everyday life.

China’s outlook in a full-scale trade war is far from optimistic, particularly in sectors like aviation manufacturing. The domestically produced C919 aircraft still relies heavily on foreign, primarily American, suppliers for critical components. A Financial Times analysis revealed that nearly all the key parts are imported, with the crucial LEAP-1C engine supplied by CFM International, a France-U.S. joint venture with core components made in Ohio. China’s own replacement engine remains in testing and is not yet viable. The C919’s supply chain includes 48 U.S. suppliers, compared to just 14 Chinese ones, providing essential systems such as avionics and flight controls through companies like Honeywell and Collins Aerospace. This heavy dependence means the United States could effectively cripple China’s large aircraft ambitions, and any retaliatory sanctions by China risk significant self-harm.

What If Our Assumptions About a War with China Are Wrong?

Tyler Hacker 

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From the rout of Union forces at Bull Run to two decades of counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, history tells us that our assumptions about future war are often incorrect. Looking to today, consider this view of a potential US-China conflict:

Any confrontation between the United States and China would be short and intense, decisively determining the war’s outcome in a matter of days or weeks.

How often has this assumption informed past discussions in the Pentagon and Washington’s think tanks? Three years of attritional war in Ukraine and stubbornly persistent security challenges in the Red Sea call this sentiment into question, causing defense commentators to reexamine the possibility that despite both nations being nuclear armed, a US-China war may not end in days or weeks, but could protract for months or even years. This raises the question: How many other assumptions about great power war are due for reexamination?

At the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, we have conducted dozens of exercises on the strategic choices facing political and military leaders regarding the revitalization of the US military for great power war. These exercises often highlight how fighting a prolonged war calls for a different approach than shorter campaigns, such as choosing to expand defense production over relying on existing stockpiles. Regardless of the participant, some form of industrial mobilization is frequently considered the key for unlocking greater production in long wars.

Admittedly, no one can know the exact character of a future war between the United States and China, but recent CSBA research on US mobilization planning during the interwar period gives reason to question some oft repeated assumptions. Comparing current planning assumptions to those of the interwar period reveals several instances where our expectations may fall short of the realities of war, protraction, and mobilization. Today’s security environment, economic circumstances, and military forces may be a world apart from those of the 1930s, but planning to wage war in the American system is fundamentally the same in many ways. For this reason, the US experience in World War II should inform our thinking regarding a future US-China conflict. Five frequently recurring and often implicit assumptions about protracted war stand out, and the American historical experience suggests they may be due for reconsideration.

Trump’s strategy of peaceBut does he have the staff to implement it?

George Beebe

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Like few American politicians, President Trump grasps the precariousness of the nation’s present circumstances. Washington’s post-Cold War ambition to democratize the world yielded a series of futile regional wars that, in turn, eroded civil liberties and brought the country to the brink of a direct armed conflict with Russia. Contrary to expectations, the enthusiasm for a globalized, borderless world hollowed out the US middle class, while catapulting a backward China into manufacturing dominance and peer-military status.

Some $36 trillion in debt underscores the wide gap between America’s expansive international objectives and its limited capacity to attain them — a condition famously described by the New Deal journalist Walter Lippmann as foreign-policy “insolvency.” Continuing the hubristic course we have followed since the Nineties would be disastrous.

Trump gets all this. Which is why he is aiming to lower the temperature across various international theaters, counterbalance the power of rival states, and reset America’s global engagement. His own shorthand, Reagan-borrowed description of the strategy — peace through strength — is apt. His ability to deliver on this vision is still an open question, however. To a large degree, it depends on the people he taps to carry it out.

Richard Nixon faced a somewhat similar situation at the start of his presidency. America was overextended abroad in an unwinnable Vietnam War that bore little connection to the nation’s vital security interests. An increasingly confident Soviet Union was flexing its muscles in Czechoslovakia and Egypt and threatening to race past parity into superiority over the US nuclear arsenal. Economically, an overvalued dollar was crippling exports and rendering the United States highly vulnerable to a foreign-induced financial crisis. At home, the country was riven by violent clashes over Vietnam and racial injustice.

Russia’s Negotiating Strategy

George Friedman

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It has been about three months since U.S. President Donald Trump began the negotiation process with Russian President Vladimir Putin for peace in Ukraine. Many discussions have ensued, but no real progress has been made. Trump is constantly optimistic, Putin is constantly saying he wants peace (despite the fact that the situation makes a rapid settlement impossible), and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is helplessly caught in between.

I do not normally personalize geopolitics, but these talks are not about geopolitics, the reality of which is clear: Russia has failed to defeat Ukraine. The phase of the peace process we are in, such as it is, is what I call engineering. It is the process by which leaders of countries try to construct an edifice that is necessarily based in reality but is compatible with each side’s political needs – in terms of international relations and internal politics alike. The process of engineering is essential and extraordinarily difficult. The most difficult parts of this particular feat of engineering are Putin’s political needs.

I compare this phase of engineering to the negotiations that ended the Vietnam War. The U.S. went to war to block North Vietnam, a communist state, from conquering South Vietnam and extending Chinese and Russian power in Southeast Asia. The assumption was that U.S. military power would readily defeat the Viet Cong, and that doing so was a geopolitical necessity. The U.S. failed because it underestimated the power of the Viet Cong, supported as it was by the Soviet Union, and because it couldn’t craft an appropriate military strategy to defeat the enemy before it. The Viet Cong was fighting for fundamental national imperatives – including reunifying Vietnam under Hanoi’s control – while the U.S. was fighting for a marginal geopolitical imperative. In short, the U.S. lost the war by not winning it, and its defeat had domestic political consequences all around the world, particularly in the U.S. The negotiations to end the war took place from 1969 to 1973. Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard Nixon were negotiating an end to the conflict, of course, but they also had the political imperative to show the world U.S. power had not been diminished.

Ukraine Faces A Growing Risk of Outright Military Collapse If No Deal Struck

Daniel Davis

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U.S. Army Soldiers assigned to Alpha Battery, 3rd Battalion, 29th Field Artillery Regiment, 4th Infantry Division, fire a M109A6 Paladin in support of the joint training exercise Eager Lion ’19 at Training Area 1, Jordan, Aug. 27, 2019. Eager Lion is an annual, multinational training event in its ninth iteration which enables partnered nations to strengthen military relationships and exchange expertise. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Angel Ruszkiewicz)

In Trump’s Truth Social post following his phone call with Putin last Monday, the U.S. President wrote the “tone and spirit of the conversation were excellent.” Putin also voiced guarded optimism, adding the call was, “very meaningful.” Words aside, the realities on the ground do not indicate peace is any closer today than before the call.

If Trump and Putin made optimistic comments following the phone call, there were anxious comments coming from European and Ukrainian leaders. Their angst is well placed – though not because their positions are solid or logical. Rather, it is the European and Ukrainian unwillingness to acknowledge painfully evident ground-truth realities that keeps them at odds with Trump’s views.

That is a real problem, at least for Ukraine.

Going back to April 18, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said of the two sides, “If we’re so far apart (that a deal) won’t happen, then the president is ready to move on.” That was repeated by Trump in an NBC interview on May 4 when he admitted “there may come a time” when he’ll walk away. When considering the positions of the two sides now, following the Trump/Putin call, however, that walk-away moment may be close at hand.

From the Russian side, the solution to the war is to a) continue unconditional negotiations while b) continuing to fight, and c) if their conditions can be fully met, adopt a ceasefire. The Ukrainian side, however, wants a) an unconditional ceasefire first, b) additional sanctions on Russia to “force” them to accept peace on Ukrainian terms, and c) give up no sovereign territory. Those are wholly irreconcilable positions, and in fact, one could argue they are further apart now than they were on April 18.

America Is No Longer the Indispensable Nation

Andrew Latham

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The post-Cold War hegemonic fantasy is finally dead.

But you wouldn’t know it from listening to Washington’s foreign policy establishment.

From K Street to Foggy Bottom to think tanks stacked with credentialed nostalgia, the old gospel still holds.

American hegemony is indispensable, American power is unbounded, and the rest of the world would fall into chaos if the United States stopped trying to micromanage it.

That reality died years ago – only the mythology lingers. Unipolarity wasn’t permanent. It was a fluke, born of Soviet collapse, Chinese weakness, and a divided Europe. For a brief moment, the United States really did seem to sit atop the world, dictating terms, writing rules, and enforcing order. But that moment was always going to end. And now, long after the facts have changed, the strategy remains stubbornly the same.

The world today is defined not by primacy but by rivalry. China has risen – not as a partner, but as a challenger. Russia, battered and brittle, still lashes out where it can. Iran remains a regional problem the U.S. can’t solve and shouldn’t try to. India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia – each is playing its own game, pursuing its own interests, with no intention of subordinating its strategy to American preferences. Even allies in Europe and Asia are hedging, questioning whether the U.S. can still be counted on – or whether it’s overextended, distracted, and drifting.

America – No Longer the Indispensable Nation

It’s not a failure of strength. It’s a failure of imagination. American power remains formidable, but it can no longer carry the weight of a global strategy designed for a world that no longer exists. What we need now is not more ambition – but more clarity. We need a strategy grounded in restraint. Not retreat, not disengagement, but the kind of disciplined realism that once guided American statecraft during far more dangerous times than these.

Trump, Hegseth announce 'Golden Dome,' a ‘game changer’ to protect American homeland

Pete Hegseth

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President Donald Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announce a 'Golden Dome' missile shield and answer reporters' questions about the 'supertechnology' system from the Oval Office.

President Donald Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced the U.S. will soon begin construction of a "Golden Dome" missile defense system they say will be a next-generation "game changer" protecting the American homeland from outside adversaries.

A similar system, the Iron Dome, has already been developed in Israel with U.S. assistance and has proven effective in repelling missile attacks. Now. Trump says a bigger, more technologically advanced, multi-layered dome system will soon be installed in America.

The president announced the "one big beautiful" budget bill being discussed in Congress will include $25 billion in initial funding for the project, which he expects will cost $175 billion overall. He said he expects a major phase of the dome will be complete in under three years and that it will be "fully operational before the end of my term."

He noted there is significant support for the project in Congress, quipping, "It's amazing how easy this one is to fund."

President Donald Trump announced his proposal for a "Golden Dome" missile defense system in the United States May 20, 2025. (Reuters/Leah Millis/File Photo; Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)

"In the campaign, I promised the American people that I would build a cutting-edge missile defense shield to protect our homeland from the threat of foreign missile attack. And that's what we're doing today," he said, adding that the Golden Dome "will be capable of intercepting missiles even if they are launched from the other side of the world and even if they are launched from space."

New intelligence suggests Israel is preparing possible strike on Iranian nuclear facilities, US officials say

Jim Sciutto, Katie Bo Lillis and Natasha Bertrand

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The US has obtained new intelligence suggesting that Israel is making preparations to strike Iranian nuclear facilities, even as the Trump administration has been pursuing a diplomatic deal with Tehran, multiple US officials familiar with the latest intelligence told CNN.

Such a strike would be a brazen break with President Donald Trump, US officials said. It could also risk tipping off a broader regional conflict in the Middle East — something the US has sought to avoid since the war in Gaza inflamed tensions beginning in 2023.

Officials caution it’s not clear that Israeli leaders have made a final decision, and that in fact, there is deep disagreement within the US government about the likelihood that Israel will ultimately act. Whether and how Israel strikes will likely depend on what it thinks of the US negotiations with Tehran over its nuclear program.

But “the chance of an Israeli strike on an Iranian nuclear facility has gone up significantly in recent months,” said another person familiar with US intelligence on the issue. “And the prospect of a Trump-negotiated US-Iran deal that doesn’t remove all of Iran’s uranium makes the chance of a strike more likely.”

The heightened worries stem not only from public and private messaging from senior Israeli officials that it is considering such a move, but also from intercepted Israeli communications and observations of Israeli military movements that could suggest an imminent strike, multiple sources familiar with the intelligence said.

Among the military preparations the US has observed are the movement of air munitions and the completion of an air exercise, two of the sources said.

But those same indicators could also simply be Israel trying to pressure Iran to abandon key tenets of its nuclear program by signaling the consequences if it doesn’t — underscoring the ever-shifting complexities the White House is navigating.

US special ops forces want in on AI to lighten the operator's 'cognitive load' and make their job easier

Chris Panella

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US special operations is using artificial intelligence to reduce the cognitive load on operators.

This includes not just combat operations but also paperwork, manual tasks, and data.

Various types of AI are already being employed and expanded.

From warfighting to paperwork, US Special Operations Forces are interested in getting in on AI to simplify the work.

The goal for these elite forces, much like it is for regular people working office jobs and using AI to sort data or compile information, is to lessen the overall cognitive load, or mental effort, required for whatever a task may be. A lot of different types of artificial intelligence are being used, and it's only growing.

AI has many potential applications for the US military, from autonomous features in uncrewed systems to AI-enabled targeting to enhanced situational awareness. The Department of Defense is eager to implement this technology to prepare US forces for a high-end technological conflict chock full of data and information.

Future wars could be fought in an environment where decision-making may need to happen quicker than humans alone can do, and that's where military officials see the benefit of AI and human-machine teaming.

With AI, "we can reduce the cognitive burden of our operators," Col. Rhea Pritchett, the program executive officer of SOF Digital Applications, said at SOF Week in Tampa, Florida, earlier this month. Instead of worrying about other things, operators "will take that precious time to critically think about actions that they need to take next to achieve the effect that they want."

AI is seeing a wide variety of applications in the US military, such as the Air Force's X-62 VISTA aircraft, piloted by artificial intelligence. Air Force photo by Richard Gonzales

Conflict Narratives: How Narratives Impacted the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas Conflicts

Emily Weinzheimer 

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Narratives are the root of nearly everything we think and do. They are the way to tell a story, and, if crafted correctly, sway an audience to a desired opinion. They are selective, only including the information that contributes to their desired effect’s theme and thrust. Furthermore, narratives are the synthesis of information and are the outcome of the different ways information is processed. Foundational cultural narratives can impact the effectiveness of stories and other forms of communication, especially if they have a foundational narrative similar to that of the audience. In the case of the Russia-Ukraine War, the narrative put out by Ukraine resonates with most of the Western world, with the United States at the forefront. When utilized in a conflict, a master-narrative – narratives at the heart of a society that determine how the majority of that society gives meaning to events – can heavily sway an audience to one side, impacting the outcome of both smaller battles within a war and the overall outcome of the conflict itself.

Narratives are the root of nearly everything we think and do. They are the way to tell a story, and, if crafted correctly, sway an audience to a desired opinion.

The next layer of a narrative is a metanarrative, which is defined as the following:

“…created by global media as the prism through which the international community views the situation and it determines how conflicts are perceived and how events and actors are understood. It does this by selecting which aspects of the conflict are emphasized, which topics are highlighted and which actors are identified, and how motivation is assigned to the actors.”

Understanding metanarratives can be highly advantageous for an actor in conflict, as will be shown by Ukraine’s immediate harnessing of the narrative – global news outlets ran with the narrative that Ukraine had been wrongly invaded by a larger, hostile, neighboring country. This narrative will build upon the West’s existing metanarrative of Russia that has existed since the Cold War.

Does The EU Still Have The Sanctions Cards Needed To Hurt Russia? – Analysis

Ray Furlong and Rikard Jozwiak

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(RFE/RL) — With the ink still drying on the European Union’s freshly printed 17th sanctions package on Russia, work is already underway on a next step that European leaders say will be “massive.”

But some analysts warn that, in many ways, the EU has already used its best cards and doesn’t have many left in its hand, especially at a time when Washington seems reluctant to join in as it pushes peace talks between Kyiv and Moscow.

“The cards that we still have to play largely include measures for which we would need the United States,” Benjamin Hilgenstock, Senior Economist at the Kyiv-based KSE Institute, a think tank, told RFE/RL.

“Specifically, this would be about removing Russian oil and gas from global markets in volume,” he said, adding that counties such as India, China, and Turkey would not stop buying Russian fossil fuels without the weight of secondary US sanctions.

European leaders threatened Russia with “massive” sanctions on May 10 if Moscow did not agree to a 30-day cease-fire proposed by Washington. They said they were making their demand after coordinating it with US President Donald Trump.

It was meant to appear as a game-changing moment, but the apparent transatlantic concord quickly went awry.

Russian President Vladimir Putin did not commit to a cease-fire during a phone callwith Trump on May 19, yet Trump praised the call and did not appear ready to announce new US sanctions saying imposing them now could imperil talks and make the situation “much worse.”

To be clear: the “massive” sanction threat was nothing to do with the 17th package of EU measures announced on May 20, as this had already been some time in the works.

Make Moscow Pay

Wally Adeyemo and David Shimer

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As Russia continues its war against Ukraine and the Trump administration reduces U.S. aid to Kyiv, European countries have stepped up their support of the Ukrainian people. But more can be done. At this critical moment, the European Union should seize the immobilized Russian sovereign assets that sit in Europe and use those resources to provide Ukraine with a sustainable source of assistance.

In February 2022, just days after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the United States worked with the G-7 to freeze approximately $300 billion in Russian assets, the vast majority of which were held in Europe. Before the decision was made, some European countries raised economic and legal concerns, but they ultimately agreed. Over the course of the Biden administration—which both of us were a part of—the United States encouraged Europe to go one step further and seize Russia’s funds so that they could be put to use, as opposed to sitting frozen in accounts. But European leaders were unwilling to take this additional action: concerns similar to the ones raised several years earlier persisted.

Today, Europe should reconsider. The need to seize Russia’s sovereign assets is more urgent now than at any time since the war began. U.S. military aid deliveries to Ukraine from U.S. stockpiles, authorized during the Biden administration, will run out in the coming weeks, and the Trump administration has not announced renewed assistance for Kyiv. Russian President Vladimir Putin has rejected calls for a 30-day cease-fire and has stalled peace talks by making maximalist demands, presumably betting that Ukraine’s position will deteriorate as U.S. aid winds down and as China, Iran, and North Korea maintain their support for Russia.

Over the past three years, European countries have provided extraordinary support to Ukraine—more than the Kremlin ever expected. They have, for example, sent military and financial aid, implemented an unprecedented price cap on Russian oil, and enacted 17 sanctions packages against the Russian economy. But Europe will need to do even more to fill the void left by the United States. Europe cannot afford to see Russia triumph over Ukraine.

Learning to Learn: Lessons for the US Army from the Israel Defense Forces’ Wartime Adaption

John Spencer 

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In war, survival often depends not just on strength or firepower, but on how fast an army can adapt—and whether it can do so in time to save lives. In late 2023, as the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) pushed into Gaza following the October 7 Hamas invasion, one horrific moment underscored the urgency of battlefield adaptation. While navigating the complex urban terrain in a column, Israeli infantry soldiers had been staying inside their armored personnel carriers too long as they waited for the lead vehicle—typically a bulldozer or tank—to clear the path forward. Hamas exploited this hesitation and attacked that specific type of vehicle with a rocket-propelled grenade from a close and elevated position, killing eleven soldiers in one attack. Hamas had not only found a way around Israel’s advanced active protection systems, but also recognized the vulnerability in the IDF’s dismount timing. Hours later, another Israeli unit spotted a militant attempting the same tactic.

In response, the IDF did something remarkable. They paused combat operations for twenty-four hours across multiple brigades. The goal was not discipline but diffusion: ensuring that all personnel, from brigade commanders to squad leaders, received the lesson and immediately adjusted their tactics. Soldiers would no longer sit in idling armored personnel carriers before dismounting. One moment of battlefield horror became a lifesaving protocol—disseminated in a day.

But how do you make a military learn at the speed of battle?

Three Vectors of Learning: Digital, Document, and Direct

Over five visits to Israel and Gaza since the war began, I had the opportunity to observe firsthand how the IDF adapted in real time to the brutal realities of urban combat. What began as informal conversations soon turned into focused inquiry, as I recognized the uniqueness of what I was seeing. I spoke with commanders, learning officers, and frontline troops, and followed tactical evolutions as they unfolded on the ground. The more I asked, the clearer it became: the IDF was not just learning—it was learning how to learn. And it was doing so with speed, purpose, and institutional resolve that few modern militaries have achieved.

Zelensky accuses Russia of 'buying time' to stall truce talks

Rachel Hagan

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Volodymyr Zelensky has accused Russia of "trying to buy time" to continue its war in Ukraine, a day after Donald Trump said progress towards a ceasefire had been made in a call with Vladimir Putin.

"If Russia continues to put forward unrealistic conditions and undermine progress, there must be tough consequences," Ukraine's president wrote on social media, adding that Kyiv was ready to negotiate.

Following separate calls with Zelensky and Putin on Monday, Trump said truce talks between Russia and Ukraine would start "immediately".

Putin said he was ready to work on a "memorandum on a possible future peace agreement", but did not address calls for a 30-day pause in fighting.

On Tuesday, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said it was up to Kyiv to "make decisions" and respond to a proposed peace memorandum.

However, the Kremlin downplayed suggestions that negotiations were close, with Russian state news agencies citing spokesperson Dmitry Peskov as saying "there are no deadlines and there cannot be any".

Meanwhile, Zelensky launched a fresh round of diplomacy, speaking to Western allies in a bid to shore up support.

Following a phone call with the Finnish president, Zelensky wrote on social media that Ukraine was working with partners to ensure pressure on Moscow "forces the Russians to change their behaviour".

It came as the European Union and UK announced that they had adopted new rounds of sanctions against Russia.

Russia Is Devastating Ukraine With Iranian Shahed-136 Drones

Maya Carlin

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Over the last week alone, Russian Forces have fired 250-plus drones targeting Ukraine, marking a significant uptick in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) bombardments. According to Ukrainian officials, Moscow fired a total of 273 UAVs on May 18, making this the largest drone barrage since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion back in early 2023. This hefty barrage occurred just one day prior to a scheduled phone call between U.S. president Donald Trump and Russian president Vladimir Putin concerning a ceasefire. Moscow’s continued use of Iranian-produced Shahed drones is capable of overwhelming Ukrainian air defenses and further diminishing civilian morale through frequent barrages. These cheap, easily produced, lethal UAVs are now mass-produced in Russia and certainly play a major role in the ongoing conflict.

How did Moscow Acquire Iranian Shahed UAV?

Initially, Iranian officials persistently denied delivering suicide drones like the Shahed-136 to fuel Russia’s offensive war efforts in Ukraine. However, countless images and other footage prove the Shahed’s frequent deployment in the war. Back in 2022, the Biden administration divulged it had obtained satellite imagery showing Russian delegations visiting Iran’s Kashan airfield. Moscow’s procurement of Iranian-produced lethal drones is believed to have occurred shortly after.

In 2024, Russian state-run outlets published a video depicting a Shahed drone factory in Yelabuga. Russian-made versions of the Shahed can be identified in the video, and the sheer number of these UAVs depicted demonstrated Moscow’s massive UAV stockpile. Today, Moscow uses a combination of smuggled Western electronics and imported Chinese components to mass-produce these lethal drones. As detailed by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Russia’s reliance on Shahed drones is based largely on price. Each UAV is priced at roughly $20,000-50,000, and Russia tolerates a loss rate of more than 75 percent as it opts to saturate Ukrainian air defenses.

The Hidden Cost of AI: Extractive AI Is Bad for Business

Ali Crawford, Matthias Oschinski, and Andrew J. Lohn

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The Chinese AI company DeepSeek recently sent shockwaves through the financial world, causing market chaos and sparking uncertainty among tech policymakers. OpenAI released a statement acknowledging potential evidence that DeepSeek trained its model on data generated by outputs from OpenAI’s GPT-4o model through a process called distillation. Simply put, DeepSeek is being accused of training its model on OpenAI’s model and benefiting from that transfer of knowledge. But before we ask whether DeepSeek stole from OpenAI, we should ask a deeper question: who did OpenAI take from?

OpenAI has been accused of illegally appropriating data in the form of news articles, stories, and even YouTube video transcriptions to power its models. Those models are trained on vast amounts of human-generated data, often without compensation or acknowledgement to the human creator. These practices are only lightly discussed at major international AI safety summits—such as those in the United Kingdom, South Korea, and more recently this past February in France—which tend to focus on whether AI might invent biological weapons, develop new cyberattacks, or if unseen model bias poses a threat to humanity. The silent transfer of value from creators to algorithms is emerging as one of the most overlooked economic risks of the AI boom. The truth is, people have already begun to express that they have been harmed by decisions to use or employ AI.

In a recent significant event, one of the first major labor disputes over the use of AI was observed in the 2023 Writers’ Guild of America (WGA) strike. While the main issue revolved around streaming services and residuals owed to writers, negotiations concerning the use of generative AI prolonged the strike, which has its own section in the WGA’s Minimum Basic Agreement (MBA). Essentially, the WGA advocated against company or studio use of AI to write or rewrite literary materials, and that AI-generated content cannot be used as source material, which would have implications for how writers receive credit for their original work. Additionally, the MBA gives the WGA the right to assert that the exploitation of writers’ work used to train an AI model is prohibited.