Indian Strategic Studies: 06/03/25

3 June 2025

The United States’ Role In The Recent India-Pakistan Crisis – Analysis

Sandeep Bhardwaj

In early May 2025, triggered by the shocking Pahalgam terrorist attack, India and Pakistan engaged in an intense and wide-ranging four-day conflict. On 10 May 2025, the two sides agreed to a ceasefire that the United States (US) claimed it had brokered. New Delhi denied American role in the ceasefire negotiation.

The back-and-forth between Washington and New Delhi has obscured the strategic implications of the US’ role in the whole crisis. This time, Washington threw away the well-established playbook for managing South Asian crises that successive administrations has developed over decades. The result was confused signalling and ad hoc measures that exacerbated the risks and weakened US ability to intervene in future crises. While thankfully a ceasefire was achieved this time, the long-term dangers for the subcontinent have substantially increased.

Since the 1998 India-Pakistan nuclear tests, one of the central goals of the American policy in South Asia has been to prevent any crisis spiralling out of control. The US has activated its crisis management mode during the 1999 Kargil War, 2001-2002 Twin Peaks Crisis, 2008 Mumbai Terror Attacks, 2016 Indian LoC strike and 2019 Balakot airstrike. Although American crisis diplomacy has had varying degree of influence on different crises, it has always been present. The central challenge for Washington has been to contain escalation while avoiding the moral hazard of encouraging India or Pakistan to engage in risky behaviour by signalling that the US will always step in to defuse the crisis.

Since the President Donald Trump’s first term, the US’ South Asia crisis diplomacy has destabilised because of two contradictory impulses in Washington. On one hand, Trump has signalled his desire to withdraw the US from its traditional role as the guarantor of international order, especially its commitment to maintain stability and security in various parts of the world. On the other hand, the knee-jerk instinct to prevent crisis escalation in South Asia beyond nuclear threshold still persists in the Washington establishment.

Breaking the Ice: India’s First Ministerial Engagement with the Taliban

On 15 May 2025, India and the Taliban reached a pivotal moment in their diplomatic relations when External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar engaged in a telephone conversation with Amir Khan Muttaqi, the Acting Foreign Minister of Afghanistan’s Taliban administration.[i] This marked the first Ministerial-level contact between the two since the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021. The conversation took place just days after India and Pakistan agreed to halt their military strikes in the wake of Operation Sindoor,

which followed the Pahalgam terror attack of April 22, which left 26 innocents dead and dozens injured[ii], an incident condemned by the Taliban regime.

India-Taliban Ministerial Talks

India’s Foreign Minister, in a message that was posted on X (formerly Twitter), wrote, “Good conversation with Acting Afghan Foreign Minister Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi this evening. Deeply appreciate his condemnation of the Pahalgam terrorist attack.”[iii] During the telephonic conversation,

Dr Jaishankar underlined India’s traditional friendship with the Afghan people and reiterated India’s continued support for their development needs and “welcomed his firm rejection of recent attempts to create distrust between India and Afghanistan through false and baseless reports.”[iv] This appeared to be a response to allegations made by Pakistan’s military spokesperson, Lieutenant General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry,

who claimed during a May 10 press conference that India had “fired missiles at Afghan soil and conducted drone attacks inside Afghanistan.”[v] In reaction, Afghan Defence Ministry spokesperson Enayatullah Khwarazmi dismissed the accusation as baseless[vi].

How the India-Pakistan Crisis Became a Profitable Spectacle Online

Dr. Fizza Batool is an Assistant Professor at SZABIST University, Karachi, with expertise in South Asian Studies and Comparative Democratization. Connect with her on LinkedIn or read her works on ResearchGate

In late April 2025, a terrorist attack in Pahalgam in Indian-administered Kashmir led to escalating tensions between India and Pakistan. After four days of intense conflict, a ceasefire was agreed on May 10, 2025, following US diplomatic intervention. This conflict wasn’t just fought on diplomatic and strategic fronts—it was fiercely contested in the digital space, where the battle continues even after military tensions have cooled.

The crisis revealed a profound shift in the information hierarchy, with YouTube channels and TikTok accounts often generating more engagement than official government statements or traditional news broadcasts. Piers Morgan’s viral debate featuring social media influencers alongside traditional experts perfectly captures this new reality— individuals who once would have been mere spectators now sit on equal footing with government representatives and veteran journalists in shaping public understanding of international conflicts.

Behind this digital conflict lies a troubling economic reality: content creators on both sides of the border have transformed geopolitical tensions into a profitable business model. While their strategies differ dramatically as per the socio-political context in each country—Pakistani creators predominantly use humor and satire, while Indian counterparts amplify nationalist narratives—both narratives operate within the same attention economy that rewards emotional engagement over factual accuracy.

After The India-Pakistan Crisis, US Should Focus on China

Samir Kalra, and Akhil Ramesh

It is high time that US policy treats India and Pakistan for what they are: an emerging global power on the one hand and a bankrupt Chinese vassal state on the other.

There are few countries in the world that can dial both Beijing and Washington for support. One of them is Pakistan. The country has come to embody the phrase “running with the hare and hunting with the hounds.”

During the Global War on Terror, Pakistan simultaneously provided tacit support to the terrorist forces seeking refuge in its territories, fleeing American forces while at the same time supporting Washington as a non-NATO strategic ally.

Fast-forward to a post-Afghanistan world, Islamabad has maintained ties with both Beijing and Washington to leverage them when needed. This is particularly important during times of crisis like the recent one that arose after Islamist terrorists (likely sponsored by Pakistan) massacred mostly Hindu tourists in India’s Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir.

The terrorist attack by “The Resistance Front,” an offshoot of Lashkar-e-Taiba, a State Department-designated foreign terrorist organization, elicited a military and non-military response from India, including strikes on terrorist infrastructure deep in Pakistani territory. Pakistan subsequently escalated the conflict by launching drone and missile attacks on civilians, places of worship, and military installations in India, drawing a stronger Indian response that destroyed several Pakistani air bases.

For its part, the United States has publicly avoided taking sides between India and Pakistan. As a matter of fact, it has gone so far as to draw false equivalencies between the two countries, angering New Delhi and emboldening Pakistan. Pakistani military and government officials have even gone to the extent of holding celebratory rallies despite clear evidence that India dominated the short military conflict.

Pakistan and the Latest Reincarnation of Lashkar-e-Taiba

Kunwar Khuldune Shahid

Indian Army Colonel Sofiya Qureshi speaks as Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri looks on during a press conference regarding Operation Sindoor, May 7, 2025. Behind them, a map shows the locations struck by India, purported “terrorist camps” in Pakistan-administered Kashmir and Pakistan.Credit: Government of India

The clashes between India and Pakistan in May – the closest the two nuclear-armed neighbors have come to a full-blown war since 1999 – hinged over the status of India-bound jihadist groups in Pakistan, led by the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). India struck various sites in Pakistan, which it claimed were training camps of the LeT, the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM). Together, these groups form the jihadist umbrella dedicated to “liberating Kashmir from Indian occupation.”

New Delhi’s strikes came as reaction to last month’s attack in Pahalgam town of Indian-administered Kashmir, claimed by the LeT-allied The Resistance Front, in which 26 civilians, nearly all tourists, were gunned down. Islamabad denies any connection with the militant raid and points to the fact that both Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed are banned in Pakistan.

The LeT was founded by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed in 1990 out of former anti-Soviet jihadists. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the LeT remained aligned with regional jihadist outfits, notably al-Qaida and the Taliban, but dedicated its focus to the Kashmir jihad in the 1990s. The group carried out numerous raids in India with the backing of Pakistan’s security agencies. After being designated as a terror outfit by the U.S. post-9/11, the LeT, along with the JeM, was banned in Pakistan in 2002. However, some of the group’s deadliest maneuvers in India came in the aftermath of the ban, including the Delhi bombings in 2005 and the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

Pakistan’s TTP Problem: Why Military Solutions Continue to Fail

Maqbool Shah

The resurgence of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) since the Afghan Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 has exposed fundamental flaws in Pakistan’s counterterrorism strategy. Despite decades of military operations, billions in defense spending, and significant tactical successes during operations like Zarb-e-Azb and Radd-ul-Fasaad, Pakistan finds itself confronting an emboldened insurgency that operates with virtual impunity from Afghan territory.

As someone who commanded troops in counterinsurgency operations on contested border regions, I witnessed firsthand how conventional military thinking often proves inadequate against asymmetric threats. The current TTP resurgence demonstrates that Pakistan’s military establishment has learned few lessons from previous campaigns. It continues to pursue tactical solutions to what is fundamentally a strategic and political problem with regional implications extending far beyond Pakistan’s borders.

The Taliban’s Gift to the TTP

The Afghan Taliban’s victory in August 2021 fundamentally altered the strategic landscape for the TTP. Within months of the Taliban takeover, TTP attacks inside Pakistan increased dramatically, with the group claiming responsibility for over 100 attacks in 2022 alone – a significant increase from previous years when the organization appeared weakened and fragmented.

The sanctuary provided by Taliban-controlled Afghanistan has allowed the TTP to rebuild organizational structures, enhance training capabilities, and coordinate operations with a freedom of movement not enjoyed since the peak of the insurgency in 2008-2010. Unlike the fragmented organization that Pakistani forces degraded through sustained military pressure, the current TTP appears more centralized, strategically focused, and tactically sophisticated.

How SE Asia can break China’s rare earth monopoly

Patricio Faundez

Southeast Asia has the resources to challenge China's rare earth element monopoly. Image: Facebook

Last week, Australia’s Lynas Rare Earths produced heavy rare earth elements (HREEs) at a commercial scale in Malaysia, marking the first time this has ever happened outside of China.

This breakthrough, which includes elements like dysprosium and terbium, is no small feat in a market dominated by China, which is responsible for around 60% of global rare earth production and virtually 100% of the world’s HREE supply.

Rare earth elements (REEs) are critical for the US and other advanced economies: they power technologies from electric vehicles to defense systems. The US Department of Defense, for instance, has identified HREEs as vital for missile systems, radar and advanced communications.

Yet, the US itself produces only about 12% of global REEs—and almost none of the heavy types. Without secure access to these materials, Western industries risk supply chain disruptions that could slow the clean energy transition and compromise national security.

Russia’s Hybrid Warfare Tactics Target the Baltics

Eitvydas Bajarūnas

We are publishing this piece because Ambassador Eitvydas Bajarūnas has a wide range of governmental experiences that give him unique insight into modern political warfare. Among his many overseas postings, Ambassador Bajarūnas served as the Ambassador of Lithuania to Russia and as Deputy Ambassador of Lithuania’s delegation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). He previously served as Ambassador-at-Large for Hybrid Threats and regularly provides analysis on Russian informational warfare against the Baltics. In 2016, when he finished his posting as the Lithuanian Ambassador to Sweden, the then-Minister for Foreign Affairs nominated him as Ambassador-at-Large for Hybrid Threats. His main tasks were, first, to serve as the focal point within the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on this topic, and second, to promote understanding of hybrid threats and the need to counter them among EU and NATO allies.

Ambassador Bajarūnas participated in various EU and NATO working groups and initiatives (e.g., the NATO-Ukraine Hybrid Platform, the EU Working Group on Countering Hybrid Threats). He also negotiated and signed the memorandum establishing the European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats on behalf of Lithuania. Additionally, Bajarūnas took part in numerous seminars and working meetings, wrote numerous articles, and gave interviews to promote understanding of this phenomenon. Ambassador Bajarūnas’s piece helps place these developments into a larger context and explains why Russian political warfare is a decisive threat to frontline states. This essay builds upon Beniamino Irdi’s previous Perspectives article “Hybrid Threats and Modern Political Warfare: The Architecture of Cross-Domain Conflict,” highlighting the themes of dispersion across domains and gradualness in timing.

Executive Summary:Hybrid threats describe a complex strategy combining military tools with unconventional methods. Addressing hybrid threats in the Baltics is a continuous, never-ending process centered around developing resilience at the societal, national, European, and trans-Atlantic levels.

Army 2.0: UK cyber hackers to fight drones on the battlefield in new era for warfare

Cyber experts will be deployed on the battlefield alongside the regular Armed Forces as part of a major modernisation of the British military to prepare for drone warfare, The i Paper can reveal.

A new “digital warfighting group” with skills in hacking and cyber operations will work alongside infantry soldiers to scramble enemy drone signals, take down drone “swarms” and launch counter-attacks, if the UK is engaged in another war.

The plans, to be unveiled in the long-awaited Strategic Defence Review (SDR) on Monday, mark a new era for military capabilities and are in response to the war in Ukraine, where more soldiers have been killed by drones than traditional weapons and artillery.

Figures revealed by Western officials earlier this year showed that 80 per cent of battlefield casualties in Ukraine were due to drones, often deployed at short range.

The new digital warfighting unit will consist of personnel with basic military training but they will not be traditional soldiers, and will be employed instead for their cyber expertise.

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) is expected to fast-track recruitment of cyber experts to create the unit ready for the front line if Britain ever goes to war again.

The plans, which are being recommended by the SDR but have been endorsed by the Government, are part of enabling the British military to “adapt to a new style of warfare”, a Whitehall source said.

Welcome to the long war: Why a Ukraine deal was never realistic

Brian Whitmore

This war will be decided on the battlefield.

Four months of chaotic shuttle diplomacy aimed at reaching a cease-fire in Ukraine, multiple phone calls between US President Donald Trump and Kremlin leader Vladimir Putin, repeated US attempts to pressure, browbeat, and bully Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy into concessions, have all yielded exactly nothing.

Which is not in the least bit surprising. Because there is no deal to be had with Russia on Ukraine. There never has been, and there never will be.

There is simply no magic formula, no concession, and no grand bargain that would satisfy the Kremlin’s maximalist and eliminationist goals. Moscow wants to end Ukraine’s sovereignty, nationhood, and statehood. Ukraine wants to continue to exist as an independent sovereign state. Given this, no compromise is possible. Any Kabuki negotiations or Potemkin cease-fire would be meaningless and treated by the Kremlin as nothing more than a strategic pause and an opportunity for sanctions relief.

“Russian imperialism will not be neutralized by negotiations, compromises, or concessions,” Andreas Umland, an analyst at the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies and an associate professor at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, wrote on May 22.

Following his latest call with Trump, Putin said he wanted any settlement to address what he called the “root causes of the crisis.” That choice of phrase was no accident. The Kremlin leader used a similar formulation when addressing the issue of ending the war during a joint press conference with Belarusian strongman Alyaksandr Lukashenka in March.

Trump’s space-based Golden Dome will revolutionise warfare

Recently, the United States has fully unveiled a new initiative under President Trump called Golden Dome – a missile defence project of unprecedented scope and ambition. Originally included among Trump’s flurry of Executive Orders in January as an American version of Israel’s Iron Dome, it has since changed names and is envisioned to be much, much bigger. It is intended to provide security for the entirety of the United States homeland, but it will have global coverage – because the US can be targeted by long-range missiles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles, launched from any point on the globe.

Golden Dome is intended to be a family of systems – some, based on the ground – but centred around a space-based architecture. It would deploy interceptors in orbit capable of being fired from space to intercept enemy missiles during their intra-atmospheric course. These are essentially airborne targets. But once the principle is established that you can target an airborne threat from orbit, a Pandora’s Box opens: why not strike a ground-based target, or a naval target, from space?

This is the beginning of a new era in space warfare. For the first time, the United States has made it its policy to place weapons in space that can conduct space-to-Earth strike – effectively, and eventually, bombardment from orbit. To channel President Trump’s inimitable style, this is HUGE. It is going to be a major departure for US space policy – an expensive programme, with massive industrial and strategic repercussions.

Golden Dome also raises foundational questions for international security. The principle of the “peaceful use of outer space” has long been front and centre in international space diplomacy and agreements since the first US-Soviet Space Race in the 1960s. But the legal framework is narrower than many assume. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 prohibits weapons of mass destruction – namely nuclear weapons – in orbit. It does not prohibit conventional weapons. During the Cold War, there were numerous tests of conventional weapons for space intercept and other offensive military operations. In recent years, China, Russia, and India have all conducted direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) missile tests from the ground. So the taboo against space weaponisation has always been more normative than strictly legal.

Fighting Fire with Fire: Texas Rangers, Tactical Innovation, and Counterinsurgency Operations in the Mexico City Campaign, 1847-1848

Nathan Jennings

In the spring of 1847, at the height of the Mexican-American War, the United States Army invaded the heart of Mexico. Not content with limited victories in northern provinces, the American government hoped that a decisive campaign in the interior would compel negotiation and territorial concessions. On April 18, after seizing the Atlantic port of Veracruz and marching inland, an expeditionary force under General Winfield Scott won a convincing victory at the Battle of Cerro Gordo through superior fire and maneuver. This battlefield success shattered President Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna’s last remaining field army and set conditions for a potential march on Mexico City. However, despite the triumph, Scott soon worried from his forward outpost at Jalapa, a town along the road to the Mexican capital, of “bands of exasperated rancheros” resorting to “the guerilla plan.”

Map courtesy of the United State Military Academy’s Digital History Center.

The American commander’s fears proved perilously correct as the Mexican government embraced the timeless strategy of occupied societies: guerrilla warfare. Pedro Maria Anaya, now serving as the substitute president, swiftly recognized that the U. S. Army’s vulnerability lay in the unconventional arena. On April 28 he accordingly decreed the creation of an elite-led program of asymmetric resistance that would employ cavalry elements to attack the invaders along their flanks and rear echelons. Santa Anna confirmed the shift when he stated his intent to organize new forces to “harass the enemy’s rear in a sensible manner.” If Mexico could not expel the invaders through Napoleonic battle, it would isolate and destroy the American army with a decentralized savagery born of nationalistic desperation.

Why Turkey Welcomes An Emerging Arab Alliance – Analysis

Dr. Sinem Cengiz

Historically, there have been periods when Turkiye and the Arab states were unable to harmonize their strategies and interests in the region. Political differences often overshadowed potential cooperation, and at times the Arab alliance failed to align with Turkiye’s regional interests. There were also rare moments when Turkish-Arab cooperation proved to be effective and mutually beneficial. However, it appears that a new Arab alliance is emerging in the region among the historic capitals of Damascus, Baghdad, and Beirut. In a parallel shift, Turkish-Arab cooperation is achieving significant momentum with a harmony that serves mutual interests.

The collapse of the Assad regime significantly influenced Syria’s position within the Arab world. Coinciding with this shift, Lebanon has entered a new phase, with the election of a new president and the appointment of a prime minister after a two-year political deadlock. Meanwhile, Iraq, for the first time in years, has been positioning itself as a regional actor, not only mediating disputes but also facilitating economic cooperation.

One common factor in the reemergence of these three countries in the Arab world order is the diminishing influence of Iran, which is particularly favorable for Ankara. Despite Ankara’s ability to compartmentalize its relations with Tehran, Turkiye has been among the regional countries most uncomfortable with Iranian proxies in the region, especially in Iraq and beyond. Therefore, a region free from Iranian control is a strategic win for Turkiye. Moreover, one key element of this era emerging in the region is the intent to integrate Iran through dialogue, not isolation. Thus, containing Iran through diplomacy, not confrontation is an approach that Turkish and Arab perspectives share today.

In Syria, the new government has been building strong political, economic, and defense ties with Ankara, marking a fresh chapter in Turkish-Syrian relations after more than a decade of hostility under the Assad regime. As Syria embarks on an uncertain path toward reintegration into the regional and international fold, there are some similarities with Iraq’s post-Saddam experience. The new Syrian administration is eager to avoid the same instability that Iraq faced after the fall of Saddam, and Turkiye is keen to prevent a repeat of the post-Saddam scenario in Syria.

Israel’s Iron Beam Laser Air Defense System Has Downed Enemy Drones

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Israel has used a new air defense laser to shoot down Hezbollah drones in the current conflict in the Middle East, it has been confirmed. What is described as an adapted version of the Iron Beam system made its combat debut last October, and the definitive version should be fielded by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) later this year, joining an already formidable, layered air defense network, something you can read about in more detail here.The purported demise of a Hezbollah drone, targeted by the interim version of the Iron Beam last October. Rafael screenshot

The use of the Iron Beam — also known by its Hebrew name Magen Or — was announced by the IDF, Israeli Air Force (IAF), and defense contractor Rafael, in a joint statement. These three organizations, it is said, “executed an accelerated development program to deploy revolutionary interception systems,” as part of an effort that also involved Israel’s Directorate of Defense Research and Development.

Spheres of Influence Are Not the Answer

Sarang Shidore

the director of the Quincy Institute’s Global South Program.An illustration shows Trump from above and behind walking away with six views of the globe behind him.Foreign Policy illustration/Getty Images

The Oval Office clash between U.S. President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky before a full-court media, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stating that Ukraine is “not our war,” and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s acquiescence to any U.S. annexation of Greenland have increased speculation on whether the United States is jettisoning the decades-old model based on allies and partners and adopting a spheres-of-influence approach in its grand strategy. These signals have been buttressed by Trump’s recent speech in Saudi Arabia, in which the president rejected what he saw as previous U.S. presidents’ tendencies to “look into the souls of foreign leaders and use U.S. policy to dispense justice for their sins.”

The big promise with spheres of influence is the reduction, if not elimination, of the risk of world war. As great powers carve up the world, limit their defined interests, and respect one another’s backyards, they have less disputes and less reasons to engage in conflict. Or so goes the claim.

Sarang Shidore is the director of the Quincy Institute’s Global South Program. He focuses on the geopolitics of the global south, Asia, and climate change. X: @globalsarang

Read More On Geopolitics | Great Power Politics

United States wondered how China had made such progress in the field of microchips. Huawei and Xiaomi are the answer, with massive development.

The United States has long dominated the semiconductor market, putting China under pressure with trade restrictions on companies such as Huawei and Xiaomi. But in just a few years, Beijing has made a spectacular comeback.

The embargo that triggered the offensive

Since 2019, sanctions imposed by Washington on Chinese tech giants have prohibited Huawei, among other things, from accessing advanced components from US companies such as Qualcomm or Intel. The aim: to curb China’s technological expansion and preserve its strategic lead in the semiconductor sector.

But far from paralysing the sector, these restrictions have accelerated China’s investment in its electronics industry. The government has injected billions of yuan into research, training and, above all, the local manufacture of chips, even if they are technically less advanced than the 3 or 5 nanometre chips produced in Taiwan or Korea.

Huawei and Xiaomi: the bridgeheads

Huawei’s return with its in-house Kirin 9000S processor – integrated into the Mate 60 Pro – has caused surprise, if not concern, in Washington. This system-on-a-chip, produced in SMIC factories, is tangible proof that China can produce advanced chips locally, despite embargoes. Xiaomi followed suit with the development of its own semiconductors, notably for cameras and energy management.

Even if these chips do not yet fully rival the latest generations from Qualcomm or Apple, they mark a strategic turning point: the end of China’s total dependence on foreign technologies. The industry is also reorganising around national standards and alternative architectures such as RISC-V, which are open and less subject to Western control than ARM or x86 architecture

Hegseth Outlines U.S. Vision for Indo-Pacific, Addresses China Threat

Matthew Olay

While delivering plenary remarks at a Singaporean security summit today, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth outlined to numerous Asian ally countries DOD's vision for the Indo-Pacific region, while also addressing the strategic threat posed by China.

Speaking at the International Institute for Strategic Studies Shangri-La Dialogue, Hegseth began his remarks by underscoring the Defense Department's priorities of achieving peace through strength by focusing on restoring the warrior ethos, rebuilding the military and reestablishing deterrence.

The secretary then used the topic of deterrence — noting, specifically, that our allies around the world are beginning to invest more in their self-defense — to segue into speaking about the Indo-Pacific region.

"As our allies share the burden, we can increase our focus on the Indo-Pacific: our priority theater," Hegseth said.

Stating the futures of the U.S. and its Indo-Pacific allies are "bound together," Hegseth said the security and prosperity of Americans are linked to the security and prosperity of U.S. ally countries' citizens.

"We share your vision of peace and stability, of prosperity and security and we are here to stay," he said.

The future vision for the Indo-Pacific is one "grounded in common sense and national interests," Hegseth said, where the U.S. and its allies work together while respecting their mutual self-interests and engaging on the basis of sovereignty and commerce, as opposed to war.

The secretary pointed out, as President Donald J. Trump continues to lead European allies to step up in their self-defense, the U.S. can then focus more resources on the Indo-Pacific region.

"This enables all of us to benefit from the peace and stability that comes with a lasting and strong American presence here in the Indo-Pacific," Hegseth said.

"These benefits, they only multiply when our allies and partners are also strong," he added.

Regarding American influence in the region, Hegseth said the U.S. isn't interested in the approach to foreign policy of the past.

Asia Is Getting Dangerously Unbalanced

Stephen M. Walt

a columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.Donald Trump looks up as he sits beside China's President Xi Jinping during a tour of the Forbidden City in Beijing on Nov. 8, 2017.Donald Trump looks up as he sits beside China's President Xi Jinping during a tour of the Forbidden City in Beijing on Nov. 8, 2017. JIM WATSON/AFP via Getty Images

April 1, 2025, 4:42 AM

With all the chaos currently engulfing U.S. foreign policy, it’s easy to lose sight of some more fundamental aspects of global politics. We’ve all been distracted by Signalgate, the Russia-Ukraine negotiations, the Trump administration’s increasingly obvious animus toward Europe, a looming trade war, the self-inflicted wound of a deteriorating U.S.-Canada relationship, and the systematic assault on democratic institutions inside the United States. If you’re having trouble keeping up with all this mishigas, you’re not alone.

Let me pull you away from the headlines for a moment and invite you to focus on a big issue with long-term implications: the future of U.S. alliances in Asia. U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth is taking a break from using an insecure app to text his colleagues (and a journalist) about attack plans in Yemen and is off trying to reassure U.S. allies in Asia. I wish him luck because the combination of Hegseth’s inexperience and the administration’s policies to date won’t make that easy.

Stephen M. Walt is a columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. Bluesky

The 20th Century’s Lessons for Our New Era of War

Hal Brands

a professor of global affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.A black-and-white photo shows soldiers carrying guns and wearing helmets, seen from behind as they head toward something burning on the horizon. Plumes of smoke billow into the sky.Soviet infantry in combat during the Battle of Kursk in 1943. Laski Diffusion/Getty Images

America must “pay the price for peace,” said President Harry Truman in 1948, or it would “pay the price of war.” The ghastliest moments of the 20th century came when autocratic aggressors ruptured the Eurasian balance of power. Standards of morality went by the wayside in conquered regions. Autocratic spheres of influence became platforms for further predation. Countervailing coalitions, thrown together under dire circumstances, had to claw their way back into hostile continents at horrid cost. This is why Truman’s America, having paid the price of war twice in a quarter century, chose to continuously bolster the peace after 1945.

There was nothing simple about this. Preventing global war was arduous, morally troubling work. It required learning the apocalyptic absurdities of nuclear deterrence. It involved fighting bloody “limited” conflicts, going to the brink over Cuba and Berlin, and preparing incessantly for a confrontation the United States and its allies hoped never to fight. The long great-power peace of the postwar era didn’t just happen; it was the payoff of a decades-long effort to make the military balance favor the free world. An important lesson, then, is that a cold war is the reward for deterring a hot one.

Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger distinguished professor of global affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and the author, most recently, of The Eurasian Century: Hot Wars, Cold Wars, and the Making of the Modern World. X

The Electromagnetic Spectrum for Golden Dome To Succeed

Robert Peters

There is a huge debate going on right now in Washington regarding the electromagnetic spectrum.

The crux of the debate centers around whether the Federal government should auction additional portions of the electromagnetic spectrum to private industry, or if it should refrain from doing so in the name of national security.

The portions of the electromagnetic spectrum in question are those that fall between 3.1 to 3.45 gigahertz (GHz) and 7 and 8 GHz. Telecommunication companies for years have utilized parts of the electromagnetic spectrum to deliver faster internet speeds, more reliable connectivity, and breakthroughs in artificial intelligence.

By auctioning off additional parts of the electromagnetic spectrum, as the House Energy and Commerce Committee approved to do earlier this month, the government could not only reap billions of dollars in tax revenues, but also enable advances in wireless technology in the private sector that could support the development of driverless cars, more reliable remote surgeries, or other types of technological breakthroughs.

President Trump indicated in a May 20 post that the U.S. government should auction off large chunks of the spectrum in order to ensure that the United States can remain a world-leader in 6G technologies and WiFi accessibility. These are critically important goals, and President Trump is correct that America must remain a leader in these technology areas.

Such an auction, however, could come with a significant cost if certain parts of the spectrum were not fenced off for national security reasons.

In particular, the 3.1 to 3.45 GHz band of the spectrum that may be auctioned off is currently reserved for military applications and are critical to missile defenses such as the Navy’s Aegis system. These systems are central to defending against ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles—all of which are required if the United States is going to build the Golden Dome for America missile defense architecture.

MITRE sounds alarm on cyber war threats to critical infrastructure, presents five-step playbook

As geopolitical tensions sharpen and cyber operations move into the shadows of critical infrastructure, non-profit organization MITRE published a fact sheet on its December 2024 national-level tabletop exercise, offering a glimpse into how government and industry leaders are grappling with the growing possibility of a sustained cyber assault across American installations. The white paper lays down five steps to prepare critical infrastructure for a cyber war, including creating a civil defense mindset, managing limited resources during emergencies, planning for operations under extreme conditions, strengthening emergency communications systems, and ensuring workforce readiness for emergencies.

Authored by Mark Bristow, Irving Lachow, Meredith Keybl, and Lisa Mackin, the MITRE white paper draws on insights from more than 200 participants across 70 public and private sector organizations who took part in a national-level simulation of prolonged cyber disruption. The exercise revealed a stark reality that isolated breach response is no longer sufficient. As adversaries target the interconnected systems that power the nation’s electric grids, water infrastructure, transportation networks, and emergency communications, the priority must shift toward strategies that enable sustained resilience. Survival in this new threat environment hinges on the ability to operate through persistent attacks, not just recover from them.

The publication summarizes key takeaways from MITRE’s tabletop exercise and subsequent stakeholder discussions on infrastructure resiliency, societal preparedness, and coordinated national-local responses. It delineates observations, challenges, and actionable recommendations, emphasizing the importance of collaboration, contingency planning, and operational readiness for prolonged cyber disruptions. Furthermore, while security considerations limit the findings shared in the document, full details are available to U.S. critical infrastructure owners/operators and government entities.

MITRE detailed that stakeholders stressed the need to prepare the public for disruptions to essential services like electricity, water, telecommunications, and transportation during a cyber conflict. Infrastructure owners must collaborate with federal, state, and local governments to align restoration priorities and coordinate emergency responses.

Handbook for Cyber Stress Tests

ENISA developed this handbook as guidance for national or sectorial authorities overseeing cybersecurity and resilience of critical sectors, at the national level, regional or EU level under NIS 2 Directive. It could also be useful for other supervisory and national authorities under the sectorial regulations, such as those under Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) or the Critical Entities Resilience (CER) Directive.

Anticipating AI’s Impact on the Cyber Offense-Defense Balance

Artificial intelligence (AI) is beginning to change cybersecurity. This report takes a comprehensive look across cybersecurity to anticipate whether those changes will help cyber defense or offense. Rather than a single answer, there are many ways that AI will help both cyber attackers and defenders. The report finds that there are also several actions that defenders can take to tilt the odds to their favor.Download Full Report

The cyber domain touches nearly all systems and aspects of society, so any changes to the relative offense-defense balance in cyber could be very impactful. As a digital technology, AI can be expected to have a more direct effect on those balances than in other domains.

To assess how AI may affect the offense-defense balance within cyber, we collected arguments for an offensive or defensive bias in various aspects of cyber operations as well as arguments for what gives cyber its unique character. We then considered how varying levels of AI advancement might strengthen, weaken, or alter those arguments. The results of that analysis are grouped into five categories: Changes to the Digital Ecosystem, Hardening Digital Environments, Tactical Aspects of Digital Engagements, Incentives and Opportunities, and Strategic Effects on Conflict and Crisis.

There is no single answer to the question of whether AI will make cyber offense or defense dominant. Cyber attackers and defenders have too many different goals that can be achieved in multiple ways, but AI is likely to change the cyber landscape in ways that can be predicted and perhaps controlled to some extent.

Although AI will increase the scope of defensive tasks by making the digital ecosystem larger and more complex, it may also reduce the scope of defensive tasks in other ways, such as by decreasing the number of network connections to monitor. AI systems could replace known human weaknesses, but AI components are often vulnerable. AI components could also aggregate too much information or control into high-risk digital targets, and eliminating manual controls could reduce resilience during attacks. As system designers, acquisition officials, and users incorporate or implement AI, they will decide how much risk to accept along each of these lines.

AI also promises to further harden digital environments by performing tasks that currently overwhelm defenders. If these tasks can be done reliably by AI and if defenders can keep up with faster discoveries of new vulnerabilities and attack tactics, then defenders can take advantage of their ability to impose delays and frictions to gain more from AI than attackers. Doing so could prevent AI from enticing new threat actors and could limit the strategic benefits that aggressors might see from AI’s increase in speed and scale. But that defensive advantage is far from guaranteed and there are several missteps that could push the balance toward offense instead of defense in the years to come.

The US Is Losing Its Technological Edge

The Big Picture brings together a range of PS commentaries to give readers a comprehensive understanding of topics in the news – and the deeper issues driving the news. The Big Question features concise contributor analysis and predictions on timely topics.

From the Cold War of the twentieth century to today’s US-China rivalry, technology has been a prominent feature of superpower competition. This worked well for the United States in the past, but with Donald Trump’s administration apparently intent on destroying America’s vaunted innovation ecosystem, it is far from clear who will come out on top this time.

The Best and Worst Way to Remove a Tick

Angela Haupt

You probably won’t see a tick as it clings to a blade of grass, but it can see you. The tiny parasites are opportunists that spend their days waiting for humans, dogs, and other mammals to brush against them so they can latch onto exposed skin and feed on blood. As the climate warms and tick populations proliferate, there’s a good chance that in many parts of the U.S., you’ll get intimately acquainted with one this summer.

Most people who get bitten by a tick will be perfectly fine, says Michel Shamoon-Pour, a molecular anthropologist at the Binghamton University Tick-borne Disease Center in New York. But a small percentage develop serious symptoms related to Lyme disease and other illnesses, including anaplasmosis and babesiosis. “The best thing you can do is avoid a tick bite—and, if you find a tick, remove it quickly and safely,” Shamoon-Pour says. “That’s the closest we get to not having to worry about diagnosing or treating an infection. Just put a stop to it before it starts.”

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Tick removal requires technique—and if you don’t do it correctly, you can increase your risk of infection. We asked experts for the best and worst ways to remove a tick.

Best: Use fine-tip tweezers

Worst: Use your fingers or a tweezers with a wide tip

Ticks are remarkably small—many are no bigger than a poppy seed, Shamoon-Pour says. Adult deer ticks, for example, are about 1/10th of an inch when they’re not engorged. If you go after one with your big, clumsy fingers, or a large tweezers, you’re probably going to end up grabbing the body of the tick—and that’s one of the chief mistakes experts report people make. Speaking of…

Best: Grab the tick’s mouth

Worst: Go after its body

When you’re ready to remove a tick from your body (or someone else’s), use your tweezers to clasp its mouth, which is the part digging into your skin. Don’t grab the entire body. If you do, you’ll end up squeezing it, “and our concern is the potential presence of pathogens,” Shamoon-Pour says. “If you squeeze the tick, you’re going to be basically emptying whatever is in its body, including potentially pathogens, into your skin.”

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