Indian Strategic Studies: 06/21/25

21 June 2025

India’s Great-Power Delusions

Since the turn of the century, the United States has sought to help India rise as a great power. During George W. Bush’s presidency, Washington agreed to a major deal with New Delhi that offered support for India’s civilian nuclear program despite the country’s controversial development of nuclear weapons. Under the Obama administration,

the United States and India began defense industrial cooperation that aimed to boost the latter’s military capabilities and help it project power. During President Donald Trump’s first term, the United States started sharing sensitive intelligence with India and made it eligible to receive advanced technologies previously reserved only for American allies;

under President Joe Biden, Washington gave New Delhi sophisticated fighter jet engine technology. Each of these recent administrations deepened diplomatic, technological, and military cooperation with India, making good on Bush’s promise “to help India become a major world power in the twenty-first century.”

The rationale for this pledge was simple. Washington wanted to transcend the rancor of the Cold War era that had divided the two great democracies. With the demise of the Soviet Union, India and the United States no longer had reason to be on opposite sides. Furthermore,

they were increasingly tied by deep people-to-people connections, as Indian immigrants played a larger role in shaping the American economy and New Delhi’s own post–Cold War economic reforms invited American firms and capital to Indian markets. Beneath these shifts lay a deeper geopolitical opportunity: Indian and U.S. officials recognized that they had many shared interests, including combating Islamist terrorism and, more important, addressing the dangers of a rising China while protecting the liberal international order. Washington correctly concluded that a stronger India would make for a stronger United States.

But India and the United States are not aligned on all issues. New Delhi does not want a world in which Washington is perpetually the sole superpower. Instead, it seeks a multipolar international system, in which India would rank as a genuine great power. It aims to restrain not just China—the near-term challenge—but also any country that would aspire to singular, hegemonic dominance, including the United States.

The May 2025 India-Pakistan Conflict Neither Quite the Same Nor Quite Another

Frédéric Grare

Frédéric Grare examines the norms that were broken during the May 2025 India-Pakistan conflict. He assesses the implications for the India-Pakistan relationship as well as the roles of the United States and China in South Asia.

On May 10, 2025, following four days of intense fighting, India and Pakistan accepted a ceasefire, putting an end to what had been the greatest military escalation between the two countries in decades. Initially broken within a matter of hours, the ensuing uneasy truce remains in effect at the time of writing.

As the fog of war gradually dissipates, the battle of narratives continues unabated. What is the significance of a conflict that paradoxically is very familiar yet, by comparison with previous India-Pakistan wars, relatively out of the norm?

The conflict was still constrained by the nuclear factor, but the limits were no longer geographic. It also mobilized a set of new, cheaper, and perhaps more destabilizing weapons. Two major diplomatic documents, the Indus Water Treaty and the Simla Agreement,[1] signed respectively in 1960 and 1972, were suspended—if not de facto abrogated—and the conflict ushered in a new military doctrine on the Indian side.

With crisis after crisis, though, relations between India and Pakistan are going nowhere. The latter’s behavior is unlikely to sustainably change in the foreseeable future.

This commentary will examine the norms that were broken during the conflict and assess the implications for the India-Pakistan relationship as well as the roles of the United States and China in South Asia.

A Conflict Out of Norms

The four-day military conflict between India and Pakistan from May 7 to 10 broke norms in more than one way. Pakistan-sponsored terrorist attacks had in the past led to retaliations limited to Pakistan-administered Kashmir. In response to a terrorist attack on April 22 in India-administered Kashmir that India alleges was sponsored by Pakistan, the Indian Air Force conducted airstrikes not only in Pakistan-administered Kashmir but also in Pakistani Punjab. The latter area is the heartland of Pakistan’s army and the country’s economic, political, and strategic center of gravity.

The Most Dangerous War Game Finally Happened

Gary Anderson

Since 2011, my graduate Red Team class at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs has had a final exercise in which the students play an Iranian reaction to what actually just happened with Israel’s attack on Iran’s nuclear program. In the game, the students play the main Iranian government factions.

They are deciding how to react to a Blue (American) proposal designed to contain the crisis before it becomes a major regional conflict. In the game the students play against Blue but also against each other to influence the Supreme Leader’s final decision regarding how to react to the American proposal.

The only constant in all games through 14 years is that no Iranian team ever seriously considered giving up the quest for nuclear weapons.

Over the years, the final outcome has largely been determined by the relations between Tehran and whatever administration was in power in Washington. Every year, I have anticipated a need for a new scenario expecting that Israel would strike. This year, it finally happened.

The student groups play the three power factions in Iran. These include the Guardian Council, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and the Executive Branch (which includes the office of the President and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). A Supreme leader is selected from the class and tasked with making the final decision. This is what is called a Complex (multi-sided) Seminar War Game (or simulation). During the course of the semester the students study the motivations of their group in preparation for the game.

Not surprisingly, the Guardian Council group is primarily interested in staying in power and protecting the hereditary land ownership that makes them the primary landlords and agricultural power in Iran. The IRGC has two primary interests. First, as they guys with the guns, they control the population and quell unrest. Second,

this is a “for profit” organization which owns the nuclear program. They will resist any attempt to seriously control or curtail their attempt to get nuclear weapons. Finally, the Administration Team represents what passes as adult supervision in Iran. They are primarily interested in seeing that the crisis not escalate into a full borne regional war, but they are also the weakest faction.

Does Xi Have Trump’s Number? China has come out ahead in recent dealmaking.

Scott Kennedy,

The world breathed a sigh of relief on May 12 when, after negotiations in Geneva, the United States and China initially agreed to a 90-day pause in their trade war, halting sky-high reciprocal tariffs and other measures,

such as China’s latest export controls on rare earths. Markets reacted positively, and businesses geared up to use the pause to ramp up trade of goods in both directions, in case the cease-fire wasn’t extended.

The goodwill lasted all of one day. The deal quickly hit a snag over the status of the seven rare earths (samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, and yttrium), but it’s not clear why—or how significant this is. Some may read this as another example of the tussle between the two powers,

with things likely to settle down after the recent meeting in London, in which China agreed to a six-month pause on any rare-earth limitations. U.S. President Donald Trump said the deal was “done,” while Chinese Vice Commerce Minister Li Chenggang said the two sides had, “in principle, reached a framework for implementing the consensus.”

Scott Kennedy is a senior advisor and trustee chair in Chinese business and economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Read More On Economics | Geopolitics | Trade Policy & Agreements

Scott Bessent and He Lifend stand next to each other while shaking hands and posing for a photo. Behind them are United States and Chinese flags.

Weaponizing Commercial Airspace Disruption: An Emergent Strategy for Iran and the Houthis

Chelsi Mueller, Brianne Bernhardt

On May 4, 2025, the Houthis launched a missile from Yemen—built with Iranian-supplied components—that evaded Israeli and American air defenses and struck within the perimeter of Israel’s Ben Gurion International Airport. The strike triggered a cascade of flight suspensions that grounded many non-Israeli airlines, left Israelis stranded abroad, and discouraged tourism and business travel to Israel. Between 2015 and 2022, during the US-supported, Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen, Saudi Arabia faced a similar threat when nearly 1,000 missile and 350 drone attacks—executed by the Iran-backed Houthis—targeted critical infrastructure, particularly airports, resulting in repeated disruptions to civil air traffic. Most notably, al-Abha International Airport in southwestern Saudi Arabia was hit twice in June 2019.

The outbreak of war between Israel and Iran on June 13, following Israel’s preemptive strike on Iran’s nuclear weapons program, has opened a new frontier for this warfare model. Iran’s initial aerial retaliation targeted Israel’s defense headquarters in Tel Aviv, but its subsequent aerial retaliations focused on civilian population centers—a shift that underscores its evolving tactical priorities, given its diminishing missile arsenal. How might Iran adapt its strategy in response to the reopening of Israel’s airspace to commercial traffic? This analysis explores how the intentional targeting of commercial air traffic has become a potent instrument of asymmetric warfare for Iran and the Houthis.

Missile Strike at Ben Gurion International Airport

Despite Israel’s robust air defense system successfully intercepting dozens of missiles launched from Yemen in prior attacks, on May 4, 2025, a single missile evaded interception and landed within the grounds of Ben Gurion International Airport. At 9:18 am Israel time, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) detected a launch and promptly relayed a warning to air traffic controllers who then activated their prearranged response protocols and airborne aircraft were diverted away from potential interception zones. One aircraft on final approach was permitted to land at 9:21 am. Air raid sirens sounded at 9:22 am across central Israel, including the airport’s vicinity. At 9:24 am a missile struck a field near an access road leading to an airport parking lot. According to Israel’s Civil Aviation Authority, “Following approximately thirty minutes of runway inspections, landing operations resumed.”

Iran Threatens Nuclear Exit And Oil Choke Point As War With Israel Escalates – Analysis

RFE RL, Kian Sharifi

(RFE/RL) — Amid an escalating Israeli air campaign against Iran, calls are mounting in Tehran to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and close the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most critical oil routes.

The archenemies have been trading fire since June 13 after Israel launched an unprecedented attack on Iran’s nuclear sites, military bases, and residential areas in a bid to hinder Tehran’s program and eliminate top military leadership.

Several high-profile Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders and nuclear scientists have been killed in the attacks. Iran’s Health Ministry said on June 15 that 224 people, including children, had been killed.

At least 24 people, including civilians, have been killed in Iranian counterstrikes, according to Israeli authorities.

Israel said it launched its attack because it had concluded that Iran was weeks, if not days, away from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Iran rejects the claim, insisting that its nuclear program is peaceful.

Iran’s parliament is moving forward with a bill to withdraw from the NPT, Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baqaei announced on June 16. Iranian officials are also threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz if the attacks continue.

But experts warn Tehran’s threats may be more about political theater than imminent change.

NPT Withdrawal: More Bark Than Bite?

Hard-line Iranian lawmaker Hamid Rasaee over the weekend charged that there was no point in remaining in the NPT since it had failed to protect Iran’s nuclear sites from attacks.

Fellow hard-line legislator Mohammad Mannan weighed in, announcing that a high-priority bill would be submitted to the parliament to push ahead with the withdrawal.

Despite the heated rhetoric in Tehran, experts say Iran is unlikely to actually leave the treaty anytime soon.

Israel’s Airstrikes Against Iran: Strategic And Regional Ramifications – Analysis

Dr. Yunis Gurbanov

Israel’s coordinated drone and aerial strike against Iran in the early morning hours of June 13, 2025, attributed officially by Operation Rising Lion, was a significant escalation of the decades-long covert war between the two countries.

The strikes hit over 100 locations, reports said, including Natanz and Fordow nuclear enrichment plants, various ballistic missile bunkers around Isfahan, and various Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) command and intelligence hubs. Iranian state media confirmed the deaths of at least 39 personnel, including two senior IRGC officers, Brig. Gen. Amir Reza Shahraki and Col. Hassan Hedayati, both involved in missile operations and regional proxy management.

Furthermore, the bombing caused extensive central and western Iran infrastructure destruction, disrupted vital military command and communication nodes, and triggered the instantaneous closure of uranium enrichment at major facilities. Israel’s targeting of Iran’s nuclear program marks more than a tactical escalation. It signals a calculated move away from deniable operations toward open military confrontation. From a strategic point of view, Operation Rising Lion underscored Israel’s increasing readiness to engage in escalatory risk in pursuing long-term regional deterrence.

That Israel could strike with such precision, and over such a wide area, suggests that Iranian air defenses had already been compromised. It also reveals just how far Israel’s intelligence and surveillance reach has evolved. Authoritative analyses, including those of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the Financial Times, have noted how this strike illustrates Israel’s transition from reactive deterrence to active disruption. The subdued and largely ineffective Iranian retaliation, chiefly through intercepted drones, illustrates an asymmetric balance: while Tehran retains proxy leverage, its direct conventional response options appear constrained.

Why Israel’s Attack on Iran Is a Geopolitical Blow for India

Gaurav Sen

On June 12, Israel launched a significant military operation targeting Iran, marking a dramatic escalation in the ongoing conflict between the two nations. This operation, described as a preemptive strike, aimed at crippling Iran’s nuclear program and eliminating key military leaders associated with it. The ongoing strikes exchanged since then by Israel and Iran will have significant implications for India, given its strategic interests and relationships with both nations.

The Israeli airstrikes focused on multiple military and nuclear sites across Iran, including facilities in Tehran and other strategic locations. Reports indicate that the strikes resulted in the deaths of several high-ranking Iranian officials, including Major General Mohammad Bagheri and Major General Hossein Salami, among others. The Israeli military confirmed that the operation was intended to disrupt Iran’s nuclear capabilities and missile programs.

Iranian officials vowed to respond decisively to what they view as an act of aggression. Following the Israeli strikes, Iran declared a state of emergency and launched retaliatory missile attacks against Israel. Reports indicate that Iran fired dozens of missiles, with some reaching Israeli territory, leading to casualties and damage.

The conflict is bad news for India for several reasons.

First, Iran serves as India’s conduit to Central Asia. India has invested billions in Iran’s Chabahar port – a competitor to Gwadar port in Pakistan – to establish a direct link with Central Asia. Central Asia is crucial for India, not only regarding energy security but also due to its abundance of rare earth minerals, but India does not share a direct border with the region, limited trade potential. The Iran-Israel conflict will jeopardize India’s connectivity plans and impede the long-anticipated progress of the International North-South Corridor.

The Iran-Israel Conflict Drives Home the Importance of Gwadar for China

Kashif Hasan Khan

Israel’s airstrikes on Iranian nuclear and military targets, followed by Iranian missile and drone counterattacks, have roiled the Gulf region. Amid the conflict, global energy flows and maritime security are increasingly in question, with shipping disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most vital oil chokepoint.

With traditional shipping lanes from the Gulf in jeopardy, Gwadar Port in Pakistan is once again in focus. Gwadar has never been just a commercial node, but instead serves as a strategic safety valve in China’s long-term energy calculus.

Approximately one-fifth of global oil trade transits through the Strait of Hormuz, and its closure would ripple through the world economy. Recently, Iranian MPs made exactly this threat amid the Iran-Israel hostilities. Meanwhile, shipping disruptions are already visible. Container vessels are slowing down in the strait, a sign of anxiety among maritime operators.

Markets have responded accordingly. Oil prices rose 7-14 percent in the immediate aftermath of initial strikes, then settled marginally as no actual blockade occurred. As one analyst noted, global supply thus far has remained firm because Tehran often prefers to leverage fear rather than follow through. Yet it is often true that threats drive prices more than actions.

Iran’s capability is real. It has amassed missiles, naval mines, anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems, and drones – all tools that could significantly disrupt Hormuz transit. Nevertheless, closing the Strait of Hormuz would also cause economic damage to Iran itself, jeopardizing its sea-based oil exports and risking the ire of key buyers like China.

Whatever unfolds from here, this unfolding crisis adds urgency to Beijing’s push to develop alternative transit routes like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which centers on the port of Gwadar. Strategically located just outside the high-risk Gulf area but connected to China via pipelines and highways, Gwadar offers a route to bypass the congested Malacca Strait – and potentially even Hormuz, if an overland pipeline connecting Pakistan and Iran ever becomes a reality.

Which Fighter Jets Did Israel Use to Attack Iran?

Harrison Kass

The three American-made fighter jets proved their worth on the battlefield, allowing Israel to target Iranian nuclear sites with precision.

In recent airstrikes against Iran, Israel deployed a combination of advanced aircraft, all American-made. The three aircraft involved in the strike were the F-35I Adir, the F-16I Sufa, and the F-15I Ra’am.

The Israeli aircraft were used to devastating effect, as part of “Operation Rising Lion,” which involved over 200 jets. Iranian targets in the attack included Iranian nuclear and military infrastructure.

The F-35I Adir is a customized variant of the American F-35 Lightning II, specially tailored for the Israeli Air Force (IAF). The Adir features Israeli-developed avionics, electronic warfare systems, and weaponry, enhancing the aircraft’s capabilities in stealth, precision strikes, and electronic warfare.

During Operation Rising Lion, the Adir was instrumental in the targeting of over 100 sites across Iran, including the Natanz uranium enrichment facility, missile production sites,

and air-defense systems. The Adir allowed the Israeli air force to penetrate Iranian airspace and disable advanced air-defense systems, such as its S-300 batteries, while minimizing exposure to risk. The Adir speaks to Israel’s strategic emphasis on advanced, stealthy, and precise air power in its military operations.

Why the Defense Sector Is a Strategic Imperative, Not a Passing Trend

Robert S. Walsh

We are no longer living in an era defined by isolated conflicts or short-lived military engagements. The Russia–Ukraine war, the Israel–Hamas conflict, ongoing tensions between India and Pakistan, and the enduring civil war in Syria all point to a new geopolitical reality: we are in an age of prolonged, multi-year conflicts that reshape regional and global power structures. These are not flashpoints, they are drawn-out struggles with open beginnings and undefined ends.

This is the world as it is, not as we hoped it would be. From proxy wars to asymmetric campaigns, these conflicts are both highly regional and globally consequential. Each one touches supply chains, diplomatic alignments, and resource flows. They mark the end of an era where peace was assumed, and war was the exception. We are witnessing the return of geopolitical competition on a systemic level between major powers, ideologies, and civilizations.

This emerging paradigm demands a fundamental shift in how war is understood not only by generals and policymakers, but by societies and markets. The immediate response to the crisis, marked by short-term procurement surges and emergency allocations, is no longer sufficient. What’s required is a long-term strategy: multi-year supply agreements, secure and exclusive production lines, and sustained investment in innovation and readiness. War is no longer about the next campaign; it’s about the next decade.

The commercial logic follows naturally. Governments and defense clients must now think in decades, not quarters. Defense readiness has become an enduring priority, not a budgetary footnote. Those who understand this shift and act on it will be the ones who shape the next generation of security architecture.

There is something significant unfolding here. This is not about trend-chasing. It’s about positioning ourselves on the right side of a long historical arc. A return to great power politics, accelerated by technology and shaped by fractured alliances, is bringing the world into a period of sustained strategic competition.

What Can We Learn from Israel’s Attack on Iran

Eyal Tsir Cohen & Jesse R. Weinberg

On June 13, 2025, Israel launched a direct and sustained attack on Iran — a calculated and multi-layered military operation that marked the culmination of years of strategic buildup, intelligence assessments, and unheeded warnings. While the world debates the implications, the more important question is: What can we learn from this operation?

Why Now?

To understand the timing, one must recognize the growing urgency in Israeli assessments over the past year. Iran had been accelerating its nuclear enrichment program and advancing weaponization research at an alarming pace. At the same time, it became increasingly immune to deterrence. Iran dismissed U.S. efforts to signal a credible military threat and interpreted international caution as strategic paralysis.

Most critically, Tehran misjudged Israel’s resolve. In the wake of the October 7th attack by Hamas — a day that fundamentally changed Israeli strategic thinking — it became clear that existential threats would no longer be managed with ambiguity. For Israel, the combination of unchecked uranium enrichment and Iranian defiance left no option but military action. War, at this point, was not a question of preference — it was a matter of national survival.

How Did Israel Strike?

The Israeli campaign was defined by one crucial military principle: surprise. The initial phase of the operation targeted Iran’s ability to respond. Israel sought to decapitate both the leadership and the operational infrastructure that could enable a counterstrike. The groundwork for this was laid months earlier, on October 26, 2024, when Israel covertly dismantled key segments of Iran’s air defense systems. This preliminary strike created a corridor of vulnerability, enabling a stealth offensive when the time came.

This was not a one-night strike. It was the opening move in a rolling campaign — and success demanded a wide spectrum of capabilities. By degrading Iran’s layered air defense networks, Israel expanded the operational freedom of its air force for the critical days and weeks that would follow.

Is the U.S. Vulnerable to a Drone Sneak Attack?

The first ironclad battle between the Union and the Confederacy resulted in the instant obsolescence of the wooden “ship of the line.” The Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor demonstrated the supremacy of the aircraft carrier over the battleship. A short while ago, Ukraine’s sneak attack using pre-positioned drones marked a similar leap for gaining momentum and supremacy in battle.

Israel’s recent attack on Iran further demonstrates the unstoppable power of drones swarming from bases already within the target country. Evidence has emerged that Israel pre-positioned drones within the interior of Iran. Details are sparse, but we can hypothesize that the Israeli attack exploited a technique similar to the one recently used by the Ukrainians: hauling truck boxes disguised as commercial shipping deep into the interior of the target country near the most sensitive targets. When the agents are safely out of harm’s way, a remote signal activates the automated drones to deliver small explosive payloads with devastating precision.

The Russian nuclear-capable bombers presented a soft target to the Ukrainians; the Iranian military leadership was an even softer target for Israel. Technology exists to create killer drones with facial recognition software and AI navigation that can stealthily hunt down specific targets. When they locate the target, a charge large enough to take out that target alone explodes within point-blank range.

Unlike the advancements in ironclads, nuclear weapons, or aircraft carriers, a massive industrial effort is not required to build drones. China, Iran, Russia, and many other countries are automating drone production on a massive scale, as if the survival of their regimes depends on it. And it seems likely that warfare is changing so that regime longevity does depend on a credible drone offense and defense capability.

Iran’s pathetic counterattack, in which most of their return missiles were destroyed, further demonstrates the impotence of conventional weaponry in projecting an attack over the long-range distance separating two belligerent powers.

We’ve had similar panics before about terrorists smuggling in a “suitcase” nuclear weapon or a pathogen. If we’re to believe our Justice Department, Chinese operatives have now been caught trying to smuggle in “potential agroterrorism weapons” said to be capable of infecting the U.S. food supply.

The US Is Already Losing the Next War

Holden Triplett

The US intelligence apparatus needs new legal authorities, operational models, and institutions built for hybrid warfare.

The next war has already begun. We are just not fighting back yet. While national security debates focus on Russian aggression in Ukraine or a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan, these are conventional scenarios. The more urgent conflict is already underway—hybridized intelligence warfare.

Unlike traditional battles, these wars are fought across TikTok and Instagram feeds, encrypted messaging apps, proxy criminal networks, and supply chains. Additionally, such warfare is not typically conducted by military assets. Its game pieces are a combination of intelligence, security, and law enforcement assets.

Despite this, our wargaming and policy planning remain fixated on tanks and missiles. The problem is not that those threats are fictional—they are, of course, very real—but that our institutions are structurally blind to the ongoing forms of conflict that don’t look like traditional war.

The recent Ukrainian drone attack on Russian air force assets is a case in point. While it caused serious physical damage to Russia’s bomber fleet, its more important function was symbolic and informational. The operation was led not by the Ukrainian military but by the SBU—Ukraine’s domestic intelligence and security service. The strike was quickly publicized through edited footage designed for global platforms. This was not war in the traditional sense—it was messaging through sabotage, weaponized for X/Twitter.

This is the emerging norm. Covert manipulation of key institutions—economic, political, and social—is no longer just a means to facilitate battlefield victories; it has become an end in itself and the main event. Russia, China, and others have created and operationalized a playbook that includes cyber intrusions of critical infrastructure, digital propaganda psychologically reshaping societies, and strategic corruption to hollow out institutions from within. All are operationally organized by intelligence, security, and law enforcement assets. Not military assets.

The Normal President

Lee Smith

The main reason Israel’s massive attack on Iranian leadership, nuclear facilities, and other targets came as a surprise is that no one believes American presidents when they talk about protecting Americans and advancing our interests—especially when they’re talking about the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Ever since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, U.S. presidents have wanted an accommodation with Iran—not revenge for holding 52 Americans captive for 444 days, but comity. Ronald Reagan told Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to tear down the Berlin Wall, but when the Iranians’ Lebanese ally Hezbollah killed 17 Americans at the U.S. embassy in Beirut and 241 at the Marine barracks in 1983, he flinched.

Bill Clinton wanted a deal with Iran so badly, he helped hide the Iranians’ sponsorship of the group that killed 19 airmen at Khobar Towers in 1996. George W. Bush turned a blind eye to Tehran’s depredations as Shia militias backed by Iran killed hundreds of U.S. troops in Iraq, while Iran’s Syrian ally Bashar al-Assad chartered buses to transport Sunni fighters from the Damascus airport to the Iraqi border,

where they joined the hunt for Americans. Barack Obama’s signature foreign policy initiative was the Iran nuclear deal—designed not, as he promised, to stop Tehran’s nuclear weapons program, but to legalize it and protect it under the umbrella of an international agreement, backed by the United States.

That all changed with Donald Trump. At last, an American president kept his word. He was very clear about it even before his second term started: Iran can’t have a bomb. Trump wanted it to go peacefully, but he warned that if the Iranians didn’t agree to dismantle their program entirely, they’d be bombed. Maybe Israel would do it, maybe the United States, maybe both, but in any case, they’d be bombed. Trump gave them 60 days to decide, and on day 61, Israel unleashed Operation Rising Lion.

Until this morning, when Trump posted on Truth Social to take credit for the raid, there was some confusion about the administration’s involvement. As the operation began, Secretary of State Marco Rubio released a statement claiming that it was solely an Israeli show without any American participation. But even if details about intelligence sharing and other aspects of Israeli-U.S. coordination were hazy, the statement was obviously misleading: The entire operation was keyed to Trump. Without him, the attack wouldn’t have happened as it did, or maybe not at all.

With no clear exit strategy in Iran, Israel risks another war with no end

Analysis by Matthew Chance, Chief Global Affairs Correspondent

Despite stunning early successes in Israel’s unprecedented strikes on Iran, a weekend of intensive bombardment and retaliation is raising questions about Israel’s exit strategy – how it can end this conflict with its ambitious goals achieved.

While Israeli war planes pummel Iranian military and nuclear sites virtually unopposed, dozens of Israelis have been killed and injured in retaliatory Iranian attacks.

Meanwhile, the United States – though helping Israel defend against Iranian missile strikes – is for the moment refusing to take part in attacking Iran, forcing Israel to reassess what its military operations can achieve.

“The end will be diplomatic, not military,” one Israeli source told CNN, adding the Israeli hope is now that its ongoing military action “weakens Iran’s negotiating hand” in any future nuclear talks.

This same theory, that Israeli military action will pressure an adversary to make concessions, has failed to force Hamas in Gaza to cave. Still, the mere mention of Iranian negotiations as a possible outcome suggests a shifting view.

From the start of the unprecedented strikes on Iran last week, Israel made its aims perfectly clear.

The intention, one Israeli military official spelled out to CNN, was to permanently remove the Islamic Republic’s “existential” nuclear and ballistic missile threats.

And no time limit would be set, the official insisted, to fulfil that military objective.

But that ambition, always highly dependent on the United States joining Israel militarily, has now run up against the reality of US reluctance to get drawn into yet another Mideast war.

Sources familiar with the matter tell CNN that Israel has spoken with the US about increasing its level of involvement.

Russia’s Influence in Middle East Takes Hit From Israeli Strikes

Israel’s unexpected missile offensive on Iran on June 13 caught Moscow off guard, disrupting its assumptions about U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations and raising suspicions of a concealed Western strategy to undercut Tehran’s military and nuclear ambitions.

Moscow condemned Israel’s actions rhetorically but failed to offer substantive responses, and many passages in its statement read like descriptions of Russia’s own aggression against Ukraine.

Russia’s strategic partnership with Iran and its loss of influence in Syria and Libya, along with ineffective oil price manipulation, highlight Russia’s vulnerability and declining global status.

Israel’s decision to launch a series of missile and bomb strikes on Iran on June 13 was a shocking surprise for Moscow, where the working assumption had been centered on the presumably protracted U.S.-Iranian talks on the limitations of the nuclear program (see EDM, May 5).

The possibility of an independent Israeli decision appears inconceivable to the Russian leadership, so it likely concludes that the now-suspended talks in Oman were merely a cover-up for the real U.S. strategy of degrading Iranian offensive capabilities and undermining its nuclear ambitions (Kommersant, June 13).

Nobody dares to suggest that Russian President Vladimir Putin unwittingly contributed to that supposed ruse by offering to mediate between Iran and the United States, and in the latest phone conversation with U.S. President Donald Trump,

the Russian autocrat reiterated that offer and shared the content of his conversation with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, while condemning the Israeli strikes (President of Russia, June 13; RBC, June 14).

Russian Soldiers in Ukraine Use Smartphone Videos for Protest at Home

Russian soldiers fighting against Ukraine are making and sending home video protests to their local governments about a wide variety of issues, boosting the profile of opposition causes.

Video protests from soldiers are increasing because commanders are unwilling to spark more anger in the ranks by confiscating smartphones. The videos are often effective because officials in Russia are less willing to ignore the voices of soldiers than they are of civilians.

One indication of Kremlin concern about this development is a new plan for a census of smartphones and related devices, which would make it easier for commanders to restrict soldiers’ smartphone use.

Moscow has long been worried about veterans of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine causing problems when they return to Russia (see EDM, January 19, 2024, May 29). Russian soldiers in Ukraine,

however, are already creating problems for their local governments. These soldiers are increasingly using their smartphones while fighting in Ukraine, not just to communicate with friends and families but also to send video protests to officials in their hometowns about a wide variety of issues (Novaya Gazeta, June 7; Kedr, June 10).

Video protests are growing in number because commanders are unwilling to confiscate soldiers’ phones and punish those using them. Even though there is currently a ban on soldiers at the front using smartphones, commanders are not enforcing these rules,

lest they spark more anger (Oreanda; Smolnarod, August 24, 2024). Protest videos produced by Russian soldiers in Ukraine are increasingly effective because officials in Russia are less willing to ignore the voices of soldiers than civilians. Civilian activists view military personnel as potential allies because soldiers can speak out more freely and are more likely to be heard by the Kremlin. Unsurprisingly,

the Russian government wants to stop soldiers’ infusion of support for opposition groups and plans to conduct a country-wide census of smartphones and related devices (Rossiiskaya gazeta, June 8). The census could make it easier for Russian commanders to restrict soldiers’ smartphone use, but some say that the plan could exacerbate the issue (Svobodnaya Pressa, June 16).

Israel Can’t Be a Hegemon

Stephen M. Walt

Israel’s far-reaching attack on Iran is the latest round in its campaign to eliminate or degrade every one of its regional opponents. In the wake of the Hamas attack in October 2023, it has waged a brutal campaign to destroy the Palestinian people as a meaningful political force, an effort that has been described as a genocide by leading human rights organizations and numerous academic experts. It has decimated the leadership of Hezbollah in Lebanon through airstrikes, booby-trapped cellphones, and other means.

It has attacked the Houthis in Yemen and bombed post-Assad Syria to destroy weapons caches and prevent forces it sees as dangerous from exercising political influence there. And the latest attacks on Iran aim to do more than just damage or destroy that country’s nuclear infrastructure. At a minimum, Israel wants to end the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program;

cripple Iran’s ability to respond by killing top Iranian leaders, military officials, diplomats, and scientists; and, if possible, drag the United States deeper into the war. At a maximum, it hopes to weaken the regime to the point where it collapses.

Given that each of these actions has been at least partially successful—at least in the short term—should we now think of Israel as a regional hegemon? If such a state is defined as “the sole great power within a particular region,” such that “no other states (or combination of states) could mount a serious defense in an all-out test of military strength,” does Israel now qualify? If so, should we also expect its neighbors to act as others have when facing a hegemon: “recognize its superior power and defer to it on matters of vital interest to the hegemon”?

Cyber pros warn Israel of possible Iranian retaliation in the cyber realm

After Israel launched a large-scale offensive against Iranian nuclear and military infrastructure, Operation Rising Lion, on June 13th, there has been an escalation in cyberthreats.

“The cyber domain is a primary theater in the Israel-Iran conflict. Organizations across Israel must be aware and brace for a wave of sophisticated and ideologically driven cyberattacks,” cybersecurity company Radware said following the Israeli operation in Iran last Friday.By Majid Saeedi/GettyImages

Shortly after the news broke, the company noticed an increase in cyber activity by threat actors aligned with Iran. They claim to be attacking Tzofar – the Israeli public address system which notifies civilians of potential missile attacks.

Arabian Ghost claimed it had shut down several radio stations, and Team Bangladesh warned Jordan and Saudi Arabia about cyberattacks if they chose to support Israel. Another threat actor claimed they took down the Mossad’s website. And Handala, a pro-Palestinian hacktivist group, claimed it exfiltrated over two terabytes of data from two major Israeli energy companies, Delkol and Delek.

According to Radware, prominent Iran state-sponsored groups like APT34 (OilRig) and APT39 (Remix Kitten) continue to engage in surveillance, espionage, and disruptive operations targeting infrastructure.

“Iranian cyber operations are likely to be complemented by coordinated information warfare. Drawing from earlier campaigns, Iran is expected to activate AI-driven botnets and inauthentic social media personas to disseminate disinformation, erode public trust in Israeli leadership, and amplify divisive or destabilizing narratives,” Radware said.

Cyber hostilities between these two countries date back to at least 2010, when the first cyber weapon to cause physical destruction, the Stuxnet worm, was discovered. The infamous malware was programmed to mess with the systems of uranium-enriched centrifuges in hopes of disrupting Iran’s nuclear program.

Israel’s and Iran’s Military Adventurism Has Put the Middle East in an Alarmingly Dangerous Situation

Amr Hamzawy

For the past few months, the greatest threat to security in the Middle East has been the military adventurism pursued by Israel’s far-right government and its belief in its ability to impose its will on its enemies through warfare, coupled with its effective rejection of negotiations and peaceful solutions.

Sure, other dangers should be addressed, including the unregulated military applications of AI and the destabilizing effects of the Palestinian situation on Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq. But what is most alarming is the ease with which wars and armed conflicts now erupt in the Middle East (either directly or via proxies), the near-total absence of collective diplomatic frameworks, and the vast disparities in military and intelligence capabilities among regional powers.

As a result, the breakout of war between Israel and Iran last week was not surprising. Nor was the fact that Israel struck Iranian nuclear facilities and military sites across a wide geographical area and that it targeted nuclear scientists and military leaders. Equally unsurprising was Iran’s response: missiles launched at Israel, directed at military and strategic targets—some of which landed in residential areas. Nor was it unexpected that Israel insisted on prolonging the war, viewing the Iranian nuclear program as an existential threat, or that Iran offered to return to negotiations with the United States over its nuclear program once Israeli attacks ceased—effectively implying a ceasefire proposal.

The vast imbalance in military power and intelligence capabilities heavily favors Israel over Iran. The Islamic Republic’s most advanced air defense systems (the Russian S-300s) were destroyed in earlier Israeli strikes. And perhaps most notably, its proxies in the region—the cornerstone of its regional influence doctrine, largely established after the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and the fall of Saddam Hussein—are either militarily or politically depleted.

Where is Israel's operation heading?

On Friday, after Israel launched an unprecedented attack on Iran, its Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed Iranians directly. Speaking in English, he told them that the time had come for them to stand up against an "evil and oppressive regime".

Israel's military operations were, he announced, "clearing the path for you to achieve your freedom".

Now, as the military confrontation between Iran and Israel intensifies, and the range of targets widens, many are asking - what is Israel's real endgame?

Getty Images

On Friday Israel launched an unprecedented attack on Iran, including in the capital Tehran

Is it simply to end, as Netanyahu also declared on Friday on the first night of strikes, "the Islamic regime's nuclear and ballistic missile threat"?

Was it also to finish off any more talks between the US and Iran, to reach a new negotiated deal to curb Iran's nuclear programme in exchange for the lifting of painful sanctions?

Or could that message to Iranians about clearing a path to achieve freedom nod to an even bigger aim of trying to bring an end to Iran's clerical rule?

From generals to Trump: Who has his ear?

The political career of Israel's longest-serving prime minister has been marked by his personal mission to warn the world of the dangers posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran - from a cartoon of a bomb he's shown at the United Nations, to his repeated refrain during the last 20 months of a burning regional war that Iran was the biggest threat of all.

Social media now main source of news in US, research suggests

Social media and video networks have become the main source of news in the US, overtaking traditional TV channels and news websites, research suggests.

More than half (54%) of people get news from networks like Facebook, X and YouTube - overtaking TV (50%) and news sites and apps (48%), according to the Reuters Institute.

"The rise of social media and personality-based news is not unique to the United States, but changes seem to be happening faster – and with more impact – than in other countries," a report found.

Podcaster Joe Rogan was the most widely-seen personality, with almost a quarter (22%) of the population saying they had come across news or commentary from him in the previous week.

The report's author Nic Newman said the rise of social video and personality-driven news "represents another significant challenge for traditional publishers".

The institute also highlighted a trend for some politicians to give their time to sympathetic online hosts rather than mainstream interviewers.

It said populist politicians around the world are "increasingly able to bypass traditional journalism in favour of friendly partisan media, 'personalities', and 'influencers' who often get special access but rarely ask difficult questions, with many implicated in spreading false narratives or worse".

Despite their popularity, online influencers and personalities were named as a major source of false or misleading information by almost half of people worldwide (47%) - putting them level with politicians.

Quantifying the Gray Zone: A Framework for Measuring Hybrid Warfare Power Balances

Michael S. Groen, Andrew Borene, Doug Livermore

The contemporary security environment defies traditional categorizations of war and peace. We exist in what some analysts increasingly term a “hybrid Cold War,” that is, a persistent state of competition that blends conventional capabilities with irregular tactics, cyber operations, and information warfare. This reality demands that defense professionals move beyond conceptual hand-waving to develop quantifiable frameworks for assessing power balances in these gray zones of conflict.

Recent dialogue among intelligence, military, and defense industry professionals has highlighted a critical gap: the absence of systematic approaches to measure hybrid warfare capabilities and effectiveness. NATO’s newly published Hybrid Threats and Hybrid Warfare Reference Curriculum represents a significant step forward, targeting over 800 defense and security academies worldwide. However, the curriculum’s focus on resilience-building, while necessary, reflects Western democracies’ defensive posture in an arena where adversaries operate with fewer constraints.

Defining the Hybrid Battlefield

The mushy quality of hybrid warfare definitions has long frustrated practitioners. Unlike conventional warfare’s clear metrics—divisions, tanks, aircraft—hybrid capabilities resist easy quantification. The phenomenon encompasses everything from cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure to weaponized migration, cultural influence operations, and economic coercion.

Consider recent examples: Russian-backed interference in European elections, including direct support for political parties in Moldova; Chinese influence campaigns targeting Taiwan’s elections; and systematic attacks on undersea cables and telecommunications infrastructure across the Baltic region. These activities exist in the gray zone between peace and war, and are designed to achieve political objectives without triggering conventional military responses.

This strategic ambiguity serves adversaries well. Russia’s “active measures,” refined during the Cold War and adapted for the digital age, exemplify hybrid warfare’s evolutionary nature. The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki has documented how hybrid threats combine speed, scale, and intensity previously impossible before digital interconnectivity.

Army seeks hefty boost in network funding in Pentagon procurement proposal

Carley Welch

Gen. Randy George, Chief of Staff of the Army, discusses next generation command and control (C2) system capabilities with a 1st Infantry Division Soldier during a human machine Integration demonstration at Project Convergence – Capstone 4, Fort Irwin, Calif., March 18, 2024. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Brahim Douglas)

WASHINGTON — As the Army rushes to modernize its IT and communications networks, the recently revealed Pentagon procurement budget shows the service wants to pour hundreds of millions more into related portfolios.

The biggest increases were seen in the “management initialization and service” portfolio, with a jump to $244 million from $49 million last year. Additionally, the “tactical network communications” portfolio saw a jump of over $488 million, from $378 million in fiscal 2025 to $866 million this year.

While the procurement documents, obtained by Breaking Defense, don’t go into detail as to what those portfolios encompass, the management initialization and service one was described in the service’s FY25 Justification Books.

The books show that there are four distinct program components within the portfolio. They mostly cover logistics support for the Army’s networks enterprise management system, planning and monitoring for its wide portfolio of tactical radios, data products for network interoperability and support for the service’s unified network operations (UNO).

Inside the Army’s extensive UNO efforts lies the service’s Unified Network Plan which was announced in 2021 that aims to collapse its 69 and tactical networks into a single, shared network by 2027. This portion of procurement funding for UNO includes tools and systems such as zero trust, identity, credential and access management (ICAM) and other help desk and logistics support, per last year’s Justification Books. The Army noted in the books that “UNO software will reside on multiple existing hardware platforms that are managed by other Programs / funding lines.”

Though the Army asked for a generous boost for its management initialization and service portfolio, at around the same time Democrats on the House Appropriations Committee published their own budget proposal with much less funding, suggesting only $16.7 million, nearly a third of what the service was given in FY25.

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