Indian Strategic Studies: 06/01/25

1 June 2025

Why Turkiye Chose to Side With Pakistan Over India

Omair Anas

In the recent India-Pakistan military conflict, Turkiye stood steadfast in offering unambiguous support to Pakistan before and after the conflict.

Sources close to the Turkish government claimed that Turkish cargo planes carried military supplies to Pakistan, although this was denied by Turkish officials. This is one of the loudest statements Turkiye has made in a long time, marking a clear departure from its previously stated Asia Anew Initiative, as Turkiye reprioritizes security over trade in its South Asia policy.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has spoken several times since then, reiterating his country’s support for Pakistan.

Turkiye has clearly made up its mind on how it looks at South Asia and who it sees fit to support in the region. This has not happened overnight. Nor is it temporary. Turkiye is operating within its conception of a “securitized South Asia,” where its national security is linked to the region.

Nearly all statements coming from Turkiye after the Indian military action have condemned the “provocative steps” and claimed that strikes inside Pakistan raised “the risk of an all-out war.” No other Muslim or Arab nation, except Azerbaijan, issued a direct condemnation of the Indian operation.

Turkiye and Pakistan’s Shared Predicament

There is general agreement that in the post-Cold War era, both Turkiye and Pakistan have lost their relevance to the Western security architecture. Both have been searching for ways to stay relevant in the changing security landscape.

Turkiye’s NATO allies have been harsh in their criticism of its growing ties with Russia, particularly after it purchased the S-400 missile defense system. Its allies have denied Turkiye crucial defense technologies and supplies to the extent that in today’s Middle East, non-NATO members Israel and the UAE have received the best of NATO defense technology, which Turkiye has been denied, including the F-35.

Pakistan, too, is vulnerably dependent on the Chinese defense industry — its only option after the West abandoned it. Turkiye’s Pakistan policy may not be India-centric, but both countries need each other because they have few allies.

The bigger question, however, is whether Turkiye can or should have a Pakistan policy at the expense of its relations with India.

Lessons from India-Pakistan war: Were China's arms overrated?

The brief military conflict between India and Pakistan from May 7 to May 10 marked a turning point in South Asian security dynamics.

This was not a conventional border conflict, but a high-tech showdown featuring drones, cruise and ballistic missiles and long-range air defenses. While India and Pakistan were the primary belligerents, a third power — China — played a pivotal, if indirect, role.

Beijing’s involvement via the supply of advanced weapon systems and real-time satellite reconnaissance data to Pakistan turned the engagement into a revealing trial run for Chinese arms in a live combat setting.

This conflict offered the first real-world glimpse into how China’s premier military technologies perform under fire. The implications extend far beyond South Asia — to Taiwan, the East and South China Seas and global arms markets. The operational lessons drawn from this brief war matter not just for India and Pakistan, but for military planners from Tokyo to Washington.

Scrutinizing Chinese systems

Pakistan relied heavily on Chinese military hardware. Most notably, it deployed the J-10C “Vigorous Dragon” fighter jets armed with PL-15E air-to-air missiles and HQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missile systems with a 200-kilometer engagement envelope. These platforms were tested in actual combat for the first time. Chinese satellite reconnaissance reportedly supported Pakistani targeting, with Beijing even re-tasking satellites to enhance coverage over Indian military zones.

Kirana Hills Mystery: U.S. Radiation Jet, Egyptian Transport, and Pakistan’s Nuclear Core—What Really Unfolded?

(DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA) — Unverified reports emerging from Indian media outlets and amplified by social media chatter suggest that India may have executed a high-stakes precision strike using cruise missiles on Kirana Hills, a site long suspected to house elements of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons infrastructure.

The allegations, though unconfirmed, claim that New Delhi’s air offensive under “Operation Sindoor” targeted nuclear-sensitive facilities, allegedly triggering a radioactive leak so severe that it compelled Islamabad to accept a ceasefire.

Despite the intensity of the rumours, no official confirmation has been issued by either the Government of Pakistan or international watchdogs like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding any incident at Kirana Hills.

Kirana Hills, nestled within the military-heavy Sargodha region, has long been cloaked in secrecy and is believed to contain underground storage or experimental facilities critical to Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent.

The site holds historical significance as the venue for sub-critical nuclear tests, also referred to as “cold tests,” carried out by Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan and his team at Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL) throughout the 1980s and early 1990s—years before the 1998 Chagai detonations brought Pakistan into the nuclear club.

These tests, designed to validate implosion mechanisms and nuclear triggering systems without producing actual yield, were instrumental in validating the country’s early atomic weapons architecture.

Kirana’s geography—isolated, rugged, and far from population centers—made it an ideal site for clandestine nuclear research and testing, shielded under layers of military and intelligence protection, including oversight from ISI and military intelligence units.

Why Did the Soviet Union Send Its Worst Tanks to Afghanistan?

Brandon J. Weichert

The fact that the Soviets were using large numbers of their older tanks did not inherently mean that they were likely to lose.

Picture the scene. A group of Western military analysts are snickering at the sight of ancient Soviet T-55 and T-62 Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) leading attacks on the battlefield in Russia’s latest foreign conflict. Many in the West believe that the presence of these antiquated tanks, rather than more modern and sophisticated equipment, are a sure sign that the Kremlin is on track to lose.

No, this is not a reference to the Ukraine War—though it very well could have been. In fact, this is an allusion to the Soviet-Afghan War from 1979 to 1989 that defined the geopolitics in the 1980s. It also speaks to a fundamental misunderstanding by many Western analysts about the Russian (or, in this case, Soviet) way of war.

Of course, as those same analysts would point out, the Soviets lost in Afghanistan. But in spite of many of the same disadvantages, Russia is gradually winning in Ukraine. Why the difference? Because the Soviet-Afghan War was never viewed by Moscow as an existential struggle in the same manner that Russian leaders today think about the Ukraine War—and the Kremlin never devoted the same resources to victory in Afghanistan that it has in Ukraine.

The Use of Older Soviet Tanks in Afghanistan

There were a plethora of T-55s and T-62s left over in the USSR when the Soviet-Afghan War erupted. Moscow figured that their newer, more advanced T-72s and T-80s would be needed to continue deterring NATO’s more advanced tanks arrayed against the Soviet bloc in Europe. Conversely, given the abundant supply of older T-55 and T-62 MBTs—as well as the fact that the mujahideen in Afghanistan were by no means a near-peer adversary with sophisticated anti-tank weapons—the Red Army’s leadership assessed their arsenal of T-55s and T-62s were more than sufficient for squelching the rebellion.

What to Know About the New COVID-19 Variant NB.1.8.1

Alice Park

Public-health experts have warned for months that the COVID-19 virus isn’t gone—and, far from waning, SARS-CoV-2 has mutated yet again into a new variant. Called NB.1.8.1, it's causing a spike in infections in China. A few cases also recently appeared in the U.S. when people arriving at airports tested positive, according to a statement from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The World Health Organization has also designated it as a “variant under monitoring.”

Here's what to know about the new variant.

Where did NB.1.8.1 come from?

Data from GISAID, a global database of genetic sequences of major disease-causing viruses, show the first known cases of NB.1.8.1 toward the end of April, appearing in travelers from China, France, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand.

NB.1.8.1 is now the dominant COVID-19 strain in China, where it is contributing to spikes in emergency room visits and hospitalizations.

Where is the new COVID-19 variant in the U.S.?

The CDC operates a program at several airports in the U.S. where health officials randomly test travelers who agree to be swabbed. The new variant was picked up by this program beginning in late March. Cases have now been reported in a handful of states, including California, Hawaii, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Washington. So far, only a few cases have been detected in the U.S. so it doesn't yet register on the CDC's COVID-19 data tracking site of variants.

Will the latest COVID-19 vaccine protect me?

NB.1.8.1 is still part of the Omicron family, which means that current vaccines and immunity from recent infections should provide some protection against serious disease.

China accuses Taiwan-linked group of cyberattack on local tech company

Chinese authorities have accused a hacker group allegedly backed by Taiwan of carrying out a cyberattack on a local technology company and targeting sensitive infrastructure across the mainland, state media reported.

According to police in Guangzhou, the group — allegedly linked to Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) — has targeted more than 1,000 key networks in over 10 Chinese provinces, including military, energy, transportation and government systems.

Authorities said the campaign involved large-scale espionage efforts, crude hacking tools and a range of low-sophistication tactics such as phishing emails, exploitation of known software vulnerabilities and brute-force password attacks.

The attacks were described as “malicious sabotage” aimed at undermining China’s security, police said, adding that the group’s activity had significantly increased over the past year.

Investigators said the group used poorly-coded, self-developed Trojan programs that left digital traces enabling reverse tracking. Authorities added that the attackers attempted to obscure their origin by routing attacks through VPNs, foreign cloud services and compromised devices across multiple countries.

While Beijing did not name the targeted tech company or the hacker group, it said the group had been active in recent years and that its actions were being closely monitored by Chinese cybersecurity agencies.

Taiwan’s National Security Bureau has denied the allegations. In a statement to Reuters, it accused the Chinese Communist Party of “manipulating inaccurate information to confuse the outside world” and shift blame. The bureau said Beijing has long been involved in cyberattacks on Taiwan, including data theft, disinformation campaigns and attempts to sow division through cognitive warfare.

Taiwan and China’s complex and tense relationship — rooted in Beijing’s claim over the self-governing island — often extends into the cyber realm.

In a recent report, Taiwanese security officials said Chinese hackers were behind most of the cyberattacks targeting the island.

China, in turn, accused Taiwan of conducting cyber operations against the mainland and has recently begun publicly identifying alleged threat actors behind the attacks.

Earlier in March, Chinese authorities accused four individuals allegedly linked to Taiwan’s military of conducting cyberattacks and espionage against the country.

While naming foreign hackers is common practice among some Western cybersecurity firms, the move marks a new development in China’s cyber attribution efforts.

Latest PLA Anti-Corruption Campaign Enhances Xi Jinping’s Control Over the Military

Xi Jinping delivering a speech at the fourth plenary session of the 20th CCDI of the CPC on January 6. (Source: Xinhua)

Executive Summary:

The PLA followed the overall disciplinary work of the Chinese Communist Party to promote the “all-around battle” against corruption.

The “all-around battle” against corruption includes strengthening vertical control and enhancing horizontal coordination. The former focuses on centralizing power while delegating responsibility, and the latter aims to expand the reach and power of disciplinary work.

By expanding the reach of disciplinary work in the military and further tightening control over the disciplinary system, Xi Jinping is taking another step to strengthen his control over all aspects of the PLA’s operations.

In late April, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) held its annual training session for newly appointed discipline inspection committee secretaries and supervisory committee directors at the military corps level and above (全军军级以上单位新任纪委书记监委主任培训班). This session aimed to help senior military officers responsible for maintaining discipline better understand their responsibilities and the expectations of their superiors regarding disciplinary work. Given that this training event took place after Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission He Weidong (何卫东) was reportedly put under investigation and Deputy Secretary of the Military Discipline Commission Tang Yong (唐勇) was dismissed, it may reveal recent shortcomings in the PLA’s disciplinary system and the Party’s efforts to address these issues (China Brief, February 14; April 11).

A new emphasis in this year’s disciplinary work is the “all-around battle” (总体战) against corruption (Xinhua, January 6; Xinhua English, January 6). The phrase was mentioned during the plenary meeting of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), the expanded meeting of the Central Military Commission Discipline Inspection Commission, and the training session for key PLA disciplinary officials in 2025. It signals a new phase in Xi’s efforts to exercise oversight of the military as he attempts to construct a loyal and operationally ready force.

‘All-Around Battle’ Focuses on Unified Leadership and Integrated Management

The “all-around battle” against corruption has now become a key focus of disciplinary work. In recent years, the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) main disciplinary meetings have opted for alternative terms like “tough battle” (攻坚战) and “protracted battle” (持久战) to describe the anti-corruption campaign. CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping used these terms in CCDI plenary meetings in 2015, 2017, and 2022, and they were also included in the 20th Party Congress report in 2022. None of these mentioned the “all-around battle” (Party Members Net, January 13, 2015; January 6, 2017; January 18, 2022; Xinhua, October 25, 2022

Political Discourse, Debate, and Decisionmaking in the Chinese Communist Party

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) employs a system of coded speech to communicate policy directives to its implementing bureaucracy. This coded speech is governed by rules and exists in a specific cultural context, potentially confounding those unfamiliar with that context. CCP leaders deploy these codes through the party propaganda system to issue policy directives, and the codes take the form of slogans, linguistic formulations, or key phrases, collectively called tifa.

In this report, the author analyzes tifa by providing an overview of the role and relative authority of the information systems the CCP uses to develop, build consensus around, and promulgate tifa. He also identifies four essential characteristics of tifa. The author concludes that, although tifa analysis has specific limitations, it can produce authoritative determinations of what the CCP tells itself it is doing and why and could yield valuable insights into CCP leader perceptions.

Key Findings

Key FindingsTifa have four identifying characteristics: (1) They are politically laden and stated verbatim, (2) they extend along a clear line of authority, (3) they are distributed to official party organs, and (4) they characterize or resolve a dialectical contradiction between competing ideas in the CCP.

CCP leaders speak in a code of tifa that is distinct from daily speech to announce collective assessments and new policy determinations. Although this coded speech follows rules specific to the CCP’s cultural context and might not be straightforward to outside observers, it is not secret. Tifa are openly announced to an audience of CCP bureaucrats who are responsible for implementing new policies.

CCP leaders discuss and debate tifa in the internal-only neibu system, and they publicly present policies that have achieved ostensible consensus, characterized as tifa, in the gongkai public information sphere through the CCP’s propaganda system.

CCP bureaucrats and officials demonstrate loyalty to party leaders by publicly repeating tifa verbatim in a practice called biaotai. A party leadership announcement of a new tifa and bureaucrats’ repetition of the tifa become a call-and-response cycle, and foreign analysts can identify disruptions in that cycle to infer the existence of intraparty disputes.

Time for China’s belt and road partners to pony up as debt comes due, think tank finds

China has become the leading debt collector of developing countries, shifting from a net capital provider, “as bills coming due from its belt and road lending surge in the 2010s now far outstrip new loan disbursements”, according to new research.

In 2025, about 75 of the world’s poorest and most vulnerable countries will make “record high debt repayments” totalling US$22 billion to China, according to research released on Monday by an Australian think tank, the Lowy Institute, as a result of peaks in new loan commitments made from 2012 to 2018.

The author, Riley Duke, said China was grappling with a dilemma.

“It faces growing diplomatic pressure to restructure unsustainable debt, and mounting domestic pressure to recover outstanding debts, particularly from its quasi-commercial institutions,” his report said. “But a retrenchment in Western aid and trade is compounding difficulties for developing countries while squandering any geopolitical advantage for the West.”

White Paper Offers Chinese Wisdom at the Crossroads of History

Arran Hope

The opening ceremony on April 15 of an exhibition titled “A Great Country's Peace and Rejuvenation—Theme Exhibition on the 10th Anniversary of National Security Education for the People.” (Source: China Daily)

Executive Summary:A new white paper titled “China’s National Security in the New Era” is targeted to both domestic and international audiences and offers “Chinese wisdom” and solutions to contemporary challenges.

In a bid for global leadership, the document frames “unstoppable” world historical trends as aligning with its mission of national rejuvenation and rebukes the United States for being a destabilizing international actor.

Claiming the world is at a “historical crossroads,” the document is a call for countries to fall in line behind its vision of ensuring peace, development, stability, and order in the international system.

For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the world is in constant, complex motion; in flux. There are “trends” (动态) and “flows” (流动). History has “tides” (历史潮流) and thought has “currents” (思潮). A scientific analysis of the world tells us that any movement in time and space has two qualities: magnitude and direction. Time moves relentlessly in one direction. Nothing else does. In some cases, the direction of travel is upward (升); in others, it is in reverse (逆). There is, however, an overall direction (大方向). The Party, in a white paper on “China’s National Security in the New Era” (新时代的中国国家安全), now tells us with confidence that that direction aligns with its vision: “The historic tide … is unstoppable; the overall direction of human development and progress, and the overall logic of world history, have not changed” (历史潮流不可阻挡，人类发展进步的大方向、世界历史曲折前进的大逻辑没有变) (State Council Information Office, May 12).

Re-Imagining America’s Defense Industrial Base

Mark J. Gerencser, and Ethan Ingram

The US military’s prowess finds its origins in the Second World War’s defense industrial base (DIB), which preemptively identified the Axis Powers’ threat. This foresight enabled the United States to churn out an “arsenal of democracy” that included 1,500 naval vessels, 303,713 aircraft, and 41 billion rounds of ammunition. The DIB today is nowhere near as capable. It cannot produce what the US military needs to face modern threats. Several issues plague this once-robust industry.

Without significant transformation, major problems and shortfalls loom over the military. This transformation must address gaps in domestic manufacturing, the need for resilient production at scale, and the threat of disruption risk from adversaries. A re-imagined DIB can no longer be stovepiped as a separate subset of US capabilities. By necessity, it must incorporate a large part of the commercial industrial base.

Increasingly Complex Military Equipment

Past US mobilization efforts managed to rise to the occasion. In both World Wars, American industries broadly engaged to support the warfighter. For example, Frigidaire manufactured aircraft parts alongside its signature refrigerators during the Second World War.

Today, the challenge is infinitely more complex. The contemporary F-35 Lightning II fighter jet’s central fuselage alone comprises more than 10,000 parts. With more complex weapon systems, future production surges cannot rely solely on the simple retooling of production lines in adjacent industries. A much more challenging solution is required.

Manufacturing and Innovation Atrophy

In 1950, the US manufacturing labor force made up 33.7 percent of the domestic economy—a figure that has dwindled to less than 8.4 percent today. US defense manufacturing capabilities have struggled to keep pace with Ukraine’s expenditure of 8,000 155mm howitzer shells per day. The same kind of challenge holds true for electronics. In the 1990s, 37 percent of the world’s computer chips were produced domestically. Today, that number has declined to 12 percent. Offshoring these capabilities for a cost advantage is emblematic of a critical production shortfall in several domestic sectors that will take years to resolve.

Putin Holds Firm to War Course, Conjuring Mirage Of Victory

Moscow’s war against Ukraine has seen no meaningful progress toward peace in the past month as hostilities have escalated with Russia preparing a list of conditions for a ceasefire that would be agreeable to Kyiv.

Russian President Vladimir Putin seeks to capitalize on Western political divisions, interpreting weak European sanctions as a sign of diplomatic success while Kremlin media emphasizes Russia’s control of battlefield momentum.

Russia’s militarized economy shows signs of strain due to rising inflation, stifled civilian sectors, and diminishing oil revenues as Moscow’s aggressive posturing risks economic instability.

The fever of diplomatic battles around Russia’s war against Ukraine in the first three weeks of May has broken, leaving few meaningful results. The intensity of trench warfare is unabated, while the scale of mutual drone strikes has increased, with Kyiv coming under several cruel attacks. Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to presume that he has withstood the pressure for an immediate cessation of hostilities without inviting the ire of U.S. President Donald Trump, who appeared to be satisfied with the long telephone conversation last Monday (Re: Russia, May 21). The threat of new U.S. sanctions has receded, and the threat of new European sanctions is perceived in the Kremlin as so insignificant that Kirill Dmitriyev, Putin’s aide and key negotiator, has ventured an opinion that the European Union spends too much time and effort on economic self-destruction (RIA Novosti, May 23). For the next round of bilateral talks with Ukraine, Moscow is preparing a list of conditions for a ceasefire and a memorandum outlining the terms of a peace deal. Neither document, however, is drafted in a manner that would be remotely agreeable to Kyiv (Nezavisimaya gazeta, May 20).

Putin’s conceit is evident in the upbeat tone of commentary on the outcome of the diplomatic sparring in Russian mainstream media, which is superficially deferential to Trump and only hints at how Russia has not abandoned its interests (Nezavisimaya gazeta, May 20; Kommersant, May 23). The noisy crowd of “patriotic” pundits is even more explicit in hailing Putin’s triumph and deriding Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s failure to persuade Trump to put more pressure on Russia (TopWar.ru, May 22). Only a few experts dare to suggest that Trump’s desire to make a peace deal remains undiminished, and Moscow should therefore consider meaningful compromises to proceed with a new “reset” in relations with the United States (RIAC, May 22). Their arguments aim to link the tactical benefits of demonstrating flexibility with Russia’s strategic interest in ending the unwinnable war (Forbes.ru, May 23).

The Kremlin keeps pressing the point on controlling the initiative in combat operations and progressing toward the ultimate goal of subjugating Ukraine and breaking the trans-Atlantic solidarity and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) unity (Re: Russia, May 23). The immediate aim of relentless attacks is to expand the “security zone” in Ukraine’s Sumy oblast ordered by Putin to prevent any hostile incursions into Kursk oblast. In contrast, the proposition for annexing this Ukrainian region is eagerly entertained by Russian jingoist war commentators (TopWar.ru, May 24). This escalation of Russia’s aggression requires a shift from tactical gains to a large-scale summer offensive, for which reserves amounting to several divisions need to be built, while the costly system of attracting volunteers barely delivers the numbers sufficient for compensating the heavy losses (Novaya gazeta Europe, May 21; Media-Zona, May 23). The troops from North Korea, although lightly armed and inexperienced in drone warfare, played a significant role in the Kursk battles. The arrival of reinforcements is uncertain, however, as the trade-offs between Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un are carefully monitored by the People’s Republic of China (The Insider, May 20).

Russia’s Hybrid Warfare Tactics Target the Baltics

We are publishing this piece because Ambassador Eitvydas Bajarūnas has a wide range of governmental experiences that give him unique insight into modern political warfare. Among his many overseas postings, Ambassador Bajarūnas served as the Ambassador of Lithuania to Russia and as Deputy Ambassador of Lithuania’s delegation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). He previously served as Ambassador-at-Large for Hybrid Threats and regularly provides analysis on Russian informational warfare against the Baltics. In 2016, when he finished his posting as the Lithuanian Ambassador to Sweden, the then-Minister for Foreign Affairs nominated him as Ambassador-at-Large for Hybrid Threats. His main tasks were, first, to serve as the focal point within the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on this topic, and second, to promote understanding of hybrid threats and the need to counter them among EU and NATO allies.

Ambassador Bajarūnas participated in various EU and NATO working groups and initiatives (e.g., the NATO-Ukraine Hybrid Platform, the EU Working Group on Countering Hybrid Threats). He also negotiated and signed the memorandum establishing the European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats on behalf of Lithuania. Additionally, Bajarūnas took part in numerous seminars and working meetings, wrote numerous articles, and gave interviews to promote understanding of this phenomenon. Ambassador Bajarūnas’s piece helps place these developments into a larger context and explains why Russian political warfare is a decisive threat to frontline states. This essay builds upon Beniamino Irdi’s previous Perspectives article “Hybrid Threats and Modern Political Warfare: The Architecture of Cross-Domain Conflict,” highlighting the themes of dispersion across domains and gradualness in timing.

Hybrid threats describe a complex strategy combining military tools with unconventional methods. Addressing hybrid threats in the Baltics is a continuous, never-ending process centered around developing resilience at the societal, national, European, and trans-Atlantic levels.

With Russia’s frontline in Ukraine nearly stagnant, Moscow’s efforts yielding limited results despite enormous casualty rates and physical destruction, and peace efforts so far have made no progress, the prospects of a prolonged conflict have become apparent.

The Kremlin is now preparing for a long battle both on the frontline and beyond. Consequently, Russia’s use of hybrid strategies, alongside military ones, has become more evident.

The Baltic States have effectively countered Russia’s continuously escalating hybrid threats through resilience and strategic cooperation with the European Union and NATO. Their ability to withstand pressure highlights their strength in defending democracy and resisting foreign interference.

The U.S. Military Needs to Relearn Nuclear Signaling

Philip Sheers

For decades, the United States’ extended nuclear deterrent has backstopped nuclear stability and supported nuclear nonproliferation among U.S. allies. Nuclear-sharing agreements and security guarantees have solidified nuclear deterrence, and combined conventional exercises have helped allies and partners feel secure in the face of hostile adversaries.

However, as the Trump administration openly reexamines the extent and depth of its alliance commitments, the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent is fading. In response, the acquisition of sovereign nuclear capabilities has emerged as a legitimate policy pursuit in Japan, Korea, and Ukraine. These trends portend nuclear proliferation, threatening the nuclear balance and increasing the likelihood of nuclear use.

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Philip Sheers is a research assistant for the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS).

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It's Time to Rethink U.S. Defense Strategy

RAND's David Ochmanek discusses the erosion of U.S. military power and influence. Ochmanek, who previously served as a deputy assistant secretary of defense under two different administrations, breaks down why U.S. defense strategy and posture have become “insolvent,” lessons from the war in Ukraine that the United States could apply to future conflicts, and how the U.S. military can learn to “fight differently.”

Featured in This Podcast

You're listening to Policy Minded, a podcast by RAND. I'm Deanna Lee. Today, we're joined by David Ochmanek. He's here to discuss the decades-long erosion of U.S. military power and influence and what might be done to restore it. David is a senior international defense researcher at RAND, he previously served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy from 1993 to 1995, and more recently as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Development from 2009 to 2014. David, thanks for being here.

All right, let's jump right in. You wrote in a highly influential RAND report published two years ago that U.S. National security was at a pivotal inflection point. What did you mean by that?

So for those who aren't mathematically-inclined, an inflection point is where a curve stops going down and goes up, or vice versa, stops going up and turns down. And as we looked at the situation the United States found itself in, we found three trend lines that were pointing us to the need for some very fundamental rethinking of our strategy and our military forces. First, at the end of the Cold War, we had a fairly benign international environment. Our most consequential adversaries were what were known as regional adversaries, the Irans, the Iraqs, the North Koreas of the world, with really second or third class military capabilities. That's fundamentally changed now, particularly with China emerging as a adversary state, well equipped with world-class military systems, Russia turning overtly hostile, and these other regional states acquiring new military capabilities. So we're in a much more challenging international environment than we were before. At the same time, military technologies are changing, really eliminating our near-monopoly on modern military capabilities, such as near real-time sensing, precision strike. And finally, we were well aware of trends within our own society that are undermining the consensus we've had as a nation about the need for the United States to remain globally-engaged as a leading country and as a security guarantor. So the confluence of those three trends to us created a situation where we've really got to, as a nation, take stock of where we are and decide what role we want to play in the world, and if we want continue to play an activist role, to remake our military capabilities in some fairly fundamental ways.

PRC Positions Brazil as Regional Hub in a New Latin American Order

Matthew Johnson

President Xi Jinping walks beside President Lula at a welcome ceremony outside the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. (Source: Xinhua)

Executive Summary:

Brazil, a strategic partner to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), is taking a co-leading role in shaping a regional economic order decoupled from U.S.-centric trade and financial norms.

The most consequential outcome of President Lula’s recent visit to Beijing was the signing of a comprehensive financial integration package encompassing settlement, currency swap lines, market access, and shared digital infrastructure design.

Lula was in town for the Fourth Ministerial Conference of the China-CELAC Forum along with other leaders and ministers from the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). In his speech at the forum, President Xi Jinping signaled a drive to expand the PRC’s presence in Latin America through coordinated infrastructure investment, economic integration, and political alignment.

New security cooperation agreements signed with Brazil may intersect with U.S. regional drug enforcement efforts and suggest a future in which Beijing could gain procedural influence over how security and surveillance are administered in partner states.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is moving rapidly to build parallel economic and financial systems with Global South partners. Nowhere is this more evident than in Latin America. The Fourth Ministerial Conference of the China-CELAC Forum, held in May between the PRC and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), saw PRC officials advance a layered agenda of economic integration, infrastructure development, and local currency settlement—positioning the region as both a commercial outlet and a geopolitical hedge. CELAC is a 33-member regional bloc that explicitly excludes the United States and Canada.

Drone Attacks on Port Sudan Jeopardize Plan for Russian Red Sea Naval Base

Andrew McGregor

Russia’s plans to create a naval base on the Sudanese coast of the Red Sea have been upset by drone attacks launched on Port Sudan in early May. Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces claimed responsibility for the attack.

The destruction of Port Sudan’s infrastructure demonstrates that Sudan’s domestic instability would threaten a Russian base, potentially jeopardizing a broader arms-for-access agreement that included Sudan’s acquisition of Russian warplanes.

Sudan accused the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of supplying the People’s Republic of China (PRC)-made drones used in the attack. The UAE and the PRC may be acting to curb Russia’s naval ambitions.

Russia’s hope of establishing a naval base along Sudan’s Red Sea coast took a serious blow when drones shattered infrastructure at its proposed site from May 4 to 8 (Sudan Tribune, May 7, 9). The week-long drone attack, believed to have been carried out by Sudan’s rebel paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), exposed the vulnerability of the port’s proposed site to damage related to domestic instability. The alleged involvement of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as the supplier of the RSF’s People’s Republic of China (PRC)-made drones complicates the international implications of the devastating attack.

Following the destruction of the Khartoum/Omdurman capital region and its industrial base early in Sudan’s civil war in 2023, Port Sudan has acted as the political and military headquarters of the Sudanese state. Port Sudan operates under the unelected Transitional Sovereignty Council (TSC) and its dominant partner, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), commanded by General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan. Both the RSF and the UAE reject what they refer to as “the Port Sudan Authority” as the legitimate government of Sudan (Mada Masr, May 9). The city hosts Sudan’s most important port, its last functioning civil airport, a naval base, and a military airport. Crude oil from Sudan and South Sudan is exported from Port Sudan, and refined petroleum products for domestic use are stored there. It is the only delivery point for desperately needed aid and relief supplies in the war-ravaged nation.

Trump should build millions of cheap drones, not Golden Dome

Max Boot

The future of war has arrived in Ukraine. That country’s defenders are able to hold back a Russian advance, even though the Russians have a manpower advantage of as much as 5-to-1 along some parts of the front line, largely by using drones. By some estimates, unmanned aerial systems are now inflicting 70 percent of all casualties on both sides, reducing traditional weapons such as tanks and artillery almost to irrelevance. The war has also ushered in the use of ground-based and sea-based drones — indeed, using the latter, Ukraine managed to defeat Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.

The drone revolution necessitates an urgent effort by the U.S. military to catch up, but instead of looking to the 2020s and beyond, the commander in chief has his eyes firmly fixed on the 1980s.

President Donald Trump came to office with dreams of reviving President Ronald Reagan’s plans for using space-based interceptors to protect the United States from nuclear missile attacks. He initially called his blueprint Iron Dome for America, after one of the systems that help protect Israel (a country the size of New Jersey) from missile attack. Now, in keeping with Trump’s fixation with gold (the dominant motif in the redecorated Oval Office), it has been renamed Golden Dome.

Last week, Trump unveiled more details about Golden Dome during an Oval Office event, and named a manager (U.S. Space Force Gen. Michael Guetlein) for the project. Trump claims Golden Dome will cost $175 billion to build; protect America not only against intercontinental ballistic missiles but also hypersonic missiles, cruise missiles and drones; and be operational by the time he leaves office in 2029.

And, if you believe that, the president has some memecoins he would be happy to sell you. In reality, the cost of developing and operating space-based interceptors is estimated by the Congressional Budget Office to be as high as $542 billion over the next 20 years, and missile-defense experts say it will take at least 10 years for such a system to be operational — if it’s possible at all. And, even if such a system is deployed, it is very unlikely to provide an effective defense for the entire country against nuclear attack.

Success in Syria, Failure in Ukraine: The Russian T-90 Main Battle Tank in Combat

Nathan Stueve

Although it had been in use for over a decade, the T-90 main battle tank (MBT) had not seen major combat until the recent conflicts in Syria in Ukraine. Initially praised as the most advanced tank in Russian frontline service, the T-90 saw some success in Syria, being able to withstand the older anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) employed in that warzone. However, upon encountering a variety of effective anti-armor weapons systems in Ukraine, the T-90 has proven to be far from invincible.
Executive Summary

When it comes to Soviet- and Russian-made armor, a number of well-known weapons systems easily come to mind. There is the venerable T-34 heavy tank, which held its own against Axis forces in WWII and UN forces in the Korean War. There is the not-so-venerable T-72 main battle tank (MBT), which saw poor performance in Iraqi service when up against superior Western tanks during the Gulf War. Then there is the T-14 Armata, referred to by some as a “stealth tank,” which is yet unproven in combat, but is still a subject of keen interest and dynamic discussion.

However, when it comes to the T-90 MBT, the first Russian tank to enter service after the fall of the Soviet Union, much less seems to be known and much less attention seems to be paid. Indeed, unlike other better-known Soviet and Russian tanks, a cursory overview of publicly available books on armored warfare shows a clear lack of mentions of the T-90. Although the T-90 entered production in 1994, this state-of-the-art Russian tank saw little actual combat for almost two decades – that is until Russian forces launched their full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022.

The ongoing fighting in Ukraine grants observers a unique, and heretofore unrealized, opportunity to evaluate the Russian T-90 MBT and its performance in Ukraine. Here are the key takeaways available from OSINT sources on this topic:

Trump Is Killing American Innovation And China Will Reap the Benefits

Over the last few months, an elaborate plan to ensure China prevails in the global economic competition has taken shape. The plan’s chief architects, however, are not China’s leaders—they are U.S. politicians. The Trump administration’s cuts to federal agencies are undermining the United States’ ability to innovate, the driver of its economic growth. Hostile immigration policies are making it harder for U.S. firms, industries, and universities to attract the best ideas and talent from around the world and leverage them to boost America’s prosperity. Wild threats of tariffs and restrictions on foreign supply chains are terrifying investors, who are beginning to sit on their capital and look for new opportunities away from the chaos. China, meanwhile, is becoming more competitive in the very fields the United States is kneecapping.

Washington needs to rediscover the value of innovation. Every area of future economic growth in which the United States is poised to lead—such as software, AI, oil and gas drilling, robotics, and electric vehicle production—depends on innovations that are impossible to nurture without reliable long-term support from the federal government. Both U.S. political parties once saw public investment in scientific education, training, and innovation as central to the country’s future prosperity. Today, neither party reliably understands or champions that message. Instead, they adopt well-intentioned but misguided bipartisan policies aimed at cutting the United States’ dependence on China and join together to bash Beijing, driving the rest of the world toward greater reliance on China.

Walling off the Chinese economy from the West will fail. Washington has no choice but to participate in a globalized economy it can no longer unilaterally control. The United States has spent decades and trillions of dollars to build the world’s best innovation system. That system, in turn, has become the primary source of the country’s economic and military strength. Stripping it for parts just as China is seeking to build an innovation apparatus that rivals the United States’ would be suicidal.

Ukraine’s New Way of War

Nataliya Gumenyuk

Since entering office in January, President Donald Trump has pressed for a negotiated settlement to the war in Ukraine, largely on Russian terms. “You don’t have the cards right now,” Trump told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in their infamous February Oval Office meeting—suggesting that Ukraine could resist a Russian takeover only with continued American military backing or Russia’s voluntary restraint.

And yet, despite flagging U.S. support, Ukrainian forces continue to hold the Russians off, and their resilience points to Kyiv’s growing autonomy from the United States. In fact, the conflict’s front line, which extends for about 1,900 miles and features intense combat along 700 of them, has not moved much since Trump took office in January. What’s keeping Ukraine in the fight is not Russian mercy, or even solely American arms: It’s innovation.

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In just three years, Ukraine’s military has evolved from defending itself with leftover Soviet weapons to pioneering a new kind of warfare. In 2022, observers described combat in Ukraine as 20th-century-style trench warfare, dependent on tanks. Ukrainian soldiers had little choice but to fire whatever old shells they could find. The nature of the battlefield had changed by 2023 once the United States and other Western allies began supplying Ukraine with advanced weapons systems, including HIMARS rocket launchers and ATACMS long-range missiles. Recently, however, the U.S. president has thrown the future of American military aid to Ukraine into question. Last month, he even suggested that the U.S. might hesitate to sell Ukraine Patriot missile systems.

Why Trump Won’t Sacrifice Taiwan

The basic contours of President Donald Trump’s China policy and its implications for Taiwan remain uncertain. Many express concern Trump will sacrifice Taiwan for a grand bargain with Beijing. Rear Admiral Mike Studeman (Ret.), for example, suggests that the possibility of Taiwan being traded as “a huge blue chip” in a grand economic bargain cannot be dismissed. Such concerns overlook the key role elite and popular opinion plays in constraining President Trump’s options.

All presidents must secure domestic ratification for international agreements as part of a “two-level game,” and Trump is no exception. Historical and contemporary evidence illustrates that Trump’s maneuvering room for innovative policy on Taiwan is more limited than many assume.

Congressional Support for Taiwan

The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) does not bind the United States to take any particular action in the event of Chinese aggression, only holding that such acts would be treated with “grave concern.” This means that, from a legal perspective, the American response ultimately depends on the president’s discretion.

Yet observers should not mistake the US Congress’ lack of legal authority for lack of influence. As the Third and Fourth Taiwan Strait Crises reveal, Donald Trump would not be the first US president to have their preference for US-China stability undermined by staunch congressional support for Taiwan.

As Trump Seeks Iran Deal, Israel Again Raises Possible Strikes on Nuclear Sites

Julian E. BarnesDavid E. SangerMaggie Haberman and Ronen Bergman

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, wary of a diplomatic solution to curbing Iran’s nuclear program, continues to press for military action that would upend President Trump’s push for a negotiated deal.

As the Trump administration tries to negotiate a nuclear deal with Iran, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel has been threatening to upend the talks by striking Iran’s main nuclear enrichment facilities, according to officials briefed on the situation.

The clash over how best to ensure that Iran cannot produce a nuclear weapon has led to at least one tense phone call between President Trump and Mr. Netanyahu and a flurry of meetings in recent days between top administration officials and senior Israeli officials.

Mr. Trump said on Sunday that there could be “something good” coming about his effort to limit Iran’s nuclear program in the “next two days.”

Others familiar with the negotiations said that at best there would be a declaration of some common principles. The details under discussion remain closely held and would likely only set the stage for further negotiations, starting with whether Iran could continue to enrich uranium at any level, and how it would dilute its stockpiles of near-bomb-grade fuel or ship them out of the country.

The New York Times reported in April that Israel had planned to strike Iranian nuclear sites as soon as this month but was waved off by Mr. Trump, who wanted to keep negotiating with Tehran. Mr. Netanyahu, however, has continued to press for military action without U.S. assistance.

A New Playbook for Irregular Warfare: How the United States Can Win Without Fighting

Christian Trotti |

Editor’s Note: this article is being republished with the permission of the Irregular Warfare Initiative as part of a republishing arrangement between IWI and SWJ. The original article was published on 21 January 2025 and is available here.

During the final stretch of the 2024 American presidential election, the Department of Justice seized 32 web domains linked to ‘Doppelganger,’ an aggressive Russian disinformation campaign to influence American voters. Meanwhile, China has continued to exploit the US sanctions regime to promote its own currency, the renminbi, as a viable alternative to the dollar. And while wildfires and winter storms ravage expansive regions of the country—not long after Hurricanes Helene and Milton had exposed glaring deficiencies in the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA’s) planning and budget—forecasters and politicians alike grapple with an increasingly grim future defined by extreme weather and climate change.

What do these challenges have in common? According to the siloed US national security enterprise, perhaps not much. But that assumption betrays a critical lack of vision. In reality, Americans are under siege every day, often by forces that they neither perceive nor understand. The United States is at war—not kinetically, but instead on the intangible battlefields of internet chat groups, currency exchanges, security cooperation agreements, and natural disaster responses. As the 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS) warns, the contemporary security environment is best described as an era of strategic competition and transnational crises. And the simultaneity of these challenges will be a defining feature of American foreign and domestic policy in the 21st century.

Five Steps to Prepare Critical Infrastructure for a Cyber War

Mark Bristow , Irving Lachow, Ph.D. , Meredith Keybl , Lisa Mackin

Are we ready for a cyber war? A recent MITRE tabletop exercise exposed the urgent need for infrastructure owners/operators, government agencies, and communities to shift from addressing isolated cyber incidents to preparing for large-scale disruptions lasting weeks to months. This fact sheet spotlights key insights and actionable strategies to safeguard essential services during prolonged cyber conflicts.

In an era of growing cyber threats, protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure is a priority. The U.S. Intelligence Community’s 2025 Annual Threat Assessment highlights the risk of adversaries, including China and Russia, pre-positioning access to U.S. infrastructure for asymmetric cyber operations. With sectors such as energy, water, transportation, and communications becoming increasingly vulnerable, the nation must prepare for prolonged cyber conflicts that disrupt essential services.

This fact sheet synthesizes insights from MITRE’s December 2024 classified tabletop exercise, which convened more than 200 participants from 70 organizations to simulate a sustained cyber war scenario. The exercise underscored the urgent need to transition from isolated incident response to comprehensive strategies for enduring cyber disruptions. Key findings emphasize the importance of fostering a civil defense mindset, managing limited resources, planning for operations under extreme conditions, strengthening emergency communications systems, and ensuring workforce readiness.

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