“Separate ground, sea and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort.”
Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight D Eisenhower after the end of Second World War
More
than 70 years have passed since the end of second World War. Who does
not know in modern times without jointness no war can be fought. Every
modern armed forces of the world have changed accordingly. Even the
Chinese is going in for integrated commands in a big way. The most
honourable exception is Indian Armed forces. Second largest Army, fourth
largest Air Force and sixth largest Navy of the world refuse to change!
They still want to fight the war service wise from their own service
centric Operations Rooms. Led by a Committee. In 21st century. All
Command HQs of all the three services are located at different places!
Not a single one is co located. For example in a conflict with China
Eastern Army will fight from Kolkata, Eastern Navy from Vizag and
Eastern Air Force from Shillong.
Post
Kargil, Group Of Ministers Report recommended jointness. HQ Integrated
Defence Staff (IDS) was established. It is at best a half baked interim
measure without any teeth. How can a service Chief go against his own
service HQ view as Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee. One Commandant of
US Marine Corps very succinctly summed up the problem of chairman of
such committee : "Being loyal to your own service as well as the joint
services is like being loyal to your wife and mistress at the same
time." In 2002-3 when I was undergoing LDMC Course at College of Defence
Management in a seminar on Jointness ( a very popular subject, plethora
of such seminars happen every year) I asked a question quoting this. A
former Naval C in C who was chairing the session tongue in check told me
that in hoi polloi of Delhi some of them manage to do both! That was
two yug,14 years back. I wonder they can still do it. If you don't
believe ask Gen Petraeus! It will continue to remain so till some
“shove” comes from political masters. This is the reason any major
decision cannot be taken where any of the services HQ has some
reservations. Can you tell me which are the critical operational issues
where the three services HQs will be unanimous. It is not that HQ IDS
does not do much. In fact, in spite of many systematic problems it has
slowly made its presence felt and taken a number of initiatives which
would have never been done without its existence. At least purple colour
has been propagated to all and sundry.
Whenever
the issue of lack of jointness comes up at the highest levels, one
often hears, it has to come from top meaning political leadership. I
have never heard more ‘daft’ reasoning. You know the problem, you know
the solution. But won’t do anything, pass the buck to political leaders,
sit back, relax and play golf. Typical of No Action Talk Only (NATO)
forces. I often wonder is it too much for the political leadership to
kick the butt of some people responsible and get a road map moving. Of
course, they have to be clear in mind what they want to do with
jointness.
How Does Reorganisation Happen, Some Examples
Future of the Army
In
recent times two key issues which were bugging Pentagon on US Army. US
Congress ordered a study to answer these questions: What should the size
of the future Army be? And how should the Amy apportion its aviation
fleet between the regular Army and the Army National Guard? National
Commission on the Future of the Army came out with a report in one year
flat. The hyper link would get you the report of 9 MB. Since I have been
blocked by US Army to access any document I requested my Naval chela to
send me the document which he sent me pronto with his comments. I have a
fair idea how many in Indian Army's Think Tank are reading these
reports. Of course there are observation / criticism. Conrad C Crane has
raised the following seven Issues the Future of the Army Commission
should Have Spent More Time On :
a) Once cut, the Army is not easily expansible
b) Deeper analysis on options to better integrate the active and reserve components
c) A more thorough discussion of deficiencies in force structure and capabilities
d) Expanded discussion of stability operations and counterinsurgency
e) Explicit analysis of force size and structure recommendations
f) A real discussion of risk
g) Contractors on the battlefield
Maj Gen Robert H. Scales (Retd) ex Commandant Army War College writes :
And
I was pleasantly surprised. The document is good. The commission
members were faithful to their congressional charter. Fifteen years of
continuous warfare have changed the Army’s culture. Decades of
regular–National Guard mutual commitment have co-joined the services
into a joint fighting force unparalleled on the planet. One cannot find a
serving senior soldier who fails to appreciate the amplifying power of
“jointness.” Experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has compelled the Army
to discover new dimensions of war by embracing the role of the
interagency, so called “whole-of-government” contributions to wars
fought in the gray regions of conflict.... Virtually hidden in the
report are a few additional jewels that should raise awareness among our
political leaders. The commissioners write about capability “gaps” and
the consequences for “risk.” In essence, the commission is warning that
the fighting abilities of the nation are being impeded by several very
serious shortcomings that have grown and festered during our recent
wars. The first is air defense. In Ukraine and Syria, the Russians have
clearly shown that they understand our “gaps” in air defense and have
worked effectively to exploit them. In both places, the Russians have
created an enormously complex, layered array of integrated air defenses
that, in the hands of a Russian or Russian surrogate force, might deny
our air forces access to the close fight. If the air forces are late to
the battle, the Army will be unable to shoot down attacking aircraft and
drones because it has virtually no low- and medium-altitude air
defenses. This is a serious shortcoming. The Army must field a robust
air defense capability immediately. ..... The second critical commission
observation deals with a painful self-inflicted wound: neglect of our
artillery force. The Russians have rediscovered artillery. In 2014,
Russian multi-battalion artillery “fire strikes” virtually destroyed a
Ukrainian tank unit within minutes. The “Little Green Men” employed
sophisticated electronic means to locate the Ukrainians and followed
their movements using layers of orbiting drones.