Ukraine is using drones like hovering WiFi repeaters to help attack drones reach farther

Business Insider | Sinéad Baker, Jake Epstein

Ukrainian defence firms including Twist Robotics, TAF Industries, and Roboneers are deploying airborne signal repeater drones to extend line-of-sight communications over 50 kilometres and bypass Russian jamming. These specialized relay platforms, derived from platforms like the Saker Scout or repurposing bomber UAVs, hover aloft to bridge radio signals between operators and strike drones operating at extended ranges.

Electronic warfare remains a constant threat. While official Ukrainian doctrine aims to secure stable control links across complex terrain, practical execution requires rapid two-week software and hardware update cycles to stay ahead of Russian countermeasures. By elevating control signals high above terrain, these flying relays protect pilot positions from radio-frequency geolocation while giving strike platforms greater operational depth. Russia has similarly adopted airborne relay tactics to project attack drones deeper behind Ukrainian lines, prompting Western militaries like the US Marine Corps to study comparable airborne command and relay concepts.

The New Subterranean Front

The Atlantic | Simon Shuster

Ukraine’s newest battlefield runs through at least 57 steel gas pipelines beneath the Donbas and Kharkiv regions, where Russian and Ukrainian troops fight in pipes one to two metres wide. Russian infiltrations began in spring 2025, exploiting tunnels to reach positions behind Ukrainian lines. The underground front is expanding.

Above ground, drones have helped create a kill zone dozens of miles wide across a front exceeding 700 miles, where movement is exposed to attack. Brigadier General Ihor Obolensky, commanding the Khartiia Corps, said Russia pioneered subterranean warfare and Ukraine is catching up. Under Operation Veles, Ukrainian forces have retaken about nine miles of pipeline after roughly six months of fighting; Ukraine holds two pipelines, while dozens remain under Russian control. Ukrainian officers and officials report Russian preparations for a winter offensive, with control of the Donbas pipeline network potentially shaping any advance.

The fastest arms race is happening in the electromagnetic spectrum

The Jerusalem Post | Merav Davidovits

Russia’s use of a Starlink-linked BM-35 strike drone over Kyiv in late January 2026 exposed how electromagnetic competition now extends beyond jamming into satellite-network access and software control. Ukraine’s defence minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, took the evidence to SpaceX, which built a whitelist of authorised Ukrainian terminals in about a day. By early February, unregistered terminals along the front had gone dark.

The episode reflects a wider dependency: drones, radars, tactical networks, satellite links, GPS-guided munitions and command-and-control systems all rely on the electromagnetic spectrum. In Ukraine, countermeasures now move within weeks, while fibre-optic drones accounted for 32% of strike drones by April 2026. AI-based navigation, including KrattWorks’ Ghost Dragon, is reducing reliance on GPS. Advantage is perishable. Israel’s 5114th Spectrum Warfare Battalion reportedly defeated about 25% of roughly 1,100 Iranian drones during the June 2025 war. The contest is shifting from programmed systems toward learning systems that can adapt during an engagement.

Russia’s Attritional Theory of Victory in Ukraine

Parameters | Tewfik Hamel

Russia no longer requires the total military defeat of Ukraine to claim a politically usable success. Moscow can treat a negotiated freeze, forced neutrality, durable limits on Ukrainian military sovereignty or weakened transatlantic cohesion as victory if the outcome confirms its strategic depth and veto rights over Europe’s security architecture.

The initial special military operation sought rapid political effects through multi-axis thrusts and a decapitation effort against Kyiv. That approach failed. The war then shifted to slower, industrial attrition tied to Russian state endurance and the durability of Western support. Russian strategic culture supplies the frame of great-power identity and buffer zones. The updated theory of victory relies on coercive attrition, force preservation, long-range strikes and exploitation of Western political variation. Putin’s 14 June 2024 statement conditioned a ceasefire on Ukrainian withdrawal from the four claimed regions and renunciation of NATO membership. By 2025 Russian forces advanced only tens of meters per day while sustaining nearly 1.2 million casualties since February 2022, yet still converted persistent pressure into cumulative political advantage. Operational performance has often been poor relative to resources consumed; the strategic adaptation has not abandoned the original political aims.

Why a Russia Gas Deal Can’t Buy Peace in Ukraine

The National Interest | Andreas Umland

President Donald Trump’s envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner have urged Kyiv and European capitals to consider resuming Russian gas flows through Ukraine’s pipeline network as part of a peace settlement. The suggestion followed a US announcement of a deal to buy 2.25 million barrels of Russian diesel and reports of discussion around the surviving Nord Stream 2 string.

Ukraine would likely accept transit under a ceasefire. It permitted Russian gas to continue flowing after the February 2022 invasion until 1 January 2025, moving 15–16 billion cubic metres in 2024 and booking over $1 billion under the prior contract. Russia’s oil and gas revenues fell 23.8 percent in 2025 to 8.48 trillion rubles, with a further 17.2 percent year-on-year drop in the first nine months of 2026, and the end of Ukrainian transit cost Gazprom up to $4.5 billion annually. Yet Moscow earlier cut Nord Stream supplies for political leverage and has not moderated its territorial aims. An EU regulation now phases out Russian pipeline gas from autumn 2027. Economic cooperation offered before a verified ceasefire would reward aggression without securing behavioural change.

Ukraine: With or Without Trump

Comment is Freed | Lawrence Freedman

Ukraine remains dependent on selected United States intelligence and military capabilities despite becoming less reliant on Washington since January 2025. Lawrence Freedman describes growing friction between Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Donald Trump over sanctions, military support and responsibility for the war. The immediate stakes include Ukraine’s access to warning information and the credibility of American diplomacy.

The author links the dispute to reported US decisions involving Russian diesel exports, sanctions under the Graham Act and alleged restrictions affecting military Starlink use. Trump also announced an energy ceasefire that, Freedman reports, neither Moscow nor Kyiv had agreed to beforehand. Zelenskyy accepted the announcement, while Vladimir Putin deflected. Meanwhile, US envoy Steve Witkoff’s visit to Moscow produced no breakthrough, although Russia indicated readiness to re-engage in trilateral talks. Freedman portrays Trump’s public statements as unreliable and his treatment of Ukraine as increasingly sympathetic to Moscow. The extract ends before completing its promised assessment of Trump’s objectives, the peace negotiations and their implications for Ukraine.

The New Energy Stalemate in Ukraine

Foreign Affairs | Tatiana Mitrova and Sergey Vakulenko

The Trump administration has demanded that Ukraine suspend attacks on Russian refineries, one of Kyiv’s most effective means of pressuring Moscow, as the fifth winter of war approaches. It has also struck a deal with Moscow that temporarily waives US sanctions on Russian diesel exports, and its envoys have proposed that Europe buy more Russian gas, Mitrova and Vakulenko write.

Ukraine has adapted with batteries and distributed generation, yet 2,500 to 3,000 of Kyiv’s 12,000 apartment buildings could enter winter without alternative heat. Ukrainian drones have cut Russian refinery throughput by roughly 30 percent since mid-2025, leaving a gasoline shortfall of about ten percent. Moscow has room to manoeuvre, having loosened fuel standards and subsidised imported gasoline. Neither side has a decisive edge. The authors judge that energy strikes alone are unlikely to force either side to accept the other’s terms, and only a true cease-fire can break the cycle.

Trump Asked Musk to Reverse Limits on Ukraine’s Military Internet Use

The New York Times | Michael Crowley, Maggie Haberman and Siobhán O’Grady

President Trump called Elon Musk last week and asked him to restore Ukraine’s full access to the Starshield satellite communications network after Ukrainian officials reported new limits on military drones essential to the war against Russia. The limits raised alarms that the restrictions might have been imposed at Trump’s direction.

Ukrainian drones flying faster than 100 miles per hour began losing their Starshield connection in mid-October, with some falling from the sky. Longer-range operations and interception of faster Russian jet-powered drones were disrupted. Starshield is the military-grade version of Starlink, offering higher encryption and security; the US government has spent billions on it and granted Kyiv access. Control remains disputed. Musk states that limits are decided by the US military and ultimately the president. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the United States cannot direct a private company and that no one in the system requested changes. Trump declined to confirm the call but said Musk “put it back.” Full restoration remained unclear to some Ukrainian officials. The disruption has not altered the broader stalemate, yet it has heightened concerns about the direction of US support.

It’s terrifying: Ukraine and Europe on edge as Trump sides with Putin

Euronews | Jorge Liboreiro, Sasha Vakulina & Shona Murray

Donald Trump’s apparent alignment with Vladimir Putin has intensified Ukrainian and European fears that Washington could pressure Kyiv into accepting a settlement favourable to Moscow. Reported restrictions on Starlink, delays in American weapons deliveries and interruptions to intelligence-sharing have raised concerns about Ukraine’s ability to defend itself. European leaders are trying to restore momentum in peace negotiations.

The dispute extends beyond diplomatic rhetoric to the military support on which Ukraine depends. A November 2025 US-backed 28-point proposal reportedly called for territorial concessions, limits on Ukraine’s armed forces and permanent renunciation of NATO membership. Kyiv has also sought permission to manufacture Patriot interceptors domestically, but no final licensing agreement had been confirmed. Washington denies imposing restrictions for political reasons. European governments are pursuing simultaneous support for Ukraine, pressure on Russia and engagement with the United States. Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre and Finnish President Alexander Stubb organised talks in Oslo as tensions rose. The central uncertainty remains whether negotiations can progress without weakening Ukraine’s defences or diminishing Europe’s influence over the terms of a settlement.

The Myth of Inevitable Russian Victory over Ukraine

Institute for the Study of War | Frederick W. Kagan, Kateryna Shymkiv, Nikolai Sundstrom

Russian forces have made effectively zero net gains in 2026 at the cost of over 40,000 casualties per month since July, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) assesses. It judges a Russian military victory extraordinarily unlikely unless Western support for Ukraine collapses, and says Ukraine has held the initiative in key sectors.

Operation Vivaldi liberated around 277 square kilometres and 16 settlements near Lyman. Putin’s claims of gains are fictional, ISW says, and it is unclear whether he is lying or being lied to. Over 1.5 million Russian personnel have been killed or seriously wounded since the start of the full-scale invasion, and recruitment lags losses. At the 2026 rate of approximately 0.25 square kilometres per day, Russia would need 60 years to seize the rest of Donetsk Oblast. Russia could still win. ISW sees a collapse of Western support as the likelier route.

How Laser Communications Could Simplify Modern Warfare

The National Interest | Jean-Francois Morizur

Ukraine’s military reported that some drones lost satellite internet connectivity when flying too fast, following restrictions affecting Starshield, SpaceX’s military satellite service. One unit experienced interruptions lasting 10 to 20 seconds, disrupting sensitive missions. In operations where drones may have only moments to identify and engage targets, even brief communications failures can make intelligence unusable.

The article explains that intelligence loses value at different rates, depending on whether it identifies a fixed installation or a moving target. A June operation cited by the Center for Strategic and International Studies delivered commercial satellite information to Ukrainian operators roughly 15 minutes after collection. Optical communications use narrowly directed laser beams to transmit more information during brief satellite contact with ground stations. They are difficult to jam or spoof, but weather disruption and precise alignment remain limitations. The proposed approach combines optical links, radio communications, sufficient ground stations and alternative connections. Its central concern is ensuring that intelligence reaches decision-makers before circumstances change, rather than concentrating solely on image quality or collection speed.

From Siberia to Fairford: How Operation Spider’s Web Has Changed the Rules of Airpower

RealClearDefense | Frank A. Rose

Ukraine’s Operation Spider’s Web demonstrated on 1 June 2025 that relatively inexpensive drones launched from within Russia could threaten high-value strategic aircraft. The reported removal of 12 US B-1 bombers from RAF Fairford in Britain amid concerns about a potential Iranian-backed attack illustrates how such threats can influence basing decisions. Iran has denied involvement. The reported intelligence concerned possible attacks on aircraft and American personnel.

Spider’s Web reportedly involved approximately 18 months of preparation, with drones concealed in specially constructed containers and transported by trucks to locations near Russian airfields. This approach bypassed the need to penetrate extensive air defences from distant launch points. The resulting vulnerability extends beyond aircraft in flight to valuable platforms parked at bases. Dispersal can reduce the exposure created by concentrating aircraft at a single location. The development also raises questions about base security, surveillance, electronic warfare, infrastructure resilience and the cost of defending high-value military assets against inexpensive systems. The US Air Force’s Agile Combat Employment concept reflects a related emphasis on dispersed operations and continued combat capability.

Throttling Starlink Is a Disaster for Ukraine and the United States

Center for Strategic and International Studies | Max Bergmann

Ukraine’s access to SpaceX’s Starlink and Starshield services has reportedly been disrupted, impairing frontline communications and drone operations as Russian attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure intensify. The Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Max Bergmann warns that the restrictions could harm Ukrainian defences and damage confidence in US technology and security commitments. The immediate effects extend to civilian warning systems.

The disruption follows worsening relations between Washington and Kyiv over Ukraine’s strikes on Russian energy infrastructure and proposed peace terms. Bergmann links the reported service limitations to wider concerns about American reliability, although the Trump administration denies restricting access. Ukraine continues to depend on US intelligence, satellite communications and Patriot air-defence systems, despite Europe assuming a greater share of its financial and military support. The author argues that restricting already-contracted services differs from withholding new aid. He warns that prolonged disruption could accelerate European efforts to develop alternatives, reduce reliance on American technology and weaken confidence in NATO commitments. The dispute therefore carries consequences beyond Ukraine’s battlefield communications, potentially affecting US defence exports and technology businesses.

America Should Play Peacemaker in Ukraine

RealClearWorld | Lyle Goldstein

Persistent inflation, rising energy prices and a war in the Persian Gulf have soured American voters ahead of next month’s midterm elections. Lyle Goldstein of Defense Priorities calls on Washington to seek peace in both the Gulf and Ukraine, since he sees runaway inflation as predating Donald Trump’s war on Iran.

He dates the worst month for US inflation in 40 years to June 2022 and says sanctions on Russia hurt America and its allies, citing Japanese rice prices and European energy costs. In his view, Joe Biden failed to reckon with economic warfare cutting both ways. He calls the Strait of Hormuz one of the primary drivers of current prices and the new diesel deal with Russia an unlikely fix. Both countries are exhausted, he says. He urges reviving the framework floated at last year’s Anchorage summit, under which Kyiv would cede the Donbas region and accept armed neutrality.

How Israel and Ukraine Are Guiding the Next Generation of Air Defense

National Interest | Seth J. Frantzman

Western nations, led by the United Kingdom's pledged $13 billion Britannia Shield initiative, are rapidly reconfiguring global integrated air defence architectures around hard-learned combat lessons from Israel and Ukraine. Proliferating swarms of cheap one-way attack drones and loitering munitions threaten to exhaust stockpiles of premium interceptors like Patriot and THAAD.

Israel’s multi-tiered system—comprising Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow—achieved a reported 90 percent interception rate against short-range threats while absorbing massive Iranian ballistic missile salvos in 2024. Simultaneously, Ukrainian forces confronting thousands of Iranian-supplied Shahed-136 drones have accelerated wartime defence industrial production and deep-strike capabilities. High attrition rates alter strategic calculations. As daily attack volumes in Eastern Europe scale into hundreds of air threats, military establishments are integrating directed-energy lasers, microwave platforms, and lower-cost interceptor drones. These multi-layered frameworks aim to resolve the severe economic asymmetry of expending multi-million-dollar missiles against mass-produced unmanned aerial systems.

Containing Escalation in the Black Sea

Carnegie Europe | Dimitar Bechev

Russian drone strikes hit the Comoros-flagged tanker Yara J in Romanian territorial waters near Sulina on 14 October 2026, marking a direct spillover of Moscow's maritime interdiction campaign into sovereign NATO domain. The attack follows a broader surge in Black Sea sabotage that killed or left missing 27 crew members across seven vessel strikes along EU shorelines during October.

Moscow is capitalizing on Ukraine's restricted early-warning intelligence feeds and depleted interceptor stockpiles following recent U.S. restrictions to systematically choke grain exports from Odesa, Chornomorsk, and Pivdennyi. Sub-threshold hybrid operations also target critical infrastructure inland. Romanian F-16 fighter aircraft subsequently shot down two invading Russian drones over national territory. Consequently, Bucharest and Sofia are appealing to the North Atlantic Council to bolster NATO maritime domain awareness, air policing, and trilateral mine-clearing patrols with Turkey, attempting to contain Black Sea escalation without formally triggering Article 4 consultations.

Russia Says It Upgraded Its Jet-Powered Tanks. Are They Really Better Now?

National Interest | Peter Suciu

Russia’s state military conglomerate Rostec recently praised the modernized T-80BVM main battle tank, highlighting its GTD-1250TF gas turbine engine, enhanced armor protection, and 125mm 2A46M-4 smoothbore cannon. Russian officials framed the updated 46-ton vehicle as a versatile direct-fire and mobile artillery system capable of operating alongside spotter drones in Ukraine.

The platform has a troubled operational history. First introduced 50 years ago, early T-80 variants suffered heavy combat losses during the First Chechen War between 1994 and 1996. Chechen forces easily exploited the tank's Korzhina autoloader carousel design, triggering catastrophic internal explosions that earned the vehicle the moniker "steel coffin." In December 1994 alone, 18 out of 84 T-80s were destroyed during the Battle of Grozny due to lacking explosive reactive armor. Consequently, Moscow withheld the platform from subsequent conflicts in Georgia and Chechnya. Russia now deploys the modernized T-80BVM as a second-tier replacement in Ukraine, where attrition remains severe.

A viable path to peace in Ukraine

Asia Times | Jeffrey D. Sachs

Columbia University Professor Jeffrey D. Sachs proposed a single-package peace framework for the war in Ukraine to be adopted by the United Nations Security Council under Chapter VII. Guaranteed jointly by the five permanent members of the Security Council, the proposal mandates Ukraine adopt permanent constitutional neutrality modeled on Austria's 1955 law while rescinding NATO's 2008 Bucharest expansion pledge.

To enforce this geopolitical compromise, an armistice line would freeze current holdings, triggering reciprocal territorial withdrawals, including Ukrainian forces exiting Donetsk and Russian troops leaving Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and Sumy. Sanctions would be lifted during 2027. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe would monitor demilitarized buffer zones, while the European Investment Bank administers a multilateral reconstruction fund supported by Russia and Western states. Ratification by the Verkhovna Rada and the Russian Federal Assembly would permanently conclude hostilities, restoring European energy transit, free navigation in the Black Sea, and intermediate-range missile moratoria.

Trump and Zelensky appear at loggerheads despite Oslo optimism

BBC News | Paul Adams

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff in Oslo following escalating tensions between Kyiv and Washington over altered American military and diplomatic support. US President Donald Trump recently waived sanctions contained in the Graham Act and approved deals opening US markets to Russian diesel. This policy shift accompanies growing operational friction regarding US defence deliveries to Ukrainian forces.

Air defence stockpiles are critically low. Deliveries of vital Patriot air defence interceptors have slowed to a trickle amid severe global supply shortages, severely eroding Kyiv's capacity to counter advanced Russian missile attacks. Furthermore, Ukrainian forces suffered three days without US satellite early-warning data prior to Russian S-400 missile strikes on 12 October, alongside reported speed throttling of Elon Musk's Starlink satellite internet network. While American officials cited software glitches for the technical outages, Witkoff subsequently departed for St Petersburg with updated peace proposals for Moscow.

Trump’s Russian Diesel Deal Explained

Council on Foreign Relations | Mary Kate Godfrey

U.S. President Donald Trump announced on October 9 that he struck a deal to purchase Russian diesel, reversing years of Western sanctions and straining transatlantic alliances. The agreement involves immediate supplies exceeding three hundred thousand tons, followed by subsequent deliveries totaling millions of tons. Russian President Vladimir Putin endorsed the arrangement to boost global economic stability, while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy criticized it as a concession that undermines regional security.

European officials and bipartisan U.S. lawmakers similarly condemned the pact for providing Moscow with economic relief during ongoing hostilities. Elevated fuel prices driven by the Iran war and Ukrainian refinery strikes motivated the White House action ahead of the November 3 midterm elections. Analysts project the promised volumes will fall short of closing global supply deficits or significantly lowering pump prices. Meanwhile, the Treasury Department issued a temporary license suspending relevant sanctions until April 2027, despite statutory restrictions requiring congressional review. The administration also pressured Kyiv to halt drone attacks on Russian energy infrastructure, complicating Ukraine's military campaign.