As China rises and acts aggressively on our Northern borders laying claim to the whole of state of Arunachal Pradesh, establishing contact and strengthening our ancient ties with South East Asia is a strategic necessity. South East Asia is China’s soft underbelly. Our North East is a bridge to South East Asia to further our economic, cultural and strategic ties with that region. However despite all this obvious logic, we have been generous with words and short on action.
Wikipedia defines Special Operations as “military operations that are ‘special’ or unconventional and carried out by dedicated special-force units using unconventional methods and resources. Special operations may be performed independently of, or in conjunction with, conventional military operations. The primary goal is to achieve a political or military objective where a conventional force requirement does not exist or might adversely affect the overall strategic outcome. Special operations are usually conducted in a low-profile manner that aims to achieve the advantages of speed, surprise, and violence of action against an unsuspecting target. Special operations are typically carried out with limited numbers of highly trained personnel that are adaptable, self-reliant and able to operate in all environments, and able to use unconventional combat skills and equipment. Special operations are usually implemented through specific, tailored intelligence.”
The opposition parties and the habitual critics of the present dispensation have now made the presence of about 40000 Rohingyas in India a political issue. With the usual and unthinking support of the human rights activists and the National Human rights Commission, the issue has now become communal.
Last week, an Islamic State (IS) flag was seen hoisted above one of Islamabad’s main highways. The flag, which sprung the capital’s law enforcement agencies into action, bore the message “The caliphate is coming.” While the capital police have not been able been able to find the people behind the incident, the hoisting of the flag in Pakistan’s capital offers a chilling reminder that support for militant groups such as IS is growing in Pakistan.
On September 22, Chinese troops staged their first live-fire exercises at China’s first overseas military base, which opened in Djibouti on August 1. Ever since Beijing publicly acknowledged in November 2015 that China was building a logistical support facility in Djibouti, the home of the only permanent U.S. military installation in Africa, much ink has been spilt detailing China’s growing involvement in the Horn of Africa nation. 
This has been a potentially momentous week in U.S.-China relations, particularly as they relate to the growing threat of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs.
What a difference a year makes. In late summer 2016, there was some hope the July 2016 UN Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling in favor of the Philippine interpretation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea regarding the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal would curtail Beijing’s subsequent activity in the South China Sea (despite China’s refusal to even participate in the arbitration case or recognize the court’s jurisdiction, let alone accept the ruling).
North Korea is clearly getting quite good at long-range missile engineering. It’s Hwasong-12 and Hwasong-14 missiles have made that clear this year with their multiple successful flight tests, demonstrating what is by far the best-performing family of missiles North Korea has ever flight-tested.
Turkey’s reaction to the rift among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries—the June 5, 2017 embargo imposed by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain and Egypt against Qatar for its alleged support to terrorism—has been significant. Within two days of the Saudi-led quartet announcing the severing of ties with Qatar, Turkey’s parliament approved a bill for deploying troops in the Turkish military base at Doha. The bill had been pending for approval since early May 2017 and its approval was hastened by the surprise developments in the Gulf. 
In a brief news conference in New York on Sept. 25, North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Su Yong said that U.S. President Donald Trump's recent statements to the U.N. General Assembly were tantamount to a declaration of war. Therefore, he argued, Pyongyang has a right to self-defense under the U.N. charter and would be justified if it were to shoot down U.S. strategic bombers, even outside North Korean territory. 
Outer space has been called the last frontier, but could it become the battleground of the future? Warfare in space seems difficult to imagine outside works of science fiction, but the concept and advantages of weapons in space have been under serious deliberation by global powers in the recent past. Though the international community in years past has made great strides in addressing and eliminating the nuclear threat emanating from outer space, additional threats have yet to be addressed. As it stands now there exists an international consensus banning the placement of strategic Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in outer space and on celestial bodies. 
For Erik Alda and Claire McEvoy, prevailing methods for measuring conflict deaths are inadequate. They believe that the current understanding of conflict related deaths is too narrow and that mortality measurement methods must change to address this problem, particularly when it comes to deaths among forcibly displaced populations. As a result, they here examine 1) opportunities provided by the UN’s Sustainable Development Goal 16.1 to broaden the scope of recorded conflict deaths; and 2) the importance of developing a better understanding of the relationship between direct and indirect conflict deaths.
The instinctive response to the latest folly emanating from the Ministry of Defence – from Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman herself – has been outrage. On September 16, Sitharaman said that the Army would clean upthe garbage left behind by irresponsible civilians in high-altitude tourist spots.
At 14,000 feet above sea level and with a perpetually harsh climate, the Doklam Plateau is an enormously difficult place to defend. Meanwhile, those launching an attack face exponentially greater challenges—and that's before the Himalayan winter sets in. This helps explain why China and India last week ended a military standoff there that had been festering since June.
In this article, Nicholas Heras explores how state and non-state actors in the Middle East are turning to ‘gray zone’ strategies to defeat their opponents without extensive or sustained military activity. In particular, he focuses on 1) the gray zone activities of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps expeditionary Quds Force and its proxy network forces in Syria, Iraq and Yemen; and 2) how the so-called Islamic State and al Qaeda are using gray zone strategies in the governance vacuums across the Greater Middle East to develop indefinite, state-like authority among local populations.On September 22, Chinese troops staged their first live-fire exercises at China’s first overseas military base, which opened in Djibouti on August 1. Ever since Beijing publicly acknowledged in November 2015 that China was building a logistical support facility in Djibouti, the home of the only permanent U.S. military installation in Africa, much ink has been spilt detailing China’s growing involvement in the Horn of Africa nation. The conventional wisdom holds that China has spent billions of dollars building infrastructure in Djibouti, which might prompt the government to prioritize China’s interests over those of the United States and other countries with a military presence in Djibouti. Moreover, it is suspected that China will use its military facility in Djibouti for more than just logistics, and that this facility will be the first of many overseas outposts for China’s military.
As Trump considers military options, he’s drawing unenforceable red lines.
Now that the 2017 German elections have wrapped up, the process of forming a government and determining exactly who will lead the country is underway. Negotiations to determine the members of the governing coalition could take weeks or even months, but to some extent, it doesn't matter who is named chancellor in the end. The challenges that the next leader of Europe's largest economy must tackle will broadly be the same, whether Angela Merkel returns to the chancellery or not. The country's next government will have to satisfy the same set of national imperatives while dealing with the same outside pressures that shape its options in setting a national strategy. To understand the strategy, it's first necessary to explore these imperatives and surroundings.
The nineteenth-century Germans focused so much on philosophy partly in order not to compete with the protean genius of Goethe, who had dominated all the other literary genres in Germany for so long. And so we have Hegel, Nietzsche and Schopenhauer defining, among other things, the concept of tragedy. But it is Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel who concerns me here, because he formulated some concepts apt to our foreign policy debates regarding armed intervention, particularly in the Middle East.
At different historical periods, weapons emerged that changed how armies fought. Four millennia ago on the flat plains of Mesopotamia, the Assyrians employed the chariot—predecessor of the tank—to dominate all opposing tribes.1 In the twelfth century A.D., Genghis Khan’s horsemen swept out of Mongolia, employing highly mobile firepower—superb riders equipped with short bows—to terrify the more civilized peoples living along the western edges of Europe. World War II brought the ultimate destructive weapon—nuclear bombs—along with massive air power. Just as the Assyrians and Mongols applied their weapons to the slaughter of both warriors and innocent civilians, so too did Germany, Italy, the Soviet Union, England, and America employ aerial bombing.
Urgent new orders went out earlier this month for United States Navy warships that have been plagued by deadly mishaps this year.
With the steady escalation of both multilateral and U.S. sanctions against it, North Korea is threatening once again to ratchet up its response. The week began with U.S. President Donald Trump telling the U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 19 that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un was on a "suicide mission" and the United States would "totally destroy" North Korea if necessary to protect itself and its allies. Trump followed up his remarks by signing an executive order on Sept. 21 that will allow the U.S. Treasury Department to go after entities trading with North Korea. On Sept. 22, Kim responded by promising countermeasures.
In 1999, India’s then-foreign minister, Jaswant Singh, travelled to Tokyo to smooth ruffled feathers after India’s nuclear tests of that year. “Relations between Japan and India are basically good,” declared Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, damning with faint praise. “But the nuclear issue remains a thorn in the throat. India’s signing of the CTBT would remove that thorn.” India did not sign the CTBT, but the thorn quickly disappeared.
As the highest ranking officer in Jammu and Kashmir during the September 28-29, 2016 surgical strikes, the buck literally stopped with Lieutenant General Deependra Singh Hooda.
Donald Trump’s strategy for Afghanistan and South Asia announced on 21 August, was intended to highlight the novelty and surprise elements of a roadmap that purportedly sought little short of the decimation of terrorism. For all that, the ‘new’ strategy, its overheated semantics and studious ambiguity notwithstanding, in reality is but a continuation of the American trial and error method that has kept insurgent aspirations of a victory alive these 16 years since the US intervened in Afghanistan. After spending much blood and treasure, has the US learnt from its mistakes? Is the present strategy a break with the past? Or is it a mere continuation of a policy with no defined objectives and outcomes?
NEW DELHI — President Trump has pivoted toward India and away from Pakistan. Calling upon India to help in Afghanistan, “especially in the area of economic assistance and development,” Mr. Trump was holding up the prospect of a major Indian presence to goad Pakistan to crack down on the Taliban and deny them sanctuary.
WASHINGTON — At the vast, windswept White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico earlier this year, nearly a dozen military contractors armed with laser guns, high-tech nets and other experimental systems met to tackle one of the Pentagon’s most vexing counterterrorism conundrums: how to destroy the Islamic State’s increasingly lethal fleet of drones.
The various Army Chiefs of Staff issued six different professional development reading lists between 2009 and 2017 (Casey I, Casey II, Dempsey I, Odierno I, Odierno II and Milley I). All these lists are completely different — Dempsey’s brief list consists of 26 books while Milley’s massive list clocks in at a staggering 115 books. These six reading lists cumulatively contain the names of 240 different books, yet not a single one shows up on every list and only one book (Makers of Modern Strategy 2nd ed.) shows up on five of the six lists. In fact, 80 percent of the books on the most recent list are not mentioned on any of the previous lists.
