Strategic Study India Publications
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The Profession of Arms: A Guide for Young Army Officers
It takes courage, especially for a young officer, to check a man met on the road for not saluting properly or for slovenly appearance, but, every time he does, it adds to his stock of moral courage, and whatever the soldier may say, he has respect for the officer who does pull him up.
Read Document →The Dragon's Teeth: Assessing China's Military Modernization
PLA has focused on modernising its capabilities across all warfare domains to achieve these goals. This includes land, air, and maritime operations, nuclear, space, counter-space, electronic warfare and cyberspace operations, aiming to become a fully integrated joint force.
Read Document →Transforming the PLA: A Decade of reorganisation from SSF to ISF
PRC has engaged in a sustained and broad effort to transform the PLA from an infantry-heavy, low-technology, ground forces-centric military into a high-technology, networked force with an increasing emphasis on joint operations and naval and air power projection.
Read Document →Eyes without Borders: Exploring the World of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) in the Digital Age
Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) is gaining prominence with the rise of social media, the digital society and the vast growth of publicly and commercially available information (PAI and CAI).
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The PLA’s Developing Cyber Warfare Capabilities and India's Options
Informationised warfare blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime. A nation in the information age cannot wait for the hostilities to break out to collect intelligence, carryout influence operations, develop antisatellite systems or design computer software weapons.
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Galwan and After
Why did China did this when he is under tremendous pressure in all fronts, is this China's salami slice tactics being progressed rigorously, what will be new Rules of Engagement, what will be escalatory control mechanism, who has taken this decision, will there be some pressure put by China in India's North-East through insurgency.
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India’s Joint Doctrine for Cyberspace Operations: A Critical Review
Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Anil Chauhan and Secretary, Department of Military Affairs, formally released declassified versions of the Joint Doctrines for Cyberspace Operations during the Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting in New Delhi.
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Know your Enemy General(now Field Marshal) Syed Aseem Munir
Gen SA Munir's position in the hierarchy of Pakistan was not very comfortable. The state of economy, insurgency in Pakhtoonistan and Balochistan, attack on the Jaffar Express, constant protests by supporters of Imran Khan's supporters inside and outside of parliament.
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Decoding Operation SINDOOR: Key Aspects and Implications
Precision strikes were carried out on nine sites—four in Pakistan and five in PoK—linked to anti-India terrorist groups such as the LeT, JeM and the Hizbul Mujahideen. The targeted sites included Muridke (LeT headquarters) and Bahawalpur (JeM headquarters).
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Chinese Cyber Exploitation in India's Power Grid - Is There a linkage to Mumbai Power Outage?
The New York Times (NYT), based on analysis by a U.S. based private intelligence firm Recorded Future, reported that a Chinese entity penetrated India’s power grid at multiple load dispatch points. Chinese malware intruded into the control systems that manage electric supply across India, along with a high-voltage transmission substation and a coal-fired power plant
Read Document →15 January 2025
Tougher US sanctions to curb Russian oil supply to China and India
Nidhi Verma, Chen Aizhu, Siyi Liu and Florence Tan
Chinese and Indian refiners will source more oil from the Middle East, Africa and the Americas, boosting prices and freight costs, as new U.S. sanctions on Russian producers and ships curb supplies to Moscow's top customers, traders and analysts said.
The U.S. Treasury on Friday imposed sanctions on Russian oil producers Gazprom Neft (SIBN.MM), opens new tab and Surgutneftegas, as well as 183 vessels that have shipped Russian oil, targeting the revenues Moscow has used to fund its war with Ukraine.
Many of the tankers have been used to ship oil to India and China as Western sanctions and a price cap imposed by the Group of Seven countries in 2022 shifted trade in Russian oil from Europe to Asia. Some tankers have also shipped oil from Iran, which is also under sanctions.
Russian oil exports will be hurt severely by the new sanctions, which will force Chinese independent refiners to cut refining output going forward, two Chinese trade sources said. The sources declined to be named as they are not authorised to speak to media.
The expected disruption in Russian supply drove global oil prices to their highest in months on Monday, with Brent trading above $81 a barrel.
How Fukushima’s radioactive fallout in Tokyo was concealed from the public
Franรงois Diaz-Maurin
On March 14 and 15, 2011—three days after the Great East Japan Earthquake and its resulting tsunami hit the Fukushima nuclear power plant—explosions at two of the plant’s reactor buildings released a huge amount of invisible radioactivity. These radioactive plumes were blown away by the wind, descending over the surrounding area and into the ocean. Eventually, the radiation emitted from the Fukushima plants spread over the entire Northern Hemisphere. It also spread to Japan’s capital, Tokyo.
Following the explosions, Japanese researchers rushed to collect and study radioactive materials from the soil and the air to find out what had happened inside the reactors, believed now to have melted down because their cooling systems failed. On March 13, the Tokyo Metropolitan Industrial Technology Research Institute, the agency responsible for measuring the air quality of particulate matter in the Tokyo area, started to collect air samples more frequently. This effort was part of the Tokyo metropolitan government’s emergency monitoring program for environmental radiation, which aimed to detect gamma-emitting nuclides in airborne dust. The filters revealed that at around 10 a.m. on March 15, 2011, a large plume of radioactivity reached Tokyo, some 240 kilometers (149 miles) south of Fukushima. All samples taken on March 14 and March 15 showed spikes in radioactivity.
U.S. SOF Must Act Now: Preventing Taiwan from Becoming the Next Ukraine
Bradley Gorham
As the world is still reeling from the nearly three-year-long bloody war in Ukraine, the US is ramping up to prepare for another area of impending global conflict: Taiwan. In 2022, President Xi Jinping announced China’s vision to re-establish firm control of the island by 2030 using any means necessary. Since then, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has increased military preparations and intensified maritime efforts to assert dominance in the South China Sea, highlighting their staunch resolve. The PRC needs a swift takeover of the island, fearing that any delays may lead to a prolonged conflict and extensive US involvement.
Sound familiar? Russia’s initial operation to seize Ukraine and overthrow the government in 10 days quickly collapsed into World War I-style trench warfare without any major gains in the last two years. Undoubtedly, President Xi has been closely monitoring the situation and America’s response throughout the conflict, looking to avoid Russia’s mistakes. While the US is pursuing provocative naval Freedom of Navigation Operations to deter Chinese aggression, it may be missing the opportunity to exploit one of its greatest options for deterrence: Special Operations Forces (SOF).
How Trump can break China’s tightening grip on Central Asia
Andrew Korybko
The ceremonial launch of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway on December 27 was the latest indication of China’s growing influence in Central Asia.
Construction is expected to take six years and will bolster China’s growing trade with a strategic region the US has de facto abandoned since withdrawing militarily from neighboring Afghanistan in 2021.
China’s trade with Central Asia, comprised of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, hit US$89 billion in 2023, making it by far the region’s largest trade partner.
China’s trade was followed by the EU with $53.9 billion, Russia’s $44 billion and Turkey’s nearly $13 billion. Central Asia has long been considered Russia’s sphere of influence but that’s perceptibly shifting toward China, in part due to the Ukraine war.
America’s combined trade with Central Asia in 2022, the last year for which the Office of the United States Trade Representative has published data, was a meager $4.4 billion.
This is in spite of the “United States Strategy for Central Asia 2019-2025: Advancing Sovereignty and Economic Prosperity”, published in February 2020 under the previous Trump administration.
US ‘risks electronic warfare’ with China after unveiling anti-satellite jammer network
Enoch Wong
The US Space Force has revealed its plan to deploy jammers designed to disrupt satellite signals in the Indo-Pacific, prompting warnings that it could escalate into an “electronic warfare battle” with China when Donald Trump returns to office.
Kelly Hammett, director of the Space Rapid Capabilities Office, said last month that the systems, known as Remote Modular Terminals (RMTs), were designed to disrupt “kill chains”.
A primary target for these jammers is China’s expanding satellite surveillance network, especially its Yaogan series.
Yaogan’s satellites are able to track objects as small as a car from space and provide continuous surveillance over the Indo-Pacific Command, according to a report by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington-based think tank.
Meet the Chinese ‘Typhoon’ hackers preparing for war
Of the cybersecurity risks facing the United States today, few loom larger than the potential sabotage capabilities posed by China-backed hackers, which senior U.S. national security officials have described as an “epoch-defining threat.”
The U.S. says Chinese government-backed hackers have — in some cases for years — been burrowing deep into the networks of U.S. critical infrastructure, including water, energy, and transportation providers. The goal, officials say, is to lay the groundwork for potentially destructive cyberattacks in the event of a future conflict between China and the United States, such as over a possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
“China’s hackers are positioning on American infrastructure in preparation to wreak havoc and cause real-world harm to American citizens and communities, if or when China decides the time has come to strike,” then-outgoing FBI Director Christopher Wray told lawmakers last year.
The U.S. government and its allies have since taken action against some of the “Typhoon” family of Chinese hacking groups, and published new details about the threats posed by these groups.
Chinese Fighter Jets “Better Protected” Than U.S. Warplanes; New Report Says Beijing Can Quickly Wipe-Out USAF Bases During War
Ashish Dangwal
China’s extensive fortification of its air bases in recent years has provided it with a significant advantage over US military airfields, particularly in the event of a conflict over Taiwan, according to a new report by the Hudson Institute.
Over the past decade, Beijing has undertaken an extensive effort to “harden” its airfields and, in the process, utilized enough concrete to construct a four-lane highway stretching from Washington to Chicago, as stated in the report titled “Concrete Sky: Air Base Hardening in the Western Pacific.”
China has engaged in what the report describes as a “nationwide, systematic campaign” to expand and harden its airfields. The goal is to withstand large-scale attacks, with a particular focus on safeguarding aircraft during intense air combat.
The analysis, authored by Timothy A. Walton, a senior fellow at the think tank, and Thomas H. Shugart, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, highlights that the number of hardened aircraft shelters—designed to protect planes from enemy strikes—has more than doubled, from 370 to over 800.
Meanwhile, the number of non-hardened shelters has surged from 1,100 to more than 2,300, bringing the total number of shelters across the country to over 3,100. These shelters are crucial for protecting China’s vast fleet of combat aircraft during a conflict.
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Chinese Toy Entrepreneur Zhu Becomes Billionaire After Frenzied IPO
Yue Wang
Zhu Weisong is China’s newest billionaire after a strong market debut of his Bloks Group in Hong Kong.
Bloks’ Hong Kong initial public offering Friday was 6,000 times oversubscribed and wildly popular after trading began, giving Zhu, the 42-year-old chairman and CEO, a fortune of $1.7 billion mostly based on his stake in the company, according to Forbes estimates.
Bloks Group raised HK$1.7 billion ($215 million) by selling 27.7 million shares at HK$60.35 apiece, or the top end of a previously marketed range, to develop new products and expand marketing efforts. The retail portion of the share sale was 6,000 times oversubscribed, triggering a claw-back mechanism that led the company to offer more shares to individual investors, according to a stock exchange filing.
The company’s shares jumped as much as 82% from their IPO price in their first trading day Friday, before paring some of the gains to end 54% higher as of 11:30 a.m.
Zhu left Chinese gaming company Yoozoo Information Technology almost a decade ago to establish his own toy company. Bloks makes Lego-like building blocks and Ultraman figurines.
Amazon And Alibaba Are Selling Gear That Makes Rogue Drones Tougher To Take Down
Jeremy Bogaisky
On the Chinese ecommerce giant Alibaba’s online shopping platform, with a couple of clicks, Americans and Europeans can order one of the latest deadly innovations from the battlefields of Ukraine: fiber-optic control equipment that makes drones impervious to electronic jamming or remote takeover.
That’s a worrying development for domestic law enforcement agencies, which rely on those methods to deal with rogue drones that fly near airports or stadiums.
For under $300, an armchair shopper on Aliexpress can buy all the gear needed for a pilot to control a drone using a spiderweb-thin fiber-optic wire rather than radio signals. The main element: a cylinder that will pay out as much as 18 miles of cable as the drone flies. Suitable fiber-optic cabling can also be bought in bulk on Amazon, without the necessary spool to load it on a drone.
“If you want to start your own air force, you can order everything you need off of Amazon and Alibaba,” said Troy Smothers, cofounder of a U.S. volunteer group called Drone Reaper that’s developed an affordable fiber-optic control system for Ukrainian drones. “It's right there — we did it.”
Chinese Naval Developments 2024 In Review – Part 2: Submarines, Auxiliaries, Experimental Programs
Alex Luck
The previous instalment explored Chinese naval developments for combatant programs in 2024. This second part provides a Naval News outline for the PLAN submarine- and auxiliary forces. Additionally this report delves into developmental programs. Notably, several of these programs do not have obvious ties to the Chinese Navy.
PLAN Submarine Force In 2024
Two notable events concern the PLAN submarine force in 2024. Naval News reported on the emergence of imagery of the newest nuclear powered attack submarine type, the Type 09IIIB, undergoing sea trials around October. Bohai Shipyard is the principal developer and builder for all nuclear powered submarines in China. At least four and more likely six new SSN launched so far at Bohai as of early 2025. Estimates consider statements in the newest American report on military and security developments regarding the PRC (usually dubbed China Military Power Report), and observable activity at Bohai’s construction facilities.
Furthermore the China Military Power Report again claimed ongoing construction of further Type 09IV ballistic missile submarines. Additional Type 09IV SSBN may be a means to swiftly increase Chinese secure second strike capabilities, before the next gen-Type 09VI is joining the fleet.
PLAN is also in the process of expanding submarine berthing at primary bases in Qingdao and on Hainan to accommodate the expanded fleet.
Mystery submarine in Wuhan
The most curious episode in 2024 involved the launch of a new submarine type at builder Wuchang in Wuhan. Wuchang historically is the principal builder of conventionally powered submarines (SSK) for PLAN and export customers, such as Pakistan. Together with Jiangnan in Shanghai Wuchang has produced the bulk of PLAN SSK, including Type 039, followed by the separate Type 039A/B/C-design family.
Chinese Naval Developments 2024 In Review – Part 1: Major Programs
Alex Luck
Chinese naval developments in 2024 have proceeded with some nuance compared to earlier years. The first half of this two part-review on Naval News will provide an overview over the primary PLAN building programmes. This report focuses on relevant events in 2024 for aircraft carriers, amphibious carriers, destroyers and frigates for the Chinese Navy.
Changes in launch pacing come down to three major aspects. The first is how new shipbuilding programs have succeeded previous batch construction efforts. The temporary pause of Type 055 DDG construction, the new Type 054B frigate and the also new Type 076 amphibious carrier are points in case.
Secondly, the past year has seen substantial production of naval combatant-derived hulls for the Chinese Coast Guard. This mostly concerns Type 054A-FFG derived hulls produced at Hudong in Shanghai and Huangpu in Guangzhou.
Three Type 054A-derived cutters for the Chinese Coast Guard fitting out at Huangpu, with one Type 054B FFG visible behind. Image via Chinese social media.
Thirdly, Hudong and Dalian have made some changes to how the yards produce warships. Hudong relocated production from their legacy facilities on the Huangpu River to Changxing Island. Dalian meanwhile is not presently producing combatants at their previously utilised primary drydock, using it for civilian contracts. The builder relocated naval assembly from the Port of Dalian to Dagushan across the bay.
Could a Trump Deal Change the Middle East in 2025?
Tom O'Connor
With just over a week until President-elect Donald Trump takes office, the soon-to-be second-time U.S. leader famed for his "art of the deal" approach in business and politics prepares to take on a series of interconnected yet equally volatile conflicts in the Middle East.
As war continues to rage between Israel and the Palestinian Hamas movement and Iran's embattled coalition regroups from a series of losses, the prospect of diplomacy appears remote at first glance. Even Saudi Arabia seems to be driving a hard bargain in the elusive U.S.-led effort to establish ties between the influential kingdom and Israel.
But former officials familiar with the subject argue the vast changes that have swept through the region over the past four years and particularly in recent months also provide new chances for a grand bargain.
"The challenges are significant in the Middle East, but the opportunities are real," one former government official close to the issues involved told Newsweek. "They may not be realized, but, boy, are they worth trying."
Trump’s Greenland Grab
CARL BILDT
In 2019, when Donald Trump first proclaimed that the United States should “buy Greenland,” Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen rightly dismissed the idea as “absurd.” Greenland is not for sale, she noted. While Denmark manages the territory’s foreign and security policies, Greenland sees to its own domestic affairs.
But now that Trump is returning to the White House, he believes that it is an “absolute necessity” for the US to get “ownership and control” of the huge Arctic territory. And even more shockingly, he says that he will not rule out the use of military force to achieve this objective – though threatening “huge tariffs” remains his preferred option.
Flabbergasting as such pronouncements may seem, they are no laughing matter. Greenland is an important and sensitive diplomatic issue. Its status should be treated with care and compassion, lest a much larger crisis ensue. That would not serve anyone’s interests.
History matters here. Greenland was a Danish colony until 1953, when it became an actual province of Denmark. The vast island (the world’s largest, in fact) then adopted home rule in 1979. Since 2009, Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark have maintained a wide-ranging autonomy arrangement in which a few policy domains – primarily security and defense – remain under the control of the government in Copenhagen.
‘First, we will defend the homeland’: The case for homeland missile defense
Robert Soofer with contributions from Kari Anderson, James McCue, Tom Karako, Mark J. Massa, Alyxandra Marine, and Jonathan Rosenstein
Threats and challenges
First, the expansion of North Korea’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) arsenal will likely drive an increase in the number of deployed US Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) as the United States tries to stay ahead of the threat. The Biden administration’s intent to increase the number of GBIs by twenty starting in 2028 will spark a debate about whether US homeland missile defenses could upset strategic stability with Russia and China as these countries grow concerned about rising levels of US homeland missile protection, albeit intended against North Korea. Some analysts judge that the United States can rely on nuclear deterrence against North Korea, arguing that staying ahead of the North Korean threat is unaffordable—and will upset strategic stability with Russia and China.3 Other analysts find that reducing US vulnerability to rogue nation missile threats is essential for a US grand strategy reliant on allies.4 Allies might perceive a United States unwilling to protect itself against North Korea as unwilling to take risks on their behalf.
Trump Is Ushering In a More Transactional World
Ravi Agrawal
Donald Trump is commonly described as transactional. At some level, however, all leaders are transactional. What defines the U.S. president-elect is his unabashed opportunism, often at the expense of values, alliances, and even treaties. For Trump, who co-wrote the 1987 book The Art of the Deal, every transaction is zero-sum, with a clear winner and loser. More than anything else, Trump likes to be seen as a winner, even when he isn’t.
Pundits reflexively see Trump’s nakedly transactional nature as an attribute that might terrify other global stakeholders. The reality is more complicated. States that have come to rely on U.S.-backed alliances will certainly need to recalibrate. Global markets will experience turbulence. But countries and companies will also sniff out opportunities. The ones with the means to do so will look to exploit the president-elect’s tendency to prioritize his self-interest. As Trump begins a second term, world leaders and corporate executives are more prepared than they were in 2016. They have not only learned lessons from his first stint in the White House but also since pored over abundant reporting about Trump’s non-traditional leadership style, his what’s-in-it-for-me mindset, and his reliance on family members for dealmaking.
Labour and the challenge of coherence
Sam Freedman
There is a deep sense of frustration on the centre-left and within the Labour party itself at their progress so far in government. No one ever thought it would be easy, given the fiscal context, global tensions and shambolic state of public services. Trump’s victory has made a poor hand even harder to play.
But they didn’t think it would be this hard. That frustration was explicit in Keir Starmer’s pre-Christmas speech complaining about the British state’s willingness to wallow in the “tepid bath of managed decline”. SPADs and ministers are learning, like many before them, that the levers they’re allowed to pull often aren’t connected to anything.
At the same time there’s frustration from senior officials and advisers that a lack of direction from Starmer makes it even harder to work this creaky machine. As I’ve noted before he doesn’t enjoy discussions about abstract philosophy or strategy; preferring concrete decisions on specific questions. In his first speech outside No. 10 he spoke of leading a government “unburdened by doctrine”. And, especially after the last decade or so, there’s a superficial attractiveness to a managerial leadership that isn’t demanding everything passes a rigid ideological test.
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