Indian Strategic Studies: 2025

12 November 2025

WEF says AI, robotics, nanotech to transform agriculture; cites case studies from India

New Delhi, Nov 7 (PTI) Citing several case studies from India, the World Economic Forum on Friday said seven emerging deep technologies, including generative AI, robotics and satellite-enabled remote sensing, are poised to transform agriculture.

These technologies, which also include computer vision, edge Internet of Things (IoT), CRISPR (clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats), and nanotechnology, will boost resilience and productivity, while securing rural livelihoods, the WEF said in a new report.The report, titled 'Shaping the Deep-Tech Revolution in Agriculture' and developed in collaboration with stakeholders from both industry and academia, comes at a time when agriculture globally faces a convergence of crises.

Rising rural-to-urban migration, intensifying climate extremes, and accelerating degradation of natural resources, particularly soil and water, are collectively threatening productivity and endangering the livelihoods that depend on agriculture.According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the world would need to significantly produce more food, to feed a growing population by 2050.

This will have to be achieved in the light of mounting pressures with one-third of the world's soil degraded, 71 per cent of aquifers depleted, and the average farmer reaching around 60 years old.he WEF said these seven technology domains have the potential to trigger fundamental shifts in how crops are grown, monitored, protected, and distributed consequently improving productivity, sustainability, and resilience across the sector.

The report also highlighted the potential of converging these technologies for high-impact use cases such as autonomous swarm robotics, precision farm management, agentic AI systems, and carbon reporting.It showcased use-cases such as climate resilient rice varieties that emit 20 per cent less emissions, precision agriculture in sugarcane that has improved yields by 40 per cent, and the use of remote sensing to predict supply chain risks and promote carbon finance to farmers.

Xi’s latest moves show corruption is still a big military problem

Ying Yu Lin

The latest personnel changes in the Chinese military show that Xi Jinping is seeking to tighten control by bringing its political apparatus under the authority of its disciplinary arm. The appointments also demonstrate his ongoing efforts to purge factionalism from the military.

The sweeping changes suggest that the Chinese military still struggles with corruption and instability, to the detriment of its combat readiness.

The specific evidence of Xi’s intention to tighten control of the military’s political organisation are his expulsion of its chief and his promotion of a discipline inspection official to the position of vice chair of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the body that has overall control of the armed forces. The discipline inspection commission of a Chinese government organisation enforces party rules and internal party discipline. This notably extends to catching corrupt officials.

Last month, nine active-duty generals were accused of serious violations and expelled from the party and the military, including CMC vice chairman He Weidong, director of the Political Work Department Miao Hua and commander of the paramiliary People’s Armed Police Wang Chunning. Soon after, during the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee, Zhang Shengmin, secretary of the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission, was promoted to the position of CMC vice chair, restoring the dual vice-chairman structure of a political cadre paired with a military officer (Zhang Youxia).

Born in 1958 in Shaanxi Province, Zhang Shengmin served in the Second Artillery (now the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force) before briefly working in the PLA’s General Political Department. In 2016 he became political commissar of the Logistics Support Department, and in 2017 he was appointed secretary of the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission, joining the CMC at the 19th Party Congress.

Zhang’s continued presence in the CMC after the 20th Congress is closely linked to his supervisory role in the military. Since the 18th Congress, he has overseen the purge of many senior officers. Beyond corruption and misconduct, this must reflect deep political struggles in the armed forces. Although a military coup is unlikely, factionalism and self-serving networks remain pervasive in the armed forces, and the recent expulsion of the Political Work Department chief Miao Hua is significant.

Productivity has underperformed the US and other advanced economies since Xi Jinping took power

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard

By pulling the trigger on rare earths, Xi Jinping has destroyed global trust in

China’s share of the global economy is shrinking for the fourth year in a row. Few are aware of this astonishing development, and even fewer predicted it.

Chinese GDP equaled three-quarters of American GDP in 2021: it has fallen to just two-thirds today, when measured at market exchange rates, the relevant metric for the projection of world power across the full strategic spectrum.

“The era in which China’s share of global output was surging has ended,” says Mark Williams, head of Asia at Capital Economics. The yuan may rise again, but woe betide Chinese deflation if it does.

Productivity growth has collapsed and has even been negative by some measures. It has underperformed the US and other advanced economies since Xi Jinping took power in 2012 and turned away from China’s Great Reopening.

“Economic growth is being powered almost entirely by investment, despite diminishing returns and escalating debt,” says Williams.

The malaise has spread even to Chinese manufacturing, long thought immune. “There is mounting evidence that industrial policy is itself partly to blame,” he says.

Capital Economics says the trend rate of output growth is likely to drop to 2pc this decade. By then the demographic crisis will be deepening. China’s workforce will be 8pc smaller in 2040.

China will not overtake the US to become the world economic hegemon by 2050 on current trend lines.The gap may instead widen slightly, assuming that America overcomes its Maga fever in time to avert economic suicide.

Yet at the same time, China is running away with the electrotech revolution. China owns the global solar industry and it controls every stage of the supply chain for electric vehicles – from mineral mines to battery technology.

Decentralization For Stability: A Path To Resilient Balochistan

Ali Mehar

Balochistan has stood at the crossroads between promise and neglect, a naturally well-endowed province bereft of participatory governance as a habit. The underdevelopment, political alienation, and recurring instability this has generated are not accidental but structural in origin. Rampant centralism has deprived citizens of their agency and sapped administrative efficiency, continuing to polarize state-society relations. Thus, the call by Senator Saeed Ahmed Hashmi for the establishment of empowered local governments across Balochistan is no less than a political statement-it’s a roadmap to lasting peace and inclusive development.

Basically, Hashmi argued that stability starts from the grassroots. For too long, Balochistan has been run and is being run from Quetta alone-a single locus of administration which is burdened with work that no provincial capital can ever bear efficaciously. From appointments in the education department in Turbat to decisions on infrastructure in Zhob, everything has to cross the bottleneck of the provincial secretariat. Predictably enough, everywhere the result was delayed execution and inefficiency translated into public frustration. It was this power imbalance that fostered dependency instead of empowerment, leaving 37 districts at the whims of fate and with little control over their fates.

Senator Hashmi has underlined Articles 32 and 140A of the Constitution of Pakistan in an effort to bring into effect something which should really be self-evident: genuine democracy cannot be conceived without properly functioning local governments. Article 32 calls for encouragement of local institutions, and Article 140A binds each province to transfer political, administrative, and financial powers to elected local representatives. These are not symbolic clauses but constitutional guarantees for taking governance to the doorsteps of the people. I, therefore, welcome Senator Hashmi’s efforts toward bringing this important issue to the national stage.

Middle East between chaos and transformation: Why the future remains uncertain

Ralph Schoellhammer

There is a famous—if apocryphal—quote attributed to Lenin: “There are decades where nothing happens and then there are weeks where decades happen.” We find ourselves in such a period today, particularly when examining the trajectory of the Middle East. The challenge in these transformative moments is distinguishing signal from noise, a task that becomes exponentially more difficult when every development carries the weight of potential historical significance.

Consider the period between 1918 and 1938. Those twenty years witnessed countless movements across Europe that pointed in wildly different directions from what ultimately transpired. There were rapprochements between Germany and France, negotiations between Britain and Germany and throughout the 1920s, especially, no clear indication of which course European and world history would ultimately take. In hindsight the course of history appears to have been predetermined, but this was not so. The Locarno Agreement of 1925 that was intended to guarantee Germany’s Western borders was at the time as significant as the Abraham Accords are today. Unfortunately, the former did not stand the test of time – and it is too soon to tell whether the latter will. To put it differently, we face a similar predicament in the Middle East today as Europe faced in the interwar years.

The battle over Gaza's future: Why no-one can agree on the rebuild

Paul Adams

In the midst of a still shaky ceasefire, Gazans are taking the first tentative steps along the long road to recovery.Bulldozers are clearing roads, shovelling the detritus of war into waiting trucks. Mountains of rubble and twisted metal are on either side, the remains of once bustling neighbourhoods.

Parts of Gaza City are disfigured beyond recognition."This was my house," says Abu Iyad Hamdouna. He points to a mangled heap of concrete and steel in Sheikh Radwan, which was once one of Gaza City's most densely populated neighbourhoods.

The sheer scale of challenge to rebuild Gaza (pictured in January) is staggeringAbu Iyad is 63. If Gaza ever rises from the ashes, he doesn't expect to be around to see it."At this rate, I think it'll take 10 years." He looks exhausted and resigned. "We'll be dead... we'll die without seeing reconstruction."Nearby, 43-year-old Nihad al-Madhoun and his nephew Said are picking through the wreckage of what was once a home.

The building might well collapse but it doesn't deter them - they collect old breeze blocks and brush thick dust off an old red sofa."The removal of rubble alone might take more than five years," he says. "And we will wait. We have no other option."

Turkey’s return to great power status

Sumantra Maitra

‘The world order of tomorrow is not a world order based on nation states or countries. It’s a world order that is based on empires’, Guy Verhofstadt once said, a theme the Belgian politician has repeated several times, most recently after US Vice President JD Vance’s infamous Munich Security Conference speech. Claiming that the European Union is unfit to survive in the age of empires, and in competition with a rising China, a reckless United States and a revanchist Russia, in 2016 Verhofstadt remarked: ‘Let’s create a European defence union. Let’s take on our responsibilities… Let’s become an empire.’

He would have found qualitative sympathy from another formidable liberal, Joseph Chamberlain, who – with rather unfortunate timing in 1904 – claimed that the days of small nations were over and the days of empires were here. Verhofstadt, overexcitable though he may be, is correct that the days of small nations are over.

Yet empires rarely arrive planned, nor can they be initiated suddenly with a signature from a pen. Scotland, for example, only joined England after the Scottish attempt at an empire fizzled: it lacked the requisite manpower to have its own empire or defend its colonies against a predatory Spain. Security then, just as now, was the determining rationale to pool forces. European empires, likewise, despite the post-colonial slant, were a long drawn-out affair without any centralised planning or exploitation. Great power competition over resources, territory, technological growth (due to the industrial revolution), and production capacity (requiring colonial manpower), was a collaborative process that more often than not operated with the consent of the governed. In short, per the logic of the realist school of international relations, it was multipolarity and security maximisation that resulted in conquest and imperialism.

The key to grand strategy

William D. James

Does the Trump administration have a grand strategy? Many are sceptical, regarding the president’s brand of populism as incompatible with the very notion. Searching for coherence is certainly challenging given his mercurial style. Will he arm Taiwan and Ukraine, or abandon them in grand bargains with China and Russia? One moment he hails Europeans’ defence investment pledges; the next, he muses about annexing Greenland. Some suggest that such inconsistencies are part of a ‘deliberate strategy’ to keep allies and adversaries off balance. Others argue that, beneath the bluster, there is clear ‘prioritisation’, with the Indo-Pacific fully eclipsing Europe. The appointment of Elbridge Colby at the Department of War and the early berating of NATO allies suggest as much. Still, another view holds that Trump will focus on the Western Hemisphere, freeing China and Russia to carve out their own regional spheres of influence. The military build-up around Venezuela, the Golden Dome project, and Washington’s diplomatic overtures to Beijing and Moscow add ballast to this thesis.

There is clearly much debate but little consensus. Part of the challenge for those seeking to discern order in Trump’s actions is the sheer volume of competing statements and examples of contradictory behaviour. The bombing campaigns in Yemen and Iran, for example, hardly suggest a narrow focus on either East Asia or the Western Hemisphere. Meanwhile, the recently announced drawdown of troops from Romania might imply broader retrenchment from Europe, but the rude health of the US-Poland alliance suggests otherwise.

Yet to dwell on Trump, or any single administration for that matter, is to miss the deeper question. Trump’s presidency is emblematic of a perennial puzzle: how to interpret coherence in statecraft amid the turbulence of domestic and international affairs. The more enduring question is: where do grand strategic ideas come from? Are they the work of one leader, or the product of the wider machinery of state and society that surrounds them?

Commentary: How long can China play its rare earths trump card against the US?

Kevin Chen

SINGAPORE: You don’t have to be an expert in international security to see that China is currently emboldened on the world stage.

And to be fair, it has good reason to be confident, especially after United States President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping met in South Korea last week and reached a trade deal.

Compared to the 2018 trade war during Mr Trump’s first term, Beijing is much better prepared to deal with the US this time. It fortified its economy and identified points it could use for leverage. Instead of skirmishing with tariffs and counter-tariffs, China went for what one scholar called the “nuclear” option.

In the lead-up to the meeting in South Korea, China instituted sweeping export controls over rare earths. And it worked, paving the way for a deal where it gained concessions on key tariffs and export restrictions.

This playbook is strongly influenced by the belief among Chinese leaders that they understand Mr Trump and know how to deal with him. To them, Mr Trump is not a natural China hawk, his policies are not rooted in ideologies beyond a preference for tariffs, and he is open to trading strategic concessions for non-strategic incentives.

Autonomous Systems: Learning the Right Lessons from Ukraine for Down Under

Mick Ryan

Our experience will be invaluable for the entire rational world, because any country could face a similar scenario. I don’t know of a single NATO country capable of defending its cities if faced with 200-300 Shaheds every day, seven days a week. Robert ‘Madyar’ Brovdi, July 2025.

On 4 November 2025, I appeared as an expert before Australia’s federal parliament Defence subcommittee of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade. I testified about autonomous systems, AI and defence partnerships and their implications for Australia’s defence and national security.

First, what are the trends in drone operations during the war in Ukraine that we must understand and learn from in the Australian Defence Force (and other military forces). And, second, what might we do now to adapt the force structure, warfighting concepts, training and procurement systems to ensure that our military remains at the leading edge of 21st century capability.

Below is not a transcript of my testimony. The sections below however do cover the key concepts and ideas that I explained to the Defence subcommittee of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade.

Korea-US joint fact sheet delayed amid final wording adjustments on security issues

Anna J. Park

Final adjustments to the joint fact sheet summarizing recent Korea-U.S. summit talks and related negotiations on tariffs and security are taking longer than expected, mainly due to ongoing “language coordination” in the security section, Seoul officials said Friday.

A senior presidential office official told reporters that the release of the document, which had been expected this week, has been delayed amid continued fine-tuning of the text.

According to the official, the document comprises two major parts regarding security and tariffs, with a near-complete draft being prepared. However, “recently, on the U.S. side, there has been an additional interagency review process required by their system, during which some departments requested further input, and that review process has caused some delays," the official said.

“In particular, we needed to incorporate new security-related discussions raised during the Gyeongju summit,” the official added, referring to the bilateral talks between President Lee Jae Myung and U.S. President Donald Trump in Gyeongju, North Gyeongsang Province, in late October on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meetings.

He noted that, given the evolving situation, it remains difficult to predict when the joint fact sheet will be finalized.

“The situation continues to change, so we cannot say for certain when it will be completed,” the official said. “Nonetheless, we intend to maintain a consistent stance and continue consultations with patience to ensure that our position is fully reflected.”

Addressing speculation that the upcoming Korea-U.S. fact sheet could be invalidated or subject to renegotiation if the U.S. Supreme Court rules the Trump administration’s tariff policies unconstitutional, the official downplayed such concerns.

“I don’t think it will go that far,” the official said. “It’s unlikely the administration would be rendered powerless by such a ruling, and even if that happens, it wouldn’t automatically nullify the agreement.”

Russian Black Sea Port Halts Fuel Exports After Ukrainian Strike

Fuel exports from the Russian Black Sea port of Tuapse have been suspended, and its local oil refinery has stopped processing crude after a Ukrainian drone strike damaged infrastructure, Reuters reported Wednesday.

Before being attacked on Sunday, the port had reportedly been expected to increase fuel exports in November.

But shipping data reviewed by the news agency showed tankers moved off their berths and anchored offshore as of Wednesday.

Three tankers had reportedly been docked for loadings of naphtha, diesel and fuel oil on the day of the Nov. 2 attack.

The Rosneft-controlled refinery halted processing on Monday due to port damage, Reuters cited two industry sources as saying.

The refinery, with a processing capacity of 240,000 barrels of oil per day, mainly supplies markets like China, Malaysia, Singapore and Turkey.

On the day of the attack, Ukrainian Navy spokesperson Dmytro Pletenchuk predicted long-term consequences for Russia’s shipping industry, noting that the strike would not only damage key technological infrastructure but also affect refueling companies, raise insurance premiums, and discourage many from using the ports.

Russia has repeatedly accused Ukraine of escalating attacks on energy facilities. Kyiv counters that fuel infrastructure directly supports the Russian military and remains a legitimate target.

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How tariffs ate American foreign policy

Joshua Keating

The Supreme Court might take away Trump’s international weapon of first resort.

President Donald Trump has described the ongoing Supreme Court case over the legality of his use of emergency powers to impose tariffs on more than 100 countries as a matter of “literally, LIFE OR DEATH for our Country.” Certainly the case, in which oral arguments were heard at the Court on Wednesday, has profound implications for executive power and, as my colleague Ian Millhiser explained earlier this week, will be a key indicator of the court’s willingness to rein in the administration.

Based on the hostile questions from the conservative justices on Wednesday, the court appears likely to rule against Trump — a potentially serious blow to the administration, and not only its economic policies.

Trump is a self-described “tariff man,” and tariffs are rivaled perhaps only by mass deportations as the signature policy of his second term. Trump loves tariffs in large part for their traditional function: protecting US industries from foreign competition and raising government revenue, and is unpersuaded by the arguments of most economists that US consumers will ultimately bear the costs of these measures.

But less noticed is the degree to which tariffs have also become the centerpiece of Trump’s foreign and security policy. It sometimes seems as if there’s hardly a problem in the world that Trump doesn’t think can be solved with more tariffs.

Just this week, for instance, the Financial Times reported that US officials have been waging a campaign of intimidation to block a new treaty on shipping emissions, threatening new tariffs against countries that support the agreement.

Trump has used tariffs to address broad geopolitical challenges, including levying them against countries like India that buy the oil Russia uses to fund its war in Ukraine. And he has used them for his personal grievances, like threatening a 50 percent tariff on Brazil over the prosecution of former President Jair Bolsonaro, a Trump ally.

Trump has also used tariff threats to assert dominance over smaller countries, like Colombia, which attracted his ire in the first weeks of his term by refusing to accept deportation flights on military planes. And he has used them against some of America’s largest trading partners, like the tariffs he slapped on China, Mexico, and Canada over their alleged failure to stop the flow of fentanyl into the US.

US readies EIAMD integrated defense shield to block Chinese missile strikes on Guam’s critical power projection assets

Julian McBride

The Pacific island of Guam is one of America’s most strategically important overseas territories, holding some of the US Air Force’s most critical military assets and staging many of its most crucial operations in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

As such, Guam’s strategic positioning and prominence to US force projection make the island a prime target for key Asian adversaries such as China and North Korea. Both Beijing and Pyongyang have recently developed ballistic missile capabilities specifically to be able to reach and penetrate Guam’s defenses.

To shield Guam from these rising threats, Washington has finalized plans for an Enhanced Integrated Air and Missile Defense (EIAMD) system to protect the island. By fully converting Guam into a forward-operating base, the Pentagon can use EIAMD to combat rising threats in the Indo-Pacific while continuing to bolster its regional assets.

The EIAMD is built to serve as a multi-layered air defense system. Plans for better fortifying Guam have been ongoing since at least August 2022, when the US Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) top leadership provided details of upgrades to protect the island’s forward assets.

Under the plan, Guam will be covered by a 360-layered EIAMD, with 16 locations on the island used for various batteries and interceptors. Both the US Army and MDA were awarded the contract to develop and deploy the US$8 billion EIAMD to Guam.

The Aegis, Standard Missile 3 and six missile interceptors (SM-3 & SM-6) will reportedly be incorporated into the system.

Along with various missile interceptors, the Pentagon is considering deploying six radar systems to help track and plot ballistic missile interceptions. According to the Arms Control Association, EIAMD’s implementation will require 400 construction contractors and an additional 2,300 permanent and civilian personnel to operate the system.

More Than Just the Tigers: How America and its Chinese Partners Dominated the Skies Over WWII Asia

Samuel Hui

In May of this year, reports emerged that the U.S. Army would disband two Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs). This followed the Air Force’s decision to shutter its dedicated Combat Air Advisor (CAA) units, with both actions sparking intense discussion among military circles about the folly of cutting these partner-focused capabilities. The mission of training, equipping, and advising partner forces has always carried significance for U.S. national interests beyond the purely military realm to encompass strong political and symbolic dimensions. General Claire Chennault and his 14th Air Force’s support to the Chinese American Composite Wing (CACW) in World War II offers a novel case study in war-time aviation security force assistance that achieved remarkable success and provides enduring lessons for military advisory efforts.

The CACW represents one of the earliest examples in American military history of a “train and equip” program directed at a foreign air force. Yet the program revealed that simply training and equipping alone could not secure victory in the skies over China—it also required trust and camaraderie between the airmen of both nations. Chennault’s most significant achievement, therefore, was not measured merely by the number of enemy aircraft downed by his Flying Tigers, but by his success in integrating a cadre of professional American and Chinese pilots and rebuilding the war-torn Republic of China (ROC) air force. This experience provided the embryonic U.S. Air Force an enduring model for conducting advisory missions in the postwar era. The principles of coordination, empowerment, and mutual respect that underpinned the CACW continued to guide U.S.-led coalition operations for decades to come.

The legacy of the CACW remains visible today in the close cooperation between the U.S. Air Force and its allies, and notably the continued existence of core CACW units in Taiwan’s current air force structure. Above all, this enduring spirit of collaboration stands as one of the most valuable assets Chennault bequeathed to the modern U.S. Air Force. Drawing on research conducted at the U.S. National Archives, the Hoover Institution Archives, the Air Force Historical Research Agency at Maxwell Air Force Base, and oral interviews with pilots who participated in the CACW, this paper illuminates the struggles and outstanding achievements of the American-Chinese WWII air campaign over four years of combat.

Elevating Information: Why the Army Should Establish Information as a Core Warfighting Function for Multi-Domain Operations

David R. Cowan |

The modern battlefield transcends traditional geographic boundaries, encompassing the physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions. In this complex environment, the United States Army’s FM 3-0, Operations (2022), outlines the critical shift towards Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) to prevail in Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO). While this doctrine recognizes information as a critical component of contemporary warfare, this article argues that the Army must take the next logical step: formally establishing information as a core warfighting function, equal in status to mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection.

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine provides compelling evidence that information operations are not merely supporting efforts but are central to military success across domains. This article contends that formally elevating information to a warfighting function would enable commanders to more effectively integrate operations in the information environment into every facet of military planning, from Brigade to Corps levels, creating decisive advantages in MDO.

Ukrainian Integrated Information Operations: A Case Study

Ukrainian forces have employed a combination of physical and informational means to achieve military objectives. They have used drones not only for direct attacks but as part of sophisticated deception operations. According to the New York Times, drones now account for approximately 70% of deaths and injuries on the battlefield, illustrating their central role in the conflict. Ukraine’s plan to produce up to four million drones annually by 2024 underscores their strategic importance in both direct combat and information-enabled deception operations.

Technical Deception with Information Amplification

Battlefields To Wastelands: UN Warns Conflicts Are Destroying Ecosystems Worldwide

UN News

From Gaza to Ukraine and beyond, conflict has caused widespread death and destruction, but it has also devastated natural resources such as water systems, farmland and forests.The impacts affect livelihoods, and fuel displacement as well as ongoing instability. Moreover, they can linger even after the fighting has ended.

In Sierra Leone, for example, “when the guns fell silent in 2002 after a decade of conflict, our primary forests and savannahs also fell silent,” deputy foreign minister Francess Piagie Alghali told the UN Security Council on Thursday.“We witnessed loss of biodiversity, the forced migration of wildlife, and the abandonment of agricultural fields and swamps, all direct consequences of the armed conflict.”

Long-term implications

Sierra Leone holds the rotating Security Council presidency this month and Ms. Alghali presided over a debate on the environmental impact of armed conflict and climate-driven security risks.It was held as more armed conflicts rage across the planet than at any time since the end of the Second World War, and two billion people – a quarter of the global population – live in conflict-affected areas.

“Environmental damage caused by conflicts continues to push people into hunger, into disease and into displacement and thereby increasing insecurity,” said Inger Andersen, Executive Director of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP).Conflicts lead to pollution, waste, and the destruction of critical ecosystems, with long-term implications for food security, water security, the economy and health, she explained.

Ukraine Military Situation: Will Pokrovsk Fall? How Will Russian Glide Bombs Affect The War?

Can Kasapoğlu

Ukrainian forces have committed significant effort to maintaining layered defensive combat operations in and around the most critical current flashpoint of the war, Pokrovsk.

In recent weeks the city has faced continuous Russian offensive waves. The Ukrainian military is now trying to pinpoint the exact locations of Russian assault groups and halt their movements, a process known in military terminology as fixing. These fixing operations seek to prepare and shape the battlefield for potential Ukrainian counteroffensives should Ukraine break the momentum of Russia’s piercing moves.

While Kyiv’s official statements have denied that Pokrovsk could soon fall, Ukrainian combat formations are at risk of complete encirclementin the city. Open-source visuals of tactical engagements suggest that heavy fighting is raging throughout the area. Fighting has escalatedin Myrnohrad on the northern flank of Pokrovsk. The Ukrainian General Staff has rushed reinforcements to the area, including air assault combat formations under the 7th Rapid Response Corps and a notable drone warfare unit, the 425th Separate Assault Regiment (known as “Skala”). To boost morale, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy visited the 7th Rapid Response Corps’ command.

In a parallel effort, Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR), led by General Kyrylo Budanov, has also deployed elite warfighting formations to the area. Last week GUR forces raided critical areas and conducted air cavalry operations—using rotary-wing aircraft to give land warfare formations air support and increase their maneuverability. Budanov’s troops, led by the Timur Special Unit, are focused on maintaining lines of communication and preventing Russian units from attaining fire control over the logistics routes of Ukraine’s defensive lines. The Russian militaryhas long targeted Ukraine’s logistics in the area.

The Election Of Mamdani: What It Means – And What It Doesn’t Mean

William L. Anderson

To the Democratic Socialists of America and their fellow travelers, “The Moment” has arrived. With the victory of Zohran Mamdani in New York City’s mayoral election Tuesday night, the DSA has another attractive face to add to its advocates nationwide, someone to complement Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Sen. Bernie Sanders as socialism marches to its inevitable triumph over the entire United States.

As one who believed that the US was on its way to a real revolution of free markets and personal freedom with the election of Ronald Reagan to the US presidency in 1980, and later his sweeping re-election in 1984, I realize that the DSA supporters who presently are giddy and ready to roll will experience the inevitable disappointment just as the free market supporters of Reagan did 40 years ago. However, before that moment arrives—and it will arrive—the socialists are going to do a lot of damage.

Given current public attitudes, voters are not convinced that the state is illegitimate, but rather that it is just doing a bad job and that the DSA can fix it. People in the MAGA movement also sees state power as the premiere level of things, and their statist agenda reflects the belief that government intervention will result in a better economy and better life for them, even while Donald Trump continues to demand more inflation and pushes through tariffs that can only depress the economy further.

Hamas is afraid Gaza will become Lebanon. So is Israel

Lazar Berman

After much excitement around the ceasefire in Gaza last month, plus no small measure of pomp and circumstance, US President Donald Trump’s 20-point peace plan has lost much of its momentum. A string of senior US officials making the pilgrimage to Kiryat Gat — a phrase no journalist ever thought they would write — injected some energy into the process, but even the ongoing visits can’t hide the fact that Trump’s vision is encountering friction at every turn.

Still, the process is crawling forward, much of it the result of Trump’s stubborn determination.Hamas has stretched out the handover process of slain hostages across the four weeks since the ceasefire went into effect, but now, only 6 of the 28 bodies the terror group held on October 10 remain in Gaza.

With phase one still incomplete, no talks have been held on phase two of the deal.Get The Times of Israel's Daily Editionby email and never miss our top storiesYet the Trump administration is making sure things are moving in the right direction. A draft United Nations Security Council resolution has been circulating, aiming to create a mandate for peacekeeping forces that would make potential contributing states feel comfortable with the mission.

Central Asia in the New Great Power Rivalry

Michael Rossi

On November 6, President Donald Trump met with the leaders of Central Asia in Washington for the U.S.–Central Asia (C5+1) summit, marking one of the most high-profile American engagement with the region in years. Once a peripheral concern for U.S. policymakers, Central Asia is moving up Washington’s foreign-policy agenda as a result of renewed great-power competition. Geography, energy, and connectivity have turned this landlocked region into a strategic crossroads between Russia, China, and the West.

For the United States, the summit is about identifying reliable partners for supply chains, critical minerals, and energy diversification, while ensuring that U.S. sanctions on Russia remain effective and that Beijing’s growing influence in Eurasia does not go unchallenged. Washington’s priorities include securing new trade corridors, tightening export controls, expanding energy and minerals cooperation, and reinforcing border and counterterrorism capabilities.While all five

Central Asian states are part of the summit, their importance to the U.S. differs. Collectively, Central Asia’s economies remain modest – Kazakhstan’s $288 billion economy is larger than those of Uzbekistan ($115 billion), Turkmenistan ($89 billion), Kyrgyzstan ($20 billion), and Tajikistan ($15 billion) combined. The region’s income gap is stark: Kazakhstan’s GDP per capita of roughly $14,000 is more than four times higher than Uzbekistan’s and ten times that of Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan. As such, the smaller economies – Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan – offer limited economic potential but serve specific geopolitical purposes.

Non-Russians in Russia Arm Themselves as War in Ukraine Drags On

Paul Goble

Since the very beginning of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s expanded war against Ukraine in February 2022, Russian observers have noted that the conflict has made it far easier for the residents of the Russian Federation to acquire guns. Some estimate that there are now far more than the 20 million weapons in private hands and that the weapons Russians now have are far more lethal as well (see EDM, November 29, 2022, September 11; Novaya Gazeta Europe, April 2, 2024). Immigrants from Central Asia and the Caucasus, along with non-Russians indigenous to and citizens of the Russian Federation, are among those who have acquired the most guns over the last three years.

The reasons for this conclusion are largely of the Russian government’s own making. The Kremlin has adopted an ever-tougher line against immigrant groups, prompting the latter to seek to defend themselves. Moscow has also disproportionately used non-Russians as a source of troops for its war. This means they are in a position to be disproportionately larger sources of such weapons for people back home. Moreover, in many cases, Moscow has treated its non-ethnic Russian citizens in ways that predispose these people to share the desire of immigrants to have their own weapons.

Google says North Korean cybercriminals have stepped up ‘misuse’ of its AI tools

Shreyas Reddy

North Korean cybercriminals have stepped up their use of Google’s artificial intelligence (AI) assistant Gemini to supercharge their cryptocurrency theft operations and malware attacks, the U.S. search giant reported Thursday.

In its new “AI Threat Tracker” report, the Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) said North Korean state-sponsored threat actors have continued their “misuse” of generative AI tools to enhance all stages of their operations.

One such group, classified by Google as UNC1069 (also known as MASAN and CryptoCore), used Gemini to research cryptocurrency concepts and locate data related to targets’ virtual currency wallet applications.

This financially motivated cybercrime group has been active since at least 2018, according to the Google-owned cybersecurity firm Mandiant, and some of its activities have previously been tracked as operations carried out by the Pyongyang-backed Lazarus Group.

In Thursday’s report, GTIG highlighted UNC1069’s extensive use of social engineering tactics to steal cryptocurrency, notably through the harvesting of users’ credentials and the use of computer maintenance-related language in phishing lures.

The threat group used Gemini to create lure material and other messages related to cryptocurrency, as well as to overcome language barriers by generating Spanish-language work excuses and requests to reschedule meetings.

6 Most Successful Insurgencies in Military History

Patrick Bodovitz

After its conquest by Spain in the 1500s, the island of Hispaniola became a colony of multiple European powers for around 300 years. France and Spain imported thousands of Africans to work in gold mines and sugar farms as slaves. By 1789, France controlled half of the island, which they named Saint-Domingue. The colony had a population of 560,000, most of whom were slaves. The horrific living conditions they endured made a revolt inevitable.

The revolutionary French government in 1793 banned slavery and granted citizenship to mixed-race Haitians. Toussaint Louverture, a wealthy mixed-race landowner, took control over much of the colony and agreed to keep it under French rule with limited autonomy. However, First Consul Napoleon Bonaparte reinstituted slavery and launched a military expedition to oust Toussaint in 1802. Over 20,000 French troops arrived and began fighting Toussaint’s militias. They captured him and he subsequently died in French captivity in April 1803.

The Haitians continued to fight under the leadership of men such as Jean-Jacques Dessalines, who staged a hit-and-run campaign against French forces. French forces suffered staggering casualties from Haitian ambushes and yellow fever. They could beat the Haitians in pitched battles, but they struggled to track them down in the jungles. By 1804, French troops were bottled up by Haitian rebels and the British Navy in the last colonial outpost at Gonaïves. When they surrendered, Haiti gained its independence at the cost of over 200,000 people.

Codifying Convergence: Synchronizing Non-Lethal Effects and Non-Kinetic Activities for Operational Control Over Adversary Decision-Making

Scott Hall

Commanders are putting soldiers at unnecessary risk, not because they lack firepower, but because they fail to synchronize the effects of information forces with ground maneuver. In today’s multidomain battlespace, failing to integrate information effects can fracture adversary cohesion, delay enemy movements, or erode public support. Modern battlefields are increasingly shaped by information – its use, misuse, and contestation – across all domains. U.S. Army formations, long valued for mobility, firepower, and shock effect, now operate amid pervasive informational, physical, and human dimensions, networks, ubiquitous sensors, and global media. To prevail, maneuver forces must be enhanced by integrating Non-Lethal Effects (NLE) and Non-Kinetic Activities (NKA) into operations. Such integration seeks to “bake in” information advantage rather than sprinkle it on top.

Converging NLE/NKA with maneuver operations creates synergistic effects across domains, allowing commanders to exploit adversary vulnerabilities and establish Information Advantage (IA) at decisive points in time and space. By influencing how adversaries think, decide, and act at every echelon, we can mitigate or deter aggression before it escalates into full-scale war. This requires strategic leaders and operational planners to adopt new doctrines, advanced technologies (such as AI/ML), and innovative targeting processes, including Non-Lethal Critical Vulnerability Analysis (NLCVA), that converge effects across domains. The following analysis combines an accessible strategic narrative with in-depth technical details on integration, providing actionable recommendations for Army leaders to institutionalize these concepts through doctrine, training, and planning.

11 November 2025

Hezbollah Is Down but Not Out

Michael Jacobson

A senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and Matthew Levitt, the director of the counterterrorism and intelligence program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.Billboards show Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem (center) and his slain predecessor, Hassan Nasrallah, during a ceremony marking the first anniversary of Nasrallah's death, in Deir Qanoun al-Nahr, Lebanon, on Sept. 27.Billboards show Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem (center) and his slain predecessor, Hassan Nasrallah, during a ceremony marking the first anniversary of Nasrallah's death, in Deir Qanoun al-Nahr, Lebanon,

After being battered by Israel, Hezbollah is working to replenish its badly damaged capabilities. Morgan Ortagus, the U.S. special envoy to the Middle East, was in Beirut last month to press Lebanese President Joseph Aoun to disarm the Iran-backed group—but she found out, if she hadn’t suspected already, that it is easier said than done.

Iran remains Hezbollah’s primary patron, as underscored by the U.S. Treasury Department's announcement today that it is sanctioning operatives funneling Iranian money to the group. Beyond direct funding from Iran, however, the group also has its own extensive and independent global procurement and financial networks. If the past is precedent, then Hezbollah will rely heavily on those international networks to bounce back from its recent setbacks. To succeed in freeing Lebanon from Hezbollah’s iron grip, the United States and the international community must not only support the Lebanese government’s internal disarmament efforts but also thwart Hezbollah from operating freely abroad.

Pakistan nuclear weapons, 2025

Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, Mackenzie Knight-Boyle

Pakistan continues to slowly modernize its nuclear arsenal with improved and new delivery systems, and a growing fissile material production industry. Analysis of commercial satellite images of construction at Pakistani army garrisons and air force bases shows what appear to be newer launchers and facilities that might be related to Pakistan’s nuclear forces, although authoritative information about Pakistan’s nuclear units is scarce.

We estimate that Pakistan has produced a nuclear weapons stockpile of approximately 170 warheads, which is unchanged since our last estimate in 2023 (see Table 1). The US Defense Intelligence Agency projected in 1999 that Pakistan would have 60 to 80 warheads by 2020 (US Defense Intelligence Agency (1999, 38), but several new weapon systems have been fielded and developed since then, which leads us to a higher estimate. Our estimate comes with considerable uncertainty because neither Pakistan nor other countries publish much information about the Pakistani nuclear arsenal.Table 1. Pakistan nuclear weapons, 2025. (Click to display full size with notes.)

With several new delivery systems in development, four plutonium production reactors, and an expanding uranium enrichment infrastructure, Pakistan’s stockpile has the potential to increase further over the next several years. The size of this increase will depend on several factors, including how many nuclear-capable launchers Pakistan plans to deploy, how its nuclear strategy evolves, and how much the Indian nuclear arsenal grows. We estimate that the country’s stockpile could potentially grow to around 200 warheads by the late 2020s. But unless India significantly expands its arsenal or further builds up its conventional forces, it seems reasonable to expect that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal will not grow significantly, but might level off as its current weapons programs are completed.

The US must not endorse Russia and China’s vision for cybersecurity

John Yoo and Ivana Stradner

Even as Russia and China wage a relentless cyber war against the West, the United Nations is celebrating a new cybercrime treaty whose chief architects were none other than Moscow and Beijing.

It should come as no surprise, then, that this U.N. convention, signed by 65 nations last month, is less about fighting cybercrime than about legitimizing authoritarian repression of free speech. Although his predecessor grudgingly supported the treaty, President Trump should lead the charge against it.

Russia’s and China’s efforts to shape global cyberspace norms stretch back decades. In 1999, Moscow proposed “principles of international information security,” although this initiative received little support. In 2001, Russia and China refused to ratify the first-ever international treaty on cybercrime, known as the Budapest Convention, viewing it as too intrusive and a threat to state sovereignty.

But Moscow and Beijing did not give up. In 2018, the Russians launched a fresh effort to replace the Budapest Convention. They formed a new U.N. working group on cyber as an alternative to a rival U.S.-favored forum.

The following year, the U.N. General Assembly passed a Russian resolution, cosponsored by China and other authoritarian countries and opposed by Washington and its allies, to begin drafting a new international treaty to counter cybercrime.

Pressure on the Periphery: China’s Economic Coercion in the Borderlands

Victor A. Ferguson, Viking Bohman, and Audrye Wong

Over the past two decades, economic sanctions have emerged as a central instrument in the foreign policy toolkit of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). As the most valuable export destination for many countries and a central hub in global supply chains for critical materials and intermediate inputs, China’s economy provides policymakers with a versatile foundation for statecraft. By imposing sanctions and restricting the ability of foreign governments, firms, or individuals to access the Chinese market, Beijing can compel, deter, or otherwise signal dissatisfaction with actors that cross its red lines.

This essay focuses specifically on economic coercion in the PRC’s borderlands: the twenty countries with which it shares land or maritime borders.1 Using a unique dataset of over two hundred economic restrictions imposed globally between 2010 and August 2025,2 we trace Beijing’s sanctioning behavior in the borderlands and argue that the region served as an important testing ground for Beijing’s initial sanction experimentation, especially through “informal” methods. That borderland countries served as proverbial canaries in a coal mine may be hardly surprising, given that geographic proximity means they are inherently more closely connected to, and therefore more likely to affect, interests of immediate importance to China like territory and borders. However, we also find that sanctioning activity in the PRC’s immediate neighborhood sharply declined after peaking in 2017. We argue that this is because Beijing has been driven to shift its focus toward using economic restrictions to counter pressure from more distant actors like the United States and members of the European Union.

Taiwan, want to stop the gray-zone? Put your money where your mouth is.

Jonathan Walberg

When a Togo-flagged freighter with a Chinese crew severed Taiwan’s TP3 undersea cable this year, Taipei did something unusual: it built a case, prosecuted the captain, and won a prison sentence. Gray-zone activity is supposed to be deniable; a judge’s verdict is not. That ruling should be read as more than a local story about a damaged line: it’s a proof of concept that the right mix of policing, monitoring, and law can raise the costs of below-the-threshold coercion. If Taipei wants less gray-zone harassment, it can’t just call for vigilance — it must pay for it, systematically and for the long haul.

Gray-zone campaigns thrive in ambiguity: actions that are “not quite war” but erosive over time — coast-guard pushes, maritime-militia swarms, “fishing” sorties, sand dredging, cable strikes, and propaganda that muddies facts faster than governments can clarify them. For the PRC, the formula has been clear for years: coordinated pressure by coast guards and “civilian” vessels, layered with disinformation and legal salami-slicing, designed to exhaust and outmaneuver defenders without triggering a treaty response. The near-term effect is friction; the long-term effect is desensitization. Unchallenged encounters raise the informal response threshold inside agencies and cabinets, makes media coverage feel like “old news,” and conditions local communities to treat incursions as background noise. Over time, that drip-drip creates a narrative of normalcy. Maps get redrawn in practice, if not on paper, and it becomes politically harder for Taipei to call out a violation or mobilize partners without sounding alarmist.

That is the point of the strategy: to shift the burden of proof onto Taiwan, sap bandwidth, and narrow the space for timely action. If every incident is “ambiguous,” then every response must clear a higher evidentiary bar, pass more reviews, and compete with other priorities in a finite budget. Meanwhile, administrative precedents stack up: “routine patrols,” “safety inspections,” “fisheries management” that look bureaucratic but function as creeping jurisdiction that China uses to push their agenda. The remedy, therefore, isn’t just more destroyers; it’s more prosecutors, patrol hulls, sensors, and joint law-enforcement mechanisms, to document patterns, attribute intent, impose consequences, and keep the narrative honest.

Beijing’s Growing Power Over Global Gas Markets

Elizabeth Frost, Angela Glowacki, and Jia-Shen Tsai

The governments of Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have signed a legally binding agreement to build the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline, according to Gazprom CEO Alexey Miller (Bloomberg, September 2). The pipeline signals deepening energy ties between Beijing and Moscow at a time when the PRC has suspended imports of U.S. liquified natural gas (LNG) in retaliation to President Trump’s tariffs (Bloomberg, March 18; Natural Gas Intelligence, October 29).

Despite steady growth in domestic production, the PRC remains externally dependent on LNG and pipeline gas for around 40 percent of its supply. Beijing’s approach to diversifying suppliers, including with Russia, is motivated by both economic and geopolitical concerns. These include desires to maintain competitive pricing, develop its position as a re-seller of LNG, respond to trade wars, and enhance strategic partnerships with key partners.

The U.S. Air Force Has a Plan to Escape the ‘Doom Loop’

Mackenzie Eaglen

A 96th Test Wing F-15E Strike Eagle flies during a test mission May 22, 2025 over Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. The 96 TW and the 53rd Wing teamed up to test AGR-20F Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II laser-guided rockets on the F-15E in May in an effort to get the capability to the warfighter as quickly as possible. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Thomas Barley)

Key Points and Summary – U.S. Air Force leaders briefed Congress on a 10-year fighter recapitalization to escape a readiness “doom loop” created by aging fleets, parts shortages, and high sustainment costs.

-The plan grows capacity while diversifying capability: retain select legacy jets, divest oldest tails, accelerate F-35 and F-15EX buys, push a 6th-gen fighter, and field Collaborative Combat Aircraft as a cheaper force-multiplier.

-Success hinges on solving pilot shortages, boosting mission-capable rates, expanding industrial throughput, and locking sustained funding. With adversaries fielding dense IADS, EW, and hypersonics, officials urge multi-year resources to give industry confidence to scale production and restore credible deterrence.

Demilitarization in Gaza: Could the Palestinian Authority Be Part of the Solution?

David Makovsky and Shira Efron

After the ceasefire in Gaza, the first phase of President Donald Trump's Gaza peace plan is nearing completion. All surviving Israeli hostages have returned home after two hellish years in Hamas's tunnels; the remains of the dead hostages are being retrieved—too slowly, but with the dignity their families deserve. In return, Israel released 250 Palestinian prisoners serving long prison sentences for violent attacks and 1,700 more detainees. More than two years after Hamas's October 7, 2023, assault on Israel, the worst and most vicious fighting in the decades-long Israeli-Palestinian conflict has stopped, giving both exhausted and traumatized societies a measure of respite.

The second phase hinges on Hamas's disarmament. Only after verifiable demilitarization will the IDF withdraw from Gaza and let reconstruction of the razed and battered Strip begin in earnest. The plan calls for the deployment of an international stabilization force, while a temporary, technocratic Palestinian administration manages day-to-day affairs.

Why the fall of this city would matter to Ukraine and Russia

Laura Gozzi and Paul Kirby

On Wednesday, Kyiv's General Staff denied its forces in and around the town had been encircled and maintained they were still involved in "active resistance" and blocking out Russian troops. One Ukrainian regiment said it had cleared the city council and posted a video of a Ukrainian flag hung on the building.

Skelya regiment

Ukraine's "Skelya" assault regiment said they had cleared the city council building in Pokrovsk and raised the national flag

While Ukraine's official position is that it is holding its own against Russia, military personnel cited by a war correspondent for Ukraine's Hromadske website said Ukrainian troops were outnumbered and more than 1,000 soldiers were at risk of becoming surrounded.

For its part Russia said it was continuing to advance northwards and thwarting attempts by Ukraine to break its troops out of encirclement. Ukrainian units were trapped in "cauldrons", the defence ministry said, although several commentators said that was not the case.

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