Indian Strategic Studies: 06/11/25

11 June 2025

India’s Evolved Convoluted Deterrence

India has adopted a multidimensional approach to deterrence, anchored by resolute and punitive strikes designed to raise the costs of aggression for the perpetrators. India largely borrows from the theory of extended deterrence to help support its new approach.

India and Pakistan were recently engaged in a complex conflict across the Line of Control. This was a direct consequence of the April 22 terror attack in Pahalgam by the Resistance Front, a Pakistan-based and -backed terror group affiliated with Lashkar-e-Taiba.

This terror attack claimed twenty-six innocent Indian lives. This is not the first time that Pakistan has employed terror as an instrument of statecraft against India; one of the earliest examples dates back to 1947, when tribal lashkars—supported and armed by Pakistan—pillaged and ravaged the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. Even a conservative,

cursory aggregation, extrapolation, and synthesis of available data suggest that India has endured between around 25,952 Pakistan-based and -backed terrorist attacks in the state of Jammu and Kashmir from 1991 to 2018. This estimate includes not only direct acts of terror, but also cross-border infiltrations, proxy operations,

and attacks executed by terrorists recruited, trained, radicalized, or funded by entities across the border. Notably, this data excludes Pakistan-funded militancy in Punjab in the 1980s, in Jammu and Kashmir in the 1990s,

the exodus of the Kashmiri Hindus, the hijacking of IC-184, the dastardly 1993 Mumbai blasts, the Indian Parliament attack in 2001, the Delhi bombings in 2005, the Mumbai train bombing in 2006, the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, the 2016 Uri attacks, the 2019 Pulwama attacks, and more, which were major acts of terror. However, the recent terror attack in Pehalgam on April 22, 2025, was considered to be the deadliest terror attack on civilians since 2008 Mumbai attacks.

In response, on May 7, India launched Operation Sindoor, calibrated missile strikes hitting the terror infrastructure at nine locations in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir. Despite declaring the Indian response measured, nonescalatory, and targeting none of Pakistan’s military and civilian infrastructure,

Pakistan decided to climb the escalation ladder. India hit back by neutralizing Pakistan air defense systems in Lahore, targeting Pakistani air bases, technical infrastructure, command and control centers, radar sites, and weapons depots. However, the broader and often overlooked issue beyond this immediate conflict is about India’s inadequate deterrence, which had repeatedly failed to deter Pakistan’s state-sponsored acts of terror in India.

Strategic Stalemate: A Game Theoretic Analysis of India-China Relations amidst Border Tensions

Col Raja Wangdi Sherpa

Game Theory is described as a mathematical theory of decision making in a conflict situation. However, there are several restrictions on the type of conflict and their amenability to analysis. It is important to understand that Game Theory neither provides any magical formula to solve difficult planning situations, nor offers undue hope of simplifying the decision process. To consider an estimate from the Game Theory point of view requires a higher degree of analysis and logical thought than what we use in present planning doctrine.

Various conflict situations were studied for the first time in 1944 by Von Newman, a Hungarian born American mathematician and Oskar Morginstern, a German economist, and their speculations were published in their book 'Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour'. Since then, practical applications of the theory have been made in tactical situations, weapon system analysis, logistics and economics. However, more important to the military planner is the fact that the implications of the theory can be brought to bear on situations more complicated and less precise than those to which it was applied originally.

The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a key concept in game theory that describes a situation in which two parties may not cooperate, even if it is in their best interest, because they lack trust or fear of the other party’s defection. This theory can be applied to understand the complex dynamics of India-China relations, particularly in the context of China’s assertiveness and belligerence.

Applying the Prisoner’s Dilemma to India-China Relations

In the context of India-China relations, the Prisoner’s Dilemma theory suggests that while both countries may benefit from cooperation, the mutual distrust and fear of betrayal (exacerbated by China’s belligerence) push both towards strategies that maintain the possibility of conflict. To overcome this dilemma will require incremental trust building, recalibration of geopolitical strategies and clearer communication to manage competition and avert escalatory moves. However, without such steps, the cycle of defection and mutual suspicion is likely to continue.

Japan as a New Strategic Partner in the Three Seas Initiative: Opportunities and Challenges Ahead

Sayuri Romei

In April 2024, Japan joined the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) as a new strategic partner alongside the United States and the European Union. The 3SI was established in 2015 with the objective of strengthening connectivity and reducing the disparities in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Baltic states. The initiative promotes the development of infrastructure in the energy, transport, and digital sectors in the region surrounded by the Baltic Sea,

the Black Sea, and the Adriatic Sea. The war in Ukraine has highlighted the relevance of this initiative and has underscored the frail infrastructure in the region and CEE’s economic dependence on Russia. As it becomes increasingly clear that the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific regions are inseparable, Japan is compelled to serve as an active partner in the 3SI as its role is also closely connected to the quality of assistance and support to Ukraine.

As Japan embarks on this new partnership with CEE and Baltic countries, however, moving beyond the rhetoric about the importance of this initiative and taking concrete action is a challenge that all the countries involved will have to grapple with. Japan’s dialogue with CEE, and in particular with the Visegrad-4 (V4) group, i.e., Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, officially started in the early 2000s. For the past twenty years, the relationship has mostly been smooth and without major problems.

However, Japan’s engagement with those countries has lacked dynamism, as Japanese foreign policy has mainly been focused on the United States and China. Japan’s investments in CEE have been limited and cautious, and visits from high-ranking Japanese officials have been sporadic.

In fact, the visits to Japan by the heads of the states of the V4 and CEE countries have always outnumbered those by their Japanese counterparts. Twenty years later, as CEE countries are realizing that the economic benefit from China is not as great as they had expected, Japan is in a good position to rekindle this relationship. In a January 2022 interview with Nikkei, Akio Miyajima, Ambassador of Japan to Poland, argued that it is crucial for Japan to strengthen relations with these countries. At the time of the interview, Russia had not yet invaded Ukraine,

and the Ambassador lamented that Japan remained disinterested in the Ukraine issue. Since the invasion a month later, however, Japan has not only taken a clear stance in condemning Russia’s aggression, it has also taken a leadership role in investing in the reconstruction of Ukraine.

Checking in on Modernization and Reforms in the People’s Liberation Army

Nearly a decade ago, in a study guide of his collected writings for the military, Chinese leader XI Jinping asserted the crucial need for a quality military force from the “grassroots” up: “Without grassroots officers and soldiers, no matter how grand the strategy, i

t cannot be realized, and no matter how advanced the weapons and equipment, they are useless.” After nine years of corruption purges, modernization initiatives, and substantial reforms,

Xi and China’s military leaders remain concerned. Significant portions of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and cross-military and local (civilian) efforts are not moving fast enough, or in the right direction. In less than three years, Xi expects his military to be capable of forcefully annexing Taiwan and to successfully deter, if not, defeat,

the U.S. military and its allies. The progress of reforms and modernizations is, however, insufficient, according to PLA senior leadership.

The Race for Sixth-Generation Fighter Supremacy: Pilots Aren’t Going Away

In the race for the next generation of air superiority between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC),

one thing seems clear: pilots are staying in the cockpit. Despite expectations in the US and the PRC that piloted aircraft would be quickly eclipsed by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), both sides recently hinted that high-end manned fighters will be the centerpiece of their next-generation battle systems for air dominance.

These reveals—as well as CNA analysis of PRC writings on related topics—suggest that the US and PRC see manned-unmanned teaming, with UAVs supporting crewed fighters, as the way of high-end air warfare for the foreseeable future.

Competitive Convergence

Details about next-generation fighter jet programs the US and PRC remain a mystery to the public. After President Trump’s March 21 announcement that Boeing will build the US Air Force’s F-47 sixth-generation fighter jet,

the DOD distributed several artist renderings of the fighter, the details of which were quickly picked apart in public defense analyst forums. On April 18, however, US Air Force and defense industry officials revealed that the images were deliberately distorted, intended to confuse competitors about the true capabilities of the F-47’s design.

This announcement was preceded by a similarly speculative reveal in the PRC in December 2024, where videos of two advanced, tailless tactical combat aircraft—unofficially dubbed by Western military analysts as the J-50 and JH-XX—circulated on social media. Despite speculation in the PRC and international media that these were sixth-generation prototypes, neither the PRC government nor its military have confirmed this.

While much remains uncertain about the two nations’ next-generation air weapon platforms, Washington’s and Beijing’s teasers do bolster confidence in one basic but critical shared aspect of the competitors’ next-generation air dominance programs: both advanced fighter systems appear to be centered on a manned fighter jet.

Why should America negotiate with China?

This article was developed in part through the author’s participation in a project organized by the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies. The views in this piece are the author’s alone.

Members of the policy communities in Washington and Beijing are increasingly reaching a common conclusion on the diminishing value of U.S.-China negotiations. President Donald Trump is an important outlier from this emerging consensus.

His views will carry the day in setting American policy. Thus, the central question facing American policymakers is not whether to engage in negotiations, but rather how to deliver better results from negotiations than previous administrations. To support such planning,

this paper examines the purposes of direct negotiations. It then reviews the negotiating records of the three previous U.S. administrations to draw lessons from those periods for the way forward. From there, the paper focuses on three issues that could serve as the basis of future negotiations and a strategy for organizing the process. The three issues are trade and economics, military and risk reduction,

and law enforcement cooperation. A path remains open for Trump and Xi Jinping to drive the relationship forward, but only if they take control of the moment rather than succumb to fatalism about the inevitability of estrangement or conflict.

While there are vanishingly few areas of agreement between the United States and China, there is one broadly shared sentiment between policymakers in both countries: cynicism. As the costs and consequences of the trade war become more visible, the national mood in both countries about the U.S.-China relationship is hardening. Leaders and leading thinkers seem to be becoming more fatalistic about the trajectory of relations. And there appears to be growing pessimism that problems in the relationship are fixable.

China may own the ‘narrative’ of future conflict if the US crushes the satellite imagery biz: experts

PATRICK TUCKER and AUDREY DECKER

Congress is weighing reductions to the National Reconnaissance Office's budget for acquiring commercial satellite imagery, a move that could ultimately give China an edge in the influence domain and on the battlefield.

The cut could slow growth and innovation at U.S. remote-sensing companies, at a time when China's own burgeoning satellite-imagery industry is aggressively seeking clients. Though European countries are unlikely to become reliant on Chinese imagery, the same cannot be said for governments in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. If Chinese companies can offer comparable imagery at lower cost, the profits could fuel innovation at a pace that U.S. firms struggle to match.

That could leave U.S. adversaries in control of how the world perceives developing conflicts, warned Kari Bingen, director of the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and former deputy defense undersecretary for intelligence.

“If Chinese companies end up leading in this area, they would be positioned to become the partner of choice, to undercut our companies in the global marketplace, and ultimately could control the narrative of what happens on Earth,” Bingen said. “On February 23, 2022, instead of Western companies publicly releasing imagery of the buildup of Russian forces along the Ukrainian border—and marrying that with intelligence on what we anticipated—imagine if those images and that narrative had come from China?”

The Trump administration is weighing a proposal to reduce funding for NRO’s Electro-Optical Commercial Layer program from $300 million a year to $200 million, SpaceNews first reported. And NRO requested no funding for its commercial radar program in 2026, despite expectations that it would ask for about $30 million, according to industry and congressional sources.

NRO usually doesn’t prioritize requests for commercial because officials know Congress will add money there through the appropriations process, according to one congressional staffer.

Guns by Drone: The Rise of Drone-Assisted Firearm Smuggling on Israel’s Southern Border

Dr Yannick Veilleux-Lepage

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Israel has witnessed a sharp uptick in a previously rare tactic: the use of commercial drones to smuggle firearms across its southern border with Egypt. This emerging trend in drone-assisted weapons smuggling is notable not only for its operational novelty, but also for what it reveals about the evolving nature of cross-border threats in modern conflict environments.

While drones have been widely used by non-state actors for surveillance and attacks, their adaptation for logistical purposes, particularly the covert delivery of rifles, pistols, and ammunition, marks a significant tactical shift.

This Insight examines the recent emergence of drone-enabled smuggling along the Israel-Egypt border, marked by over ten confirmed interceptions involving modified commercial UAVs since October 2024. While attribution remains incomplete in several cases,

Israeli media and IDF spokespersons have linked these incidents to Palestinian militant groups, though no independent verification has confirmed responsibility. These incidents nonetheless highlight the technical adaptations, payload profiles,

and strategic implications of drone-assisted smuggling. The Insight argues that this development is not merely an isolated innovation but a potentially replicable tactic that could reshape logistical operations for non-state actors in other conflict zones. By analysing how this tactic has emerged in Israel, the Insight aims to draw broader lessons for counterterrorism, border enforcement, and global drone regulation efforts.

Drone-Assisted Smuggling

Drone-assisted smuggling refers to the covert use of unmanned aerial vehicles to transport illicit goods, such as firearms, explosives, narcotics, mobile phones, and cash, across borders or into restricted areas like prisons. Unlike traditional smuggling routes, drones offer low-risk, GPS-guided alternatives that bypass ground-based security infrastructure. They are typically small, inexpensive, and difficult to detect, making them especially attractive to organised criminal networks

The “Huawei Saga” in Europe Revisited: German Lessons for the Rollout of 6G

While the European Union attempted to coordinate a collective response through its 5G Toolbox in Europe’s 5G infrastructure, member states diverged significantly in balancing political, economic, and technological considerations. Germany, despite its economic ties to China and status as Europe’s largest telecom market, only reached a tentative agreement in July 2024—one that appears largely symbolic.

Dusseldorf, Germany - September 22 2024: Huawei, Chinese multinational technology company's logo and lettering on the flags next to the brand's corporate office in Dusseldorf

Alexander Fedosov/Shutterstock.com

Germany’s compromise reflects persistent institutional divisions and a reluctance to decisively reduce reliance on Chinese technology, even in the face of geopolitical and security concerns. With 6G on the horizon, Europe must learn from its fragmented 5G response. A future 6G strategy should prioritize network diversity, enhanced encryption, and reduced dependency on high-risk suppliers to preserve European sovereignty and digital resilience. It is urgent to build a more unified and binding EU framework for managing the rollout of next-generation wireless infrastructure.

Tim Rühlig is Senior Analyst at the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), focusing on Europe-China relations, Chinese foreign and tech policy, and Hong Kong politics. His work explores China’s role in global standardization, the US-China tech rivalry, and implications for Europe. He holds a PhD from Frankfurt University and degrees in International Relations, Political Science, and Cultural Anthropology.

Reimagining Irregular Warfare: The Case for a Modernized OSS 2.0

A recent piece in the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) penned by a retired Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer argues against proposals to revive the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) model for today’s strategic competition environment. In the piece,

the author argues: “Reviving the OSS would add additional bureaucracy without any additional capability and could easily risk intelligence fratricide at a time when the United States needs more focus rather than more capability.” As the co-author of one of the critiqued proposals,

I am compelled to note that this argument ignores two fundamental advantages of reviving an OSS 2.0 construct.

First, the assumption is invalid that any updated OSS proposal requires creating more redundant capabilities or excessive additional bureaucracy,

rather than simply streamlining existing resources, eliminating redundant capabilities and functions, and breaking down organizational barriers between agencies with identical authorities but different cultures. Secondly, there is no acknowledgement of the very real operational fratricide that is already occurring today because of competing interests between organizations vying for missions and resources in an era of increasing government efficiency.

The paralysis this interagency competition causes costs us opportunities that we could better realize through a unitary irregular warfare department under the Department of Defense (DoD).

The Real Opportunity: Streamlining Existing Resources

A modern OSS 2.0 would not require creating entirely new structures from scratch. Instead, it would consolidate and optimize existing resources that are currently fragmented across multiple agencies under the purview of the “Department for Special Operations and Irregular Warfare” (DSOIW), created by redesignating and hyper empowering the DoD’s existing Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. This is especially critical as recent reports indicate the CIA is planning to cut 1,200 positions over the next several years, even as the Trump administration requests a historic $1 trillion budget for the DoD.

Directed Energy Weapons and the Future of European Defence

Europe stands at the edge of a new defence frontier defined by beams of light and pulses of energy. As warfighting evolves into the age of mass precision, the weapons that will shape tomorrow’s battlefield may not make noise or leave shell casings behind.

Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs) are no longer science fiction, since they are rapidly becoming a vital element of European air defences.

As Europe faces intensifying threats ranging from drone swarms to missile attacks, DEWs offer rapid-response, low-cost-per-shot solutions that can intercept threats at the speed of light.

DEWs, which include high-energy lasers, high-power microwaves (HPM) and particle beam systems are emerging as transformative capabilities in 21st-century defence. They employ electromagnetic or photonic energy to disable or destroy multiple targets with remarkable precision, unlike kinetic munitions that rely on ballistic interception. Lessons from the invasion of Ukraine and the Red Sea Crisis tell us that Europe requires these capabilities now.

Chris Kremidas-Courtney is a Senior Visiting Fellow at the European Policy Centre.

The support the European Policy Centre receives for its ongoing operations, or specifically for its publications, does not constitute an endorsement of their contents, which reflect the views of the authors only. Supporters and partners cannot be held responsible for any use that may be made of the information contained therein

Quantity Has a Quality All of Its Own

Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian intelligence operations have shifted toward a mass-scale approach, focusing on sabotage,

intelligence collection, and influence efforts. This transformation is driven by Russia’s expanding operational demands, even as it is constrained by mass expulsions of intelligence officers and the urgency to ramp up operations.

In response, Russian intelligence has prioritized quantity over quality, relying on multiple cheap, inefficient, and nonprofessional resources. Sheer numbers compensate for inefficiency, and anonymity provides an added layer of plausible deniability.

A key driver of this shift has been the Kremlin’s efforts to undermine Western support for Ukraine, which disrupted Russia’s plans for a quick victory. Russian intelligence—Russia’s primary strategic tool since the Soviet era—was tasked with imposing costs on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), shaping public opinion, disrupting arms shipments,

and gathering intelligence. However, with diminished capabilities and a decline in professionalism, Russian intelligence has moved away from precision-driven, professionalized operations to a mass-scale, decentralized model that mirrors broader trends in Russian military strategy.

This change aligns with Russian military and strategic thinking, in which material shortages are compensated by sheer numbers and a disregard for casualties. This transformation has significant implications for intelligence efficacy, resource management, and global security.

The shift from quality to quantity

Historically, Soviet intelligence operations during the era of the KGB (the Russian Committee for State Security) were marked by precision and the use of highly trained operatives. These operations focused on high-value targeted objectives such as the infiltration of foreign governments, high-profile assassinations, and covert activities.

The Devil is in the Details: Minerals, Batteries, and US Dependence on Chinese Imports

Ben Taulli and Joshua Busby

US dependence on China for critical minerals and battery supply chains represents a national security risk, leaving the country potentially vulnerable to military supply chain disruptions, coercion, cyber threats, and risks to key economic sectors. While it is well understood that China dominates key segments of the global market, the degree of US reliance on Chinese suppliers remains unclear due to data limitations.

Current trade data fails to capture firm-level dependencies and market concentration fully, impeding policymakers’ ability to make informed decisions. This brief examines the global battery supply chain, identifies gaps in trade data, and outlines four key recommendations for improving US tracking of import reliance.

Global Battery Supply Chain and Chinese Market Dominance

China holds a commanding position in the global battery supply chain, controlling a substantial share of the entire value chain from upstream mineral extraction and refinement to downstream anode, cathode,

and finished battery production. Much of the publicly available data on Chinese production, however, does not provide an accurate picture of US dependence on Chinese suppliers. More data is required to drive the nuanced policymaking required to grow the US battery supply chains and learn from China where applicable.

Much of China’s production is directed towards its domestic market, and existing trade data does not account for firm-level details or the role of Chinese firms operating through foreign subsidiaries.

The US imports nearly three-quarters of its lithium-ion batteries from China. Less well known is that only about 30% of electric vehicle lithium-ion batteries are imported, the rest are already produced domestically. The US has specific dependencies on China for graphite but Chinese presence in US supply chains for other midstream commodities such as nickel and manganese is less significant.

Airborne Axis Inside the Deal That Brought Iranian Drone Production to Russia

Omar Al-Ghusbi

Iran and Russia are deepening their political and military relationship through intermediary companies that facilitate their defense collaborations and flout global sanctions regimes. This report examines the case of Iran’s role in developing Russian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV or drone) production capability, which Russia is using to wage its war in Ukraine. Leaked records indicate that the Iranian company Sahara Thunder led an extensive collaboration with the Russian company Alabuga JSC to provide the latter with the technology and know-how to produce a variant of the S-136 UAV, which Russia has since used widely in military operations against Ukraine.

This collaboration has spanned multiple years and persisted in the face of global censure and sanctions against both countries. Key aspects of the partnership include the following:

Close Ties to the State: Both Sahara Thunder and Alabuga JSC are economic actors with long-term ties to the state. Sahara Thunder is deeply embedded in state defense networks. It is a prime example of Iran’s use of middlemen to carry out its activities while the Russian state is leveraging Alabuga JSC for defense industrial use.

UAE Intermediaries: Sahara Thunder and Alabuga JSC used a UAE-based company to carry out aspects of their partnership, which allowed the two companies to minimize evidence of direct contact in the UAE’s low-barrier business environment.

Mixed Payment Systems: Alabuga JSC paid for equipment and services through wire transfers via the UAE and gold shipments. The two payment methods offer different advantages, and the combination of the two offers agility in circumventing sanctions.

Relationship Development: The outcome of this collaboration has outlived the UAV project. Reciprocal visits by both parties served not only to expand UAV localization but also focused on other defense industrial domains, indicating a growing Russian-Iranian military partnership.

Atomic Advantage Accelerating U.S. Quantum Sensing for Next-Generation Positioning, Navigation, and Timing

Constanza M. Vidal Bustamante

One of the most consequential national security contests now unfolds on battlefields invisible to the naked eye—across the faint radiofrequency signals of the Global Positioning System (GPS) and within the quantum states of individual atoms. At stake are America’s positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) capabilities, the foundation for precise geolocation,

trajectory planning, and time synchronization across military, civilian, and commercial domains. For decades, the U.S.-invented GPS has served as the backbone of the world’s PNT, but the system’s inherent vulnerabilities have come into stark relief as adversaries increasingly jam and spoof its weak signals and build weapons to take down its satellites. GPS interference already undermines military operations and disrupts up to thousands of commercial flights daily; broader attacks could trigger catastrophic mission failures and widespread disruption of critical infrastructure, inflicting economic losses exceeding $1 billion a day.1

In the face of rising threats to traditional PNT, quantum sensors offer a compelling alternative. Leveraging the immutable properties of atoms, these devices offer unmatched measurement precision, long-term accuracy,

and reliable operation in contested environments—capabilities that can back up and even outperform current GPS-based services. Quantum sensors could enable resilient U.S. PNT within a few years—from the navigation of submarines, drones, and munitions to the synchronization of telecommunications networks, power grids, and financial systems—but only if America continues to develop and deploy the technology.

While atomic clocks—the most mature quantum technology today—already power GPS, emerging quantum sensing capabilities are beginning to show their promise as local sources of high-precision, resilient PNT. Next-generation atomic clocks can sustain timing accuracy over longer durations. Quantum accelerometers and gyroscopes can measure a moving platform’s velocity and rotation with greater precision.

Quantum gravimeters and magnetometers can reference the Earth’s unique gravitational and magnetic fields for stealthy positioning. All of these technologies offer enhanced performance without relying on vulnerable radiofrequency signals.

What Happens If the United States Leaves the WTO?

James Bacchus

Aresolution before Congress calls for US withdrawal from the World Trade Organization (WTO). Both international law and US law permit withdrawal. The case for withdrawal, however, is misguided and misinformed.

Much of what is said and widely believed about the effects of WTO membership on the United States is simply untrue. In fact, American membership in the WTO has been for decades and remains today enormously beneficial economically to US businesses,

workers, and consumers. Withdrawal by the United States from the WTO would result in the loss of many of these economic benefits, including those derived from decades of accumulated trade commitments made by the 165 other member countries on thousands of different US goods and services traded within the WTO legal framework; those resulting from the commercial shield of WTO rules forbidding trade discrimination against US exports; and those emanating from the availability to the United States of an impartial,

binding, and enforceable system of WTO trade dispute settlement. Moreover, withdrawal by the United States would cede US leadership in the WTO to other leading trading countries, including the second-largest trading country in the world, China. Trade is a win-win economically for all WTO members. WTO membership maximizes the overall economic gains from engaging in trade. The United States should remain in the WTO and help lead it toward needed reforms that will make it more beneficial to all in the modern global economy of the 21st century.

A resolution under consideration by the Congress of the United States proposes that the United States withdraw as one of the 166 member countries of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the international institution based in Geneva, Switzerland, that oversees 98 percent of world commerce. Can this be done? Can the United States withdraw from the WTO? To answer, we must look at international law (specifically, at the WTO Agreement) and, domestically, at US law and the US Constitution.

Defense or Diffusion? Open Source AI in U.S.-China Competition

Artificial intelligence is advancing rapidly, and global competition over its development and use is intensifying. The United States and China are at the center of this rivalry — each seeking an edge in AI research, deployment, and standard setting with far-reaching economic and security implications.

As governments and companies race to build ever more capable models, a debate is unfolding over an important question: What role should open-source AI play in this strategic landscape?

At its core, the question is about trade-offs. Opening AI systems can accelerate innovation, support transparency, and broaden adoption across borders. But especially in the context of U.S.–China competition, it can also raise serious concerns about how adversaries might exploit American breakthroughs for military or coercive purposes.

Beijing has made clear its ambition to achieve “global AI leadership” by 2030. China’s rapid progress in adoption and its state-backed ecosystem present a strategic test of whether—and how—the United States can sustain technological leadership without undermining its own openness, alliances, and values.

In this new report, ASPI Vice President Daniel Russel and Consultant Emily Ratté examine how open-source AI fits into U.S. efforts to stay ahead — while minimizing the risks of adversarial exploitation. Their analysis offers practical guidance on navigating this fast-moving frontier

Digital Occupation: Pixelated Propaganda, Censored Platforms and the Battle for Narrative in Gaza

Israeli propaganda frames the aggression against the Gaza Strip as a response to an existential threat to the state’s survival. [AFP]

Evolving through decades of political upheaval, military confrontations and shifting media narratives, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict stands as one of the most enduring and complex impasses of the modern era. It is fuelled by unsupported and superstitious Israeli historical assertions about land and control. Nevertheless,

how individuals all over the world associate with, comprehend and perceive the conflict has been drastically modified by the rise of social media. Social media platforms including X (formerly Twitter), Facebook, Instagram and TikTok have become advanced battlegrounds,

where stories are intensified, open conclusions are formed and, in some cases, realities and facts are distorted. Social media has become both a weapon for spreading deception and an instrument for democratising data within the setting of Palestine and Israel, making it more troublesome to find common ground. (1)

This study employs critical discourse analysis (CDA) alongside visual rhetoric analysis and networked propaganda theory to examine Israel’s digital propaganda during the Gaza conflict. Drawing on frameworks by Norman Fairclough, Emeritus Professor of Linguistics at Lancaster University, and Teun A. van Dijk, Distinguished University Professor at Pompeu Fabra University in Barcelona and a leading scholar in discourse and ideology,

the research analyses how language, imagery and media practices reinforce power structures and shape public perception. The methodology focuses on official state communications,

influencer-led campaigns, viral content (hashtags, films, etc.) and algorithmic suppression tactics. By thematically coding these elements, such as emotional appeals, mythmaking and dehumanization, the study reveals how Israel’s digital propaganda apparatus maintains narrative dominance. Data is sourced from government media, news reports, investigative journalism and academic literature.

Star Wars gets a step closer with new Space Force satellite jamming capabilitie

John Breeden

A long time ago in a galaxy not so far away — specifically, Peterson Space Force Base in Colorado Springs — the U.S. Space Force took another step towards turning science fiction into tactical reality. Their newest cutting edge piece of equipment, the Counter Communications System Meadowlands, isn’t a droid or a lightsaber, but it might be the next best thing: a sleek, ground-based system that can jam enemy satellites from a remote location with remarkable precision and control. It’s not quite the Force, but it does allow for a single, lone operator to command 300% more satellite disruption missions without ever leaving Earth.

On the modern battlefield, where lines of communication are as critical as lines of fire, CCS Meadowlands represents a strategic leap forward in electronic warfare. The U.S. has often been criticized for falling behind the curve when it comes to EW capabilities, especially when it comes to space-based communications. But this new, lightweight, highly automated EW upgrade brings serious muscle to America’s satellite-jamming capabilities, making it faster and easier to silence adversaries in orbit — at least temporarily. In a world where code can neutralize a threat before the first missile is even launched, Space Force is betting big on systems like this to keep the upper hand in space without ever leaving the ground.

The complete Meadowlands system calls for the deployment of 16 truck-sized satellite dishes along with their supporting electronics to strategic positions around the United States and the world. They ride on six-wheeled trailers that can easily be towed around to wherever needed. The system was built for Space Force by L3Harris and follows up on a much larger and less portable system that became operational in 2020. The latest iteration of the system, dubbed version 10.2, is currently the only ground-based, space signal jamming and control platform in the country’s arsenal.

Col. Bryon McClain, USSF Program Executive Officer for Space Domain Awareness and Combat Power Space Systems Command recently spoke about the upgraded capabilities that CCS Meadowlands now offers at the annual Space Foundation Space Symposium in Colorado Springs. He stressed how two commands came together — Space Operations Command and Space Systems Command — to make Meadowlands possible, and how the new system will add to both the defensive and offensive capabilities of the United States during any future engagements with satellite-equipped enemies.

Ukraine’s drone attack offers fearful lessons for a Chinese invasion force

Ukraine’s massive drone strike against Russian air bases on 1 June should reverberate across all theaters of conflict. But there is one Western Pacific scenario where it could be very relevant indeed: a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

There was a micro-panic among invasion watchers in March when a brief video appeared, and then vanished, showing an impressively large and unique Chinese device, a series of barges with telescoping vertical pylons in their hulls and built-in bridges at each end. Towed into place in line astern, the barges would extend their pylons to the sea bottom and lift themselves out of the water, connect themselves with bridges and extend a long cable-stayed ramp to the shore.

The system is designed to bypass Taiwan’s ports and allow commercial ro-ro ships to directly and rapidly discharge vehicles ashore. That’s important because an invasion of Taiwan would be so massive—300,000 troops is the baseline estimate in a comprehensive recent study by the US Naval War College—that for a navy to provide enough sealift is almost inconceivable.

But the mobile pier, ingenious as it is, acknowledges a basic fact: there is no alternative in Taiwan to an amphibious assault through the surf line, with the goal of then seizing nearby port or using the beach as a landing point for the pier. Attractive alternatives such as directly seizing a major port or using airborne force to grab centers of gravity (Hostomel was another Ukraine lesson) don’t exist.

Completed in October 2022, the War College study is the product of a conference held in 2021, before Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The study doesn’t mention the kind of drones used in Ukraine—but they could make an enormous difference.

China’s amphibious forces, a joint army-navy responsibility, are built on a blend of the assets and technologies used by the US Marine Corps and others, technologies based on experience in World War II and Korea, where the last major amphibious landing took place.

Star Wars gets a step closer with new Space Force satellite jamming capabilities

John Breeden

A long time ago in a galaxy not so far away — specifically, Peterson Space Force Base in Colorado Springs — the U.S. Space Force took another step towards turning science fiction into tactical reality. Their newest cutting edge piece of equipment, the Counter Communications System Meadowlands, isn’t a droid or a lightsaber, but it might be the next best thing: a sleek, ground-based system that can jam enemy satellites from a remote location with remarkable precision and control. It’s not quite the Force,

but it does allow for a single, lone operator to command 300% more satellite disruption missions without ever leaving Earth.

On the modern battlefield, where lines of communication are as critical as lines of fire, CCS Meadowlands represents a strategic leap forward in electronic warfare. The U.S. has often been criticized for falling behind the curve when it comes to EW capabilities, especially when it comes to space-based communications. But this new, lightweight,

highly automated EW upgrade brings serious muscle to America’s satellite-jamming capabilities, making it faster and easier to silence adversaries in orbit — at least temporarily. In a world where code can neutralize a threat before the first missile is even launched, Space Force is betting big on systems like this to keep the upper hand in space without ever leaving the ground.

The complete Meadowlands system calls for the deployment of 16 truck-sized satellite dishes along with their supporting electronics to strategic positions around the United States and the world. They ride on six-wheeled trailers that can easily be towed around to wherever needed. The system was built for Space Force by L3Harris and follows up on a much larger and less portable system that became operational in 2020. The latest iteration of the system, dubbed version 10.2, is currently the only ground-based, space signal jamming and control platform in the country’s arsenal.

The Influence Evolution Harnessing AI Innovation While Preserving Human Connection in Social Media

Social media stands at a pivotal juncture where technology and humanity converge. From productivity tools to fully autonomous AI agents, we are witnessing a fundamental shift in how content is created,

distributed, and consumed. This evolution presents dual futures: one in which AI influencers and agents dominate engagement, and another that embraces decentralized networks that enhance user agency. What is now at stake isn’t merely technological advancement but the authenticity of human connection.

The relationship between AI and influencers exists on a spectrum rather than as a binary distinction.

The unique ability of social media to foster parasocial relationships is being transformed by AI, raising fundamental questions about authenticity, trust, and the nature of digital influence.

The tension between AI agent deployment and decentralized human-centered models represents fundamentally different visions for how social media will evolve – each with distinct implications for human connection, content authenticity, and platform governance.

Effective policy must balance innovation with the safeguarding of human agency by creating frameworks that harness AI’s capabilities while ensuring transparency, user control, and the preservation of meaningful human connection.

Below you will find the online version of this text. Please download the PDF version to access all citations.

As artificial intelligence (AI) transforms how content is created and consumed, social media stands at a critical inflection point. This transformation presents both unprecedented opportunities for creativity and efficiency and profound risks to authenticity and meaningful engagement. This DGAP Policy Brief examines the complex relationship between AI technologies and social influence, mapping the spectrum from AI-assisted human creators to fully autonomous AI agents. Our central argument is that effective governance must balance technological innovation with the preservation of human agency and connection that made social media valuable in the first place. By developing nuanced frameworks rather than binary approaches, we can shape a digital future that amplifies rather than diminishes our humanity.

Critical and Emerging Technologies Index

Built with public and commercial data, this Index is a quantitative model presented through an interactive dashboard. It enables policymakers,

strategists, and researchers to assess the national power of 25 countries across key technology sectors: Artificial Intelligence,

Biotechnology, Semiconductors, Space, and Quantum. Move the sliders in the Dashboard below to test different analytic inputs, and read the country reports for in-depth analysis on different nations' tech trajectories.

Apple’s Supply Chain: Economic and Geopolitical Implications

Chris Miller |Vishnu Venugopalan

Key Points Over the past decade, many electronics firms have talked about diversifying their supply chains. An analysis of Apple—America’s biggest consumer electronics firm—illustrates that most of their manufacturing supply chain remains in China, though there have been limited increases in Southeast Asia and India.

China’s role for Apple has grown substantially. Ten years ago, Apple relied on China primarily for final assembly, while today Apple not only assembles devices in China, it also sources many components from the country.

However, Chinese-owned firms generally only play a role in lower-value segments of the supply chain. Many of the higher-value components—even those made in China—are produced in factories owned by Japanese, Taiwanese, or US firms.

Introduction

“Designed in California, assembled in China,” reads the text etched on the back of most iPhones. For over a decade, the iPhone has exemplified China’s central role in producing the world’s electronics and solidified the country’s status as the world’s leading manufacturer. Today, electronics constitute around a quarter of China’s exports; China counted for nearly a third of the entire world’s electronics exports. Apple— the world’s most valuable manufacturer of consumer electronics—stands at the center of this manufacturing base, having played a major role in helping build China’s capabilities.1

Analysts who track Apple’s supply chain have demonstrated how Apple not only assembles many of its devices in China but also has over time sourced more components from China. Economist Yuqing Xing has calculated that iPhones manufactured in 2009 sourced nearly all their components from outside China with only the final assembly (costing $6.50 per iPhone) happening in China.2 In contrast, by 2018, many components were sourced from China, totaling $104 per iPhone. Journalist Patrick McGee has reported how Apple spent billions of dollars buying equipment to place in Chinese factories, enabling them to produce more components

A Professor Was Fired for Her Politics. Is That the Future of Academia?

Sarah Viren

As Finkelstein prepared to go home, she noticed a text from someone claiming to be the college’s provost, Laura Furge. “I had just done the online phishing training,” she told me later. “And I was like, ‘I know that if the provost texts me on an unknown number, it’s spam.’” She deleted and blocked the message. Then she checked her email. There was a message from the provost there as well.

“So, I unblocked her number and called her,” she said. Furge told Finkelstein that the Department of Education had opened an investigation into Muhlenberg for potential civil rights violations. The college had yet to receive the underlying complaint, but they knew a professor had been named, and campus administrators assumed that professor was Finkelstein.

It made sense. For months, students, alumni and strangers had been complaining about Finkelstein. They started a Change.org petition the previous fall, demanding that she be fired for “dangerous pro-Hamas rhetoric” and “blatant classroom bias against Jewish students.” As evidence, the petition, and its 8,000 signers, had offered up screenshots of Finkelstein’s posts: a photo of her, on Oct. 12, in a kaffiyeh, a kaffiyeh-patterned face mask and a tank top that read “Anti-Zionist Vibes Only,” below which she had written “Free Gaza, free Palestine, stop the ongoing genocide by the Israeli and American war machines.” In another, on Oct. 26, she wrote, “ISRAEL DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO DEFEND ITS OCCUPATION.”

Furge didn’t have many details to share with Finkelstein. “She was like, ‘I wanted you to know so you didn’t hear it from the press first,’” Finkelstein recalled. “And — this is so me — I was like, ‘Laura, I am always trying to help the college have different experiences.’” Furge, Finkelstein said, “didn’t really laugh.”

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