The End of the Israel Exception

Foreign Affairs | Andrew P. Miller

The United States has stayed in lockstep with Israel for three decades, Andrew P. Miller writes in Foreign Affairs, and the bond endured Hamas’s October 7, 2023, terrorist attack and the ensuing war in Gaza. Two U.S. presidential administrations provided Israel with largely unconditional diplomatic and military support across that period.

The pattern is long established. It ran through the heady days of the 1990s peace process with the Palestine Liberation Organization, the second intifada, a five-year Palestinian uprising that began in 2000, and a series of conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon across the next two decades. Miller served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Israeli-Palestinian Affairs in the Biden administration and as Director for Egypt and Israel Military Issues on the National Security Council in the Obama administration. The headline and subtitle point to a change in American policy, but the available text stops before Miller sets it out.

The fastest arms race is happening in the electromagnetic spectrum

The Jerusalem Post | Merav Davidovits

Russia’s use of a Starlink-linked BM-35 strike drone over Kyiv in late January 2026 exposed how electromagnetic competition now extends beyond jamming into satellite-network access and software control. Ukraine’s defence minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, took the evidence to SpaceX, which built a whitelist of authorised Ukrainian terminals in about a day. By early February, unregistered terminals along the front had gone dark.

The episode reflects a wider dependency: drones, radars, tactical networks, satellite links, GPS-guided munitions and command-and-control systems all rely on the electromagnetic spectrum. In Ukraine, countermeasures now move within weeks, while fibre-optic drones accounted for 32% of strike drones by April 2026. AI-based navigation, including KrattWorks’ Ghost Dragon, is reducing reliance on GPS. Advantage is perishable. Israel’s 5114th Spectrum Warfare Battalion reportedly defeated about 25% of roughly 1,100 Iranian drones during the June 2025 war. The contest is shifting from programmed systems toward learning systems that can adapt during an engagement.

U.S. and Israel are planning for a possible attack on Iran, source tells NPR

NPR | Daniel Estrin, Hadeel Al-Shalchi, Ruth Sherlock

The U.S. and Israel are preparing plans for a possible attack on Iran in early November, after the U.S. midterm elections on 3 November, a person briefed on the war planning told NPR. Israel had initially planned a mid-October strike before its own elections on 27 October, but President Trump objected. The U.S. is amassing forces in the region.

Preparations could also pressure Iran toward a diplomatic deal. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said Tehran is ready for diplomacy or war. An Iranian security source warned of retaliation against U.S. interests and assets of participating countries if officials or civilian infrastructure are hit. The conflict began on 28 February with U.S. and Israeli strikes that killed Iran’s supreme leader and senior officials. Iran has blocked the Strait of Hormuz and targeted vessels; the U.S. has blockaded Iranian ports and oil shipments. U.S. strikes have reduced Iran’s air force, air defences and navy, yet Tehran still threatens Gulf states and has struck U.S. bases. The Revolutionary Guard has threatened data centres and underwater internet cables under the Strait. On Thursday it targeted seven oil tankers there, with four catching fire and three hitting naval mines. The IMF reports contractions of around 16 percent for Iraq, Kuwait and Qatar this year, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE also in recession, and projects oil at $130 a barrel in 2027 if disruptions continue.

Iran in ‘Advanced Stages’ of Planning Attacks Against Americans, Officials Say

The New York Times | Edward Wong, Jonathan Swan and Julian E. Barnes

The U.S. government has placed employees on heightened alert across the Middle East and begun reducing personnel at embassies and consulates after intelligence showed Iran is in the advanced stages of planning attacks against Americans. A Friday memo from Director of National Intelligence Jay Clayton to Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned that lethal plotting had reached advanced stages in the Middle East and certain other countries.

Agencies assess the threat at its highest level since the war began in February. The State Department ordered nonessential employees and families to leave Saudi Arabia and has quietly adjusted staffing at other missions already under restricted operating status. Travel advisories for 13 regional countries remain at level three or four. Officials note that some intelligence points to possible Iranian operatives in the United States and potential targets in Europe, though one official cautioned that Iran’s overseas capabilities remain limited relative to its ambitions. The warnings follow the U.S.-Israel strikes of 28 February that killed Iran’s supreme leader and other senior figures, subsequent Iranian drone and missile attacks, the ongoing U.S. blockade of Iranian ports, and the earlier withdrawal of B-1 bombers from R.A.F. Fairford after specific threats. Plans for further strikes after the midterms remain undecided.

Exclusive: Ben-Gvir’s Plan to Push Netanyahu Right

TIME | ERIC CORTELLESSA

Itamar Ben-Gvir wants Israel’s Oct. 27 election to strengthen Otzma Yehudit’s leverage over Benjamin Netanyahu, not to replace him. The national security minister seeks the defence portfolio, fewer constraints on military operations, Palestinian “voluntary emigration” from Gaza and the West Bank, and Israeli sovereignty over both territories. His immediate target is coalition bargaining power.

Polls cited by TIME indicate a tight contest: an average of four recent surveys puts Netanyahu’s right-wing bloc at roughly 50 seats and the opposition at 53, short of the 61 Knesset seats needed to govern. The result could be another fragile coalition. Ben-Gvir proposes capturing all of Gaza, settling Israelis there and reversing Ariel Sharon’s 2005 withdrawal, which evacuated more than 8,000 settlers. In the West Bank, home to 3.3 million Palestinians, he seeks annexation, the removal of Palestinian Authority weapons and further emigration. The trajectory points toward harder-line coalition demands after the vote.

Israel’s Election: Understanding Who’s Who and What’s at Stake

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS | EZRA HESS AND ITTAI RONEN

Israelis vote on October 27 for the 120-member twenty-sixth Knesset in an election widely viewed domestically as among the country’s most consequential. It is the first since Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attacks and could become a referendum on Benjamin Netanyahu’s continued premiership. Neither bloc has a clear route to the sixty-one seats required to govern.

Polling averages from October 12 to 19 put the opposition on 51.3 seats, Netanyahu’s coalition on 45.1, Arab non-aligned parties on 13.6 and Jewish non-aligned parties on 10.1. Coalition-building is complicated. The 3.25 per cent electoral threshold, the Bader-Ofer Law and the president’s mandate process shape the outcome. Palestinian statehood is not a priority for most Jewish-majority parties; only minority Arab parties support it. The change bloc lacks an agreed successor to Netanyahu and has not addressed sitting with Arab parties. A rotational government, inclusion of Arab parties or ultra-Orthodox parties could produce a majority; failure could trigger another election.

Why Israel Isn’t Leaving Lebanon Any Time Soon

THE NATIONAL INTEREST | ALEXANDER LANGLOIS

Israel’s military presence in southern Lebanon has become an open-ended occupation since its October 2024 invasion, according to Alexander Langlois. The eighth round of Trilateral Framework talks, hosted by the United States, ended without progress on Hezbollah’s disarmament or an Israeli withdrawal. Upwards of 350,000 Lebanese remain displaced while Israel maintains a southern buffer zone.

The framework, established in June, seeks verifiable Hezbollah disarmament and Israeli withdrawal from sovereign Lebanese territory. Neither goal is close. Langlois contends that Israeli operations continue despite two paper ceasefires, with thousands of Lebanese killed or injured and more than 1 million displaced at one point. Hezbollah has been excluded from, and rejects, the talks; Israel retains practical control over withdrawal timing and disarmament assessments. Nearly 80 per cent of Jewish Israelis support operations in Lebanon, and Israeli parties are competing on militarised platforms before Knesset elections. The likely trajectory is a harder, more extended occupation.

How Israel and Ukraine Are Guiding the Next Generation of Air Defense

National Interest | Seth J. Frantzman

Western nations, led by the United Kingdom's pledged $13 billion Britannia Shield initiative, are rapidly reconfiguring global integrated air defence architectures around hard-learned combat lessons from Israel and Ukraine. Proliferating swarms of cheap one-way attack drones and loitering munitions threaten to exhaust stockpiles of premium interceptors like Patriot and THAAD.

Israel’s multi-tiered system—comprising Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow—achieved a reported 90 percent interception rate against short-range threats while absorbing massive Iranian ballistic missile salvos in 2024. Simultaneously, Ukrainian forces confronting thousands of Iranian-supplied Shahed-136 drones have accelerated wartime defence industrial production and deep-strike capabilities. High attrition rates alter strategic calculations. As daily attack volumes in Eastern Europe scale into hundreds of air threats, military establishments are integrating directed-energy lasers, microwave platforms, and lower-cost interceptor drones. These multi-layered frameworks aim to resolve the severe economic asymmetry of expending multi-million-dollar missiles against mass-produced unmanned aerial systems.

The Islamic Republic Can Lose the War and Still Win

RealClearDefense | Nima Gholam Ali Pour

A joint military campaign launched by the United States and Israel on February 28, 2026, has inflicted severe economic and operational damage on Iran without achieving a decisive strategic outcome. The Islamic Republic retains operational missile capabilities and regional proxies despite losing a substantial share of its senior political leadership and military commanders to high-precision strikes.

To offset absolute western military dominance, Tehran mobilises an established martyrdom narrative rooted in Shia religious tradition and refined during the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq War. Regime survival alone constitutes political victory. By recasting structural devastation and high-level leadership losses as sacred sacrifice, the clerical establishment preserves its ideological core while resisting external pressure to dismantle its armed apparatus. Leaving the conflict in an operational stalemate risks permanently legitimizing the ruling regime, enabling Tehran to sustain its revolutionary export mandate and destabilizing proxy network for decades.

US, Israel plan renewed Iran strikes after midterms, focusing on short, intense attacks - report

The Jerusalem Post | Idan Kweller

The United States and Israel have drawn up contingency plans for a compressed, three-day military campaign targeting Iranian nuclear facilities, power infrastructure, and missile installations following the 3 November US midterm elections. Long-range fighter rehearsals over Iraq and Syria demonstrate integrated multi-domain strike capability, allowing joint forces to coordinate electronic warfare, surveillance, and aerial refueling.

This operational posture serves as a dual-track strategy to pressure Tehran while diplomatic backchannels remain active. Washington requires progress on capping Iranian nuclear material enrichment before relaxing economic sanctions. Conversely, Iranian negotiators insist on ending the blockade and restoring maritime transit through the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian officials also threatened asymmetric counterstrikes against regional data centres and undersea communications cables if attacked. Digital infrastructure threats underscore systemic vulnerabilities. Meanwhile, Field Marshal Asim Munir of Pakistan conveyed American warnings directly to Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei. Military options remain poised alongside mediation.

How Israel Can Turn Hezbollah’s Blunder Into Lasting Defeat

The Dispatch | David Daoud

The Israeli military's establishment of a southern Lebanon security zone following Hezbollah's October 2023 entry into the Gaza conflict presents Tel Aviv with a pivotal strategic opportunity. Israeli forces have eliminated key commanders, degraded missile stockpiles, and created forward defense positions to prevent cross-border raids. This operational posture tests the U.S.-brokered June trilateral framework between Washington, Jerusalem, and Beirut.

The agreement conditions complete Israeli withdrawal on the verified disarmament of Hezbollah by the Lebanese Armed Forces. However, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and army commanders prefer negotiated handovers over forced confiscation to avoid domestic conflict. Hezbollah refuses nationwide disarmament. Operational control declarations in test zones like Srifa and Froun yielded minimal heavy weapon seizures, while new tunnel complexes were discovered near Khiam. Premature Israeli withdrawal without verifiable compliance risks repeating the post-2000 strategic dynamic, where Hezbollah rearmed and expanded its regional combat operations.

Documents Show How Israel Steered Qatari Payments to Gaza

TIME | Eric Cortellessa

Qatar’s financial assistance to Gaza became a policy instrument shaped by Israeli security calculations, humanitarian concerns and regional diplomacy. TIME reports that documents and official correspondence show successive Israeli governments helped facilitate and oversee aid transfers, including fuel payments and cash assistance for Palestinian households. The arrangement aimed to ease civilian hardship while preserving leverage over Hamas.

The report traces the programme’s evolution from informal transfers to mechanisms involving Israel, Qatar and international organisations. It also records criticism that the system left both Israeli authorities and Hamas with influence over aid delivery, while Netanyahu has argued that assistance prevented humanitarian collapse. The documents, as described by TIME, sharpen questions about oversight, recipient screening and the risks of using civilian relief to manage an adversary. They do not, by themselves, establish that aid directly enabled the 7 October 2023 attack or prove a deliberate policy to strengthen Hamas. The case illustrates the difficulty of separating humanitarian relief from security strategy in a conflict zone.

One Year On, the Gaza Ceasefire Remains a Cruel Joke

The National Interest | Alexander Langlois

The October 2025 Gaza ceasefire has not ended the violence or resolved the territory’s humanitarian crisis. Palestinian authorities continue to report deaths and injuries from Israeli military operations, while restrictions on humanitarian access and damaged infrastructure complicate recovery. The United Nations reported in October 2026 that more than 1,400 Palestinians had been killed since the ceasefire announcement.

The humanitarian outlook remains fragile. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification reported that 1.2 million people faced crisis-level or worse food insecurity between mid-April and June 2026, with conditions projected to deteriorate later in the year. Thousands of patients also require medical evacuation for treatment unavailable in Gaza.

From Saddam Hussein to Israel: How Iran's wars have divided a nation

Jerusalem Post | Alex Winston

Iran faced a profound test of national cohesion during the 1980-88 war when Saddam Hussein's ground invasion inadvertently united a fractured populace behind the fledgling Islamic Republic despite domestic grievances. That historical rallying effect contrasts sharply with the recent 2025 and 2026 aerial military campaigns conducted by the United States and Israel, which targeted nuclear and military infrastructure rather than occupying territory.

Following decades of economic deterioration and violent crackdowns on domestic protests, segments of the Iranian population responded not with nationalist fervor in defense of the regime, but by openly expressing gratitude toward foreign leaders. Officials like Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei faced public opprobrium, including being booed in Tehran, exposing the severe fractures separating the clerical establishment from its citizenry. While state leaders continue to proclaim ironclad unity, the widening chasm demonstrates how external conflict now exacerbates domestic vulnerabilities rather than cementing regime survival.

Iran’s two-front war on Israel: From October 7 to election interference

Jerusalem Post | Sophia Politis

Iran planned and supported the October 7 massacre alongside cyber warfare and disinformation campaigns targeting Israel. Hamas operatives trained in Iran in September 2023 under the IRGC and Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani. Tehran subsequently escalated cyber operations through fronts like Handala Hack, CyberAv3ngers, and IDFLeaks to erode public trust.

Security agencies and researchers from Cyabra and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies tracked thousands of dormant accounts and fake profiles amplifying pro-Hamas narratives. Iranian influence operations are now resurfacing to interfere with Israel's upcoming election on October 27, 2026. Security officials mapping these networks warn that hardened election infrastructure and public vigilance are required to counter foreign subversion.

The End of Armed Resistance?

It's Noon In Israel | Amit Segal

Professor Kobi Michael from the Institute for National Security Studies reports that public backing for Hamas armed struggle dropped to 20 percent by August 2026, down from 70 percent at the war's start. Survey data shows 57 percent of Palestinians view armed resistance as a failure, while 56 percent support nonmilitary alternatives.

Concurrently, a fatal incident occurred near Kibbutz Yiftah in the Ramim Ridge area when a 15-year-old student, Elazar Yair Wilensky, picked up unexploded ordnance during a school trip on October 12, 2026. The blast killed him and injured 24 others. The Israel Defense Forces estimate that thousands of unexploded munitions remain across northern areas following Hezbollah rocket barrages containing cluster submunitions. Fragmented clearance responsibilities among the police, the Nature and Parks Authority, and the Jewish National Fund complicate hazard mitigation. State comptroller warnings spanning 2017 to 2025 highlighted systemic gaps in ordnance removal across civilian and forested zones.

What Might Have Saved Gaza

American Greatness | Victor Davis Hanson

Hamas could have entirely prevented the post-October 7 destruction of Gaza by returning 251 hostages and surrendering the architects of the massacre of 1,200 Israelis. Instead, the militant group launched thousands of rockets at Israel and integrated its 310-mile subterranean tunnel network beneath schools, hospitals, and homes to use civilians as shields.

The Iranian-backed network of proxies, including Hezbollah and the Houthis, planned the multi-cabal assault as part of a regional strategy to dismantle the Jewish state. Critics demanding proportionality ignore historical precedents where aggressors suffered disproportionate losses to hasten the end of hostilities. Furthermore, demographic data refutes charges of genocide, noting that Gaza's population grew by nearly 60 percent after Israel unilaterally dismantled all settlements and withdrew in September 2005. Without a fundamental renunciation of violence by militant factions, the region remains trapped in cycles of conflict driven by ideological hostility.

Netanyahu vs Bar: Who called who is fascinating, but both ignored writing on the wall - analysis

The Jerusalem Post | Yonah Jeremy Bob

The October 7 attack by Hamas exposed a decade-long failure of political and military leadership in Israel rather than a simple last-minute communications breakdown between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Shin Bet director Ronen Bar. Strategic errors compounded over years, culminating in a flawed doctrine that treated Hamas as permanently contained and deterred.

A pivotal turning point occurred during the 2021 war, which Israeli leaders misread as a tactical victory while Yahya Sinwar viewed it as proof that a multi-front assault could succeed. Institutional cohesion deteriorated further by July 2023 during disputes over judicial reform, leaving the state visibly vulnerable to adversaries. Disagreements endured. When Shin Bet officials alerted Netanyahu's military secretary at 6:13 a.m. on October 7—16 minutes before the invasion began—staff opted against waking the prime minister. Neither side foresaw the imminent assault, proving that operational complacency, rather than missing phone calls, drove the intelligence catastrophe.

With or without Hamas

Al Jazeera | Lorenzo Kamel

The fourth year of the war in Gaza brings intensified calls for Hamas to surrender administrative authority and evacuate the Strip. Charting a meaningful recovery is impossible without addressing the historical realities that gave rise to the group. The conflict predates Hamas, rooted in the 1948 Nakba and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.

Founders like Ibrahim al-Yazouri, Abdulaziz al-Rantisi, and Ahmed Yassin experienced displacement firsthand during these events. The group remains a symptom of a century of oppression rather than an isolated phenomenon. Western framing of Palestinian self-determination as a reward for Hamas ignores international law and demographic realities, where nearly 50 percent of Gaza's population is under 18. An Arab Barometer survey from late September to early October 2023 showed only 29 percent of Gaza respondents trusted the Hamas-led government, with a majority supporting a two-state solution. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has viewed Hamas as useful to maintain that no moderate partner exists, aligning with Bezalel Smotrich's 2017 Subjugation Plan. Meanwhile, diplomatic negotiations remain deadlocked by demands for complete disarmament, perpetuating a status quo.

The End of Gaza

Foreign Affairs | Khaled Elgindy

Israel continues to conduct persistent airstrikes across the Gaza Strip despite the October 2025 cease-fire framework negotiated under U.S. President Donald Trump's administration. This ongoing kinetic activity has killed hundreds of civilians, including approximately 300 children over a twelve-month period, following the release of the final Israeli hostages.

The framework established a phased political track meant to facilitate large-scale reconstruction and restore municipal infrastructure. U.S. envoy Jared Kushner promised early in 2026 that essential services would be restored swiftly to stabilize the enclave. Progress remains stalled. Gaza sits in a volatile political vacuum without functional administrative bodies or sovereign governance mechanisms. Without a clear transition strategy, constant tactical military engagements risk fully undermining the initial diplomatic deal. The absence of effective international oversight leaves the region vulnerable to renewed large-scale combat operations, indefinitely delaying long-term stabilization efforts.