Indian Strategic Studies

29 September 2025

Trump has just washed his hands of the Ukraine war

Of all of President Trump’s social media posts, it is the one he fired off on Tuesday that future historians may pick as marking the biggest turning point of the Ukraine war. As Trump tweets go – and his inimitable impromptu “communiqués” have long become an established genre of themselves – this one was an instant classic for its U-turn shock factor, the plurality of serious underlying messages it packed, its revealing effect on his critics, and the balance of its contradictions.

The Ukrainians, the president said to the surprise of the entire world, can “WIN all of Ukraine back in its original form” and indeed “maybe even go further than that”. Russia, in his newfound analysis, looks like “a paper tiger” that “has been fighting aimlessly” since 2022 and whose economy is in “BIG” trouble. Now, Trump suggested, “is the time for Ukraine to act”, while promising that he will continue to “supply weapons to NATO for NATO to do what they want with them” – before wishing “both Countries well” and “Good luck to all”.

To say that this is – for the moment – a complete transformation in presidential rhetoric on the Ukrainian war would almost be an understatement in these circumstances. Such declarations don’t just go against Trump’s long-held, oft-repeated and well-established view on the conflict, with a weak Ukraine seen as losing “badly” and a powerful Russia on an implacable course to victory. But they would have been utterly inconceivable just a few weeks ago when the mainstream foreign policy community was left aghast at Trump’s apparent validation of Russian power at the Alaska Summit, and his dim view of the Ukrainian cause.

So what is going on? There are three possibilities. The first is that Donald Trump has experienced a genuine Damascene conversion. Secondly, this might just be another impulsive, ill-informed, “nonsensical” outburst by the President, soon to be written off by some further development and twist in his perspective on the subject. Thirdly, and more likely, Tuesday’s tweet is in fact a more calculated political move signalling a change in policy but wrapped in wording designed to cushion the impact and control the narrative in his favour.

What’s in a pin? Trump dons golden F-22 during Erdogan meeting

Lee Ferran

WASHINGTON — As US President Donald Trump sat in the newly gold-adorned Oval Office with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a smaller piece of precious metal caught the eye of some observers: a pin, worn on the lapel of Trump’s jacket, that resembled a fighter jet.

Upon closer inspection, it appeared to be a golden F-22 Raptor, a miniature of the Lockheed Martin-made fifth-generation stealth fighter.

What was less clear, and remains so, is why the president chose to wear that particular pin for that particular meeting on Thursday. (A White House spokesperson gamely confirmed to Breaking Defense that it was an F-22, but declined to comment further on Trump’s wardrobe.)

The detail is particularly intriguing considering Turkey has long sought re-entry into another American fifth-generation fighter jet program: the F-35, which is also made by Lockheed Martin and is the counterpart to the air-to-air specialist F-22.

“We’re going to discuss the F-35. We’ll be discussing all of the things that you know about …,” Trump said, sitting next to Erdogan. “And I think you’ll be successful with buying the things that he’d like to buy. … We’ll have to see. We haven’t even started yet but I know he wants the F-35, and he’s wanted, and we’re talking about that very seriously.”

Israel Can No Longer Wish Palestine Away

Shira Efron

On September 21 and 22, Australia, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and six other countries recognized a Palestinian state. Israel has responded defiantly. Following Sunday’s recognitions, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared in a Hebrew-language video statement: “It will not happen. A Palestinian state will not be established west of the Jordan.” Although Netanyahu will only make a final decision on Israel’s full response when he returns to the region after meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump, his coalition has repeatedly threatened to annex West Bank territory and collapse the Palestinian Authority entirely.

Stop the World: Armies Key to Indo-Pacific Deterrence, Says Former U.S. General

Olivia Nelson, David Wroe

Armies hold the key to credible deterrence in the Indo-Pacific because they form the backbone of regional security networks and are harder for China to neutralise, according to a former commanding general of the US Army Pacific. And for those worried about US reliability—be that in hard power or willpower—his message is clear: don’t be.

Appearing on ASPI’s Stop the World podcast, recently retired general Charles Flynn says Beijing would ultimately need to move a large land force across the Taiwan Strait to fulfil its long held ambition of controlling the democratically self-governed island.

He says the region is ‘dominated by armies’—from the Philippines and Vietnam to Japan and India—and this strategic land power network is ‘the security architecture that binds the region together’, offering an asymmetrical advantage.

‘The A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) arsenal the Chinese have designed is primarily designed to defeat our air and maritime capabilities,’ Flynn says. ‘It is not designed to find, fix and target—attack—distributed, mobile, reloadable and networked land forces.’

He argues that forward-deployed missile and artillery units—such as US HIMARS systems, Japan’s Type 12 and 88 missiles, and the Philippines’ Bramos—could present China with a formidable deterrent by denying sea lanes and bolstering allied firepower.

‘Add in Marine Corps and special operations forces capabilities, and you have a forward position of hard power that provides a deterrent effect,’ Flynn says. ‘If you’re in the right pieces of terrain—like the Luzon Strait—you can make the air and maritime components appear larger than they are.’

Flynn warns against ignoring the role of China’s land forces in the country’s military modernisation. He says Beijing’s reforms since 2015 has fused new technologies, organisational changes and increased the complexity and scale of their exercises.

‘In order to invade Taiwan, you actually have to generate an invasion force, and that is its army,’ he says. ‘They can’t achieve their objectives unless they deliver that invasion force.’

Assessing Israel’s Approach in Gaza

Douglas A. Samuelson

We summarize the general observations developed by The Dupuy Institute in a quantitative review of the outcomes of 60 insurgencies since World War II. We then apply the resulting principles to the current Israeli efforts in Gaza. This assessment looks unpromising for the Israelis and, therefore, of concern for the U.S.

Can we assess, objectively, how well Israel is conducting its counterinsurgency in Gaza?

The Dupuy Institute (TDI) published one of the very few writings that assessed counterinsurgency approaches based on quantitative data. (Lawrence, America's Modern Wars: Understanding Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam ) To summarize briefly (and any misstatements or oversimplifications are entirely the responsibility of the current author), the main points were:Force ratios are critical. Counterinsurgencies tend to fail unless they employ at least four, and most often more than ten, times the force of the insurgents.

Successful counterinsurgencies require long-term involvement, typically more than 15 years, sometimes as long as 30 years. Holding territory requires more resources than taking it. Quick victories are rare, even with what seems to be overwhelming force.

Brutality toward the civilian population (including some who may appear to be civilians part of the time and become insurgent fighters at other times) tends to inflame the insurgency. Unless the counterinsurgency is willing and able to wipe out the insurgents completely, less repressive approaches generally are more effective than brutality.

Not providing a path toward peaceful addressing of grievances fuels the insurgency.

Insurgencies rallied by nationalism and/or defense of a home territory tend to succeed. Insurgencies focused on other motives, such as an ideological cause, tend to fail.

Terrain in which the insurgents have ample top cover, such as jungle or tunnels, blocking aerial surveillance of and attacks against their activities, helps the insurgents.

Pentagon contemplating eventual sunsetting of Link 16 as enthusiasm grows for optical communications

Jon Harper

NATIONAL HARBOR, Md. — Discussions about the eventual phaseout of Link 16 tactical data links are ongoing as the Pentagon’s Space Development Agency works to build out a network for optical communications, according to a senior official involved in the effort.

Optical comms networks use lasers to transmit data between satellites and from space vehicles to terrestrial platforms. These capabilities offer some advantages over RF networks, experts say.

“As space becomes increasingly contested and congested, traditional radio frequency communications are hitting some limits. We’re facing bandwidth constraints, security vulnerabilities, plus growing susceptibility to jamming, interference. Meanwhile, our adversaries are rapidly advancing their own space-based capabilities, making secure, high-speed data transfer more critical than ever. And this goes beyond space. The collaborative, real-time partnering attributes we’ll need in the terrestrial domains will rely on connectivity — and laser comms will be a big part of that equation. It offers a crucial pathway forward promising higher data throughput, lower latency and inherent resistance to interception,” Jennifer Reeves, senior resident fellow for space studies at the Mitchell Institute, said Wednesday during a panel at AFA’s Air, Space and Cyber conference.

“We will use that network for our own purposes to backhaul data. We call those ground entry points. … We’re building out a network of those. We also have a number of test sites, and we used those in some recent demonstrations,” he said during the panel. “We use them so that we can opportunistically connect with satellites. And then we’re also working with the warfighter community to develop what we call tactical optical sites and those capabilities. So, kind of three classes of optical terminals. We’re excited because we see optical comms at an inflection point, and we see it start to scale up and start getting economies of scale. So … we’re excited about the scale that’s coming, and we’re trying to be very adaptive to that.”

SDA is creating what the Defense Department calls a Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture, which is expected to eventually include hundreds of satellites in low-Earth orbit for data transport as well as missile tracking.

Batteries are vital for The Pentagon’s drone roll-out

Silhouettes of soldiers are using drone for scouting during military operation against the backdrop of a sunset. Application of modern technology during war

As the US military looks to expand its drone capabilities, another important consideration is the batteries that will power these devices. Bruce Parkinson, Applications Engineering and Inside Sales Manager at Ultralife Corporation, explores how modern-day drone manufacturers now have more choice when selecting a power solution.

Single-use drones are typically treated as expendable and may not return from their first mission; therefore, they do not require a rechargeable battery. In the 1940s, when early versions of single-use drones were first developed, non-rechargeable battery technology was still in its infancy and alkaline chemistry had just been invented.

Alkaline batteries have a lower energy density compared to modern lithium alternatives, and, in single-use drones, the energy required for power-intensive systems like guidance, navigation and communications must be compact and efficient, so low energy density was a significant disadvantage. Alkaline batteries also did not perform as well in extreme temperatures, which was problematic for drones that operated in hot or cold climates or at high altitudes.

Today’s lithium-based non-rechargeable batteries not only address these issues, they can even power the propulsion systems of single-use drones, but this is still very rare. As in the 1940s, non-rechargeable batteries are mainly used to power radio control systems and flight stabilizers, but modern drones also feature additional sensors that require more power.

A balancing act

Every single-use drone must strike the right balance between power output, capacity and weight. Capacity refers to how much energy the battery holds — and therefore, how long the drone can operate — while power output refers to how quickly that energy can be delivered.

A higher capacity facilitates longer missions, but adds weight, which can compromise flight performance or payload allowance. On the other hand, batteries that deliver high current may be bulkier or have lower energy density.

US officials issue ‘emergency’ cybersecurity order after hackers breach at least one government agency

Sean Lyngaas

US cyber officials issued an “emergency directive” Thursday ordering federal agencies to defend their networks against an “advanced” group of hackers that have breached at least one agency in an apparent espionage campaign.

Government officials have not commented on who is behind the hacks, but private experts say they believe the hackers are state-backed and based in China. The hackers have been exploiting previously unknown flaws in software made by Cisco for several months.

“We are aware of hundreds of these devices [running the affected Cisco software] being in the federal government,” Chris Butera, a senior official at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, told reporters.

The directive will help officials understand “the full scope of the compromise across federal agencies,” Butera said.

Unit 42, a division of cyber firm Palo Alto Networks, told CNN that they believe the hackers are based in China. But a slew of other hacking groups could try to exploit the vulnerabilities now that the issue is public and a software “patch,” or fix, is available.

“As we have seen before, now that patches are available, we can expect attacks to escalate as cybercriminal groups quickly figure out how to take advantage of these vulnerabilities,” said Sam Rubin, a senior vice president at Unit 42.

The directive will set off a scramble in Washington to detect the hackers and unplug any compromised devices before the hackers can do further damage. It gives civilian agencies until the end of Friday to update software and report any compromises.

A Cisco spokesperson said the company investigated the hacks in May with “several” government agencies and has since discovered three new vulnerabilities that the hackers were exploiting. The company urged its customers to update their software in the face of the attacks.

Microsoft cuts off some services used by Israeli military unit

Natalie Sherman

Microsoft has cut off some services to a unit of Israel's Ministry of Defence after an investigation found its technology had been used to conduct mass surveillance on people in Gaza.

Brad Smith, president of the company, said using the firm's technology to conduct mass surveillance on civilians was a violation of its standard terms of service.

Mr Smith said the decision, which was prompted by an investigation published by The Guardian, would not affect other work the company does with Israel.

Microsoft's work with the Israeli government has been a controversial issue, including within the company, prompting protests by employees.

"I know many of you care about this topic," Mr Smith wrote in a message to staff that was published by the company on Thursday.

He emphasised that the review was ongoing: "I'll share more information in the coming days and weeks, when it's appropriate to do so."

Last month's investigation by the Guardian, which collaborated with Israeli-Palestinian publication +972 Magazine and Hebrew-language outlet Local Call, found that a unit of the Israeli defence ministry used the expansive storage capacity of Microsoft's cloud service, Azure, to create a giant trove of calls made by ordinary Palestinians that it had intercepted.

The ability to collect, play back and analyse communications with such breadth helped to shape military operations in Gaza and the West Bank, according to their investigation.

Microsoft, which has responded to protests from staff over its work for Israel by firing some employees, said it launched its own review in response to the article.

The company said it did not access the content of its customers as part of that review but found other evidence to support elements of the article, including consumption of storage capacity in the Netherlands and use of AI services.

To ‘harmonize’ better: Air Force developing new defensive cyber campaign plan

Mark Pomerleau

AFA 2025 — The Air Force’s primary cyber unit is developing a new strategy to better synchronize the work of different groups of cyber defenders, with a particular focus on critical infrastructure and networks, according to the unit’s commander.

“Prior to this, we’ve always kind of looked at them [cybersecurity teams] in separate missions, but they’re really doing the same thing in a different way. We want to harmonize that better,” Lt. Gen. Thomas Hensley, commander of 16th Air Force, said during a panel presentation at the annual Air and Space Forces Association conference at National Harbor, Md.

Currently, cyber defense missions are undertaken by at least two different sets of teams. There are the local defenders, known as cybersecurity service providers or CSSPs, which perform persistent defense of systems. Then there are cyber protection teams, defensive teams focused on hunting adversaries within the network. They have been described as cyber SWAT teams that have specialized kits to eradicate adversary intrusions on networks.

The move for greater harmonization between the two groups, a spokesperson for the 16th said, came out of work the 16th has already done on what they called “mission thread defense.” That refers to an overarching strategy and process flow of information and focuses on protecting critical operational sequences that can span multiple systems and components — to include hardware, software, open vulnerabilities programmable logic controllers, data dependencies, sub systems and architecture.

“In the increasingly complex and competitive global security environment, mission thread defense protects our systems from any cyber threats, disruptions, and failures at any time. It ensures that essential capabilities, [such as] things that keep America safe, remain functional even under attack, protecting both our homeland and operational success by focusing on endurance and integrity of mission-critical operations,” the spokesperson said. “Mission thread defense safeguards critical operations from the beginning to the end of a mission. It enhances system resiliency, mitigates threats, and safeguards steady operations even under cyberattack or system failure.”

Massive Quantum Computing Breakthrough: Long-Lived Qubits

John Koetsier

An IBM quantum computerdpa/picture alliance via Getty Images

Paris-based quantum computing startup Alice & Bob has announced a stunning breakthrough in quantum computing: its qubits can now resist bit-flip errors for more than an hour. That’s four times longer than the company’s own previous record and millions of times longer than typical qubits, which often exist for just microseconds before de-cohering.

And that means Alice & Bob is on track to build a fault-tolerant quantum computer with 100 logical qubits by 2030.

“Being able to push the stability of our cat qubits year after year makes us confident that we will deliver on our roadmap,” Raphael Lescanne, CTO and Cofounder of Alice & Bob, said in a statement.

In the classical computing world, being able to maintain an error-free state for an hour is not a major accomplishment. Quantum computers, however, which promise massive computational advantages in fields like drug discovery, materials science, and cryptography, use quantum bits, or qubits, that are inherently fragile. They decohere, introducing errors in quantum computations. Solving error correction is one of the key challenges in quantum computing.

IBM’s Eagle superconducting quantum processor, for example, can achieve 400 milliseconds of coherence for its qubits. Other quantum computers might achieve only one to 34 milliseconds. New quantum computing architectures, like IBM’s Starling quantum computer that is scheduled to be built in 2029, solve the error correction problem via smarter detection technology, but longer-lived qbits solves the problem at the source.

“By virtually eliminating one of the two main error types, Alice & Bob’s cat qubits allow for more efficient error-correcting codes that require far fewer qubits,” the company says.

The new innovation, while reducing bit-flip errors, comes at the cost of more phase-flip errors, which the company says it can correct for more efficiently.

The billion-dollar infrastructure deals powering the AI boom

Russell Brandom

It takes a lot of computing power to run an AI product — and as the tech industry races to tap the power of AI models, there’s a parallel race underway to build the infrastructure that will power them. On a recent earnings call, Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang estimated that between $3 trillion and $4 trillion will be spent on AI infrastructure by the end of the decade — with much of that money coming from AI companies. Along the way, they’re placing immense strain on power grids and pushing the industry’s building capacity to its limit.

Below, we’ve laid out everything we know about the biggest AI infrastructure projects, including major spending from Meta, Oracle, Microsoft, Google, and OpenAI. We’ll keep it updated as the boom continues and the numbers climb even higher.

Microsoft’s $1 billion investment in OpenAI

This is arguably the deal that kicked off the whole contemporary AI boom: In 2019, Microsoft made a $1 billion investment in a buzzy non-profit called OpenAI, known mostly for its association with Elon Musk. Crucially, the deal made Microsoft the exclusive cloud provider for OpenAI — and as the demands of model training became more intense, more of Microsoft’s investment started to come in the form of Azure cloud credit rather than cash.

It was a great deal for both sides: Microsoft was able to claim more Azure sales, and OpenAI got more money for its biggest single expense. In the years that followed, Microsoft would build its investment up to nearly $14 billion — a move that is set to pay off enormously when OpenAI converts into a for-profit company.

The partnership between the two companies has unwound more recently. In January, OpenAI announced it would no longer be using Microsoft’s cloud exclusively, instead giving the company a right of first refusal on future infrastructure demands but pursuing others if Azure couldn’t meet their needs. More recently, Microsoft began exploring other foundation models to power its AI products, establishing even more independence from the AI giant.

Comprehensive National Power Part 2: Seven National Development Strategies

Erik R. Quam

Executive Summary:

Since 1992, the Party has enshrined seven national development strategies in the Party Charter, embedding development of “comprehensive national power” (CNP) at the heart of its approach to governance.

In the first phase (1992–2008), three strategies focused on strengthening science and education, as well as sustainable development, based on the assessment that economic and technological competition would become the dominant aspect of international struggle.

A second phase, beginning in 2008, sought to address uneven development across the system and continue building CNP in the context of an increasingly unstable international environment.

Throughout this period, the United States has been viewed as the main adversary. This was most striking in 2013, when Xi argued that strategic competition with the United States was unavoidable and that the country needed to double down on self-reliance—a remarkable assessment to make at the height of U.S.-PRC engagement and cooperation.

The Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy, unveiled in 2015, is perhaps the most significant of the seven. Described as essential for optimizing the other strategies and enabling the country to move to the center of the world stage, it calls for establishing a singular, national strategic system to advance simultaneous economic and national defense strength.

Who Is in Charge of Cyber Incidence Response in the Homeland?

Kelly R. M. Ihme, Patrick O'Brien Boling, Michael Zimmerman, Timothy G. McCormick

This article argues that the fragmented US cybersecurity framework—marked by the absence of a lead agency, insufficient whole-of-government coordination, and inconsistent private-sector compliance— undermines national resilience to cyber threats. Unlike existing literature that often focuses on technical vulnerabilities, this piece highlights systemic governance failures through detailed case studies of the SolarWinds, Colonial Pipeline, and Change Healthcare cyberattacks. The article identifies critical gaps in cyber incident response by drawing on incident reports, policy analysis, and expert commentary and offers actionable recommendations to strengthen national cybersecurity, making it especially relevant for policymakers and military practitioners concerned with protecting critical infrastructure.

The Weaponization of AI: The Next Stage of Terrorism and Warfare

C. Anthony Pfaff, Brennan Deveraux, Sarah Lohmann, Christopher Lowrance, Thomas W. Spahr, and Gábor Nyáry

In this episode of Conversations on Strategy, Major Brennan Deveraux interviews select authors of The Weaponization of Artificial Intelligence: The Next Stage of Terrorism and Warfare, a book written in partnership with NATO Centre of Excellence – Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT). The authors discuss their respective chapters, which include topics such as how terrorists use large language models, the use of artificial intelligence (AI) as a weapon, and the future of AI use in terrorism and counterterrorism.

Brennan Deveraux (Host)

You are listening to Conversations on Strategy. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

I’m your host, Major Brennan Deveraux. Today we’ll be talking about the newly released book, The Weaponization of Artificial Intelligence: The Next Stage of Terrorism and Warfare. I’m joined today by some of the book’s authors, and we’ll be exploring some of the findings and broader implications of the analysis. I have five guests with me.

The first is Dr. Tony Pfaff, the director of the Strategic Studies Institute. He was the project director and contributing author to the book. The second is Dr. Sarah Lohman, a University of Washington Information School faculty member and Army Cyber Institute visiting researcher. Her chapter of the book is entitled “National Security Impacts of Artificial Intelligence and Large Language Models.” The third is Dr. Gábor Nyáry. He’s a research professor at the National Public Service University in Hungary. His chapter was entitled “The Coming of the Techno-Terrorist Enterprise: Artificial Intelligence and the Tactical, Organizational, and Conceptual Transformation [of] the World of Violent Non-State Actors.” The fourth is Dr. Thomas Spahr, the [Francis W.] De Serio Chair of Theater and Strategic [Strategic and Theater] Intelligence at the US Army War College. His chapter is entitled “Raven Sentry: Employing AI for Indications and Warnings in Afghanistan.” Finally, Colonel Christopher Lowrance [is] an associate professor in the Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Department at the US Military Academy. He coauthored a chapter with Dr. Pfaff entitled “Using Artificial Intelligence to Disrupt Terrorist Operations.”

Disinformation as Ground-Shifting in Great-Power Competition

Sorin Adam Matei

Disinformation, distinct from misinformation, replaces accepted principles of objectivity and verifiability with novelty, framing, authority, self-reference, and conformity to create a new “truth paradigm.” This article introduces a novel definition and framework for understanding disinformation as a strategic tool in great-power competition. It includes a review of case studies, such as Russian disinformation campaigns during the Russia-Ukraine War and analyzes cognitive biases and social behaviors that facilitate the spread of disinformation. Policy and military practitioners will find actionable insights into countering disinformation, including its sociopsychological mechanisms and proposed targeted counterstrategies to protect the integrity of information flows in defense and security contexts.

Mobilizing for the ‘invisible war

Bryan Clark

In his recent confirmation hearing, Gen. Chris Mahoney, the nominee for vice chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, set electronic warfare as one of his top priorities if he is approved by the Senate. This was welcome news after more than a decade of dire assessments regarding the US military’s eroding proficiency and capacity for fighting in the spectrum.

But to turn bold statements into operational impact, the Pentagon will need to update its approach for the information age. Electronic warfare is no longer just jammers and decoys. It is a battle for sensemaking itself.

For Mahoney to make good on this opportunity will require more than replacing or updating aging EW aircraft like the EC-130 Compass Call, EA-18G Growler, or RC-135 Rivet Joint. Those are tactical improvements that might help once combat begins. The more important investments will be those that set the battlefield before the first shot — or prevent any shooting at all.

In 2025, intelligence sources are highly distributed, span military and commercial systems, and are of widely varying quality. Enemy forces can use publicly available data to target US troops, ships, or aircraft and exploit social media to gather intelligence on US servicemembers and operations. Paradoxically, disrupting, overwhelming, or deceiving this flood of information may be getting easier. Today nearly all information at some point moves through the airwaves, including to and from space. Electronic warfare and cyber operations are merging as the fastest way to get into an opponent’s network becomes an antenna.

With military and commercial sensors ubiquitous, an opponent like China can build a comprehensive picture during peacetime of US forces’ positions, identity, and habits, building a “pattern of life” akin to the approach used during counterinsurgency operations. When combat begins, People’s Liberation Army targeteers can quickly implement fire plans against US bases, ships, and ground units.

But this cuts both ways. US forces could mount a multi-dimensional campaign to undermine the confidence of Chinese planners and commanders. Jamming and decoys are just the start. The campaign should also include elements like radiofrequency-enabled cyber operations against PLA networks, deception operations using new force compositions and tactics, and false communications and messages.

Air Force’s AI ambitions mean simplifying its tangle of networks

LAUREN C. WILLIAMS

NATIONAL HARBOR, Md.—The Air Force is eager to use AI widely but is still struggling with the infrastructure to make it all work, said the service’s top buyer for battle-network systems.

“One of my biggest challenges is the underlying infrastructure that actually makes it all work,” said Maj. Gen. Luke Cropsey, the Air Force’s program executive officer for command, control, communications, and battle management, or C3BM, during the Air and Space Forces Association’s Air, Space & Cyber conference. “It's just the hard network of figuring out: how do you get the right infrastructure where you need it?”

Interoperability—whether data sharing or linking between systems—remains a challenge.

“With all the different configurations of stacks that are running around out there, getting to an enterprise-level capability is tough,” Cropsey told reporters. “As part of where we're trying to in our ‘26 priorities, we're actually looking at how do we build an enterprise battle network, [an] enterprise-wide set of strategies that allows us to go from however many disparate systems are out there today into some rational number of end-to-end capabilities that will allow us to get to the speed and the scale that we need.”

Technical teams are currently developing drafts of those strategies, which will fit under C3BM’s strategic framework announced in July. The Air Force released a separate network modernization document earlier this month.

“As we go into the fall timeframe, we're going to take those initial internal documents and strategies and start proliferating them out to the rest of the department to get their inputs and then ultimately out for comment to the broader industry base that provides that capability back into us, so that we have a robust strategy around what that end state looks like,” Cropsey said.

But even the best algorithms need good data and management practices to back them up.

Leadership and Our Army Profession

Gen. Gary M. Brito, U.S. Army Lt. Col. Danny R. Priester Jr., U.S. Army

25th Infantry Division and 2nd Battalion Royal Brunei Land Forces soldiers conduct a jungle field training exercise together during Pahlawan Warrior 24, 23–25 June 2024, in Tutong, Brunei. (Photo by Sgt. Jared Simmons, U.S. Army)

Troops are strongly influenced by the example and conduct of their leaders. A leader must have superior knowledge, will power, self-confidence, initiative, and disregard of self.

—Field Manual 100-5, Operations

We don’t have to look far to find many writings on leadership. Books, academic journals, doctrinal manuals, and more provide material on leadership styles, philosophies, and templates. I would argue that leading in the U.S. Army, although it shares much of what is written in the above material, has its own aimpoint: to be ready for combat.

In May 2025, the Army released Field Manual (FM) 1, The Army: A Primer to Our Profession of Arms. This article builds on and complements chapter 3 of FM 1, “A Leader.” I want to underscore the importance of leadership and its impact on unit performance, unit cohesion, and most importantly, our Army Profession.

A mentor once told me leadership is a little bit of both nature and nurture, and I believe this to be true. In other words, one may have innate leadership qualities such as charisma or empathy, while other qualities are learned and modeled over time. The “learned” qualities come from a variety of sources including formal education, mentoring, training, and more. We have a responsibility to our profession to nurture and develop leadership qualities in all our leaders, regardless of rank.

Supporting and investing in leader development has and will always be paramount to the Army’s success on the battlefield. Positive and effective leadership provides the foundation for combat-focused training—building cohesive teams, caring for soldiers and families, upholding standards, and making decisions. Effective leadership remains a central driver of change, not an afterthought, as the U.S. Army remains fully engaged with continuous transformation in response to a more volatile and interconnected global operational environment and adversaries that have shown the capacity to acquire technology quickly and cheaply.

28 September 2025

The Indian Army’s High-Altitude Drones

Usman Haider

Drones are gradually becoming central to routine military operations in South Asia, and the Indian military is at the forefront of this ongoing revolution. From surveillance missions to logistical support, the Indian military is currently employing drones from the high-altitude terrain of the Himalayas to the sea level near Jamnagar.

While combat-capable drones often attract the most attention, special focus should be given to the logistics drones the Indian army is operating along its northern frontiers. In these areas, mountainous terrain makes traditional transportation of supplies using conventional means expensive and sluggish. The drone operations at high altitudes reflect India’s broader military strategy to improve its capability to launch proactive operations along its disputed borders with Pakistan and China.

In his keynote address at a December 2018 seminar held by the Centre for Land Warfare Studies on “Changing Contours of Mountain Warfare,” then-Indian Army Chief General Bipin Rawat emphasized the procurement of logistics drones capable of operating in high-altitude regions. Following this, the army issued an open tender to procure such drones.

In its 2022 tender, the army devised two categories: standard and high-altitude drones, those capable of operating at altitudes of up to 12,000 feet and over 12,000 ft respectively. The systems were expected to operate day and night, withstand high altitude winds, have a minimum of 45 minutes endurance, and have a minimum of 10 kilometers of mission range. In addition, the drones must be capable of enduring at least 5,000 landings for the High-Altitude Version and at least 10,000 landings for the standard version.

The initial requirement was to acquire 163 high-altitude and 200 medium-altitude logistics drones, for a total of 363 logistics drones, in November 2022. Later, the army increased the order to 563 drones. In less than three years after the tender became public, the drones were designed, produced, tested, and deployed along the frontlines.

A recent report by Indian online media confirmed that the Indian Army has started deploying payloads through logistics drones at altitudes exceeding 12,000 ft. The Air Orca drone, manufactured by Odisha-based firm BonV Aero, is operational with the Indian Army, providing last-mile supply to the troops deployed along the Line of Control (LoC, the de facto border with Pakistan) and the Line of Actual Control (LAC, the de facto border with China). Other companies are also producing logistics drones for the Indian Army. Scandron recently claimed to deliver supplies even to soldiers deployed at around 18,000 ft via drones.

Cybersecurity in India: Adapting to the Age of AI

India’s digital ascent, from instant payments to smart factories, is rewriting the rules of growth. But sustaining this progress depends on something deeper: the security and resilience of the systems that power it.

In boardrooms across India, leaders are realising that in the age of real-time transactions, cloud-driven services, and AI-powered customer experiences, a data breach can erase years of progress overnight. Cybersecurity has shifted from being a checkbox to becoming an essential enabler of trust and resilience in business.

India’s Digital Boom, and the Risks That Follow

India’s digital economy is booming, making up about 13.42% of India’s GDP currently (2024-25), and is on track to reach 20% by 2029-30.

UPI alone processed more than 16.99 billion transactions in January 2025, and broadband subscribers now stand close to a billion. IT revenues stood at USD 283 billion in FY24–25, e-commerce platforms are surging, and digital public infrastructure like the Aadhaar and DigiLocker touch hundreds of millions of citizens daily.

But as growth accelerates, so do risks. More users, endpoints, and data create a sprawling attack surface. Traditional security models, built for a slower pace of change, are struggling to keep up.

Complexity: The New Enemy of Cybersecurity

Fragmentation is quietly becoming India’s biggest vulnerability. A sprawl of disconnected tools creates silos, slows detection, and introduces blind spots. The challenge is compounded by the shift to multi-cloud environments, the explosion of endpoints from IoT devices, and the speed at which AI is reshaping digital operations. What was once manageable has now become overwhelming, and attackers are quick to exploit these cracks.

The 2025 Fortinet-IDC Report on State of Cybersecurity in Asia-Pacific highlights the growing financial impact of cyber incidents, with one in five breaches costing organisations more than US$500,000 to recover. BFSI saw fraud cases quadruple, while insider threats and regulatory audits continue to expose weaknesses.

Semiconductor Clusters in the Making: India’s Push for Global Competitiveness

Sujai Shivakumar and Shruti Sharma

India’s semiconductor ambitions are entering a decisive phase. Backed by the ₹76,000 crore ($9.1 billion) India Semiconductor Mission (ISM) and a growing network of state-level incentive programs, the country is attempting to compress decades of ecosystem development into just a few years. Clusters are where economies of scale, supplier ecosystems, and advanced research and development (R&D) converge—turning isolated investments into sustainable industrial capacity and export-ready competitiveness. Emerging hubs in Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, and Karnataka mirror the factors that have long driven the United States’ own semiconductor clusters in New York, Texas, Oregon, and California—state-backed incentives, university-industry partnerships, and targeted infrastructure investment.

This parallel evolution creates a basis for collaboration, with both nations seeking to diversify supply chains, expand skilled talent pools, and secure competitive positions in an increasingly contested global market. For Washington, deeper engagement with India offers a trusted production base outside East Asia, expanded access to engineering talent, and greater resilience in a sector where security now rivals cost as the primary driver of strategic decisions. For New Delhi, U.S. experience in building integrated manufacturing clusters and scaling advanced R&D offers a tested roadmap for moving from design strength toward full-spectrum competitiveness—encompassing both manufacturing leadership and continued design excellence.

Q1: Where are India’s semiconductor clusters emerging?

A1: The ISM provides up to 50 percent fiscal support for eligible fabrication, outsourced semiconductor assembly and test (OSAT), and compound semiconductor projects, with states adding their own incentives and infrastructure. Alongside this manufacturing push, the Design Linked Incentive Scheme promotes chip design and intellectual property (IP) creation through R&D, prototyping, and commercialization support, including access to explanatory data analysis (EDA) tools and fabrication services.

GreenCycles: A Framework for Designing Solar-Plus-Storage Tenders in Indian States

Shashwat Kumar, Ammu Susanna Jacob, and Nikit Abhyankar

India’s ambitious clean energy journey hinges on rapid and large-scale deployment of energy storage systems (ESS), and especially battery ESS, to enable reliable integration of variable renewables. India has struggled to gain traction despite ambitious targets: With 0.11 GW of operational BESS as of the end of 2024 against a projected requirement of more than 73.93 GW by FY 2031–32, the gap is stark. Internationally, pairing solar generation with battery energy storage has proven to be one of the most effective ways to accelerate storage deployment. Pairing solar with storage, through thoughtful tender design and market mechanisms, can unlock investment and operational efficiencies for power systems.

This report puts forward an actionable solar-plus-storage tendering playbook to address India’s deployment challenges and catalyze ESS growth. Drawing on international best practice and cost-optimal modeling, this report equips policymakers, utilities, and developers with practical, scalable tools to unlock investment and accelerate BESS deployment, ensuring that energy storage is no longer a bottleneck but a strategic enabler of India’s 500 GW clean energy ambition.

Rethinking Great Power Competition: The Rise of Central Asia as Middle Powers

Eric Rudenshiold

Foreign policy experts prefer continuity to change, stability to volatility, the familiar to the unknown. International relations scholarship reinforces this preference by clinging to established archetypes: balance of power, spheres of influence, and the seemingly self-evident axiom that small states are inevitably pawns in the struggles between great powers.

Few regions are so habitually pigeonholed as Central Asia. Since independence, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have been cast in Washington, Brussels, Moscow, and Beijing alike as vulnerable prizes in a “new Great Game,” more acted upon than acting.

Persisting in antiquated assumptions risks missing not only the newfound agency of the Central Asian states themselves, but also the opportunities their assertiveness creates for Western allies. These countries increasingly define themselves as “middle powers” – actors with enough weight, resources, and diplomatic creativity to resist Russian or Chinese domination, to negotiate with multiple players, and to pursue independent development strategies.

Nowhere is this more apparent than Central Asia’s reaction to Russia’s aggression toward Ukraine.

Not cowed into deference, Central Asia is instead accelerating a realignment that is diversifying the region away from the limitations of Soviet legacy infrastructure and Russia’s market stranglehold. Moscow’s border treaty abrogation and invasion of Ukraine compelled Central Asian leaders to reinvest in their self-styled concept of “multivectorism” by engaging simultaneously with multiple partners and not subordinating themselves to the interests of large neighbors.

This pursuit of sovereignty and regional integration is exemplified in the region’s organic creation of a “Middle Corridor” trade route that redirects freight away from Russian infrastructure and connects Central Asia to China in the east and Europe via the Caspian, the South Caucasus, and Turkiye to the west. Supporting this shift is not just an economic matter but a geopolitical imperative: it is the surest way to reduce Russia’s coercive tendencies, to blunt China’s monopolization of connectivity, and to secure a more prosperous and independent Eurasia.

The Two Southeast Asias

Susannah Patton

Policymakers and scholars in the West talk about Southeast Asia as a coherent region, but it has always been divided. The region’s 700 million people speak hundreds of languages and follow different religions, and its 11 countries vary in political system, size, geography, and level of economic development. Throughout the Cold War, Southeast Asia was divided between the five original founding members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that were aligned with the United States—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand—and the three countries of Indochina—Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam—that aligned with China or the Soviet Union.

After the Cold War ended, ASEAN expanded to include Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, as well as the tiny sultanate of Brunei, increasing the salience of Southeast Asia as a geopolitical entity. Yet despite ASEAN’s achievements in fostering cooperation between its members, a cohesive Southeast Asia remains more myth than reality.

The reality is of two regions, not one. According to the Lowy Institute’s Southeast Asia Influence Index, which maps the sway of foreign partners across the region, two distinct networks persist among countries in Southeast Asia: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam form a continental group that leans toward China. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore make up a maritime group in which the countries are well connected to one another, work with a wider array of governments from outside the region, and hedge between the United States and China. The Philippines is an outlier. It lacks close friends among other ASEAN countries and relies on non-Asian partners, particularly the United States, more than any of its neighbors.

The gap between these two networks of Southeast Asian countries is set to grow in the decades ahead, leading to a de facto Chinese sphere of influence in continental Southeast Asia. To prevent Beijing from encroaching even further, the United States should deepen ties with the countries that straddle Southeast Asia’s two subregions: Thailand and Vietnam.

What China Doesn’t Want

David C. Kang, Jackie S. H. Wong, and Zenobia T. Chan

It is now considered common knowledge in Washington policymaking circles that China aims to replace the United States as the dominant global superpower and to aggressively expand its territory. Democrats and Republicans alike have embraced this consensus. Elbridge Colby, who advises the Pentagon as President Donald Trump’s undersecretary of defense for policy, has written that if China took control of Taiwan it would serve as a steppingstone to extending its reach into the Philippines and Vietnam. Rush Doshi, the deputy senior director for China and Taiwan on the National Security Council under President Joe Biden and one of the

Nobody Lost Taiwan

Philip H. Gordon and Ryan Hass

Over the past several years, few topics in international relations have gotten more attention than a possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan. And for good reason: China has never given up its claim to the island; it is in the middle of one of the largest military buildups in history; it conducts regular incursions into Taiwan’s airspace and maritime zones; and its president, Xi Jinping, has directed his military leadership to develop the capacity to conquer Taiwan by 2027 should he give the order to do so, according to senior U.S. government officials. For anyone skeptical that such an attack could take place in the twenty-first century, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was a sharp reminder that major war over territory is not a thing of the past. Russian President Vladimir Putin seized what he thought was an opportunity to take back what he considered a wayward territory that was slipping away. Sooner or later, Xi could very well try to do the same.

Other factors have also contributed to growing anxiety about Taiwan’s future. Few doubt that China would try to use force to seize Taiwan militarily if it felt all other options to prevent permanent separation had been exhausted, but Beijing’s strong preference would be to take it over peacefully—with the island’s economy, technology, and human capital still intact. To achieve that goal, China is using a combination of relentless propaganda, infiltration, and military pressure to undercut U.S. support for Taiwan and to persuade Taiwan’s residents that they have little choice but to accept a political accommodation that recognizes Taiwan as part of China’s sovereign territory.

The past two months have produced growing concerns that Beijing is making progress on this front. Taiwan’s politicians have inflamed partisan divisions with rhetoric accusing one another of undermining Taiwan’s security, Taiwan’s ruling party pushed a failed “recall” of opposition members that deeply divided the population, and President Lai Ching-te’s popularity is collapsing. Taiwan’s dealings with the United States, meanwhile, have become trickier. The Trump administration has refused Lai’s routine transit through the United States, postponed efforts to reach a trade deal with Taiwan, halted some planned arms deliveries, and expressed harsh criticism about Taiwan’s defense spending. Washington has also loosened high-tech export controls on China, which suggests that President Donald Trump puts a higher priority on reaching a trade deal and improving relations with Beijing than on steadfast support for Taiwan. The pessimism about Taiwan’s future was best exemplified in August, when an article by a former Trump administration official went viral in Taiwan. It was called “How Taiwan Lost Trump.”

Manned fighters still rule in US-China battle for air supremacy

Gabriel Honrada

With China rapidly expanding its J-20 stealth fleet and the US extending the life of its F-22 Raptors, both sides are doubling down on manned airpower, showing that despite advances in drone technology, pilots still rule the skies.

This month, multiple media sources reported that China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has reached a significant milestone by fielding at least 300 Chengdu J-20 stealth fighters, underscoring its accelerating buildup of fifth-generation combat aircraft.

The confirmation came as four J-20s, including the 300th production airframe identified by its construction number “CB10300,” arrived in Changchun, Jilin province, for an air show in mid-September.

Analysts noted the PLAAF has added at least 50 new aircraft since June 2024, reflecting a rapid delivery pace that places China second only to the US in operational stealth fleets.

The J-20 fleet now rivals the scale of the US Air Force’s 180 F-22 Raptors and more than 240 F-35As, though the US total remains larger when US Marine Corps and US Navy aircraft are included.

The J-20’s expansion illustrates China’s strategy of mass-producing modern platforms to contest US air dominance in Asia, with the program evolving from a developmental project less than a decade ago into the backbone of China’s airpower.

The US is not to be outdone. The War Zone (TWZ) reported this month that Lockheed Martin is urging the US Air Force to expand its F-22 Raptor upgrade program to include 35 older Block 20 jets currently used for training, aiming to bolster combat readiness amid uncertainty over the aircraft’s replacement timeline.

Skunk Works Vice President OJ Sanchez emphasized the strategic value of modernizing these sidelined aircraft at the recent Air, Space & Cyber Conference in Maryland. The push follows US Congressional pressure and operational concerns, as the US Air Force lacks a definitive successor to the F-22. Upgrades would extend viability into the 2040s, enhancing stealth, sensors and crewed-uncrewed teaming capabilities.

All is not lost for China in US TikTok deal

Jeff Pao

Beijing is signaling a green light to American investors’ takeover of TikTok’s operations in the United States, a rare opening in the grinding US-China tech standoff.

The breakthrough follows a September 19 call between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping, during which the TikTok issue reportedly featured prominently.

The control of TikTok’s algorithm is being addressed through a workaround. Media reports said that, under the arrangement, ByteDance will lease its algorithm to the US-based TikTok entity. At the same time, Oracle Corp will retrain it and secure a US-specific version “from the ground up.”

US officials said the aim is to give American stakeholders full operational control over the recommendation engine, while ByteDance retains intellectual property rights.

“The Chinese government respects the wishes of the company in question, and would be happy to see productive commercial negotiations in keeping with market rules lead to a solution that complies with China’s laws and regulations and takes into account the interests of both sides,” Guo Jiakun, a spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said Monday.

“The US side needs to provide an open, fair and non-discriminatory environment for Chinese investors,” the spokesperson said.

Washington and Beijing reached a consensus on the sale of TikTok’s US businesses to American investors after US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng held six hours of trade-related talks in Spain on September 14. The meeting came after the US Commerce Department added 23 Chinese semiconductor firms to its “Entity List” on September 13.

A columnist using the pseudonym “Zhongsheng” (sound of bells) with the state-owned People’s Daily said in a commentary published on September 21 that “dialogue and consultation must be grounded in principles, and the atmosphere for cooperation requires joint effort to build and maintain.”

Soybean Diplomacy Between the US and China

Geopolitical Futures

Back in July, China slashed its soybean imports from the United States, continuing its gradual pivot toward Brazil to satisfy its substantial demand for the crop. Now, weeks into the new export season, data from the U.S. Department of Agriculture shows that China, the world’s top soybean importer, has not booked any shipments of U.S. soybeans, and it is speculated that Beijing does not intend to purchase any soybeans from the U.S. this year. This marks a significant shift, as the U.S. used to be China’s largest soybean supplier.

Soybeans are crucial for both Beijing and Washington: While they are one of the United States’ most important agricultural products, China also relies heavily on imports for its supply of soybeans, which above all are used as animal feed and cooking oil. With trade negotiations intensifying between the two sides, this agricultural product is taking center stage as a key bargaining chip for China. And the diversification efforts go well beyond just soybeans: China has also decreased purchases of American corn, wheat and sorghum, while continuing to buy from Brazil, Canada and Australia. This fits into Beijing’s larger-scale plan to decrease its dependency on U.S. agriculture – something it already intended to do before the trade conflict started.

The situation is not without risks for both sides. U.S. farmers are already feeling the financial stress of the lack of Chinese orders as prices have begun to fall. At the same time, Brazilian soybean prices have shot up, and if Brazil does not have a good harvest, China will have to turn to its own reserves. As long as the two do not reach a trade agreement, things are more than likely to remain uncertain in both nations’ agricultural sectors.

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