Indian Strategic Studies: 06/30/25

30 June 2025

Why Israel’s Attack on Iran Is a Geopolitical Blow for India

Gaurav Sen

On June 12, Israel launched a significant military operation targeting Iran, marking a dramatic escalation in the ongoing conflict between the two nations. This operation, described as a preemptive strike, aimed at crippling Iran’s nuclear program and eliminating key military leaders associated with it. The ongoing strikes exchanged since then by Israel and Iran will have significant implications for India, given its strategic interests and relationships with both nations.

The Israeli airstrikes focused on multiple military and nuclear sites across Iran, including facilities in Tehran and other strategic locations. Reports indicate that the strikes resulted in the deaths of several high-ranking Iranian officials, including Major General Mohammad Bagheri and Major General Hossein Salami, among others. The Israeli military confirmed that the operation was intended to disrupt Iran’s nuclear capabilities and missile programs.

Iranian officials vowed to respond decisively to what they view as an act of aggression. Following the Israeli strikes, Iran declared a state of emergency and launched retaliatory missile attacks against Israel. Reports indicate that Iran fired dozens of missiles, with some reaching Israeli territory, leading to casualties and damage.

The conflict is bad news for India for several reasons.

First, Iran serves as India’s conduit to Central Asia. India has invested billions in Iran’s Chabahar port – a competitor to Gwadar port in Pakistan – to establish a direct link with Central Asia. Central Asia is crucial for India, not only regarding energy security but also due to its abundance of rare earth minerals, but India does not share a direct border with the region, limited trade potential. The Iran-Israel conflict will jeopardize India’s connectivity plans and impede the long-anticipated progress of the International North-South Corridor.

The regional escalation will also sever the connection between India and Afghanistan, a trade relations that also runs through Chabahar. In that scenario, China will swiftly supplant India in Afghanistan, as it has been endeavoring to do for an extended period. The recent China-Pakistan-Afghanistan trilateral dialogue was just the latest example of Beijing’s efforts in that regard.

India’s Economic Growth Masks a Deeper Malaise

Deepanshu Mohan

India’s economic ascent to a $4.2 trillion GDP in 2025 has been hailed as a historic achievement. The country is now ranked the world’s fourth largest economy by current dollar terms, surpassing Japan. From summit speeches to television debates, the triumphalist narrative hides a quieter, discomforting reality.

For a country of over 1.4 billion people, the scale of economic output should mark a turning point: better living standards, more opportunity for its citizens, and stronger government support for basic needs. But when measured against how much the average Indian earns, the picture begins to fracture.

At just $2,880, India’s per capita income lags behind much smaller economies like Vietnam ($4,810) and the Philippines ($4,350). In global terms, it ranks around 139th in per capita GDP. The average Indian earns in a year what a German earns in under a month. This is more than an income gap; it’s a gulf in life chances.

This is not just a problem of inequality but a deep-rooted pattern of systemic exclusion. The World Inequality Report 2022 shows that the top 1 percent of Indians hold over 40 percent of the country’s wealth while the bottom half, over 700 million own just 5.9 percent. Economic growth in India has become intensely vertical, enriching those already ahead while failing to uplift those who are most in need.

Meanwhile, macroeconomic stress is quietly eroding household resilience. In 2024, 62 percent of India’s poor were “newly poor,” hit by illness, job loss, or inflation. Household debt rose to 42.9 percent of GDP; middle-class savings fell from 84 percent in 2000 to 61 percent in 2023. These shifts suggest that economic growth is not trickling down. Rather, it is trickling away.

The $4 trillion headline figure tells only one part of the story. The other part is a paradox of extraordinary expansion without equitable uplift. This raises a critical, unresolved question: how can India claim economic greatness when so many of its people remain economically invisible?

Is Bangladesh’s Police Force Functional Again?

Saqlain Rizve

It was a cold night on February 28 at Patenga beach in Chittagong, the port city of Bangladesh, when Sub-Inspector Yusuf Ali, who had recently transferred from the River Police, noticed some young men smoking cannabis, which is illegal in Bangladesh. Yusuf warned them and let them go after they apologized. But the young men soon came back with more people. They grabbed Yusuf by his collar, tore his uniform, tied him up, and beat him badly. A video of the beating showed Yusuf crying and saying he is a police officer; however the mob ignored it and called him “fake” police. The incident went viral on social media.

A week later, on the night of March 6-7, another event occurred at Dhaka’s Shahbagh Police Station. A group of Islamist men attempted to storm the station and free a suspect who had been arrested for allegedly harassing a female student at the University of Dhaka.

Not long after that, on March 18 in the capital’s Khilkhet area, another group of police officers was attacked by a mob when they tried to arrest a teenager accused of rape. The angry crowd took away the suspect and badly injured him, along with seven officers. They also damaged a police van.

These incidents are not isolated; rather they show that police personnel still face great dangers and challenges while doing their jobs a full 10 months after the ouster of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and the police agency’s collapse. During the month-long student led uprisings that led to Hasina’s flight, some 1,400 people were killed by the law enforcement agencies, especially the police force, and agents affiliated with Hasina’s Awami League.

The authorities reported that 44 police personnel were killed by demonstrators during the protests, including 24 who were murdered on August 5, 2024, the day Hasina fled the country. The protesters sought revenge against the police, whom were labeled perpetrators of “genocide.” Mobs attacked police stations, and the force went on strike for their own safety.

In the end, the Bangladesh Army had to leave its barracks in order to control the situation.

China’s Cautious Calculus In The Iran-Israel Conflict – Analysis

Observer Research Foundation / Antara Ghosal Singh

In his first public comment following the escalation of tensions in the Middle East, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that China is “deeply worried” about Israel’s military operation against Iran, and that “China stands ready to work with all parties to play a constructive role in restoring peace and stability in the Middle East.”

Meanwhile, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has already spoken to Iranian Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar, and Omani Foreign Minister Sayyid Badr bin Hamad bin Hamood Albusaidi regarding the latest hostilities.

While publicly slamming Israel for attacking Iran, China has sought to engage both countries to ensure that Chinese interests are safeguarded and that the safety of Chinese institutions and personnel is maintained. Beijing also wants to explore the possibility of mediating between Tel Aviv and Tehran as a potential peacemaker in the current crisis.

One reason behind China’s underwhelming support for Iran could be Tehran’s less-than-ideal reputationwithin China, particularly in the public opinion space. Since the beginning of the latest episode of hostilities between Israel and Iran, the dominant discourse in China is that Iran’s future appears bleak. A series of news reports, commentaries, and blogs on the Chinese internet deliberated the various perceived shortcomings faced by Tehran: it has too many traitors, serious internal contradictions,

has been under sanctions for far too long—with its economy crumbling, technology outdated, and military incompetent. Criticism of Iran flooded the Chinese internet space as Iran’s senior military personnel were killed and its nuclear facilities destroyed by Israeli strikes. Overall, Chinese public opinion shows little sympathy or support for Iran—only a vague hope that Iran might sap some of Israel’s, and by extension America’s, power by dragging it into a quagmire, and thereby easing pressure on China.

Russia Won’t Sit Out A US-China Asia-Pacific War – Analysis

Garrett I. Campbell

(FPRI) — Contrary to the popular assessments of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership, Chinese and Russian national interests primarily converge in the Asia Pacific and Arctic, not in Europe and Ukraine. For the last two decades, the United States has not paid adequate attention to this convergence at our peril.

Overall assessments by the US national security community, think-tanks, and academia of the strategic partnership have almost universally fallen short and downplayed the Russia-China convergence.[1] This is a mistake. While establishing its sphere of influence over Europe will remain Russia’s priority, Russia could go to war to support China in the event of a US-China conflict in the Asia Pacific.

It is true that China has done much to support Russia’s war in Ukraine. While it has avoided direct involvement, it remains Russia’s primary enabler. Albeit China does not want to undermine its own economic interests in Europe. Russia’s position in the Asia Pacific is significantly different than that of China in Europe;

thus, there is less risk in how it pursues its strategic interests, and that may be fundamentally preparing Russia to elevate the Sino-Russian entente to a military alliance in the Asia Pacific. President Vladimir Putin and Russia’s elites bet their legacy not only on the forceful realignment of the international system, but on the country’s future economic prosperity anchored in the Sino-Russian relationship, including the collaborative development and use of the Arctic and Russia’s Northern Sea Route.

As such, Putin has implemented a series of Russian maritime doctrine and Arctic policy changes, undertaken force structure and alignment changes involving a geographic reprioritization, and empowered Russian elites to participate in supporting the Sino-Russian strategic partnership involving these mutually important regions. These actions convey the importance Putin places on the pursuit of Russian national interests and suggest he may be slowly preparing Russia to support its most important treaty partner in the event of a US-China conflict in the region.

The ASEAN–GCC–China Summit: more symbolism than substance

Despite being overshadowed by President Donald Trump’s tour of the Gulf states a week earlier, the ASEAN–GCC–China Summit on 27 May 2025 in Kuala Lumpur was symbolically significant. The first-ever meeting between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations,

the Gulf Cooperation Council and China emphasised a shared commitment to a ‘rules-based multilateral […] open global trading system’, deeper cooperation and a unified position on the Israel–Palestine conflict. With a combined GDP of nearly US$25 trillion and a total population of 2.15 billion, ASEAN, the GCC and China would potentially constitute a hefty coalition.

Speaking at the 22nd IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore a few days later, Malaysian Prime Minister Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim suggested the purpose of the summit was to ‘connect ASEAN’s energy and talent with the Gulf’s capital and China’s scale’. However, translating the political and economic ambitions declared at the summit into concrete progress is likely to remain challenging.

Symbolic significance The brainchild of Ibrahim, whose country is chairing ASEAN in 2025, the summit was symbolic for multiple reasons. Against the backdrop of President Trump’s ‘Liberation Day’ tariffs and withdrawal from international organisations and agreements – including the World Health Organization, the UN Human Rights Council,

UNESCO and the Paris climate accords – the trilateral commitment to rules-based multilateralism acquires added significance. It aligns with China’s attempts to portray itself as a responsible global power committed to the multilateral rules-based system, in contrast to Trump’s MAGA nationalist movement in the US. The summit followed the completion of ASEAN–China FTA 3.0 negotiations, the second update of their 2002 free-trade agreement, now including the digital and green economies. It also marked the official launch of FTA negotiations between the GCC and Malaysia.

The AI Cold War Is Here: And The Global South Is The Battlefield – OpEd

Angelo Valerio Toma

In the 20th century, the Cold War was fought with nuclear threats and ideological blocs. Today, a new kind of Cold War is unfolding — one powered not by missiles, but by machine learning. While Washington and Beijing dominate the headlines, the real battleground is neither Silicon Valley nor Shenzhen. It’s Nairobi. It’s Jakarta. It’s Brasília.

Artificial intelligence is becoming the currency of 21st-century geopolitics. What makes this race especially dangerous — and decisive — is the role of the Global South. Once treated as passive terrain for great power games, these countries are now both the testing grounds and the prize in a technological arms race that will shape the future of global power.

Tech Hubs or Digital Colonies?

China is moving fast. Through its Digital Silk Road initiative — the AI-driven arm of its Belt and Road strategy — Beijing exports surveillance technologies, facial recognition systems, and cloud infrastructure to dozens of developing nations. These tools often arrive bundled with generous loans and turnkey solutions, helping governments monitor citizens and manage dissent — all under the banner of development.

In Uganda, Zimbabwe, and Ecuador, Huawei-backed surveillance systems have raised alarms about human rights and data privacy. Yet from local governments’ perspective, the offer is pragmatic: Chinese firms deliver fast, affordable solutions without the regulatory headaches often faced with Western partners. For many, it’s not about ideology — it’s about access.

The United States, meanwhile, is waking up late. The Biden administration’s Digital Transformation with Africa initiative responds to China’s head start. But beyond slogans, Washington faces a credibility gap. Western companies often lack the political backing or sustained funding to compete with state-backed Chinese tech giants like Alibaba Cloud or

The Global A.I. Divide

Adam Satariano and Paul Mozur Graphics Karl Russell and June Kim

Last month, Sam Altman, the chief executive of the artificial intelligence company OpenAI, donned a helmet, work boots and a luminescent high-visibility vest to visit the construction site of the company’s new data center project in Texas.

Bigger than New York’s Central Park, the estimated $60 billion project, which has its own natural gas plant, will be one of the most powerful computing hubs ever created when completed as soon as next year.

Around the same time as Mr. Altman’s visit to Texas, Nicolás Wolovick, a computer science professor at the National University of Córdoba in Argentina, was running what counts as one of his country’s most advanced A.I. computing hubs. It was in a converted room at the university, where wires snaked between aging A.I. chips and server computers.

“Everything is becoming more split,” Dr. Wolovick said. “We are losing.”

Nicolás Wolovick, a computer science professor at the National University of Cordoba in Argentina. “We are losing,” he said.

Sarah Pabst for The New York Times

Artificial intelligence has created a new digital divide, fracturing the world between nations with the computing power for building cutting-edge A.I. systems and those without. The split is influencing geopolitics and global economics, creating new dependencies and prompting a desperate rush to not be excluded from a technology race that could reorder economies, drive scientific discovery and change the way that people live and work.

Trump’s risky Iran bet aims for political dividends at home

Natasha Lindstaedt

President Donald J. Trump attends the 2019 Army Navy Game in Philadelphia, Pa., Dec. 14, 2019. Photo: US Army / Sgt. Dana Clarke

During Donald Trump’s first term, he made clear that he wanted his foreign policy to be as unpredictable as possible, stating: “I don’t want them to know what I’m thinking.”

With the United States’ recent attack on Iran, Trump certainly kept everyone in suspense. While US enemies may not have known what Trump was thinking, the problem was that neither US allies nor US legislators knew, either. Trump apparently did not bother to inform his own vice-president, J D Vance, when he had made the decision.

Trump has portrayed this as a strength. He sees himself as the only one capable of getting certain things done in foreign policy because his unpredictability and risk-taking behavior give him more leverage.

But thus far he has had fewer successes than wins with this approach. His dalliance with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Trump’s first term only resulted in the acceleration of North Korea’s nuclear program.

His great relationship with Vladimir Putin has so far led to no concessions from Moscow regarding the war in Ukraine – even causing Trump to effectively give up trying to resolve that crisis, at least for now.

In Trump’s second term, his MAGA base has been a bit more divided than in his first. On the issue of tariffs, key Republican senators begged him to backpedal, due to concerns that the new tariffs would be catastrophic for the US economy – improving the economy having been one of the issues that propelled him to victory. Yet he went ahead with the tariffs anyway, as some members of his base were in support.

With the Middle East crisis, Trump supporters appeared to be mostly against the US getting involved in a foreign conflict. “No more wars” is a common slogan on the campaign trail.

Can Washington Counter Beijing Without Repeating Cold War Mistakes

Andrew Friedman

At the height of the Cold War, U.S. partners could reliably count on U.S. military or intelligence support for any number of actions if they were sold as vital to counter communism. This included coup d’états and extreme human rights violations up to and including death squads. While U.S. military and intelligence support for unsavory regimes and actors is somewhat well known, historical examples of human rights concerns taking a back seat to geopolitics are not limited to the Pentagon or Langley.

Take, for example, the annual Human Rights Reports (HRRs). These reports are a legally required Department of State exercise that reports on human rights violations in every country around the globe. They are generally regarded as factual, objective, and a vital source for journalists, analysts, government adjudicators, and policymakers. However, analysis from the Cold War period shows consistent gaps between the analysis of human rights organizations and the Department of State’s HRRs in their reporting on U.S. allies versus countries seen as competitors or Soviet allies. According to the authors, this indicates “that the [United States] shows significant favoritism towards countries that it values strategically.”

This approach is unsurprising, as it is not uncommon for the United States or other sovereign states to stand by allies in international arenas, even in the midst of unpopular, problematic, or morally abhorrent decisions. It does, however, demonstrate the breadth of support for problematic regimes in efforts to counter geopolitical foes and the insistence on such support from all elements of the U.S. foreign policymaking process. Put differently, at times, all U.S. foreign policy decisionmakers, including the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Intelligence Community, have seen value in glossing over human rights concerns.

The Soviet Union, since its collapse in 1991, has no longer been the pacing threat for the United States. This role has been assumed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) over the past several years, leading to concerns that human rights and democracy, which were once dismissed in international efforts to counter Moscow, may now be dismissed in efforts to counter Beijing.

Innovation Lightbulb: U.S. Federal Investments in Quantum Technology Research and Infrastructure

Hideki Tomoshige

Of the 52 federal investments to date, 36 began in 2020 with funding from the National Quantum Initiative Act and the CHIPS and Science Act. They are geographically distributed across 19 states, highlighting major regional quantum research hubs. Currently, Illinois and Maryland lead with seven institutes each, followed by New York with six,

California with five, and Colorado and New Mexico with four and three, respectively. As highlighted in the figure, these investments are led by multiple federal agencies, each leveraging its existing infrastructure and expertise.

Federal Agencies and Their Roles in QIST

Federal agencies play central roles in supporting progress in QIST research and infrastructure, including by coordinating funding and resources, promoting public-private-academic collaboration, and advancing human resource development and innovation.

Department of Energy (DOE): DOE combines cross-disciplinary scientific expertise in fields such as particle physics,

materials science, and laser physics with knowledge of how to operate premier, large-scale research facilities.National Quantum Information Science Research Centers (NQISRCs): DOE has committed $575 million in quantum over 5 years through five NQISRCs and has announced an additional $625 million in funding for these centers this year. Each center integrates DOE's national labs and talent pools with private sector partners to advance R&D in quantum technologies. This investment represents the largest single federal investment in QIST.

Why the United States Acted Now Against Ira

Kari A. Bingen and Clayton Swope

Looking at the strategic chessboard, it’s clear why the president seized this moment to strike at Iran’s nuclear program. There may never have been a better time. Iran was closer than ever before to having the ability to manufacture an atomic bomb. In the run-up to Operation Midnight Hammer, Iran walked away from the negotiating table, signaling it was not interested in diplomacy. And,

finally, Iran was suddenly weak, its air defenses in shambles. It is too early to know the long-term ramifications of the U.S. decision to join Israel’s attack on Iran, but the short-term impacts are clear. Iran’s nuclear program has been set back, and the prestige and influence of the axis of resistance have ebbed. Operation Midnight Hammer is also a reminder of U.S. resolve and military power—and the consequences for those who underestimate either.

For years, Tehran has been constructing clandestine nuclear facilities in deeper, more expansive underground tunnel complexes. In May 2025, the International Atomic Energy Agency assessed that Iran’s stockpile of near-weapons-grade uranium had increased by 50 percent since its last report three months prior, citing the rapid accumulation of highly enriched uranium of “serious concern,” and placing Iran within short reach of a breakout capability. In testimony this month before Congress,

the commander of the U.S. Central Command wrote that Iran possessed enough enriched uranium—well past the enrichment level required for peaceful, civilian purposes—for 10 nuclear weapons and could produce enough weapons-grade material for one bomb within a week. Although Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei probably had not decided to build a nuclear weapon, pressure was likely increasing on him to do so, particularly after the start of Israeli strikes on June 12.

America’s Forgotten War in China: Psychological Warfare Against Imperial Japan’s Chinese Puppet Army

Samuel Hui

A leaflet targeting Chinese collaborationists accused the Japanese forces of failing to provide the puppet army officers and soldiers with sufficient clothing, food, and weapons. It demanded that the Japanese address these issues and questioned, “How can we fight a war under such conditions?” (Source: National Archives and Records Administration)

Abstract: This article explores the little-known U.S. psychological warfare campaign against the Chinese Reorganized National Government under Wang Jingwei during World War II. Drawing on declassified Office of Strategic Services (OSS) documents, U.S. Air Force records, and interviews with former puppet soldiers, this piece examines how American psychological operations targeted Chinese collaborationist forces—not to destroy them, but to win them over at a crucial moment at the dawn of the Cold War.

Most scholars consider the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 or the Korean War (1950–1953) as the opening shots of 20th century military conflict between the United States and China. Yet beyond these two well-known confrontations, there was another overlooked episode: the World War II shadow war between the United States and China’s Reorganized National Government under Wang Jingwei—an Imperial Japanese puppet government comprised of Chinese collaborationists. In the final stages of the war, the U.S. Office of War Information (OWI) and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) executed psychological operations targeting the Wang Jingwei regime in China.

The OWI primarily employed so-called “white propaganda” using platforms such as the Voice of America and air-dropped leaflets to urge both Chinese military personnel and civilians in Japanese-occupied territories not to collaborate with the invading forces. In contrast, the OSS focused on “black propaganda” aimed at driving a wedge between the Wang Jingwei regime and the Japanese military. Such psychological operations involved disseminating false information and fabricating rumors to exploit internal divisions within the enemy camp to encourage the defection of Chinese puppet troops.

Examining the psychological dimensions of the conflict between Wang’s regime and the United States offers valuable insight for today’s U.S.–China rivalry. The physical landscape may have shifted from Imperial Japan to the PRC, but the lessons of OWI and OSS-style “morale operations” remain highly relevant for strategic competition into the future.

War, Bound: Fiscal Constraints, Tactical Realities, and Contemporary Land Warfare

Gil Barndollar

It’s been a rough new millennium for armies. After the end of history ended abruptly on 9/11, US and NATO land forces spent twenty years pursuing counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, spending trillions of dollars to achieve strategic defeat despite the massive tactical overmatch they held against insurgent enemies.

The US Army now grapples with an identity crisis, while European NATO forces are in far worse shape: belatedly rearming, but increasingly unable to man their shrunken formations. The West’s potential adversaries are hardly better off: The failures of Russia’s military reforms have been dramatically exposed since 2022, while China seems to doubt its army’s readiness for war amid relentless purges of the top ranks.

A major land war in Europe, now three years old, has certainly given a shot in the arm to discussions of ground combat—and to European defense budgets. But the grinding, attritional nature of the war in Ukraine, after the failure of Russia’s initial coup de main and Ukraine’s 2023 counterattack, has fueled a legion of technological determinists who argue that drones have revolutionized warfare. (The metastasizing US defense venture capital sector, now armed with political influence commensurate with its growth, may also be a factor in this latest RMA devil’s tattoo).

William F. (Wilf) Owen is having none of it. A British Army veteran, defense consultant, and editor of Military Strategy Magazine, Owen is a longtime analyst and commentator on military affairs, often in the pages of the British Army Review and the RUSI Journal. A naturalized Israeli citizen, he blends deep knowledge of two nearly opposite military cultures. Britain wields the original long-service, professionalized Anglosphere army,

while Israel is the world’s foremost model for a conscript, reservist, nation in arms. In his new book, Euclid’s Army: Preparing Land Forces for Warfare Today, Owen has done something oddly rare in contemporary military writing: assembling an intensely practical primer on modern tactics and training, based around the idea of what an army division should look like and what it needs to fight today.

A Strait of Hormuz blockade would barely hurt the US

Phar Kim Beng and Luthfy Hamzah

The Strait of Hormuz has long stood as a symbol of global energy vulnerability. Stretching barely 39 kilometers at its narrowest point between Iran and Oman, it funnels nearly 20% of the world’s oil supply and over one-third of liquefied natural gas. Any threat of its closure—whether rhetorical or real—inevitably triggers alarms across energy markets.

Yet beneath the headlines and hyperbole lies a strategic paradox: closing the Strait of Hormuz would not deal a decisive economic blow to the United States. In fact, the economic and geopolitical recalibration underway since the US shale revolution suggests that Washington is less exposed than its adversaries and even some of its allies.

Since the early 2010s, the United States has pursued a pathway toward energy self-reliance. The shale boom transformed the US from a net importer into one of the world’s top oil producers. According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), less than 10% of its crude imports now come from the Persian Gulf.

Moreover, the US has fortified itself with a Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) capable of dampening supply shocks during times of geopolitical crisis. Though partially drawn down during the Ukraine and Gaza crises, the SPR remains a vital economic shield.

This structural shift has dramatically reduced America’s vulnerability to turmoil in the Gulf. In contrast to the 1970s oil shocks, when OPEC’s embargo inflicted widespread inflation and recession, today’s US economy is not tethered to the Strait of Hormuz.

Energy independence has become a cornerstone of US strategic confidence, especially under the Trump administration’s renewed emphasis on resource nationalism and transactional diplomacy.

But the implications go deeper. For President Donald Trump and his circle of foreign policy strategists, any regional escalation in the Gulf—whether through Iranian retaliation or Israeli provocation—can be leveraged as a controlled escalation.

What Happened to the US ‘Asia First’ Doctrine?

Adham Sahloul

President Donald Trump made the United States a direct party to the Iran-Israel conflict through a series of strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities on June 21. That decision has forced the Asia policy community on both sides of the Pacific to ask whether the Trump administration is truly committed to an “Asia First” approach to U.S. national security strategy.

The U.S. is deepening its engagement in the over 16-month-long Middle East conflict even as Trump is straining its network of allies and partners over trade and pressuring its Indo-Pacific allies on defense spending. This backsliding on prioritizing the Indo-Pacific theater is compounded by cuts to foreign assistance offices, U.S. information and media programs, and key China staff at the National Security Council.

U.S. policy in the Middle East has impacted Washington’s alliance management in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Japan’s Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru’s decision to skip the NATO Summit can be read as linked to the escalation in Iran. This,

along with reports that Tokyo is rescheduling July 2+2 talks with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth over the Trump administration’s mixed messaging on Japan’s defense spending, suggests that Trump’s call sheet should include leaders well beyond the Middle East and Europe.

What happens in the Middle East has historically yielded global ripple effects, from oil shocks and mass migration to spikes in terrorist attacks. U.S. allies Japan, Australia, and South Korea and burgeoning partner India – to say nothing about China – will be directly impacted by any strain on oil and liquified natural gas (LNG) exports caused by a prolonged conflict.

More broadly, it is well recognized by both sides of the political aisle – albeit ignored by policymakers in successive U.S. administrations – that U.S. overextension in the Middle East comes at the expense of focusing on the Indo-Pacific and China, by siphoning away finite military and political resources.

The Iran-Israel Conflict Drives Home the Importance of Gwadar for China

Israel’s airstrikes on Iranian nuclear and military targets, followed by Iranian missile and drone counterattacks, have roiled the Gulf region. Amid the conflict, global energy flows and maritime security are increasingly in question, with shipping disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most vital oil chokepoint.

With traditional shipping lanes from the Gulf in jeopardy, Gwadar Port in Pakistan is once again in focus. Gwadar has never been just a commercial node, but instead serves as a strategic safety valve in China’s long-term energy calculus.

Approximately one-fifth of global oil trade transits through the Strait of Hormuz, and its closure would ripple through the world economy. Recently, Iranian MPs made exactly this threat amid the Iran-Israel hostilities. Meanwhile, shipping disruptions are already visible. Container vessels are slowing down in the strait, a sign of anxiety among maritime operators.

Markets have responded accordingly. Oil prices rose 7-14 percent in the immediate aftermath of initial strikes, then settled marginally as no actual blockade occurred. As one analyst noted, global supply thus far has remained firm because Tehran often prefers to leverage fear rather than follow through. Yet it is often true that threats drive prices more than actions.

Iran’s capability is real. It has amassed missiles, naval mines, anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems, and drones – all tools that could significantly disrupt Hormuz transit. Nevertheless, closing the Strait of Hormuz would also cause economic damage to Iran itself, jeopardizing its sea-based oil exports and risking the ire of key buyers like China.

Whatever unfolds from here, this unfolding crisis adds urgency to Beijing’s push to develop alternative transit routes like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which centers on the port of Gwadar. Strategically located just outside the high-risk Gulf area but connected to China via pipelines and highways, Gwadar offers a route to bypass the congested Malacca Strait – and potentially even Hormuz, if an overland pipeline connecting Pakistan and Iran ever becomes a reality.

The ‘German Connection’ in Myanmar’s Civil Wars

Thurein Naing

Myanmar’s civil war has been one of the most complex and enduring conflicts in the history of modern warfare. It is a tragic saga defined by ethnic strife, authoritarian rule, civil dissent, and relentless armed resistance against the control of the central state. At the heart of this entanglement lies Heckler & Koch (HK), the renowned German firearms manufacturer, which has quietly shaped the arsenals of both the Myanmar military and its opponents. While celebrated for its technological innovations,

HK’s historical connection to postcolonial Burma/Myanmar reveals a lesser-known narrative of how a company born in the ashes of the Third Reich came to arm both sides of a civil war with no clear end in sight. Initially intended to bolster a nascent post-colonial state, HK arms ultimately fueled a brutal civil war, leaving a continuing and indelible mark on Myanmar’s landscape and people.

In the defense industry, Heckler & Koch, has been renowned for its exceptional engineering in firearms since its inception. Founded in 1949, HK could be seen as being free from the legacies of Nazism. However, Alex Seidel, Edmund Heckler, and Theodor Koch, the three founders of HK, served in the Nazi military-industrial complex and can trace their technical training lineage to Mauser, the German arm manufacturer that armed the Third Reich with, K98K, Gewehr 98 rifles and other assortment of small arms.

HK’s headquarters in Oberndorf am Neckar, in the state of Baden-Württemberg, is the same town where Mauser was once based.

Theodor Koch actually served as the financier/patron (Förderndes Mitglied der SS) in the infamous Schutzstaffel (SS), which was responsible for carrying out the Holocaust and many other crimes against humanity during World War II. Koch, as the financier, did not serve on the frontline but paid a monthly contribution to the SS. Therefore, HK, like many other German industrial giants, has an undeniable linkage to Nazi Germany.

12 Days Of War: Takeaways From The Israel-Iran Conflict – Analysis

RFE RL / Kian Sharifi

(RFE/RL) — After 12 days of unprecedented direct hostilities, Israel and Iran have agreed to a cease-fire that has brought a tense and uneasy calm to the region.

The war, marked by devastating air strikes, missile barrages, and covert operations, has left both countries reeling. While the immediate fighting has stopped, the political, military, and nuclear implications of this brief but intense war are only beginning to unfold.

Both countries have rushed to claim success, with the Israelis insisting they accomplished their goals and the Iranians claiming to have “imposed” the cease-fire on their archfoe.

Yet beneath the official statements, analysts warn that the cease-fire is fragile, the strategic balance has shifted, and the risk of renewed conflict or dangerous escalation remains high.

Israel’s Gains, And A Critical Omission

Israel’s government declared it had “achieved all the objectives of Operation Rising Lion,” citing the reported destruction of key Iranian nuclear and missile sites, the elimination of senior military leaders, and air superiority over Tehran.

“Israel was able to strike key military strategic governmental targets quite effectively,” Farzan Sabet, a managing researcher at the Geneva Graduate Institute, told RFE/RL.

He said the conflict highlighted the extent of the Israeli infiltration of Iran’s security apparatus, adding the country’s intelligence agency Mossad “was able to basically create a legion of defectors who were probably one of the elements in this war that caused the greatest damage.”

Butm despite Israeli and US bombings, Iran’s nuclear program, while damaged, is not completely dismantled — some enrichment capacity and expertise survived, and the risk of a covert Iranian nuclear breakout remains.

The Future of American Cybersecurity

My theme today is to try and answer the question: “What do we expect from the Trump administration with respect to cybersecurity and data privacy in the next four years?” The “A” answer of course is that nobody really knows. Trump is exceedingly unpredictable—the more so with respect to issue areas where he really has no preconceived and settled notion. Unlike, say, tariffs, it seems likely that Trump has given little thought to cybersecurity or data privacy—and thus his reactions are likely to be off the cuff. But that would be a short analysis, and you deserve more. So let’s dive in.

My deeper analysis starts by providing a broad context for U.S.-EU cybersecurity and data privacy engagement today. I then turn to specific predictions about Trump’s expected actions in the areas of cybersecurity and data privacy. I conclude with some thoughts on how these actions will impact the EU and how the EU member states ought to consider responding.

Context

Geopolitics

Our consideration of Trump’s policies arises in the context of a particularly dangerous time in the world. Existing conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza are matched by potential conflicts over Taiwan and Kashmir. It is reasonably safe to say that the potential for state-on-state violence is at the highest level it has been since 9/11 and its aftermath or, possibly, since the Berlin Wall fell.

At the same time, the United States is systematically diminishing its ability to collect and analyze information on a global scale. Funding and staffing cuts at the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Department of State all portend less data on which to base decisions—as does a seeming rise in the reluctance of our traditional allies to share information with the U.S.

This is fundamentally scary—a more dangerous world about which we know less is a formula for disaster.

Beyond Bans: Expanding the Policy Options for Tech-Security Threats

In early April, President Trump granted TikTok another 75-day reprieve from its threatened ban in the United States. It is but the latest twist in a five-year, administration-spanning saga, in which the U.S. government has repeatedly threatened to ban the Chinese-owned app from the U.S. market if it is not sold to non-Chinese buyers—but has never followed through on such ultimatums.

While the TikTok case has some unique challenges, it is part of a broader trend of using bans to address national security risks associated with Chinese technology in the United States. After Chinese company DeepSeek released an innovative new AI model, members of Congress were quick to initiate a conversation about whether to ban DeepSeek in the United States.

The government has already announced measures to ban certain connected vehicles from China and is working on similar restrictions for Chinese drones; reports suggest certain Chinese routers could also be banned. Beyond China, the last administration also banned the Russian antivirus provider Kaspersky—another example of how the government is using national security authorities in the tech supply chain.

There are plenty of real national security issues posed by technology from China and other foreign adversary countries across various elements of U.S. industries and tech supply chains. Such risks range from espionage, to “prepositioning” of malware (quietly putting malicious code in place that can be activated later), to increased leverage over U.S. supply chains,

including for the defense industrial base. To better address this policy problem, however, the United States urgently needs to build policy toolkits—and policy muscles—beyond bans. Policy discourse about how to mitigate national security risks from a specific technology, such as a Chinese AI model or mobile app, all too often results in reductive conversations about whether or not to ban such technology. But this dichotomy leaves policymakers with an unappealing choice: Either ban any technology that poses a risk, or—if unwilling to follow through with an action as dramatic and costly as a ban—do nothing, and leave the American public exposed to potential national security risks as a result.

War and Tariffs Are a Double Shock to the World Economy

The twin shocks of the Israeli-US attack on Iran and Donald Trump’s tariff war come as global GDP growth continues to slow precipitously. Given that it doesn’t take much to tip an economy nearing its “stall speed” into outright recession,

these crises and their combined effects are setting the stage for a worldwide downturn.

NEW HAVEN – The outbreak of a new war in the Middle East, together with a destructive tariff war,

makes for a lethal combination in a sluggish world economy. Notwithstanding the possibility of a tentative ceasefire, the odds of imminent global recession have increased sharply.

Iran and the Fracturing West

LONDON – Over the centuries, “the West” has come to represent much more than a geographic region. It now embodies the enduring legacy of ancient Greece and the Roman Empire, the cultural achievements of the European Renaissance, the evolution of political philosophy, and the spirit of exploration and discovery.

Since the end of World War II, however, the term has taken a more explicitly geopolitical and security-oriented meaning. From the mid-1940s until the fall of the Berlin Wall, Europe and its allies often defined themselves not only by their shared ideals but also by their opposition to the Soviet Union.

US President Donald Trump, in one of his many inane remarks about history and global affairs, claimed that the European Union was established to “screw” the United States. In fact, the opposite is true.

After 1945, Europeans were eager for America to remain actively involved rather than turn inward, as it had after World War I. Left to their own devices, European countries risked drifting into yet another conflict, potentially forcing the US to intervene again to restore peace. To prevent that, European leaders urged the US to maintain its presence on the continent as a bulwark against the growing threat of Soviet communism.

In response, the US encouraged Europe to pursue greater economic and political integration, leading to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community and, eventually, the European Common Market. Both were seen by the US as essential to ensuring long-term peace and prosperity among its transatlantic allies and preventing the continent from impoverishing itself through trade wars and protectionist policies.

The Utility of Military Deception and Information Operations in Modern Warfare

John Wirges

Sun Tzu believed in the importance of the information environment and recognized that the quickest way to achieve military victory was to attack only when the adversary was confused, disoriented, and weakened. While the revolution in military affairs offered promises of a transparent battlefield,

modern conflicts such as the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and the ongoing Russo-Ukraine War prove that Sun Tzu’s work remains as relevant today as it was in ancient China. Advances in technology over the last twenty years have led to unforeseen changes in the modern battlespace. Urbanization trends and social media have changed the relationship between combatants and non-combatants. Modern electronic warfare, long-range missiles, and unmanned systems have been integrated into cohesive sensor-to-shooter systems known as kill webs. While practitioners have seen kill webs and drones leveraged in Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine,

these modern conflicts also indicate an increased importance for information warfare. Modern technologies have made skills such as military deception, public affairs, civil-military engagement, and cyber activities necessary to outpace enemy decision-making cycles, protect friendly forces, and achieve political goals of conflict within a civil component.

Understanding the Information Environment

The information environment (IE) is a key component of the military’s operational environment (OE). An OE is best described as the aggregate of all conditions bearing on a military commander. The IE comprises all aspects of human attitudes, behaviors, and perceptions, and is a critical component of conflict. Successful operations in the information environment can neutralize an enemy’s will and capabilities to fight,

provide offramps for conflict resolution, deceive enemy decision-makers to create surprise, and deny an enemy freedom of maneuver in cyberspace and across the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS)—the spectrum of radio activity encompassing radio, x-ray, and gamma wavelengths. The Russo-Ukrainian War and Second Nagorno-Karabakh War have provided key insights into how modern technologies and human behaviors have changed the IE’s relationship with war.

These are the top 10 emerging technologies of 2025, according to the World Economic Forum

CHRIS MORRIS

Predicting which innovations will shape the future is always a challenge. On Tuesday, the World Economic Forum (WEF) released its list of the top 10 emerging technologies of 2025, highlighting those expected to influence global challenges within the next three to five years.

The list, compiled with the help of Frontiers Media, a publisher of peer-reviewed scientific journals, avoids naming specific companies. Instead, the WEF focuses on concepts that are both novel and nearing maturity, with the potential to deliver meaningful benefits to society.

Here’s what the WEF sees as being on the path to a breakthrough in 2025.

ADVANCED NUCLEAR TECH

Demand for nuclear energy is on the rise, with the Trump administration pledging to fast-track permits for nuclear projects. The WEF predicts that smaller nuclear designs and alternative cooling systems will offer safer, cleaner energy at a lower cost. These reactors, it says, “could play a key role in building reliable, zero-carbon power systems.”

STRUCTURAL BATTERY COMPOSITES

The weight of batteries has been a pain point for things like cars and planes, impacting their efficiency. New materials that store energy and support weight can make these vehicles lighter, improving both their performance and their environmental impact.

COLLABORATIVE SENSING

Speaking of vehicles, networking connected sensors can let vehicles share information in real time with each other, as well as with cities and emergency services. In the case of an incident, this can reduce traffic, increase response times, and improve safety, the WEF says.

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