29 May 2025

Operation Sindoor: How jointness was the game-changer

Lt Gen. Vipul Shinghal

(NOTE: This article was originally published in the India Today issue dated June 2, 2025)

Operation Sindoor, India's calibrated response to the Pakistan-sponsored terror attack in Pahalgam, was characterised by precise and devastating strikes on Pakistani terror hubs and later on military infrastructure. One of the reasons for its successful execution was the very high level of jointness and integration within the three services, which was the result of a concerted effort led by the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and the HQ Integrated Defence Staff over the past few years. About 200 tasks and initiatives were identified for fostering jointness. These were distributed over eight clear domains—intelligence, logistics, training, capability development, communications, human resource, maintenance and administration—to be implemented in a time-bound road map.

Two parallel tracks have been at work. In one track, measures towards jointness have primarily been conceptual in nature, affecting changes in the cognitive domain, building understanding and confidence among the services. This has been made possible by picking the best practices of each service and fostering a unique joint culture aided by common planning and training, tri-service courses and cross-postings. In the second track, measures towards integration have been implemented by creating structures, networks, computer applications and protocols to enable synergy in application of combat power, communications, intelligence, logistics and administration. Formulation of the Combined Operational Planning Process, joint doctrines, integrated intelligence and communication network and establishment of joint logistics nodes have all contributed to operational efficiency and have been validated during tri-service exercises and war games.

Operation Sindoor: How jointness was the game-changer

Joint training has been the bedrock of this transformation, from cadets at the national level to the Defence Services Staff College at the mid-service level. For colonels and equivalents at the respective service war colleges, joint content, cross-attendance, and joint faculty have been enhanced, resulting in a deeper understanding of integrated war fighting, further cemented as one-star participants at the National Defence College. These measures have been augmented by the establishment of new joint service training institutions in areas like intelligence, cyber and unmanned aerial systems.

India Redefines Its National Security Vis-à-Vis Pakistan

Dr. Lauren Dagan Amos

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: In May 2025, following a deadly terrorist attack on Pahalgam in Kashmir, India suspended the Indus Waters Treaty with Pakistan, conducted strikes deep within Pakistani territory, and declared that any future terrorist attack would henceforth be considered an act of war. These measures reflect a doctrinal shift from a policy of deterrence to one of “compellence”, or coercion. India has also unveiled unprecedented upgrades to its military capabilities that are part of a comprehensive organizational reform. India is positioning itself as a global military and technological power that is operating under a sovereign and independent strategy. This shift in India’s doctrinal approach reflects a continuation of its response to Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023. According to Indian nationalists, Israel’s response to Hamas’s massive assault served as inspiration for an uncompromising policy towards Islamic terrorism.

Between immediate escalation and limited resolution

The events that began on April 22 with the deadly terrorist attack on Pahalgam in Kashmir—an assault that resulted in the deaths of 26 tourists, most of whom were Indian citizens—escalated within days into a severe regional crisis. India pointed the finger at The Resistance Front (TRF), perceived as an arm of Lashkar-e-Taiba operating under the auspices of Pakistani intelligence. Public shock and domestic nationalist pressure compelled the Modi government to respond swiftly and decisively.

Within hours, India had suspended the historic Indus Waters Treaty with Pakistan, closed the main border crossing at Attari, revoked visas for Pakistani nationals, and reduced Pakistan’s diplomatic presence in India. Subsequent airstrikes and armed drone attacks targeted military installations and command centers in Pakistan, including some deep within Punjab province. Pakistan responded with artillery fire and the deployment of unmanned systems toward Indian targets.

Against this backdrop, the ceasefire that was achieved is notable for its restraint. According to both India and Pakistan, the initiative came from the Pakistani side, but the intention was mutual—to halt the escalation without committing to a political process. No date was set for talks, and regional issues such as Kashmir or cross-border terrorism were not mentioned.

Indian IT giant investigates link to M&S cyber-attack

Graham Fraser

An Indian IT company is conducting an internal investigation to determine whether it was the gateway for the cyber-attack on Marks & Spencer, BBC News understands.

Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) has provided services to M&S for more than a decade.

Earlier this week, M&S said the hackers who had brought huge disruption to the retailer had managed to gain access to their systems via a "third party" - a company working alongside it - rather than accessing those systems directly.

M&S and TCS have both declined to comment.

The FT, which first reported the story, cited people close to the investigation who said it was hoped the inquiry would be concluded by the end of the month.

It is not clear when TCS launched its investigation.

Customers have not been able to buy items on the M&S website since the end of April.

It said earlier this week that online services should see a gradual return to normal over the coming weeks, but some level of disruption would continue until July.

M&S estimates that the cyber-attack will hit this year's profits by around £300m.

Police are focusing on a notorious group of English-speaking hackers, known as Scattered Spider, the BBC has learned.

The same group is believed to have been behind attacks on the Co-op and Harrods, but it was M&S that suffered the biggest impact.

TCS says it has over 607,000 employees across the world and is the lead sponsor of three prestigious marathons - New York, London and Sydney.

India Spurns Carbon Tax Threat, Promotes Trade and Fossil Fuels

Vijay Jayaraj, Naveed Ahmed

Like many developing economies, India faces coercion from the United Nations and Europe to conform to climate policies, especially through the imposition of carbon taxes on imports into their countries. But Delhi is not about to bend to such tactics.

“If they [EU and U.K.] put in a carbon tax, we'll retaliate,” said India’s Union Minister Piyush Goya at the Columbia India Energy Dialogue in New York City. “I think it will be very silly, particularly to put a tax on friendly countries like India.”

That isn’t a bluff. It’s a moral, strategic, and scientific imperative grounded in realpolitik and economic logic.

India and the U.K. have inked a trade deal that promises to boost bilateral trade by more than $33 billion and increase U.K. gross domestic product and wages by many billions.

On paper, this deal is a triumph for both nations, removing duties on 99% of Indian goods entering the U.K. For India, this means greater market access for textiles, agriculture and manufactured goods – sectors that employ millions and drive economic growth.

Yet, the U.K.’s pending Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) remains in place with no exemptions for Indian steel, cement and aluminum, despite the trade agreement.

Starting January 2027, the U.K. is to impose a levy on these “carbon-intensive” imports, supposedly to compensate for the difference between the U.K.’s domestic carbon tax and India’s lower assessment at home. The tax on imports is to prevent “carbon leakage” — the idea that emissions are “outsourced” to countries with fewer regulations.

This hocus-pocus is nothing more than repugnant virtue signaling that penalizes manufacturers in developing countries for using the very fossil fuels that powered the West’s rise in the 19th and 20th centuries.

India’s export of these products to the EU and U.K. are a critical part of its economic engine. In 2022 alone, 27% of India’s iron, steel and aluminum exports went to the EU.

China Is Trapped in the South China Sea ‘Gray Zone’

Denny Roy

One of many vivid Chinese aphorisms is “chóng dǎo fù zhé,” which describes a cart following in the same tracks as an overturned cart further up the road. It’s a metaphor for repeating the same mistake despite fair warning. The PRC’s recent South China Sea policy fits this scenario.

The use of increasingly harsh “gray zone” tactics—so harsh they border on what are traditionally recognized as acts of war—is producing diminishing returns for China. The Chinese government should draw the conclusion that its interests are best served by seeking an amicable settlement with the other claimants. Unfortunately, however, that almost certainly won’t happen.

China’s ability to deploy navy, coast guard and maritime militia vessels into the South China Sea is unmatched by any other Southeast Asian country, and the gap is growing. China is the world leader in gray zone tactics, both in innovation and operational experience. Despite those advantages, however, China’s intimidation tactics during the last year were largely ineffective.

Although reticent to confront China publicly, Malaysia is continuing its hydrocarbon exploration in its own EEZ despite protests and harassment by China. Indonesia claimed to drive out Chinese Coast Guard vessels attempting to interfere with drilling operations in Indonesian waters. Beijing especially dislikes neighbors welcoming the US military into the region, but Malaysia and Indonesia continue to participate in joint exercises with the US armed forces.

Some Vietnamese fishermen continued to suffer ramming, beatings and confiscation of their fish catch by Chinese maritime law enforcement personnel. Nevertheless, although cautious about alarming China, Vietnam held a humanitarian training activity with American military personnel. Another aspect of Vietnam’s pushback is its extensive and dramatic land reclamation. In 2021, Vietnam had only one-tenth the amount of China’s reclaimed land in the Spratly Islands. By 2024, however, Vietnam had reclaimed two-thirds as much land as China had, and in 2025 Vietnam will probably equal China’s acreage. While China occupies the three largest features in the Spratlys (Mischief, Subi and Fiery Cross Reefs), Vietnam occupies the next four largest.

China’s Economy Is Weaker Than You Think

Wessie du Toit

“If you want to strike China on the cheek, China will strike you back.” So declared Victor Gao, a lawyer and vocal supporter of China’s ruling Communist Party, in a recent debate with former U.S. State Department official Elliott Abrams. The two were sparring on a Saudi news network, but Gao’s remarks were quoted approvingly in the China Daily, a paper owned by the CCP’s propaganda department. His toe-to-toe, blow-for-blow defiance was typical of the tone that China’s leadership adopted at the outset of their latest trade war with America. As Donald Trump ramped up tariffs on Chinese goods, ultimately reaching 145%, China implemented its own 125% tariffs and insisted that it was not interested in negotiation unless Trump retreated from his policy first.

That pride and bellicosity are consistent with how the world views China at the moment—a tightly-run ship moving into a Chinese Century and in position to be the prime beneficiary as the United States self-destructs. But a closer look shows that the picture is much more complicated. China has gotten very good at hiding high debt rates and low income levels in the economic face it presents to the world. Government interference in the economy has resulted in prodigious waste and overinvestment in unproductive sectors. China’s dizzying growth is real, but the underlying strength of the economy will be seriously tested in the trade war.

The Trade War

Going into this uncertain period, China does seem to have a few trump cards in its hand. Put simply, Chinese imports are more difficult for the United States to replace than vice-versa. Among the goods supplied by China—which has a $300 billion trade surplus with the United States—are valuable shipments of smartphones and computers, industrial machinery, and rare-earth minerals (used in various high-tech products such as EV batteries and advanced weaponry). American exports to China also comprise some sophisticated goods like aircraft parts and chemicals, but are weighted towards fossil fuels and agricultural products (soybeans were the biggest single export in 2024). What is more, around 40% of U.S. imports from China are components used by America’s own manufacturing sector. So Trump’s tariffs will hurt not just American consumers, but American factories and farms, the same parts of the economy that he is supposedly trying to support.

White Paper Offers Chinese Wisdom at the Crossroads of History

Arran Hope

A new white paper titled “China’s National Security in the New Era” is targeted to both domestic and international audiences and offers “Chinese wisdom” and solutions to contemporary challenges.

In a bid for global leadership, the document frames “unstoppable” world historical trends as aligning with its mission of national rejuvenation and rebukes the United States for being a destabilizing international actor.

Claiming the world is at an “historical crossroads,” the document is a call for countries to fall in line behind its vision of ensuring peace, development, stability, and order in the international system.

For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the world is in constant, complex motion; in flux. There are “trends” (动态) and “flows” (流动). History has “tides” (历史潮流) and thought has “currents” (思潮). A scientific analysis of the world tells us that any movement in time and space has two qualities: magnitude and direction. Time moves relentlessly in one direction. Nothing else does. In some cases, the direction of travel is upward (升); in others, it is in reverse (逆). There is, however, an overall direction (大方向). The Party, in a white paper on “China’s National Security in the New Era” (新时代的中国国家安全), now tells us with confidence that that direction aligns with its vision: “The historic tide … is unstoppable; the overall direction of human development and progress, and the overall logic of world history, have not changed” (历史潮流不可阻挡,人类发展进步的大方向、世界历史曲折前进的大逻辑没有变) (State Council Information Office, May 12).

Ingrained in the Party’s ideological frame is a fear of the human vulnerabilities that exposure to unwelcome movement—turmoil (变乱) and turbulence (动荡)—brings. Its response to this fear is an overwhelming preoccupation with immovability—or, in other words, stability (稳) and order (序). (‘稳’ appears more than 70 times in the text, which runs to over 20,000 characters, and ‘序’ nearly 20.) Stability is achieved through shaping one’s environment. [1] Stability over the long term relies on controlling one’s environment to the greatest extent possible. For a nation-state operating in an interconnected world where conflict threatens the social fabric (变乱交织的世界) and in which “the spatial and temporal domains are wider than at any time in history, and the internal and external factors are more complex than at any time in history” (时空领域比历史上任何时候都要宽广,内外因素比历史上任何时候都要复杂), stability is achieved by ensuring national security. 

China to build world’s largest hydroelectric project in Tibet, prompting fears of ‘water bombs’ and environmental destruction

Fred Pearce 

The Yarlung Tsangpo Grand Canyon is the deepest canyon in the world. Chinese ecologists say the canyon is one of the most precious biodiversity hotspots on the planet, containing some of Asia’s tallest and most ancient trees as well as the world’s richest assemblage of large carnivores, especially big cats.(Photo: NASA)

China has announced plans to build the world’s largest hydroelectric project at a remote river gorge in eastern Tibet, an ecological treasure trove close to a disputed border with India. Indian politicians have reacted angrily, saying it gives China the ability to release destructive “water bombs” across the border in any future conflict. They are planning a retaliatory dam on their side of the border that experts say could be at least as environmentally destructive.

Two Chinese dams will barricade the Yarlung Tsangpo, the Tibetan name for the Brahmaputra River, as it is about to flow through the world’s longest and deepest river canyon — think the Grand Canyon on the Colorado River, only three times as deep. Projected to cost $137 billion, the scheme will be the world’s biggest single infrastructure project, with almost three times the generating capacity of the world’s current largest hydroelectric dam, China’s Three Gorges on the Yangtze River.

Chinese ecologists say the canyon is one of the most precious biodiversity hotspots on the planet, containing some of Asia’s tallest and most ancient trees as well as the world’s richest assemblage of large carnivores, especially big cats. But India’s anger is geopolitical. Pema Khandu, the chief minister of Arunachal Pradesh, the Indian state immediately downstream, called the project “a big threat” that could dry up the river through his state during routine operation and potentially be weaponized to unleash a flood in which, he said, hundreds of thousands could lose their lives.

What If Our Assumptions About a War with China Are Wrong?

Tyler Hacker 

From the rout of Union forces at Bull Run to two decades of counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, history tells us that our assumptions about future war are often incorrect. Looking to today, consider this view of a potential US-China conflict:

Any confrontation between the United States and China would be short and intense, decisively determining the war’s outcome in a matter of days or weeks.

How often has this assumption informed past discussions in the Pentagon and Washington’s think tanks? Three years of attritional war in Ukraine and stubbornly persistent security challenges in the Red Sea call this sentiment into question, causing defense commentators to reexamine the possibility that despite both nations being nuclear armed, a US-China war may not end in days or weeks, but could protract for months or even years. This raises the question: How many other assumptions about great power war are due for reexamination?

At the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, we have conducted dozens of exercises on the strategic choices facing political and military leaders regarding the revitalization of the US military for great power war. These exercises often highlight how fighting a prolonged war calls for a different approach than shorter campaigns, such as choosing to expand defense production over relying on existing stockpiles. Regardless of the participant, some form of industrial mobilization is frequently considered the key for unlocking greater production in long wars.

Admittedly, no one can know the exact character of a future war between the United States and China, but recent CSBA research on US mobilization planning during the interwar period gives reason to question some oft repeated assumptions. Comparing current planning assumptions to those of the interwar period reveals several instances where our expectations may fall short of the realities of war, protraction, and mobilization. Today’s security environment, economic circumstances, and military forces may be a world apart from those of the 1930s, but planning to wage war in the American system is fundamentally the same in many ways. For this reason, the US experience in World War II should inform our thinking regarding a future US-China conflict. Five frequently recurring and often implicit assumptions about protracted war stand out, and the American historical experience suggests they may be due for reconsideration.

Encircling the West: The PRC Gains Ground in Legacy Chips

Sunny Cheung

Beijing is on course to dominate innovation in and production of legacy semiconductor chips, which strategists see as a way to push back against U.S.-led containment in critical technologies. These chips, used everywhere from vehicles to defense, offer a scalable and resilient path for latecomers to build industrial leverage without needing frontier innovation.

The Chinese domestic industry relies on vast state subsidies and fosters internal competition that leads to brutal price wars between firms. This ultimately allows manufacturers to undercut overseas competitors and drive them out of business, thereby capturing the global market share and reshaping supply chain dependencies.

This strategy prioritizes market dominance over profitability, part of a broader shift from growth-centric to security-driven industrial planning.

Chinese experts hold up Japan’s past missteps as a key lesson, and advocate remaining aligned with market demand to avoid stagnating.

In February 2025, Peking University scholar He Pengyu (何鹏宇) published an article titled “Why China Must Establish a Competitive Advantage in Traditional Chips” (中国为什么要在传统芯片上形成竞争优势) (Tencent News/Wenhua Zongheng, February 24). He argues that legacy chips should be viewed as strategic assets: technologically adaptable, economically essential, and geopolitically consequential. While not a prominent figure in the semiconductor policy community, He is among the first to make a comprehensive and analytically rigorous attempt to explain the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) sustained and largely understated focus on foundational chip technologies. His essay fills a critical gap in a policy landscape where official strategies are rarely transparent, effectively articulating the underlying logic of Beijing’s long-term industrial maneuvering for leadership in mature-node technologies.

How China Captured Apple

Bob Davis

A man wearing a VR headset smiles and poses as he records himself under a large Apple logo on a store behind him.A man wearing an Apple Vision Pro headset records footage as people wait to enter an Apple Store in Beijing on June 28, 2024. Jade Gao/AFP via Getty Images

In the early 1990s, Apple was determined to show it could continue to build computers in the United States as part of its strategy of keeping tight control over every aspect of design and production. Macintosh computers rolled off the line at one Apple factory “like a Holiday Inn toaster turns out toasted bagels,” according to a biography of Steve Jobs.

But facing bankruptcy in 1996, the company sold its Mac factory in Colorado to a U.S. contract manufacturer and started down a long road of outsourcing manufacturing, first in the United States and later in Asia. It now builds most everything it sells in China. Outsourcing has been incredibly lucrative for Apple, helping to make it one of the three most valuable companies in the world, as measured by market capitalization. But it also has made Apple frighteningly dependent on the shifting whims of Chinese politics and the priorities of Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

China has an off-switch for America, and we aren’t ready to deal with it.

Jase Wilson

Imagine waking up tomorrow and your phone has no signal. Your smart home isn’t working. Your Ring camera is offline. You get in your car, but your GPS won’t route. Worse, every traffic light in town is out. Intersections are a mess of blaring horns and confusion. Sirens echo in the distance. You drive to an ATM, hoping to grab some cash. The screen flickers, then goes black. It’s not just your neighborhood. It’s not just your state. The entire nation has gone dark.

This scenario is digital darkness, caused by China’s “off-switch” for America. It is the penultimate step in China’s strategy to defeat America before gunning for global control.

So-called “assassin’s maces” play a central role in China’s plan to become the world’s sole superpower by 2049. Of the many known assassin’s maces, four demand immediate attention:

House Select Committee Warns: "The Window to Deter War with China is Closing Fast"


WASHINGTON, D.C. – In a high-stakes hearing last week, the House Select Committee on China delivered an urgent message: the clock is ticking to stop a war in the Indo-Pacific—and this Congress may be America’s last full chance to do it.

Hearing Recap and Summary:

Chairman John Moolenaar didn’t mince words, saying, “2027 is not an American date but a Chinese one,” referencing Xi Jinping’s order for the PLA to be ready to take Taiwan by force. "Deterrence delayed is deterrence denied."

Regarding the threat of war in the Indo-Pacific, Chairman Moolenaar continued with, “We are not seeking war. We are trying to prevent one. And prevention only works if Xi believes that the cost of aggression is too high to bear.”

Retired General Charles Flynn, former head of U.S. Army Pacific, said the threat of invasion is no longer distant or theoretical. “You can't invade Taiwan unless you can generate an invasion force—and that is what we must prevent.”

Flynn warned that the U.S. has overinvested in sea and air power while neglecting land-based forces that can actually deny the PLA its objective, “the PLA does not fear our ships and aircraft... What it fears is a credible force that can counter its Army... before it ever reaches Taiwan.”

Rear Admiral (Ret.) Mark Montgomery added that China is preparing to strike not just with missiles—but with malware and economic coercion, “America’s ability to deter China is withering. And, thus, the risk of a conflict is growing.Taiwan is too small to handle the Chinese challenge alone. The stories of egregious foreign military sales delays are not anecdotal. They are persistent.”

Former Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell praised the Committee’s bipartisan leadership and said allies around the world are watching how America responds, "the real challenge that we face—if we have a faltering of our will... that is what China wants. We must keep our capabilities shifting more of our capacity to the Indo-Pacific, recognizing that this is where the ultimate challenge to American power is in the 21st century.”

Air Power in the Second Nuclear Age

James Holmes

Results from today’s battlegrounds strongly suggest that drones, AI, and other novel technologies favor the defender, with nuclear weaponry supplying a backstop in some cases.

The lords of warfare have arranged a series of field trials for Admiral JC Wylie’s ideas about “sequential” and “cumulative” operations. Circumstances differ markedly from test case to test case. Russia and Ukraine have been at war for more than three years, both on land and in the Black Sea. The prolonged Russia-Ukraine war pits the world’s largest nuclear power against an adjacent nonnuclear opponent. The US Navy has been bombarding Yemen’s Houthi militants from the Red Sea in hopes of stemming missile and drone attacks on mercantile shipping. An oceangoing, nuclear-armed hegemon has striven to achieve decisive results against a substate antagonist without resorting to ground combat. A tenuous ceasefire is holding for the moment. And, most recently, India and Pakistan, two nuclear-weapon states that abut each other by land and sea, fought a brief but intense air, missile, and drone battle across their common frontier following last month’s terrorist attack against Indian tourists in the disputed Kashmir region. The combatants fashioned a ceasefire after a few days of fighting.
“Sequential” and “Cumulative” Military Operations

Air power, including its precision-guided missile contingent, played a key part in each conflict. Readers of these pixels know that Admiral Wylie postulated that military operations take two basic forms. “Sequential” operations take place in series, proceeding from tactical action A, to tactical action B, to tactical action C, and so forth, until a fighting force reaches its objective. A sequential endeavor is readily intelligible from a visual standpoint. Observers can plot it on a map or nautical chart using a vector or continuous curve leading to the objective. If any battle or engagement were to turn out differently, the operation as a whole would turn out differently, taking on a new pattern as the sequence shifted. Wylie regarded sequential operations—Sherman’s march through Georgia to the sea, to name one among countless examples—as the mode of warfare that promised decisive results.

Israeli Military Aims to Take Over 75% of Gaza in Two Months

Ian Fisher

The Israeli military conduct operations along the northern Gaza Strip border on May 20.© Photographer: Mostafa Alkharouf/Anadolu/Getty Images

(Bloomberg) -- Israel aims to take control of 75% of the Gaza Strip and move its 2 million inhabitants into three designated areas as part of a new military offensive in the coastal strip.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said the 10-day-old operation, codenamed Gideon’s Chariots, is intended to defeat Hamas and recover hostages held by the Iran-backed group. All of Gaza will eventually be taken over by Israeli forces, Netanyahu has said, without detailing any plans for the day after.

The entire population of the Gaza Strip, just 226 kilometers (141 square miles) in total, would be directed to three areas comprising 25% of the territory — the southern Mawasi area in the south, central Gaza and Gaza City in the north — according to reports on Israeli media.

The Israeli military did not immediately confirm these reports. It said troops and tanks currently control around 40% of Gaza.

US President Donald Trump said he wants the war in Gaza to end as quickly as possible, even as Israel continues to expand its operations.

“Israel, we’ve been talking to them, and we want to see if we can stop that whole situation as quickly as possible,” Trump told reporter on Sunday.

Alongside military plans, Israel is implementing a US-backed aid-distribution system to provide food initially to around half of Palestinian civilians in the enclave. The country is facing international criticism for an aid blockade in place since early March.

Israel had blocked all aid after a truce with Hamas expired, leading to warnings of starvation. Efforts by Qatar, Egypt and the US to mediate a new ceasefire and hostage release have proved fruitless.

Russian nuclear weapons, 2025

Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, Mackenzie Knight 


Russia is in the late stages of a multi-decade-long modernization program to replace all of its Soviet-era nuclear-capable systems with newer versions. However, this program is facing significant challenges that will further delay the entry into force of these newer systems. In this issue of the Nuclear Notebook, we estimate that Russia now possesses approximately 4,309 nuclear warheads for its strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces. Although the number of Russian strategic launchers is not expected to change significantly in the foreseeable future, the number of warheads assigned to them might increase. The significant increase in non-strategic nuclear weapons that the Pentagon predicted five years ago has so far not materialized. A nuclear weapons storage site in Belarus appears to be nearing completion. The Nuclear Notebook is researched and written by the staff of the Federation of American Scientists’ Nuclear Information Project: director Hans M. Kristensen, associate director Matt Korda, and senior research associates Eliana Johns and Mackenzie Knight.

This article is freely available in PDF format in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists’ digital magazine (published by Taylor & Francis) at this link. To cite this article, please use the following citation, adapted to the appropriate citation style: Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, and Mackenzie Knight, Russian Nuclear Weapons, 2025, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 81:3, 208-237, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2025.2494386

Russia is nearing the completion of a decades-long effort to replace all of its strategic and non-strategic nuclear-capable systems with newer versions. But despite Moscow’s continued rhetorical emphasis on its nuclear forces, commercial satellite imagery and other open sources indicate that elements of Russia’s nuclear modernization are proceeding much more slowly than planned: Upgrades to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and bombers face significant delays, and the “significant” increase of Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons that US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) predicted five years ago has yet to materialize (Richard 2020, 5).

The 15-minute interview: Joe Cirincione on Golden Dome and the long-running US missile defense debacle

John Mecklin

After President Trump announced the start of a so-called Golden Dome missile defense project early this week, major press coverage was largely matter-of-fact and relatively unperturbed. Some news reports included quotes from experts who questioned the administration’s estimates of the cost and time required to complete the enormously complex and ambitious project. But the administration’s basic assertions—that all of the United States could be protected against missile attack through a system of space-based sensing and attack satellites that could be completed before the end of Trump’s term in office at a cost of “only” $175 billion—were generally accorded a remarkable degree of deference, given the long history of extraordinarily expensive US missile defense failures.Joe Cirincione

To provide some historical depth and educated skepticism to the Golden Dome debate, I talked this week with Joe Cirincione, a longtime national security and nuclear policy analyst who has followed US missile defense efforts for decades. The need for serious and fundamental questioning of the Golden Dome project became clearer and clearer, the longer we talked.

John Mecklin: Have you seen any details of this Golden Dome proposal beyond what was in the executive order back in January?

Joe Cirincione: No, I haven’t seen any architecture that they claim to have selected. I haven’t seen any details on who’s getting the initial contracts. I watched the Oval Office event, but they’ve released surprisingly little information. I haven’t seen anything at the Defense Department website, either, and I was looking for it.

Mecklin: And that’s going to probably be a continuing problem, right? I mean, they’re going to claim all of this is classified, aren’t they?

Cirincione: Well, normally there’s a general presentation that’ll be done, a general architecture or general plan. I mean, that’s how it’s been done in the past anyway. So I would expect we’d have some cartoons that would be released, some PowerPoint slides. But there’s no indication of when that would be.

West Point Trades Real Reform For Illusory Paper Compliance

Will Thibeau

In a recent New York Times op-ed, soon-to-be former West Point professor Graham Parsons blames the Trump administration for West Point’s failure to maintain their status as an apolitical, elite institution of the military profession. The claim is not just disingenuous — it is a deflection.

The op-ed accuses West Point of failing to resist the president’s agenda to rid the military of ideological perversion, as if insubordination is a virtue. This framing exposes the heart of the problem: West Point’s leadership opposes the president’s vision, either out of ideology or incompetence.

It is first important to understand some of the changes President Trump and Secretary Hegseth made to West Point. First, admissions officers are no longer allowed to maintain racial profiles or goals for admissions classes. Long a policy since the 1960s, West Point sought to categorize applicants and cadets based on the color of their skin. Under the Trump administration, that is no longer possible.

Furthermore, West Point is no longer able to be a venue for anti-American ideology like Diversity Equity and Inclusion (DEI) and Critical Race Theory (CRT). In Graham Parsons’ telling, West Point now suffers from a supposed infringement on its academic freedom. As a tenured professor, he opines as much without any consideration for the distinct nature of West Point as an institution, one not bound by the typical dictates of civilian educational institutions. It would seem that West Point as an institution has failed to strike this balance in implementing President Trump’s executive orders, too.

There are only two explanations for West Point’s failure. The first is ideological subversion — malicious compliance designed to subvert the president’s orders. Consider Lieutenant General Steven Gilland, the superintendent of West Point, testified before the House Armed Services Committee in July 2023. He called DEI initiatives “operational imperatives” and insisted that racial quotas create “a stronger and more adaptable force.” These are not the words of someone reluctantly complying with DEI; they are the words of an advocate.

Trump Takes Credit for ‘Most Powerful Army World Has Known’ During West Point Speech: ‘I Rebuilt the Military’

Rebecca Schneid

President Donald Trump returned to the United States Military Academy at West Point on Saturday to give the commencement speech to the graduating class of 2025. Adorned in his trademark “Make America Great Again” hat, Trump spoke to the 1,002-strong class for just under an hour.

During his address, he lauded the United States Army as the “greatest and most powerful Army the world has ever known.” Beyond this, he stated that he is the one responsible for the Army’s might.

“And I know because I rebuilt that army, and I rebuilt the military,” Trump told the crowd. “We rebuilt it like nobody has ever rebuilt it before in my first term.”

Trump went on to push his American-first ethos, saying: “We’re getting rid of the distractions and we’re focusing our military on its core mission: crushing America’s adversaries, killing America’s enemies, and defending our great American flag like it has never been defended before.”

In his rally-style speech, Trump celebrated the achievements of the students, while also lauding his own presidency—including his cracking down on diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) programs.

West Point has found itself in the center of the DEI-related pushback, especially related to the banning of books and educational programs that the Trump Administration says promote DEI.

In February, West Point disbanded its Society of Black Engineers club as well as multiple other clubs listed under “affinity” groups on the club directory. This followed Trump’s Jan. 20 Executive Order titled “Ending Radical And Wasteful Government DEI Programs And Preferencing” and a Jan. 21 Executive Order titled “Ending Illegal Discrimination and Restoring Merit-Based Opportunity.” A subsequent Jan. 29 instruction from Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth saw the announcement of a new task force.

US Forces Abroad Protect the Homeland

Rebeccah L. Heinrichs & Mark Melton

Arising axis comprising China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea threatens American interests across the Eurasian continent — from East Asia to Europe to the Middle East. It would be a mistake to overly compartmentalize the regions. A crisis in one theater could quickly spiral into a conflict elsewhere. For example, if China can pin down the United States in the Taiwan Strait, Russia and Iran may seize the moment to attack their neighbors. Such opportunistic aggression has occurred regularly throughout history, such as when America focused heavily on deterring a Soviet invasion of Europe but was then surprised and unprepared when the communist regime in North Korea attacked U.S.-supported South Korea.

The United States should be careful as it adapts its military posture at a time in which allies are actively preparing to contribute more of the responsibility for conventional deterrence within NATO. Relocating some U.S. forces from one theater to another may be a prudent policy, but withdrawing too many or too quickly or focusing exclusively on deterring China in a single scenario risks disaster. Testimony from two recent congressional hearings should remind Americans of this point.

In a recent hearing, Roger Wicker (R., Miss.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, cited reports that “mid-level officials in the Pentagon” are considering withdrawing some U.S. forces from South Korea, and he asked how this would affect the missions that U.S. forces conduct from there. General Xavier Brunson, commander of U.S. Forces Korea, responded, “To reduce the force becomes problematic. I won’t speak to policy, but what we do provide [in the Korean Peninsula] . . . is the potential to impose costs in the East Sea to Russia, the potential to impose costs in the West Sea to China, and to continue to deter North Korea.” Put another way, U.S. forces in Korea not only defend South Korea from a “non-China” threat but also protect the American homeland by deterring aggression in multiple theaters.

Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, agreed. Removing U.S. forces, he said, “would reduce our ability to prevail in conflict,” and “there’s a higher probability” that North Korea would invade South Korea.

Can Donald Trump build the 'Golden Dome' over the US?

Bernd Debusmann Jr

Trump said the Golden Dome will be completed by the end of his term.

Warheads raining down from beyond the Earth's atmosphere. Faster-than-sound cruise missiles striking US infrastructure. Sky-high nuclear blasts.

These are just some of the nightmarish scenarios that experts warn could come true if the US's dated and limited defence systems were overwhelmed in a future high-tech attack.

Even a single, relatively small nuclear detonation hundreds of miles above the heads of Americans would create an electromagnetic pulse - or EMP - that would have apocalyptic results. Planes would fall out of the sky across the country. Everything from handheld electronics and medical devices to water systems would be rendered completely useless.

"We wouldn't be going back 100 years," said William Fortschen, an author and weapons researcher at Montreat College in North Carolina. "We'd lose it all, and we don't know how to rebuild it. It would be the equivalent of us going back 1,000 years and having to start from scratch."

In response to these hypothetical - but experts say quite possible - threats, US President Donald Trump has set his eyes on a "next generation" missile shield: the Golden Dome.

But while many experts agree that building such a system is necessary, its high cost and logistical complexity will make Trump's mission to bolster America's missile defences extremely challenging.

An executive order calling for the creation of what was initially termed the "Iron Dome for America" noted that the threat of next-generation weapons has "become more intense and complex" over time, a potentially "catastrophic" scenario for the US.

The Trump Doctrine: Speak Loudly and Carry a Big Stick

Randall Fowler 
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Trump made innumerable, often contradictory, promises on the 2024 campaign trail. In foreign policy, he interspersed strong rhetoric against U.S. enemies with promises to end “forever wars” and bring peace to both Ukraine and Gaza within days—indeed, a day—of entering office. Nominations to his foreign policy team painted a similarly convoluted picture, with hawks, doves, conspiracists, pivoters-to-Asia, and a handful of converted neoconservatives populating key positions.

With Mike Waltz’s ouster as National Security Advisor close to the 100-day mark of Trump’s second administration, a less hazy outline of the 47th president’s approach to foreign policy is taking shape. While Ionut Popescu has posited that Trump is operating from a realist framework, Valerie Hudson contends that Trump’s attempt to carve out a coherent doctrine—restoring “great power spheres of influence, that is, a true multipolar world that relies on regional policemen, not one global policeman, to keep the peace internationally”—falls into incoherence when confronted with Trump’s actual policies in the Middle East and the Taiwan Strait. Others argue that the Trump doctrine essentially entails “unrestrained strength,” capricious opportunism, or a revival of conservative American nationalism. While each of these interpretations highlights an important dimension of Trump’s geopolitical disposition, none clearly identifies the strategic logic linking the president’s global actions to his domestic political considerations.

This essay offers a much simpler heuristic for analyzing Trump’s global actions in a way that accommodates many of the perspectives referenced above. This time around, despite his admiration for William McKinley, it’s McKinley’s successor, Theodore Roosevelt, that serves as the model for Trump’s foreign policy, which could be summarized as a twist on TR’s famous phrase: “Speak loudly and carry a big stick.”

Vance Says Trump Will Use U.S. Military Decisively Rather Than in ‘Open-Ended Conflicts’

Michelle L. Price

ANNAPOLIS, Md. (AP) — Vice President JD Vance told military academy graduates Friday that President Donald Trump is working to ensure that U.S. armed forces are only sent into harm’s way with clear goals rather than the “undefined missions” and “open-ended conflicts” of the past.

Vance, in a commencement address at the U.S. Naval Academy, said Trump’s approach “doesn’t mean that we ignore threats but means that we approach them with discipline and if we send you to war, we do it with a very specific set of goals in mind.”

Vance said the alternative under Trump will be quicker-hit military actions, pointing to the bombing that Trump recently ordered -- then paused to uncertain effect-- against Houthis rebels in Yemen.

“That’s how miliary power should be used,” he said. “Decisively with a clear objective.”

Vance, in his first remarks as vice president to one of the military service academies, also spoke briefly about his own military service as he addressed the 1,049 graduates in Annapolis’ class of 2025, most of them newly commissioned ensigns and second lieutenants.

The Ohio native enlisted in the Marine Corps after high school and served four years, doing a tour in Iraq and working as a military journalist.

Vance appeared to criticize the Iraq War as he spoke of Trump’s shift in approach, seeming to refer to the mission he served in when he said: “How hard could it be to build a few democracies in the Middle East? Well, almost impossibly hard, it turns out. And unbelievably costly.”

Vance also criticized a Biden administration effort to build a pier in Gaza to accept aid in Israel’s war with Hamas there, which he suggested never worked.

“The Trump administration has reversed course,” Vance said. “No more undefined missions. No more open-ended conflicts.”

West Point’s Class of 2025

Mike Lyons

A Testament to Institutional Strength and Future Readiness

On Saturday, May 24, nearly 1,000 cadets will graduate from the United States Military Academy at West Point. They will raise their right hands, take the oath of office, and commission as second lieutenants in the United States Army. In doing so, they will join a lineage of service and sacrifice that stretches back over two centuries—but more importantly, they will mark the beginning of a chapter uniquely shaped by the times we live in and the demands of what lies ahead.

This is not a routine graduation. This is a moment that calls attention to the enduring strength of the institution and the character of those who choose to lead at its edge. The Class of 2025 is more than a milestone. It’s a signal. A signal that West Point continues to evolve—quietly, deliberately, and with purpose—to meet the future of warfare, leadership, and national service.

I’ve observed this class closely over the past four years. As a West Point graduate, a combat veteran, and someone who remains deeply engaged with the Academy, I’ve seen firsthand the strength, intelligence, and moral clarity this group brings to the profession of arms. Their class motto— “Together We Thrive”—is not just a slogan. It’s been lived out in how they’ve trained, struggled, and grown together through one of the most dynamic periods in recent memory.
Anchored in Constitutional Leadership

At a time when civil-military relations are under constant scrutiny, West Point has doubled down on its foundation: developing leaders who are loyal to the Constitution, not to any political party or ideology. Every member of this class has taken that oath—first as new cadets, and again as graduates—and it remains the bedrock of their training.

Through programs like the Oath Project, and coursework that bridges political science, law, and ethical reasoning, cadets learn the legal and moral weight of their commission. They are taught to lead with independence of thought, responsibility to civilian control, and fidelity to lawful authority. That kind of training matters more now than ever.

The Dollar May Be Down, but It’s Still on Top

Eswar Prasad

Last year, the United States appeared to be consolidating its pole position as a haven for international investment. The U.S. economy’s remarkable strength relative to other major economies helped account for a nearly ten percent surge in the dollar’s value in the fall of 2024. The economy and labor market continued to perform well leading up to and following Donald Trump’s inauguration. And inflation was gradually falling back toward the Federal Reserve’s target of about two percent.

But since he came into office, Trump has sowed doubt among both domestic and foreign investors. His “Liberation Day” announcement, on April 2, of across-the-board tariffs on all U.S. trading partners disrupted global trade and roiled financial markets. Even though the White House has paused or lowered some of those tariffs from their initial sky-high levels, the damage has been done. The uncertainty the tariffs fomented in international trade has hurt growth prospects for the remainder of this year. This is true in particular for the United States, because the tariffs affect virtually all U.S. trade. Consequently, it has become more likely that the Federal Reserve will have to cut interest rates later this year to support the economy. This, in turn, has caused the value of the dollar to fall roughly back to its September 2024 level, before its ten percent increase.

These developments have even raised questions about the dollar’s historic role as a refuge for international investment. In the past two decades, every instance of economic and financial turmoil resulted in a mad dash by investors around the world for safe financial assets in which to park their money while the storm blew over. As I argued in Foreign Affairs last summer, those instances invariably featured swelling demand for U.S. Treasury securities, long seen as the safest of assets because of the U.S. economy’s stability and because these securities are available in large quantities and easily tradable. This higher demand typically pushes up the price of Treasury securities and drives down their interest rates, making it easier for both the U.S. government and American households to borrow cheaply. The inflow of money into dollar assets also props up the dollar itself.

How AI can slow the rise of antibiotic-resistant “superbugs”

Cesar de la Fuente-Nunez, Henry Skinner, Christina Yen

On June 30, 1924, Calvin Coolidge Jr. played a tennis match against his older brother John at the White House. It was hot and humid, and the sockless 16-year-old developed a small blister on the third toe of his right foot (Rhoads 2014). It soon became swollen and sore from an infection. His fever spiked, his lymph nodes swelled, and red streaks ran up his leg, a distressing sign that bacteria had wormed their way into his fascia and soon his blood stream. He entered Walter Reed Army Hospital on July 5, where his infection developed into sepsis, and he died two days later (Shapell 2017).

In the 1920s there wasn’t much the medical team could have done to save Calvin Jr. It didn’t matter if you were a pauper or the president’s son: When it came to bacterial infections, treatment options were limited, crude, and largely ineffective. Alexander Fleming had not yet discovered penicillin, and infections ran rampant in the pre-antibiotic era. Pneumonia was the leading cause of death with a mortality rate of 30 percent, common childhood illnesses like strep throat often turned fatal, and even seemingly minor injuries like a scratch from a rosebush or a blister could transmogrify into a bacterial nightmare, bringing Death’s scythe to one’s doorstep.