Any cross-border strike by India faces a potential drawback. It may be seen as underwhelming - Opinion

Sidharth Raimedhi

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Since the Pahalgam terror attack of 22 April, there have been expectations of an Indian ‘retaliatory’ attack against Pakistan—making the present situation an acute crisis between two nuclear states. However, a cost-benefit calculation reveals that India’s response could be somewhat unexpected. India could stop short of an escalatory military assault similar to the Balakot airstrike of 2019.

India could instead be increasingly drawn toward a response that stacks up coercive pressure while constructing a form of crisis termination that is mostly political and emphasises the bigger picture.

There are three primary reasons for this—military dynamics, international stakes, as well as a political off-ramp that has the potential to be satisfactory. Let us explain.

Military dynamics and brinkmanship

There are three ways in which 2025 is not 2019. First, and the most regrettable aspect—Pakistan has modernised, equipped and integrated its ground and air forces, which leaves India with high-risk choices in terms of escalation control/management. Marked by a crisis of legitimacy and resultant siege mentality, Pakistan’s posture has also been one of greater desperation—giving it some psychological advantage in a twisted sense.

Japan Seeking to Expand its Economic Footprint in Central Asia

Paul Goble

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The resolution of border disputes in Central Asia over the last two months has led to a sea change in Japan’s approach to the region (see EDM, March 12, April 16). This shift, however, may bring Japan into conflict with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation, the two outside powers that have attempted to dominate the situation in Central Asia. Until the resolution of disputes first between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and then among all the countries of the region, Japan had pursued soft power initiatives for two decades. Now, Tokyo has decided to seek a stake in the economies of Central Asian countries, especially in their natural resource holdings.

In August 2004, Japan and the countries of Central Asia formed the Central Asia Plus Japan Dialogue, a platform promoted by Tokyo and Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, who was then Kazakhstan’s foreign minister and is now its president (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, August 28, 2004). In the years since, these countries have held a number of meetings at the ministerial or deputy ministerial level with Japan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, March 14). As a result, Japan provided project financing and loans to assist the countries in the region in state building. In 2024, for example, Japan agreed to loan Uzbekistan 39 billion Japanese Yen (approximately $268 billion) to advance Uzbekistan’s transition to a market economy and enhance social inclusiveness and environmental sustainability (Japan International Cooperation Agency, August 13, 2024). In the period 2023 to 2024, Japan invested $42.5 million in the economy of Tajikistan and has engaged in a number of grant aid cooperation including road maintenance and solar energy installation projects, safety and efficiency improvements at the Dushanbe International Airport, and scholarships for Tajik students to study at Japanese universities (Daryo, August 18, 2024; Japan International Cooperation Agency, accessed May 1). These soft power projects expanded Japan’s influence but not its economic footprint (Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 28, 2004; Journal of International and Advanced Japanese Studies, February 2019). This platform was slated to be capped by a summit meeting between these countries in 2024, but that meeting was canceled because the Japanese prime minister was forced to stay home to deal with the threat of an earthquake (The Diplomat, August 8, 2024).

Security without deterrence

Gabriel Elefteriu

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As the geometry of international relations alters under the shockwaves emanating from the White House, old assumptions about alliances begin to fray. Like a kind of geopolitical glue, it has been US power that has held the global security system together in the broad form we have known it since 1945.

This has been a world order dominated by a US-led Western Alliance, with the “enemy’s” part played at first by the Soviet Union and now by China — with a brief Fukuyaman interlude of unipolarity after the Cold War.

The deliberate and accelerated disengagement of the US from this model — i.e. the transition to substantive multipolarity — will require a fundamental recalibration of security concepts and strategies across the West, almost from first principles.

There is no substitute for the American power we have known until now.

As such, great chunks of what today passes for our “strategic culture” are rapidly becoming obsolete. Not that those most invested in the current intellectual milieu and who take their talking points from the national security officialdom even recognise it.

Will China Escalate?

Tong Zhao

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In 2021, at the contentious first meeting between senior Chinese foreign policy officials and their counterparts in the Biden administration, Beijing’s top diplomat, Yang Jiechi, declared that the United States could no longer “speak with China from a position of strength.” The statement, which seemed to unsettle U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, has proved instructive for understanding China’s strategic outlook. In the four years since, Beijing has operated under the assumption that a profound shift in the balance of power between the two countries is underway. Chinese strategists perceive their country’s decades-long “strategic weakness” in its competition with the United States as coming to an end, driven by steady advances in China’s industrial, technological, and military capabilities and an increase in its international influence. This progress has ushered in what Beijing views as a “strategic stalemate” with the United States, in which both nations now wield comparable power.

The reelection of U.S. President Donald Trump did little to shake Beijing’s optimism that it can navigate continued threats from the United States, secure a lasting equilibrium, and vie for global supremacy. And Trump’s early second-term actions have strengthened Beijing’s conviction that the United States is accelerating its own decline, bringing a new era of parity ever closer. The perception that China likely does not face an existential threat from the United States has had a stabilizing effect on policy in Beijing, which has responded to Trump’s escalation of trade tensions in April with patience, anticipating that Trump will eventually lower U.S. tariffs in an attempt to reach an agreement.

Win fast or lose big against China

Bradley T. Gericke

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It seems that “protraction” as a way of war is having a moment, especially through the lens of a future war against China. The Army is holding wargames and conferences addressing it. Even fresh scholarship is skeptical of short wars. All of which is somewhat bewildering because history is replete with long wars, and the record of long wars is one of much blood and great cost. Tinkering with notions of protracted war allows military decision-makers to be distracted and to make a poor bargain, like the trade made by the legendary Doctor Faust that comes with extraordinary cost.

Clearly, the cost of long wars is extraordinarily high. In every respect, long wars should be an unwelcome result, not an outcome to be acquiesced. The Army especially cannot afford to mischaracterize the inevitability of long war. Acceptance of protraction as an inevitability is to surrender the United States’ best way to win militarily against China, which is to fight and win the first battle of any war. Appearing to accept that the United States will not win the first battle in a US-China war could also fatally undermine deterrence by signaling a lack of confidence in US capabilities. Winning in a future contest and strengthening deterrence means making decisions now: real choices must be made regarding forward posture, organizational structure, training, and modernization to create a battlefield system that leverages US advantages.

What May Cause China to Blink?

Zongyuan Zoe Liu

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Several news stories today report that China is signaling openness to trade talks. This fits the usual pattern of Chinese diplomacy. As I wrote in my recent Foreign Affairs piece: “Beijing has shown a strong capacity for retaliation and a tactical openness to negotiation, but not a willingness to kowtow.” The current trade disruption most closely resembles late 2022, when widespread zero-COVID lockdowns led the Chinese people to doubt whether their basic freedom of movement would ever be restored. At that time, Xi Jinping executed an abrupt policy reversal once economic stress translated to spontaneous protests.

But today’s domestic narrative is different: Xi isn’t blamed for the trade war—and that’s critical to the Party’s reaction function. China can’t hold out forever, but it isn’t desperate either. A tactical climbdown sooner rather than later would serve both sides, but meaningful negotiations are likely a different story.

As my FA article explains: “The CCP holds a monopoly on power in China’s political system, and Xi maintains a near monopoly within the party itself. This concentration of authority allows the Chinese leader to make sweeping policy decisions unchallenged—and to reverse course just as swiftly. And as a result of the party’s control over information, particularly regarding foreign affairs, any encounter with the Trump administration can be framed domestically as Xi standing firm against foreign bullying.”

China Is Still Winning the Battle for 5G—and 6G

Anne Neuberger

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When Ren Zhengfei founded Huawei in 1987, the Chinese telecommunications company had a few thousand dollars in the bank and an eye on reverse-engineering advanced foreign technology. By 1994, Huawei was producing switching equipment, the hardware and software that form the basis of modern telecommunications, and Ren was taking a meeting with Chinese Communist Party Secretary General Jiang Zemin. The Huawei chief executive observed that his company’s product was a matter of “national security” and that a country “that did not have its own switching equipment was like one that lacked its own military.” “Well said,” Jiang replied. From that moment on, business and government have been partners in the mission to keep China’s telecommunications secure.

Meanwhile, in the late 1990s and throughout the first decade of this century, the United States did not think much about its telecommunications dominance. Its leadership in the sector was unrivaled, and U.S. innovations—including 2G, 3G, and 4G technologies—were widely adopted and securely used around the world. But as the United States sat complacently in the top position, trusting that the strength of the free market would keep it there, China was carefully setting itself up as a challenger. Beijing poured resources into Huawei and other Chinese companies, positioning them to outcompete foreign firms. So successful was this effort that by 2012, Huawei telecom gear had been deployed across rural America, covering the bases that house U.S. nuclear weapons. This effectively provided the Chinese government with constant surveillance of the United States’ most sensitive capabilities and military operations. Huawei may not have been raking in profits from this venture, but for Beijing it was an intelligence coup.

LEARNING ABOUT THE PACING CHALLENGE: THE CHINA INTEGRATED COURSE

Zenel Garcia & John Nagl 

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In 2023, the U.S. Joint Staff directed the war colleges to increase the portion of their curricula devoted to understanding China, to include its “national interests, strategic objectives, and domestic constraints, and grand strategy.” The purpose of this deeper understanding of the Department of Defense’s pacing challenge is to enable students “to develop policies, strategies, forces, and military plans that counter PRC aggression against the United States, its allies, partners, and interests.” The implications of this guidance were clear, the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) had to not just raise general awareness but provide practical—preferably experiential—knowledge that will allow graduates to act in the real world.

The School of Strategic Landpower chose to implement this in phases, beginning with the resident course in the 2023-2024 academic year. The main vehicle for this was a new 10-lesson China Integrated Course (CIC). This year we tested an alternative experiential learning option. Next year, the distance education course will deliver its version of the course. All of these are just the most recent examples of how the USAWC centers warfighting with innovative pedagogies and leveraging academic and practitioner expertise.

Global Competition in Critical Minerals and Rare Earth Elements

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On May 1, Ukraine and the United States signed a long-anticipated minerals deal providing the United States with preferential rights to mineral extraction in Ukraine. The agreement creates a U.S.-controlled, jointly-managed investment fund that will receive revenues from new projects in critical minerals, oil, and natural gas. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy explains that the new deal allows “both Ukraine and the United States, which supports us in our defense, to make money in partnership” as Ukraine continues to defend itself against Russia’s full-scale invasion.

The agreement comes as the global critical minerals market remains highly competitive, with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia currently leading in mineral processing infrastructure and capabilities. The International Energy Agency (IEA) projects that by 2030, nearly 50 percent of the market value from critical minerals refining will be concentrated in the PRC. IEA further assesses that by 2030, over 90 percent of battery-grade graphite and 77 percent of refined rare earths will originate from the PRC. In 2022, Russia was the source of 40 percent of global uranium enrichment. In 2024, approximately 35 percent of U.S. uranium imports (used for nuclear fuel) came from Russia.

Jamestown analysts have been assessing international competition and capabilities in critical minerals and rare earth elements for years. Our experts provide open-source analysis grounded in local language sources to help Americans understand their adversaries and allies in their own words and in their own terms.

Decentralizing the Department of Defense: Reorganizing to Empower the Warfighters

John G. Ferrari, Elaine McCusker & Todd Harrison

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Several forces acting on the Pentagon this year could fundamentally improve its organization, weapons procurement, operational support, and personnel management. Specific recommendations for the first of these, the work of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), were presented in a February 2025 working paper.[i] A second working paper, released in March, outlined recommendations for overhauling the way America equips its warfighters.[ii] Future papers will explore the effects of budget reconciliation/appropriations and the nature of America’s strategic leadership in the world.

This third paper builds upon the recommendations from the first working paper and provides a more comprehensive set of proposals to reorganize the Department of Defense. While the number of ways one could reorganize this behemoth are infinite, this paper provides three alternative paths, each of which has elements for a template the new Administration and Congress could use to overhaul the operating structure of the Department of Defense (DoD) to empower the warfighter.

The first option, called the “Power of Three,” removes execution of tasks from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and modifies the three military departments to take on the role of executing all tasks, leaving OSD to plan, synchronize, and provide critical oversight. The second option, called the “Power of Boundaries”, would restructure the Combatant Commands around specific threats rather than geographic regions and streamline the military departments and OSD, clarifying strategic priorities and reducing redundancies. The third option, called the “Power of Core Function”, proposes a more modest initial step of refocusing and realigning defense-wide accounts on warfighter capabilities. We have a short window of opportunity to improve the way America defends its security and its interests. It is incumbent on our leaders to seize this moment. We hope that amidst the flurry of activity surrounding the Government at all levels, our leaders will have the foresight and the courage to substantively change the Pentagon. We have each seen our system’s dysfunctionalities up-close and we offer our recommendations with the hope that those whose charge it is to lead may find them useful.

CYBER DEFENSE ASSISTANCE AND UKRAINE

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INTRODUCTION

Russia’s re-invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 galvanized the West to help resist this aggression. Today, the war continues on many fronts, including cyberspace, but the assistance efforts have slowed as resource constraints and fatigue increasingly set in. Simultaneously, the digital realm in Ukraine continues to be the focus of aggression, both for prosecuting the current conflict as well as a crucial post conflict concern.

In February 2023 the Aspen Institute paper titled “The Cyber Defense Assistance Imperative: Lessons from Ukraine”1 examined how the private sector established support for Ukrainian cyber defense, discussed its impacts, and derived key lessons from the process. As geopolitical flashpoints near Russia—the Baltic States, Moldova and Poland—and in East Asia—Taiwan and the Philippines—escalate with a substantial cyber component, a deep understanding of future potential challenges to cyber defense assistance (CDA) is crucial. Ukraine’s digital resiliency will also be crucial to negotiating and sustaining Ukraine’s ability to move beyond the current conflict. Similarly, strong cyber defenses and digital resiliency can improve crisis stability in other potential flashpoints as stated in the U.S. International Cyber Strategy released in May 2024.

Today the need for effective, adaptable cyber defense and resiliency bolstered by operational assistance remains essential for Ukraine. The efforts conducted in Ukraine also illuminate how similar geopolitical situations will require similar efforts for achieving the goals for the United States and its allies. This second paper provides an update to our earlier paper and additional findings.

U.S.–South Africa Relations Are on the Brink of Collapse

Zainab Usman and Anthony Carroll

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The diplomatic relationship between the United States and South Africa has entered one of its most turbulent phases since the end of apartheid. Once characterized by cooperation across sectors such as trade, health, defense, and diplomacy, the partnership is now fraying under the weight of geopolitical tensions, ideological differences, and a string of controversial policy decisions on both sides. The deterioration began during U.S. President Donald Trump’s first term and has intensified since 2022, largely due to fallout from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, South Africa’s 2023 case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and South Africa’s close relationship with China.

However, tensions reached a boiling point after Trump’s return to office in January. A series of bold and, in some cases, controversial moves by the U.S. administration and a few strategic mistakes on the part of South Africa have taken the strained relationship to the brink of collapse.

Among the most incendiary was an executive order aimed at offering asylum to White South Africans—specifically Afrikaners—citing concerns over a new land reform law in South Africa. The law, part of an effort to address historical inequalities rooted in apartheid-era land dispossession, triggered alarm in some circles abroad. Trump’s order framed the situation as a human rights issue for Afrikaners, despite pushback from South Africans who saw it as a racially charged external intervention. Nearly 70,000 South Africans have since expressed interest in U.S. visas under this program, according to the South African Chamber of Commerce in the USA. Critics argue the move echoes past U.S. policies that favored the defunct apartheid regime and undermines South Africa’s ongoing efforts to redress systemic inequality. The country has the world’s highest levels of income inequalities, which, according to the International Monetary Fund, is evident in skewed income distribution, unequal access to opportunities, and regional disparities.

Spain’s Blackout Brings a New Meaning to Energy Security - Analysis

Keith Johnson

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The massive blackout that left Spain and Portugal in the dark on Monday brought home for many Europeans the overwhelming reliance their societies have on electricity—and the stability of the power system that provides it.

Western Europeans used to reliable trains and refrigeration were aghast at having to look for candles, but for much of the world, energy poverty (and brownouts and blackouts and rolling blackouts) is a frequent occurrence.

Russian Mercenary and Paramilitary Groups in Africa

Ryan Bauer, Alexandra Gerber, Erik E. Mueller, Cortney Weinbaum, Paul Cormarie, Oluwatimilehin Sotubo, Weilong Kong, Auburn Brown, Melissa Shostak & Zara Fatima Abdurahaman

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Russian Mercenary and Paramilitary Groups in Africa

Since 2018, Russian private military contractors have proliferated across Africa. In 2022, RAND assessed that from 2018 to 2021, such contractors were active in 33 African countries (Figure 1).1 The majority of activities occur under organizations controlled by the Wagner Group (Wagner) and, until his death in 2023, its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin.

Since Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, Moscow has sought to develop or revive its relationships with African partners to undermine western sanctions, access minerals and other raw materials, cultivate allies in international forums, advance its own political narratives, and increase military pressure on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) southern flank.2 One important means by which Russia has sought to accomplish these goals is by exporting mercenaries. Russian mercenaries serve as an important mechanism by which Moscow seeks to reduce its growing international economic and political isolation. Mercenaries help accomplish this by expanding Russia’s footprint and influence in Africa at a relatively low cost while providing an important source of revenue.3 Russian mercenaries have operated as a nimble expeditionary force, seemingly unencumbered by international rules of war, and have bolstered authoritarian regimes in Africa at the expense of the civilian populations’ and the countries’ overall security. Under Yevgeny Prigozhin’s leadership, Wagner operated on behalf of Moscow’s interests but with flexibility to pursue the group’s own goals and methods of operation. This indirect relationship with the Russian central government offered Russia the financial and diplomatic benefits from Wagner’s client relationships without Moscow incurring direct responsibility for casualties or human rights abuses.4

What If America Abandons Ukraine?

Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage

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President Donald Trump is fond of flexibility. Unperturbed by changing course, he prefers not to be pinned down by past precedent or by his own promises. Although he has pledged to end the war in Ukraine quickly, and although Washington has just signed a deal with Kyiv granting the United States a share of future revenues from Ukraine’s minerals reserves, Trump could decide to walk away from the country entirely if he does not get the peace settlement he craves. A final text of the minerals deal has not yet been made public, but there is no indication that it includes security guarantees for Ukraine. As commander in chief, Trump can minimize U.S. support for Ukraine abruptly and dramatically.

But a Ukraine shunted aside by the United States would not be a Ukraine abandoned. After three years of war, dozens of countries now support Ukraine’s increasingly capable military. No ally can replace the United States, but all of them make a difference: it is not within the power of the United States to end the war by pulling out. Although Ukraine will struggle to hold the line without U.S. support, Russia has no easy path to victory. The real risk of a precipitous American withdrawal of support is not that Ukraine will immediately collapse, but that individual European countries might lose the political will to stand up to Russia.

Should the United States forsake Ukraine, Europe would suffer multiple misfortunes. European leaders would conclude that Washington, having devoted itself to normalizing ties with Moscow, is no longer interested in providing the credible deterrence it had supplied for decades. They would perceive the Trump administration’s abandonment of Ukraine as the first step toward a post-American Europe, if not a post-American world. Against this backdrop, Moscow may be tempted to scare Europe into submission, and some Europeans might choose appeasement rather than risk Russia’s wrath.

U.S. Aircraft Carriers “Sitting Ducks” For Chinese Hypersonic Missiles; Is Pete Hegseth Hyping Chinese Threat?

Ritu Sharma

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However, this prognosis contradicts the evidence gathered from the sinking of the only supercarrier ever.

Hegseth’s remarks from an interview have been in the spotlight, where he claimed that China has been building its military prowess for the sole purpose of defeating the US. The arsenal of Hypersonic Missiles is an essential piece in their quest to achieve supremacy over the US, whose power is projected beyond its borders through aircraft carriers.

“So, if our whole power projection platform is aircraft carriers, and the ability to project power that way strategically around the globe. And, yeah, we have a nuclear triad and all that, but [carriers are] a big part of it. And if 15 hypersonic missiles can take out our 10 aircraft carriers in the first 20 minutes of a conflict, what does that look like?” he said in an interview that has recently surfaced.

The defense secretary’s comments have been gaining attention lately, and defense experts have been contending that the US aircraft carrier strike groups have limited defenses against hypersonic missiles.

A Cobalt Quagmire? The Risks of a Security-for-Minerals Deal in the DRC

Christopher M. Faulkner, Raphael Parens and Marcel Plichta

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Under pressure from the administration of President Donald Trump, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and its longtime adversary, Rwanda, signed a declaration of principles on April 25, which includes expectations of significant US public and private sector investment in the region. This move comes amid a rapidly deteriorating security situation that prompted the president of the DRC, Félix Tshisekedi, to send a letter to President Trump soliciting a formal security pact in exchange for access to critical mineral reserves.

On paper, a deal with the DRC may look desirable, even logical: access to resources, dislodging Chinese influence, and an opportunity to create stability to enhance investment. In reality, this deal looks more like a trap. Washington risks marching straight into a proxy war in some of Africa’s deadliest terrain.

The DRC is no stranger to conflict. From 1998 to 2003, the country was rocked by the bloodiest war since World War II, the Second Congolese War, a conflict most Americans have never heard of and that never really ended. Today’s conflict is witnessing surging violence; it is a tinderbox that has already drawn in nations like Rwanda and South Africa, with the former country being responsible for much of this uptick.

Experts see rise of powerful non-state groups as US retreats from global stage

PATRICK TUCKER

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Several trends are giving violent extremist groups a brighter, more profitable future, security officials and experts from around the world said this week at the Soufan Center Security Forum here.

Cryptocurrencies and sophisticated use of shell companies are helping them accumulate funds. AI is making recruitment and disinformation a snap. The reduction of social-media monitoring is enabling such campaigns to flourish. The U.S. retreat from multilateral diplomatic efforts is reducing the pressure that kept such groups in check.

All this is making such groups more powerful, independent, and useful as proxy tools for autocratic regimes.

State-backed militias are no longer operating on the margins—they're deploying increasingly sophisticated weapons and tactics, thanks in part to a surge in funding and arms transfers from autocratic sponsors. Russia, for example, has dispatched the Wagner Group across Ukraine, Africa, and the Middle East. But nowhere is this more evident than in Yemen, where Iran’s material and technical support has transformed the Houthis from a local insurgency into a regional threat. Houthis progressed from firing short-range rockets to launching cruise missiles and drones at targets hundreds of miles away—striking at Saudi oil facilities, Israeli airports, UAE territory, and shipping in international waters.

Modernizing the Unconventional Warfare Enterprise: The Case for Nonviolent Resistance

Mark Thomas

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The Age of the Dictator?

Will the 21st century belong to the dictator? The United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are competing to decide this existential question. The U.S.-led liberal world order is built on democracy, free trade, and universal human rights, while the PRC’s vision is based on survival of the Chinese Communist Party, civil obedience, and preeminent global influence. For the US to prevail in this struggle, it must be able to support those who seek to resist the authoritarian rule modeled and exported by the PRC. Consistent with integrated campaigning, a critical Department of Defense (DoD) role in great power competition is to conduct unconventional warfare (UW). Joint doctrine defines UW as activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. U.S. Army Special Forces are the only Department of Defense element authorized to conduct UW. To cite a well-known example, U.S. Special Forces conducted a UW campaign in Afghanistan supporting the Northern Alliance to overthrow the Taliban in 2001. Although this campaign was successful, the Taliban exerted only tenuous control over their country.

More modern authoritarian states wield sophisticated internal security apparatuses that cannot be easily defeated by the likes of the SF “horse soldiers” in Afghanistan. While resistance movements have increased in the past decade, their success has greatly decreased (see Figure 1). This resistance paradox presents both a problem for aspiring democracies and an opportunity for the US to gain strategic initiative over authoritarian states. Research by Harvard professor Dr. Chenoweth shows that most successful modern resistance movements are largely nonviolent (see Figure 2). While current U.S. military resistance doctrine acknowledges the growing importance of nonviolence, UW education and training still emphasize a protracted, violent struggle – reminiscent of a Maoist insurgency campaign of the early 20th century. However, the character of modern 21st-century resistance demands an evolution of the UW enterprise to account for these new trends toward nonviolence.

Economists Underestimate AI’s Workforce Disruption

Chris MacKenzie

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On Monday, Americans for Responsible Innovation (ARI) released a new report exploring the workforce impacts of artificial intelligence using a new framework for technological disruption. The report, titled The Technologist-Economist Disconnect: Assessing AI Labor Disruption, finds that economists are likely underestimating job losses from AI by failing to account for the flexibility of AI to take on and replace labor for newly created jobs. The analysis also offers an overview of the policy landscape for addressing AI labor disruption.

“Silicon Valley says they’re designing technology that can replace human labor, but many economists are still painting a rosy picture when it comes to America’s jobs outlook,” said ARI President Brad Carson. “This report is about exploring the disparity in those forecasts and offering policymakers a clearer picture of how AI might disrupt labor. The bottom line is we need to be preparing for a large-scale workforce transition that lawmakers have not yet come to terms with.”

Sovereign remedies: Between AI autonomy and control

Trisha Ray

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Introduction

Sovereign AI has gained a foothold in several capitals around the world. As Michael Kratisios, the Trump administration’s acting director of science and technology policy, stated in 2024, “Each country wants to have some sort of control over our [sic] own destiny on AI.”1 Analysts have mapped the modes and methods to achieve sovereign AI, and the interplay with antecedents like data sovereignty.2 However, there remains a critical gap: analysis of stated goals for these initiatives and what the core pillars of sovereign AI are, distinct from related concepts.

The goals outlined by governments are varied and wide-reaching: some center on preserving values or culture;3 others focus on the privacy and protection of citizens’ data;4 some initiatives center on economic growth and others of national security;5 and finally, there is a set of concerns around the current global governance vacuum, where in the absence of global frameworks, AI companies must be held accountable through physical presence.

However, each of these stated goals require differing levels of indigenized capability and control and will have varied consequences as a result. This paper will:

• Outline the various stated goals of sovereign AI, suggesting illustrative categories.
• Hypothesize the reasons for the emergence of sovereign AI as a concept, with an analysis of industry buy-in for this concept.
• Propose a streamlined definition of sovereign AI and suggest policy implications.

Harnessing the Algorithm: Shaping the Future of AI-Enabled Staff

MAJ Matt Tetreau, USA

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Introduction

Artificial intelligence (AI) promises to enable commanders and staff to make better informed, faster decisions. Integrating and analyzing the vast quantities of data available to commanders today all but necessitates reliance on AI tools. What’s more, as adversaries adopt AI planning tools, the speed of decision required to fight and win is likely to outpace the capabilities of human cognition. Despite the advantages afforded by AI, I propose that human staff should retain certain functions, even at some cost in efficiency. Just as AI is too critical for the future of mission command to ignore, some tasks are too critical for generating understanding to delegate to an algorithm. My arguments against AI performing specific functions focus primarily on the value that staff derive by executing those processes and the imperative to solve the right problems.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s dictum that “plans are worthless, but planning is everything,” underscores the value of process over output. While AI tools will likely produce serviceable plans, military professionals must grapple with the advantages in speed and manpower afforded by AI relative to the understanding and adaptability that result from deliberate planning processes. Decisions made by the Army in the coming years will set institutional norms, standards and approaches to harnessing this critical technology. Integrating AI into operational headquarters requires a deliberate and nuanced approach that synergizes the unique benefits afforded by both AI and humans. I propose a framework for an AI-enabled staff that retains and amplifies distinctly human competencies.

Bridging the Gap in Cross-Border Cyber Defense Strategies

Almerindo Graziano

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For years, the cyber domain was perceived as a virtual one. However, every cyber attack leaves a tangible footprint—a compromised server, a disrupted infrastructure or a breached supply chain. When critical systems such as water supplies or hospital networks are targeted, the consequences extend beyond data theft to real-world crises that can cost lives.

A Growing Threat Landscape

Recent cyber incidents, including Russian attacks on European infrastructure in France and Italy and Chinese government-backed breaches of U.S. telecommunications and critical infrastructure, have underscored that the cyber domain is evolving from digital espionage to kinetic effects with physical damage.

Former National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command Chief Gen. Paul Nakasone, USA (Ret.), stressed that the

Chinese-backed attacks illustrate the U.S. vulnerability against the adversaries. In response, the Pentagon is fast-tracking its Cyber Command 2.0 review, expected to be completed soon, to counter the surge in state-sponsored cyber threats. The new strategy of reshaping the U.S. national cyber forces focuses on four main efforts, including an advanced training center for military cyber forces and a better engagement with industry.

AI Technologies and National Security

Professor Kenneth Payne

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Introduction: What is Artificial Intelligence?

Artificial intelligence (AI) is rapidly altering the landscape of national security, as with so much else. For the UK, AI offers the possibility to reimagine how it defends its citizens and asserts its influence globally. But there are also many challenges, not least the risk of adverse, unintended consequences, whether from AI’s use in combat, or from its potential to transform democratic society.

‘Artificial intelligence’ encompasses a range of technologies that enables machines to perform tasks traditionally requiring human intelligence. These include: machine learning, where algorithms improve through experience; computer vision, which allows machines to interpret and analyse visual information; natural language processing, which enables AI to understand and generate human language; and autonomous systems, capable of independent decisionmaking in defined environments. These diverse capabilities underpin AI’s expanding role across societal activities, including in national security.

AI is already embedded in everyday life, from personal assistants such as Siri and Alexa to recommendation algorithms that shape our online experiences. In national security, its applications and potential applications are just as varied: AI-driven cybersecurity tools detect and neutralise threats in real-time; predictive analytics forecast potential crises; and autonomous drones provide persistent surveillance with minimal human intervention. These technologies are advancing rapidly, raising both opportunities and risks for defence and security policymakers.

Future Telecoms and National Security

Rahim Tafazolli

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Future Telecoms and National Security 

Modern telecommunications networks have the potential to enhance communication, deliver economic growth and innovation, transform certain industries and improve quality of life across the globe. Telecom networks underpin all national critical infrastructures, and their security and resilience are crucial to national security. 

Future Telecom Technology and Roadmap

Modern telecommunications networks, like 5G, have the potential to enhance communication, deliver economic growth and innovation, transform certain industries, and improve quality of life across the globe. Use cases foresee nextgeneration networks supporting millions of devices, powering smart cities and underpinning critical functions like power plants and emergency communications. Nonetheless, legacy mobile networks still play a crucial role in the development of modern telecommunications networks. They may support fewer devices and provide fewer critical services, but services such 2G, 3G, 4G and wired services still form part of existing infrastructure, have industry-specific applications, are used by rural communities, and provide back-up should modern systems fail.

Telecommunication networks, like any network, are prone to denial of service attacks. As a crucial part of daily life and a functioning economy, including the support of critical areas such as space, protecting telecommunications networks is a matter of national security. Most recently, a Chinese advanced persistent threat (APT) actor, dubbed Salt Typhoon, was said to have compromised major US telecommunications networks leading to widespread concerns over data and communications security. The group, linked to China’s Ministry of State Security, exploited vulnerabilities in telecommunication infrastructure, including wiretapping mechanisms used by law enforcement. Balancing the growth opportunities of modern telecommunications networks with national security risks is an enduring challenge for governments and societies.