Indian Strategic Studies: 07/16/25

16 July 2025

Senate panel pushing DOD on strategy to deter Chinese cyber activity on critical infrastructure

Mark Pomerleau

The Senate Armed Services Committee is proposing legislation that would require the Department of Defense to develop a deterrence strategy against cyber activity on critical infrastructure.

The provision is part of the annual defense policy bill. The committee released a summary Friday, although the full text of the legislation won’t be released until a later date.

The executive summary of the bill only offers that a provision mandates “a strategy to reestablish a credible deterrence against cyberattacks targeting American critical infrastructure using the full spectrum of military operations.”

A senior congressional official who briefed reporters Friday on the condition of anonymity described the provision as trying to identify a full scope using various methods and full spectrum options to more critically deter adversaries, particularly China, from conducting attacks on critical infrastructure, especially defense critical infrastructure.

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An official noted the provision directs DOD toward what the department needs to be doing to more effectively establish a deterrent. Officials in open testimony have indicated a clear concern that Beijing, in particular, continues to attack critical infrastructure.

They singled out Volt and Salt Typhoon by name, noting they’re a growing and more aggressive threat in cyberspace to utilities and critical infrastructure that supports DOD.

Volt Typhoon is one of a number of cyber players from China that have been discovered in U.S. networks, troubling American officials. For its part, Volt Typhoon was discovered inside U.S. critical infrastructure using a technique in the cybersecurity world dubbed “living off the land,” which means it’s using legitimate tools organic to the systems for malicious purposes.

Tokyo, Manila moves arouse Chinese concerns about Asian mini NATO

Cherry Hitkari

Manila’s adoption of Japan’s “one theater concept” has further escalated tensions with China. Proposed in March this year, the concept breaks from Tokyo’s traditional security outlook and views the East China Sea, the South China Sea and the Korean Peninsula as a “single theater.”

Analysts in Chinese news media were quick to read it as a formation of a Washington-led “Mini NATO in the Asia-Pacific” aimed at “containing China.”

A commentary noted how President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s attempts at a thaw with Beijing in early 2025 were derailed within a week when the US promised $50 million in military aid that “thoroughly exposed” Marcos’s “profiteering tendency.”

Another analysis related the situation to the Reciprocal Access Agreement signed between Manila and Tokyo in July last year. Many defined the concept as an “absurd” one that “deliberately confuses” distinct geographical regions, solely to build a case for foreign intervention. The continued stationing of US military’s advanced missile systems, Typhon and NMESIS, in Manila is similarly viewed as a way of targeting China.

While Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr.’s moves are broadly described as “unacceptable,” some in China believe he is still “pragmatic” in finding common strategic ground with Japan when compared with Lithuania, which expressed concerns over the “axis” formed by “China, Russia and North Korea” that must be opposed through an “alliance of democracies.”

PLA Military Aerospace Force: On the Frontier of Innovation and Competition

John Costello

the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) eliminated the Strategic Support Force (SSF; 战略支援部队). It reconstituted its subordinate components into three distinct arms (兵种), each directly subordinate to the Central Military Commission (CMC), the highest-level body within the Chinese armed forces (China Brief, April 26, 2024).

These organizations include the Cyberspace Force (网络空间部队; Cyberspace Force), the Information Support Force (ISF; 信息支援部队), and the Aerospace Force (ASF; 军事航天部队). One year on from its formation, analysis of thousands of recruitment notices, public procurement documents, academic publications, and news coverage, sheds light on the Military Aerospace Force (ASF; 军事航天部队). [1]

Aerospace Force Space Bases

The ASF does not maintain as rigid a structure as other services or forces, such as the Cyberspace Force; nor does it strictly align with the regional Theater Command (战区) construct. This indicates that its mission is strategic and functional rather than directly supporting individual Theater Commands. [2] The core structural elements of the ASF comprise seven primary “space bases” (航天基地) that undertake the majority of the ASF’s principal operational functions. Notably, Base 35,

responsible for Battlefield Environment Support (战场环境保障), was reassigned to the newly established Information Support Force (ISF; 信息支援部队) following the disbandment of the SSF last year. In terms of command structure, the Aerospace Force does not appear to be divided into Theater sub-commands; rather, its bases report to the ASF Headquarters, which in turn interfaces with the joint Theater Commands as needed. This means that in a conflict, ASF units would provide support to all Theater Commands (for targeting, communications, navigation, etc.) and execute strategic missions under central CMC direction (CASI, December 2022).

China’s Global Hegemony Strategy

Analyzing China’s understanding of global hegemony requires understanding not only its current foreign policy practices but also its thousands of years of historical memory and the notion of civilization.

China has historically been called the “Middle Kingdom” (Zhōngguó), and this designation has carried with it not only a geopolitical claim but also a claim of cultural superiority. This claim was embodied in the traditional tributary system that positioned the states around China in a hierarchical order, and it penetrated a wide geography during the Ming and Qing dynasties. Today’s interpretations of China’s rise are often evaluated only in the context of the post-Cold War power vacuum,

ignoring this historical continuity. However, China’s quest for hegemony is not only a modern power policy, but also a civilization-centered reconstruction project rooted in Confucian political philosophy.

In his work “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers,” Paul Kennedy argues that economic power is decisive in the sustainability of military and political power. According to Kennedy’s analysis, the collapse of great powers is often linked to “imperial overstretch.” It is observed that China has established a strategic balance in this context. It is trying to continue economic development not through military expansion but through infrastructure diplomacy,

debt policies and soft power strategies. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is the most visible manifestation of this strategy. China aims to connect not only Asia but also a wide geography from Africa to Europe with economic networks. As Kennedy emphasizes in his thesis, hegemony is established not only through military superiority but also through control of production power and logistics networks. China’s railway and port investments constitute the infrastructure of this long-term plan.

Misinformation lends itself to social contagion – here’s how to recognize and combat it

In 2019, a rare and shocking event in the Malaysian peninsula town of Ketereh grabbed international headlines. Nearly 40 girls age 12 to 18 from a religious school had been screaming inconsolably, claiming to have seen a “face of pure evil,” complete with images of blood and gore.

Experts believe that the girls suffered what is known as a mass psychogenic illness, a psychological condition that results in physical symptoms and spreads socially – much like a virus.

I’m a social and behavioral scientist within the field of public health. I study the ways in which individual behavior is influenced by prevailing social norms and social network processes, across a wide range of behaviors and contexts. Part of my work involves figuring out how to combat the spread of harmful content that can shape our behavior for the worse, such as misinformation.

Mass psychogenic illness is not misinformation, but it gives researchers like me some idea about how misinformation spreads. Social connections establish pathways of influence that can facilitate the spread of germs, mental illness and even behaviors. We can be profoundly influenced by others within our social networks, for better or for worse.

The spreading of social norms

Researchers in my field think of social norms as perceptions of how common and how approved a specific behavior is within a specific network of people who matter to us.

These perceptions may not always reflect reality, such as when people overestimate or underestimate how common their viewpoint is within a group. But they can influence our behavior nonetheless. For many, perception is reality.

PERSPECTIVE: Disinformation 2.0: Deepfakes Hit the Frontlines of Global Influence Ops

Tom Sefton-Collins

State-backed actors and disinformation-for-hire networks are already using deepfakes in real operations. The tools are public, the threat is active and we are not ready.
We’ve Entered a New Phase of Information Warfare

We are now operating in a world where seeing is no longer believing. State-backed actors and disinformation-for-hire networks are already using deepfakes in real operations. The tools are public, the threat is active, and we are not ready. State actors and disinformation-for-hire groups are actively deploying deepfakes, not just as test cases, but as real tools in live operations.

These are not future threats. They are present-day capabilities, and they are accelerating.

You may have spotted some; however, it is worth remembering that you probably weren’t the target audience. The target audience has already observed it, reacted, and moved on. Recent examples from Russia/Ukraine and Iran/Israel have demonstrated the pace and capability available to every information actor.

The Toolkit is Public, and That’s the Problem

You no longer need a cyber lab or state-level funding to create a deepfake. Tools like DeepFaceLab and Avatarify are being used in real-world campaigns, and complete tutorials are readily available. Pre-trained models, plug-and-play workflows, and community support all exist in plain sight.

Political Conclusions of the 2025 BRICS Summit

On July 6–7, the BRICS held their seventeenth summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Created in 2009 the BRICS underwent an expansion process in 2023 with five new members joining the bloc. In 2024, Indonesia also joined,

participating this year for the first time as a full member. As usual, the leaders’ meeting concluded with a final declaration that includes a significant political component and a description of the cooperation advancements. Routinely employing vague language in its international political section, this year’s declaration is not an exception. However, it can offer some meaningful insights into the current situation and the future of the BRICS.

The most significant conclusion that can be drawn from this year’s summit is that disagreements have increased within the group. The geopolitical tensions among its members are not a new phenomenon. The dispute between China and India over their Himalayan border, as well as the heterogeneity in terms of political systems, recurrently appear as key points of contention. The differences in positioning regarding the West are another fundamental challenge faced by the group. Maintaining a non-aligned discourse, Brazil,

India, and South Africa have consistently refused to adopt an apparent schism with their European and North American partners. Although these differences hinder coordination in a few instances, the BRICS has managed to deepen its cooperation in the last seventeen years. However, new challenges have emerged from the group’s expansion, and this year’s summit demonstrates that.

The BRICS has always worked through consensus. For decades, the discourses proffered by its members after the summits attempted to emphasize an alleged unity within the group. This year, however, Iran has openly declared its discontentment with the declaration’s defense of the two-state solution in Palestine and Israel.

The Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abbas Araghchi, has affirmed that the two-state solution is “unrealistic.” As Iran refuses to recognize the Israeli state, the declaration’s statement clashes with the Iranian official discourse. A public criticism made by a member of the group on the final declaration is a novelty in the BRICS.

As Drone Warfare Evolves, Pentagon Sees Its Own Vulnerabilities

Julian E. Barne and Eric Schmitt

The Pentagon has been working to beef up drone defenses at overseas bases in the past 18 months, after three Army reservists were killed in an attack by an Iran-backed militia on an outpost in Jordan early last year.

But in recent months, the U.S. military has seen a potentially broader vulnerability, as both Israel and Ukraine attacked adversaries with drones smuggled deep behind enemy lines.

The audacious and creative use of drones by an Israeli intelligence agency to mount strikes from inside Iran, and Ukraine’s so-called Operation Spider’s Web, which knocked out Russian strategic bombers with drones launched from inside Russia, has made clear that the threat to the U.S. military is not just overseas, but also at home.

American defense companies are pushing new technologies that they say can more effectively intercept drones. The companies are hoping that the billions of dollars the Pentagon is planning to invest in missile defense — the so-called Golden Dome program — will also be used to build up new drone defenses.

Hegseth directive on ‘unleashing U.S. military drone dominance’ includes deadlines for major overhauls

Jon Harper

Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth issued a new directive Thursday aimed at shaking up the Pentagon’s procurement system and quickly ramping up its arsenal of unmanned aerial systems.

The memo “Unleashing U.S. Military Drone Dominance,” addressed to senior Pentagon leadership, combatant commanders and directors of defense agencies, referred to uncrewed systems as “the biggest battlefield innovation in a generation.”

“Our adversaries collectively produce millions of cheap drones each year. While global military drone production skyrocketed over the last three years, the previous administration deployed red tape. U.S. units are not outfitted with the lethal small drones the modern battlefield requires,” Hegseth wrote.

The directive calls for approving “hundreds” of American products for purchase by the U.S. military, arming combat units with a variety of “low-cost drones made by America’s world-leading engineers and AI experts,” and more widely integrating UAS into training exercises.

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Here are some key deadlines that the SecDef laid out for Pentagon leaders:No later than Sept. 1, the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force must establish “deliberately screened, active-duty experimental formations purpose-built to enable rapid scaling of small UAS across the Joint Force by 2026,

prioritizing initial fielding to U.S. lndo-Pacific Command units,” per the memo. “Within 30 days, the Office of Strategic Capital and Department of Government Efficiency will present options, including advance purchase commitments, direct loans, or other incentives … that accelerate the growth of the U.S. industrial base to outfit our combat units with cheap and effective U.S.-made UAS. To maximize these investments, each Military Service will establish,

Bookshelf: Taiwan’s journey to geopolitical hotspot

The US administration is still formulating its Indo-Pacific policy, but recent indications suggest that it will take a tough stance on Taiwan. At the Shangri-La Dialogue, held in Singapore from 30 May to 1 June, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth reiterated that the United States is an Indo-Pacific nation and is ‘here to stay’.

He warned the participants that any attempt by China to conquer Taiwan by force would result in ‘devastating consequences’ for the region and the world. And the bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities last month demonstrated that under the right circumstances, US President Donald Trump would not shy away from military action.

In this context, the publication this month of Chris Horton’s Ghost Nation could hardly be more timely. Based in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, Horton has spent the past two decades reporting on China and Taiwan for global media including the Financial Times, The New York Times and Nikkei Asia.

Horton’s book is thoroughly researched and packed with interviews, including dissidents and professionals whose daily lives were impacted by the country’s political transformation, and former Taiwanese presidents Lee Teng-hui and Tsai Ing-wen.

Horton anchors his narrative in the triangular relationship between China, Japan and the US. The Qing dynasty took Taiwan over from the Dutch in 1683, but the emperor’s initial attitude to the island was demeaning: ‘Taiwan is no bigger than a ball of mud. We gain nothing by possessing it, and it will be no loss if we do not acquire it.’

Gradually this changed, and in 1887 imperial China declared Taiwan a province only to cede it to Japan in 1895 as part of the Sino-Japanese war peace settlement. Despite China’s vocal claims over Taiwan, Horton reminds us that the last time the island was ruled from Beijing was during the Qing dynasty.

Armenia broadens procurement horizons in drive to modernise armed forces

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In the aftermath of its defeat in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, Armenia has worked to reduce its reliance on Russia as a security partner. It has diversified its defence partnerships by forging new arms deals with countries including France and India to modernise the country’s military.

Two years after its defeat in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, Armenia began a defence-acquisition push that has seen it pivot away from its traditional security guarantor and source of defence materiel, Russia, and look elsewhere for more modern equipment.

Driven in no small part by a deterioration in relations with Moscow – which offered little support to Yerevan in the 2020 conflict and subsequent skirmishes with Azerbaijan, and whose weapons deliveries have slowed down despite prepayments – Armenia has instead turned to France, India and possibly Greece, for a range of materiel.

Armenia’s recent procurement efforts are introducing modern air defence and artillery capabilities (see Table 1) to its armed forces, which have traditionally fielded Soviet- or Russian-built weaponry. The new systems include a mix of Western equipment, such as KNDS France’s CAESAR self-propelled artillery and Indian systems like Larsen & Toubro’s Pinaka multiple rocket launcher.

The United States’ Enduring Commitment to the Indo-Pacific RegionHome

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From Day One, President Biden identified the Indo-Pacific as the critical region for the future of the United States and the world. Under the Biden-Harris Administration, the United States has reinvested in and reinvigorated our leadership in this region and, as a result, our position there is stronger now than ever before.

Together with our allies and partners, we have built a shared foundation for the Indo-Pacific–one that is free, open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient.An Indo-Pacific that is Free and Open

We are promoting a free and open region where individuals can thrive in transparent societies and nations can make sovereign political choices free from coercion. We are addressing regional issues openly, upholding international law and norms, and facilitating the free movement of goods, services, ideas,

and people by:Ensuring seas, skies, and other shared domains are lawfully governed: The Department of Defense (DoD) continues to uphold freedom of navigation and overflight in the Indo-Pacific in accordance with international law. Over the past four years, DoD has challenged over a dozen excessive maritime claims as part of the global freedom of navigation operations (FON) Program. The U.S. military,

alongside allies and partners, has participated in numerous bilateral and multilateral maritime exercises to strengthen regional and international cooperation in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific,

The Limits of Israel’s Degradation Strategy Against Iran’s Network State

The “12 Day War” between Israel and Iran is the peak of a five-decade long conflict between a military-centric hierarchy of the Israeli state and the dispersed mosaic defence infrastructure of the Islamic Republic as a network state. Israel has been scoring several pyrrhic military wins against Iran’s network of networks in the region over the last year. Yet, while Israel’s degradation strategy bought the Jewish state breathing space, Iran’s network both within and across the region remains intact.

Iran is not a state in the traditional sense, vulnerable to top-down regime change or decapitation. It is a mosaic network state – an adaptive, self-organizing, and ideologically resilient structure that has proven to be able to absorb external shocks without collapsing. Israel’s campaign, its most direct and expansive confrontation with Iran to date,

demonstrated the limits of conventional state-on-state warfare against a network state. Degrading the Islamic Republic’s broader regional network, consisting itself of networked non-state actors, will not lead to swift victories but is a long-drawn process of degradation that would require the mobilization of a counter-network.

Iran has long moved beyond the rigid structures of bureaucratic hierarchy. Its governance and regional influence operate through what network theorists call an “all-channel heterarchy”—a decentralized but interconnected system of nodes. Domestically this network revolves around the Supreme Leader who embodies the ideological and institutional anchor of a decentralized network of different parallel institutions of governance and statecraft.

The Islamic Republic can therefore be defined as a network state Iran because it generates power not solely through traditional military or bureaucratic hierarchies, but through a dispersed web of surrogate forces, competing authority centres, networks of companies and financial flows that operate across the boundaries of traditional state sovereignty and territoriality.

Israel, Iran and the New Middle Eastern Chessboard

The brief but intense confrontation between Israel and Iran in June 2025 was more than another Middle Eastern crisis—it was a diagnostic moment that revealed deep structural changes reshaping regional politics.

Like a sudden earthquake exposing hidden fault lines, this conflict illuminated power relationships and vulnerabilities that had been developing beneath the surface for years. This confrontation functions as what Jervis (1997) conceptualizes as a “system effect”—a moment when complex interactions between multiple variables create outcomes that illuminate deeper structural realities.

The analytical framework employed here draws upon theoretical traditions established by Waltz (1979) in structural realism, while incorporating insights from Wendt (1992) regarding the social construction of security threats and Arreguín-Toft (2005) concerning asymmetric conflict dynamics.

The integration of these perspectives allows for comprehensive understanding of how material capabilities, normative structures, and strategic cultures interact to shape regional outcomes. As Buzan et al. (1998) demonstrate,

security threats are not merely objective realities but are constructed through social processes that reflect deeper power relationships and ideational contests. The confrontation exposed four interconnected dynamics that fundamentally reshape our understanding of Middle Eastern geopolitics:Alliance Architecture Gap: The stark contrast between Western institutional cohesion and the nascent Russia-China-Iran counter-axis revealed the differential capacities of established versus emerging power structures, as theorized by Gilpin (1981) in his analysis of hegemonic transitions.

Alliance Dependency Paradox: Israel’s reliance on U.S. support has evolved from strategic advantage to existential necessity, creating what Snyder (1997) identifies as the “alliance security dilemma.”

Digitize or die: Ukraine’s war is a wake-up call for 20th century militaries

Kateryna Chernohorenko

A Ukrainian serviceman uses the internet on his smartphone at a base in the Donetsk region on February 23, 2023, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine. (Photo by YASUYOSHI CHIBA/AFP via Getty Images)

Four years ago, I was managing digital services for newborn registration and COVID certificates in the Ukrainian government. We were building a government in a smartphone. In fact, we were among the first in the world to move so much public administration fully online. Back then, digital transformation was about convenience.

But then Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Suddenly, the stakes were different. Our job was no longer about convenience — it was about survival.

We faced not only an invasion of our territories, but also a war unlike any seen before: where technology, data, and logistics mattered as much as troops and weapons. That’s when we confronted a truth few militaries want to admit: Bureaucracy kills. Not metaphorically. Literally.

Delays aren’t just inefficiencies — they’re casualties. And the tools you use to move information — whether it’s a form, a request, or a call for help — are just as essential as the weapons in your arsenal.

In 2022, it became painfully clear that no amount of courage or firepower could compensate for outdated processes and broken logistics. Paper forms, manual approvals, soldiers waiting weeks to change units, citizens queuing at recruitment offices for hours, just to confirm basic data. We were losing time, and time in war is oxygen.

Why Southeast Asia Is Flocking to BRICS

Derek Grossman

At the BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on July 6 and 7, the group’s leaders will celebrate a significant expansion of their organization. Since 2024, the core BRICS states (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) have been joined by Egypt,

Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates, bolstering the group’s status as a club of major emerging economies. Together, they now account for nearly 40 percent of global GDP by purchasing power, compared to just 30 percent for the Group of Seven (G-7) nations.

Curiously, Southeast Asian economies have been noticeably absent from BRICS activities for the vast majority of the bloc’s existence. The region’s largest economy, Indonesia, only joined in January. Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam recently decided to participate as partner nations, which could be a first step toward membership. The trend clearly demonstrates rising interest among Southeast Asian states in becoming enmeshed in this multilateral organization. What has changed?

How BRICS Can Survive ‘America First’

Sarang Shidore

A photo illustration of Xi and Putin smiling at each other with the U.S. Capitol building in the background and mpas of BRICS countries in the foreground.Mark Harris illustration for Foreign Policy

What does Washington’s dominant “America First” mood mean for BRICS?

As its leaders gather in Rio de Janeiro this weekend, the omens are not propitious. U.S. President Donald Trump has taken direct aim at the 10-nation grouping,

threatening to impose a 100 percent tariff on its member states should they try to dethrone the U.S. dollar from its globally dominant role. Washington has also stepped up a trade and tariff war across the world, including against almost all BRICS states.

And a BRICS member state, Iran, recently came under a ferocious military assault from the United States. Can BRICS survive this onslaught, and what must it do to stay relevant in a new world?

The evolution of cyber forces in NATO countries

The emergence of cyberspace as a realm of strategic competition has fundamentally transformed the global security environment, necessitating that NATO and its member states continuously reassess the frameworks, doctrines, and capabilities required for effective defence. As cyber threats increase in frequency, complexity, and severity—spanning critical infrastructure sabotage to hybrid disinformation campaigns—NATO allies are expediting the establishment of specialised cyber units within their national armed forces. These advancements address national security requirements and significantly enhance the Alliance’s collective resilience.

This study provides a thorough analysis of cyber force development across all 32 NATO member states, emphasising their distinct methodologies for establishing, organising, and integrating cyber units within their respective military and defence structures. Each nation is evaluated based on its cybersecurity environment, the historical development of its cyber units, and the present organisation and competencies of its cyber forces. The research indicates a robust and escalating trend wherein, although states may initially develop cyber capabilities for national interests, the aggregate impact of these concurrent endeavours substantially bolsters NATO’s collective security framework in cyberspace.

Through this detailed comparative analysis, the paper identifies both common patterns and national distinctions in how cyber forces are conceptualised, funded, and deployed. Despite variations in maturity and structure, from highly advanced commands to newly forming units, every member state is increasingly recognising cyberspace as a domain where a military presence is essential. The study highlights the strategic convergence between national sovereignty in cyber defence and the interdependence required for effective NATO coordination, especially in light of evolving threats from adversarial actors such as the Russian Federation.

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The Digital Immune System: How AI Can Outpace Cyber Threats

Cyberattacks can now compromise critical infrastructure faster than humans can perceive or respond. As adversaries grow more sophisticated and the cost of disruption rises, human-led defenses alone are no longer sufficient. We must re-engineer cybersecurity to match the speed and

complexity of modern threats, starting with core operations.

We can build an enterprise digital immune system by using models that adapt in real time, like the human immune system. This system augments Security Operations Centers (SOCs) by autonomously detecting and defending against active threats in milliseconds. The result: greater productivity, lower costs, and minimized business impact.

With AI agents advancing rapidly, the moment to shift toward a proactive, adaptive model of cyber resilience is now.

The Immune System Approach

Our bodies—divided across levels of organization that build on each other—are not unlike many of our networks. Not only do they share many interconnected systems that depend on constant communication to complete critical functions, but they also need to be defended from foreign invaders. In the body, our immune system protects us against external threats. It does so by recognizing the presence of a pathogen

Defence Data Strategy 2.0 - Decision Advantage in the Data Age

The Defence Data Strategy 2.0 builds on the foundations laid by Defence’s first data strategy, released in 2021, and responds to the direction set by the Government through the 2024 National Defence Strategy and Integrated Investment Program.

The Defence Data Strategy 2.0 continues Defence’s journey to improve the treatment of data as a strategic asset. It sets the vision that Defence will be a data centric organisation that uses data to enhance preparedness, optimise service delivery and realise decision advantage.

Decision advantage is the ability to make better decisions, faster than any potential adversary, and it is one of the 6 key capability effects identified in the 2024 National Defence Strategy.

AI’s Growing Role in News

When generative AI burst into public consciousness, many in the news industry experienced a familiar sense of dread. Social media had decimated newsroom business models over the last decade, and here is yet another set of technologies out to kill them.

But that sentiment is misguided. Indeed, AI’s role in news presents many risks to publishers, but—like the advent of the world wide web decades prior—it also represents an opportunity to fulfill the public service mission of journalism.

“No Turning Back: AI’s Growing Role in News” is the second in a series of reports on AI and News from Aspen Digital. It summarizes key insights from our March 2025 gathering in London of top news executives from the UK and Europe. What struck us most is how far things have come since we had a similar meeting in New York last spring.

The following are our takeaways, authored by Dr. Felix Simon:News rooms are using AI, but carefully – Newsrooms are embracing AI but for incremental improvements rather than revolutionary transformation. Most have focused on automating routine tasks like transcription, translation, and headline creation. Many organizations ’have established internal training programs, created specialized AI roles, and identified internal “AI influencers” to encourage adoption and mitigate resistance.

A shift to “distinctive journalism” – To mitigate the threats from AI presents for news discovery, publishers are focusing on the kind of distinctive journalism that AI cannot easily replicate, including investigative and enterprise reporting,

and nuanced analysis.Is imitation the highest form of flattery? – A central industry dispute involves the use of publishers’ content to train AI systems. Many technology companies have scraped news content without compensation, often justifying this through broad interpretations of fair use doctrine. In response, some publishers advocate for stricter enforcement of existing copyright laws and oppose copyright exemptions that favor AI developers. Proposed solutions include collective licensing arrangements or managed marketplaces to connect AI developers and rights holders.

Why Defense Is—Now—Eating the World

Chad Williamson

Nearly fifteen years after Marc Andreessen published his legendary op-ed, Why Software Is Eating the World—August 20, 2011—we find ourselves witnessing another domain shift, this time not in code, but in combat. As the U.S. asks its allies and adversaries alike to reimagine national power through the lens of defense spending, innovation, and deterrence, one thing becomes clear…

This isn’t just a digital revolution anymore. It’s a defense revolution—a full-scale transformation in how nations think, build, and align around security. The Pentagon is no longer just a consumer of defense technology. It is attempting to become the founder of a global warfighting ecosystem.

But ecosystems aren’t purchased—they’re built. And this new world of defense innovation requires a different blueprint. Not the blitzscaling of Silicon Valley. But the long game of Boulder, Colorado.

Feld, a venture capitalist and co-founder of Techstars, laid out a generational theory of how to build startup communities. His Boulder Thesis argues that real ecosystems need four key ingredients, 1. entrepreneurs as leaders (not bureaucrats), 2. long-term vision, 3. inclusive networks, and 4. substantive engagement through shared experience.

That’s exactly the mindset the Department of Defense—and its international counterparts—must adopt now.

The Annual Agony of Yearning for a Homegrown Wimbledon Champion

On the first Tuesday of Wimbledon, with hot evening sunshine lighting up the deuce court, Jack Draper, the fourth seed in the gentlemen’s singles, was playing disconcertingly well. He was on serve in his opening match and,

as he said later, “I was getting my tennis together a little bit.” Draper, who is twenty-three, was the No. 1-ranked British player in this year’s competition, which is not an uncomplicated place to be.

Britain is a nation that ignores professional tennis for fifty weeks of the year and then focusses, raptly, on the beauty and skill on display at the All England Lawn Tennis and Croquet Club,

as if the event were an extremely successful garden party to which not everyone has been invited. The great British public, in floral dresses and questionable hats, will peer through the hedge if necessary. And this year it was Draper they wanted to see.

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‘Third World War will come in cyber form, not guns and bullets

My background generally is in consultancy, organisational development and performance enhancement. From there, I moved on to managing programmes and projects and into IT as a project manager. A good project manager should be able to manage projects in any field. I say to people generally, that you should know everything about something and something about everything. That led me into a lot of fields globally because I intended to work with big organisations or national governments in the UK.

A lot of the time, you tend to manage multisite projects. That was good for me in terms of exposure. In my bid to know a little about everything, I moved into IT and then into cyber security.

Many of the people who know me for organisational development and business management consultancy may not immediately know me as a cyber security specialist, particularly in this part of the world. I went through secondary school and tertiary education in the UK but came back to Nigeria and lived with my family for nine years. I ran my own management consultancy while I was here.

The other part of this is that I am at a stage in my life that it is time for service. I have always lived the life of service, but I feel right now that I need to be doing more in terms of spreading wealth. I would like to see Nigeria’s wealth spread. I know that people talk about it a lot and I know that a lot of people are doing good things. It is just how we get synergy, pull together to make it better.

Nigeria is a very wealthy country and there is absolutely no reason why anybody should not be able to have a decent meal a day and there is no reason why anybody should not be able to send their children to school, maybe not at the same level. There is absolutely no reason why Nigerians should not be educated. When we are educated we do extremely well and we go to build and develop other countries. You hear that a Nigerian is the best Neuro-surgeon in America or you hear this or that Nigerian is the best solar engineer in Switzerland.

Military and Security Dimensions of Quantum Technologies: A Primer

Quantum technologies are advancing rapidly from experimental research into strategic defence and security applications, fundamentally altering how information is sensed, shared and secured. Ground- and satellite-based quantum key distribution networks are already being deployed by China and the European Union,

promising virtually unbreakable communication. Quantum sensing systems, capable of precise navigation without a global navigation satellite system as well as subterranean and underwater detection, are nearing operational use. In computing, there are expectations that within one to three years quantum computers will be able to solve problems with real-world applications faster or more efficiently than classical computing methods—although significant hurdles in fidelity, error correction and scale remain.

Given the dual-use nature of quantum technologies—meaning that civilian advances can be rapidly applied to military or intelligence contexts—the potential for strategic asymmetries as the rate of progress on quantum differs markedly between states, and the likely future large-scale proliferation of quantum tools, strong policy frameworks, ethical norms and international cooperation are essential. However,

while there is an expanding array of national strategies to address areas such as research, supply chain resilience and export controls, multilateral coordination on quantum standards and norms is fragmented. This report therefore provides important background and recommendations aimed at supporting the creation of international ethical, legal and security frameworks that ensure quantum bolsters, rather than undermines, global stability.

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