As theories swirl about Air India crash, key details remain unknown

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While the preliminary report into what caused the loss of Air India Flight 171 last month has provided some answers, it has also prompted a wave of speculation about its cause.

The Boeing 787 Dreamliner crashed into a building less than a minute after take-off from the city of Ahmedabad in western India en route to London, killing 241 people on board, along with 19 on the ground. One passenger survived.

Information contained in India's Air Accident Investigation Bureau report, the first official account of what happened, has raised questions about the role of the pilots.

However, experts within the aviation industry claim investigators have been highly selective in what they have chosen to say.

What the report says

Under international protocols, the state leading an air accident investigation is meant to issue a preliminary report within 30 days. The 15-page document published by India's Air Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) on Saturday fulfils this requirement.

Although the AAIB has been leading the investigation, US interests are also represented, because Boeing, the maker of the aircraft, and GE Aerospace, the engine manufacturer are American.

The report does not set out any conclusions as to the cause of the accident. Nevertheless, it has sparked considerable controversy.

In its account of the accident flight, the AAIB states that two fuel cut-off switches were moved from the "run" to the "cut-off" position seconds after take-off.

Chinese Engagement with Africa

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The authors of this report present a brief historical overview of the relationship between African countries and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since its inception in the middle of the 20th century. In this overview, the authors cover economic, humanitarian, and political aspects; highlight trade and investment flows; 

and summarize Chinese medical and military aid to Africa. The authors also cover Chinese interests in Africa and African countries’ concerns about Chinese engagement on the continent. In addition, three country case studies are presented to highlight how Chinese engagement differs from country to country on the continent. The authors conclude with recommendations for policymakers and propose areas for further research.

A decline in relations between the West and Africa at the end of the Cold War and the drop in Western approval because of undemocratic practices and human rights abuses in African countries have created an avenue for China to expand its relationships with African countries. While the West attached conditions to loans and assistance offered to African countries, China presented a no-strings-attached alternative, 

which only required African nations to respect China’s core sovereignty interests. China has also taken advantage of disinvestment by Western companies in Africa to increase its investments. Chinese economic engagement declined in the second half of the 2010s but is now enjoying a revitalization. This economic engagement has paved the way for greater political and security engagements with African 

The PRC’s engagement with African countries has gained widespread attention in the past decade because of increased Chinese engagement and influence.

Historically, Chinese interests in Africa have been mainly economic and political but now include security interests.

Trump Is Helping China Win the AI Race

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As the US regulatory environment becomes increasingly chaotic, discouraging investment and innovation, China has streamlined regulations and fostered public-private partnerships. The implications for the future of American influence could be profound.

NEW HAVEN – In the aftermath of pandemic-era restrictions and a government crackdown on the tech sector, China’s AI companies spent much of 2023 in a state of malaise. While American firms surged ahead with increasingly powerful models and applications, Chinese regulators appeared intent on constraining domestic innovation through stringent and often ambiguou rules.

But Chinese AI companies managed to pull themselves out of this rut by adopting new strategies and reshaping institutional relationships between the authorities and private developers with a view toward streamlining domestic regulations. 

Since then, the landscape has shifted dramatically: the US AI industry now grapples with a chaotic regulatory environment under President Donald Trump’s administration, while China’s approach to AI governance has grown more flexible and supportive of innovation.

Several developments have contributed to this shift. For starters, the emergence of novel institutional mechanisms helped shape a more collaborative, multi-stakeholder approach to regulation, 

fueling the creation of new AI companies. One notable example is DeepSeek, China’s breakthrough AI firm, which grew out of a hedge fund. Others, like Zhipu AI and Moonshot AI – creator of the Kimi model – originated from a partnership between Tsinghua University and the Beijing Academy of AI, a nonprofit industry association established with support from municipal authorities.

The coming rare earths war China has the advantage

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If there is a moment of origin for the China shock that has hit the United States, it is events around rare earths in the late summer and early autumn of 2010. That August, China reduced its export quotas for the rest of the year. 

The following month, it stopped selling rare earths to Japan after the Japanese Coastal Guard detained the captain of a Chinese fishing trawler that had struck one of its vessels in the waters around the territorially-disputed Senkaku Islands. 

Within four days of losing access to metals on which the country’s electronics and car industries depended, Japan backed down. But China retained the embargo for another five weeks. By November, rare earth prices had soared, and they would not return to their pre-crisis level for months.

Since China accounted for more than 90% of global production in 2010, nothing could be the same again for consumers of the 17 rare-earth elements. In 2011, a US House of Representatives sub-committee held hearings on the national security implications of China’s monopoly. In 2012, the US, 

Japan, and the EU launched a case against Beijing’s restrictions at the World Trade Organisation. After losing in Geneva, China agreed to dismantle the quota regime, but Beijing would no longer be trusted as a reliable long-term trading partner.

Yet, even as China’s share of global production has fallen to around 70%, its power as a rare earth exporter has loomed more seismically over the world economy for the past few months than ever before. 

On 4 April, China announced new licence requirements for exporting seven specific rare earths and associated magnets to all countries in response to Trump hiking tariffs on Chinese goods to 54% earlier that week. One of these metals, samarium, is exclusively produced and processed in China, and it is essential for, among other military weapons, the Pentagon’s F-35 fighter jets.

Minerals, Magnets, and Military Capability: China’s Rare Earth Weaponization Should Be a Wake-Up Call

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When China imposed export controls on seven of the seventeen rare earth elements in April 2025, it wasn’t just a trade policy tweak—it was a shot across the bow of the US defense industrial base. American fighter jets, satellites,

 guided missiles, and submarines all rely on high-performance magnets built with rare earths like neodymium, samarium, and dysprosium. 

This blocking action by China followed earlier prohibitions on gallium and germanium, which are foundational to infrared optics and radar systems. These materials are overwhelmingly Chinese controlled, processed, and manufactured—and American reliance on foreign minerals and rare earths exposes critical vulnerabilities.

China refines over 85 percent of the world’s rare earths and produces nearly 90 percent of high-performance rare earth magnets. That means US weapon systems, from F-35s and Virginia-class submarines to hypersonic weapon systems and precision-guided munitions, 

are all critically dependent on materials from strategic rivals. Exotic minerals are no longer just for the green revolution; this is about the United States and its allies having the raw materials needed to sustain a future war.

What began as a commercial pressure tactic has escalated into a strategic stress test of the US defense industrial base. American defense firms are already reporting procurement delays, while companies like General Motors are scrambling to source non-Chinese magnets to avoid broader industrial paralysis. 

Just weeks after the April restrictions took effect, multiple defense suppliers—including subcontractors for radar and propulsion systems—reported slowdowns and sourcing complications, signaling an era of Chinese weaponization of materials. While the civilian economy may appear resilient to substitution; the defense sector is not.

Partners in Deterrence: China and Russia’s Deepening Military-Technical Ties

Daniel Balazs

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In early May, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Moscow to meet with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and to participate in the Victory Day parade commemorating the victory over Nazi Germany in World War II.

 The two leaders issued a joint statement, expressing their opposition to U.S. defense initiatives such as the Golden Dome and AUKUS, which they deem threats to global strategic stability. They also committed “to enhancing the coordination of their approaches and to deepening the practical cooperation on maintaining and strengthening global strategic stability.”

The leaders did not specify the exact ways of this practical cooperation. A scrutiny of Sino-Russian military cooperation in recent years, however, reveals that there are several military-technical cooperation channels and projects — trade of arms and dual-use items, missile defense, 

submarine and helicopter development — that could be strengthened following their proclaimed effort to deepen cooperation. Advances in these areas have the potential to significantly alter the balance of capabilities in the U.S.-China-Russia strategic triangle.

Sino-Russian Military-Technical Cooperation: An Elusive Framework

China and Russia reject the idea of formal military alliances and refer to each other as strategic partners instead. Nevertheless, they still share a military partnership that relies on institutionalized interactions.

At the highest level, Xi and Putin often issue joint statements that form the guiding principles of military cooperation. At the same time, China and Russia have a Strategic Security Consultation, an annual meeting between the director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs from the Communist Party of China and the secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council, which functions as a strategic coordination mechanism between the two sides. Furthermore, Beijing and Moscow use five-year cooperation agreements to coordinate their military ties.

GM’s Final EV Battery Strategy Copies China’s Playbook: Super Cheap Cells

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General Motors has just announced its latest and likely final piece in what now appears to be a three-pronged cell-chemistry strategy to power GM’s lineup of a dozen EVs through the end of the decade and beyond.

GM has stated today it will build low-cost lithium iron phosphate (LFP) battery cells in Spring Hill, Tennessee, starting in late 2027. Conversion of cell lines to produce that chemistry will begin later this year. The cell plant at the Spring Hill complex is owned and operated by Ultium Cells, GM’s joint-venture battery company with LG Energy Solution. A GM assembly plant in the same complex builds the Cadillac Lyriq and Acura ZDX electric SUVs.

Under Kurt Kelty, GM vice president of battery, propulsion, and sustainability, the company has diversified from its previous strategy of “one cell for all EVs.” Kelty was hired in February 2024 after stints at Tesla and Panasonic, and is widely respected in the industry.

The LFP cells made by Ultium are expected to be used in the updated 2026 Chevrolet Bolt EV, which GM should reveal within two to three months. It will go into production in a Kansas plant before the end this year. For its first two years,

 it will have to use LFP cells imported from another LG plant—potentially one in South Korea. Those imports let GM get inexpensive iron-phosphate batteries onto US roads a full three years before its next cell chemistry, called LMR, which it says costs no more than LFP, but has higher energy density.

Still, converting a plant—at an unspecified cost—to build LFP cells suggests they will be used in the lineup for a while.

Floods in the Texas Hill Country: Reflections on a Catastrophe

George Friedman

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A little over a week ago, the Guadalupe River in the Texas Hill Country went berserk, as rivers sometimes do in this area, killing some 130 people. Well over a hundred are still missing. Many of the deceased were children because the Guadalupe, when sane, is a beautiful river surrounded by woods,

punctuated by summer camps along its banks. This tragedy was met with a profound and intense sorrow, followed by a wave of self-righteous accusations and searches for villains, mostly from outside the Hill Country. 

Local leaders were said by some to have failed in their duty to know that the Guadalupe would flood and failed to warn the victims to flee from the natural intermittent madness of nature. Very quickly the blame came in, from a lack of sirens to global warming to Donald Trump and cuts in the federal government that left the National Weather Service unable to anticipate the intensity of the rain and therefore that the Guadalupe would run amok.

All this is very personal to me and my wife. We live in the Hill Country and have spent time on the Guadalupe River. We chose to settle in the Hill Country about 20 years ago after a lifetime of global wandering. 

We live in Hays County, which experienced some major flooding 10 years ago that claimed many lives, though it was mercifully spared from the catastrophe of July 4. The epicenter of the floods was in Kerr County, which is only about 80 miles (130 km) from my house, but many other counties experienced loss of life.

Texas is a very large state. The smallest state in the union is Rhode Island, with an area of 1,214 square miles. Kerr County is 1,107 square miles, and by no means is it the largest in Texas. The population of Rhode Island is just over 1 million people, while the population of Kerr County is about 54,000.

An expert’s point of view on a current event.

Patrick Schröder

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The European Union is making a significant shift in its approach to resource security, preparing to launch a strategic stockpiling program for critical minerals. Amid growing geopolitical tensions and risks,this new EU stockpiling strategy, which the Financial Times first reported on last weekend, signals Brussels’s intent to reduce vulnerabilities in the supply of key raw materials and components, such as rare earths,

 lithium,and permanent magnets, that are essential for clean energy technologies, digital infrastructure, and defense applications. While the EU is not the first to adopt such measures—Japan, South Korea, and the United States have long maintained national stockpiles—this move underscores a broader securitization of critical mineral supply chains. But while stockpiling may offer short-term resilience, 

it reflects a largely unilateral response to a broader global challenge. Without stronger multilateral cooperation, such strategies risk exacerbating resource competition and undermining efforts to ensure fair and equitable access to the materials needed for the global energy transition.

Recent tensions between the United States and China over rare-earth exports appear to have eased following a new trade agreement signed last month, but this diplomatic breakthrough offers only temporary relief in an increasingly volatile market. Deeper structural challenges are obvious: the lack of robust international governance and coordination across critical raw material value chains. Earlier episodes underscore the problem.

 In April, U.S. President Donald Trump pressured Ukraine into a critical minerals deal that would allow the United States access to Ukraine’s mineral resources as a condition for continued military support. Trump also repeatedly made provocative claims about acquiring Greenland (“We need Greenland very badly”), not ruling out using military force, motivated in part by Greenland’s vast untapped mineral resources.

Undersea Cables Are Vulnerable to Sabotage—but This Takes Skill and Specialist Equipment

John Aitken

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Countries have come to rely on a network of cables and pipes under the sea for their energy and communications. So it has been worrying to read headlines about communications cables being cut and, in one case, an undersea gas pipeline being blown up.

Critical undersea infrastructure (CUI) as these connections are known, supports about US$9 trillion (£6.6 trillion) worth of trade per day. A coordinated attack on this network could undoubtedly have devastating consequences.

But, as a former submarine commander who researches maritime security, I believe that attacking and disrupting the network is not as easy as some reports might make it appear. Deliberately snagging a pipeline with a dragging anchor in relatively shallow waters can cause a lot of damage, but it is fairly indiscriminate trick with a shelf life, since the damage can be repaired, and deniability becomes increasingly difficult.

Targeting the cable networks in deeper waters require more sophisticated methods, which are much more challenging to carry out.

A hostile state wishing to attack this network first needs to locate the cables they wish to target. The majority of the newer commercial cables are very clearly charted, but their positions are not exact.

Targeting the cable networks in deeper waters require more sophisticated methods, which are much more challenging to carry out.

Cables and pipelines, even the heaviest ones, will drift somewhat as they are laid, and the deeper the water they sit in, the greater the distance they may drift.

Managing the Defense Industry

Donald Hill

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Before the Second World War, there was a strong ‘America First’ political faction in the USA, which didn’t want to take part in foreign wars. However, President Franklin D Roosevelt realized that war was inevitable and he began ramping up the US industrial base to prepare for it.

The government owned over 100 facilities that made weapons and equipment but they wouldn’t be able to provide the volume that was needed so civilian factories were converted or created to fill the demand. However, military equipment required higher precision and quality than the civilian factories and workforce could manage, so the designs of the equipment had to be modular and simplified.

One example of that process was the B-24 bomber, designed by Consolidated Aircraft. While the design was state of the art, flying faster, farther and carrying a heavier payload than the famed B-17 made by Boeing, every single B-24 was individually hand-crafted. To increase production, the government enlisted the Ford motor company, which could quickly produce cars with 15,000 parts.

Of course, there were critics of this idea: they - rightfully - doubted they could manage the same feat with an aircraft that had 450,000 parts, including 360,000 rivets that came in 550 different sizes.

When Ford’s production chief saw Consolidated’s production process he noted that no two aircaft were built alike. In his hotel room he stayed up until 4 o’clock in the morning to design a new work flow process. 

The Right Way to Wield America’s Economic Power

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We are living in the age of economic statecraft. In just two decades, the world’s leading powers—above all, the United States—have shifted from using economic pressure sparingly to making it a default feature of foreign policy. As a result, the practice of economic coercion—sanctions, export controls, tariffs, 

and investment restrictions—has proliferated at breathtaking speed. Since 2000, the number of sanctioned individuals and entities worldwide has increased tenfold. Tariffs and trade barriers have quintupled globally in just five years. More than 90 percent of advanced economies now screen foreign investment in sensitive sectors, up from less than one-third a decade ago.

 And when Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the United States and its allies froze more than $300 billion of the foreign reserves held by Russia’s central bank in G-7 jurisdictions—crossing financial boundaries once considered sacrosanct.

Indeed, more than three years later, it is clear that Pandora’s box has been opened. In its first hundred days, the current Trump administration attempted to enact tariffs with a speed and breadth unmatched in modern history. Beijing responded by imposing controls on key minerals exports and telegraphing its capacity to throttle supply chains across strategic sectors, underscoring the reality that economic warfare is no longer the exception. It is now the main arena of great-power competition.

Yet economic statecraft holds both power and peril. Unbridled economic coercion can fracture global markets, entrench rivalry between blocs, and breed instability that risks triggering the very kinetic conflicts it aims to avoid. Despite these risks, no U.S. government doctrine has yet emerged to guide economic statecraft, nor are there institutional safeguards to protect against its abuses. The use of military force, by contrast, 

The Promise and Peril of Recognizing Palestine

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In June, the United Nations planned to convene a conference on the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Led by France and Saudi Arabia, the assembled nations were expected to agree to recognize a Palestinian state and call for a renewed peace process, presumably based on the 2002 Saudi-led Arab Peace Initiative, which proposed full peace between the Arab states and Israel after the creation of a Palestinian state.

Israel repeatedly condemned the conference, and the United States was less than enthusiastic. “We are urging governments not to participate in the conference,” read a cable sent in June by the State Department in Washington to U.S. embassies around the world, according to Reuters. “The United States opposes any steps that would unilaterally recognize a conjectural Palestinian state, which adds significant legal and political obstacles to the eventual resolution of the conflict and could coerce Israel during a war, thereby supporting its enemies,” the cable stated.

The Trump administration had a more fundamental objection to the conference: it opposes not merely the recognition of a Palestinian state but also the establishment of such a state. “Unless there are some significant things that happen that change the culture, there’s no room for it,” said Mike Huckabee, the U.S. ambassador to Israel, in an interview with Bloomberg News, adding that he did not expect to see such an outcome “in our lifetime.” And if such a state ever emerges, he suggested, it should not be located in the Palestinian territories that Israel occupies but should instead be carved out of “a Muslim country.”

Just days before the conference was supposed to begin, Israel carried out a series of airstrikes on Iran. The resulting 12-day war, which the United States eventually joined, overshadowed the Israeli-Palestinian issue and made it logistically impossible to move forward with the conference, which was postponed. “This postponement cannot undermine our determination to move forward with the implementation of the two-state solution,” French President Emmanuel Macron told a news conference. “Whatever the circumstances,” he added, “I have stated my determination to recognize the state of Palestine.”

Shitposting as a National Asset

Ladislav Bittman

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On April 20, 1950, President Harry Truman gave an address to the annual convention of the American Society of Newspaper Editors. Flanked by some of the most prominent and influential media moguls of the time, Truman took the opportunity to formally state a pivotal shift in American foreign policy. “Deceit, distortion, and lies are systematically used by [the Kremlin] as a matter of deliberate policy,” Truman said. 

To combat the Soviets in the new information war, western democracies led by the United States “must make ourselves heard round the world in a great campaign of truth.” Little did those in attendance know that they were only one small piece of what became America’s most comprehensive information campaign in history; a campaign that relied just as much on stretching the truth as on the truth itself.

During the Cold War, the United States fought fire with fire, combatting Soviet information warfare operations with operations of its own. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) spearheaded numerous active measures—covert or semi-covert state-backed operations designed to manipulate public opinion and destabilize adversaries without military action. As much as it was nuclear deterrence and savvy diplomacy that won the Cold War, it was the soft power of enabling people behind the Iron Curtain to hear jazz over the radio, read glossy American magazines, and watch Apollo 11 land on the moon.

Now, we find ourselves once again engaged in an information war. Russian trolls are sowing distrust in our democratic institutions. Chinese content farms are infiltrating social media in an attempt to destabilize Taiwan. Iranian operatives are spreading deepfakes to stoke unrest and inflame tensions across the Middle East.

Shitposting as a National Asset

Ladislav Bittman

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On April 20, 1950, President Harry Truman gave an address to the annual convention of the American Society of Newspaper Editors. Flanked by some of the most prominent and influential media moguls of the time, Truman took the opportunity to formally state a pivotal shift in American foreign policy. “Deceit, 

distortion, and lies are systematically used by [the Kremlin] as a matter of deliberate policy,” Truman said. To combat the Soviets in the new information war, western democracies led by the United States “must make ourselves heard round the world in a great campaign of truth.” Little did those in attendance know that they were only one small piece of what became America’s most comprehensive information campaign in history; a campaign that relied just as much on stretching the truth as on the truth itself.

During the Cold War, the United States fought fire with fire, combatting Soviet information warfare operations with operations of its own. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) spearheaded numerous active measures—covert or semi-covert state-backed operations designed to manipulate public opinion and destabilize adversaries without military action. As much as it was nuclear deterrence and savvy diplomacy that won the Cold War, it was the soft power of enabling people behind the Iron Curtain to hear jazz over the radio, read glossy American magazines, and watch Apollo 11 land on the moon.

Now, we find ourselves once again engaged in an information war. Russian trolls are sowing distrust in our democratic institutions. Chinese content farms are infiltrating social media in an attempt to destabilize Taiwan. Iranian operatives are spreading deepfakes to stoke unrest and inflame tensions across the Middle East.

Iran’s nuclear programme after the strikes

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On 12 June 2025, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iran was in non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement, citing undeclared material and a history of activities suggesting a pursuit of weaponisation. The next day, Israel began its strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure. Nine days later, the United States joined the targeting campaign.

While the damage to individual facilities is still being assessed through secret and open intelligence, the big picture of Iran’s remaining nuclear-weapons-relevant capability is coming into focus. 

The strikes have significantly disrupted its nuclear programme and potential weaponisation options but not eliminated them. This analysis surveys the infrastructure and materials available to Iran, were it to decide to rebuild its latent nuclear-weapons capability, or ‘sprint to the bomb’.

Hunting the hexafluorideBefore the strikes, international concerns focused on Iran’s stockpile of around 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60% U-235, a few steps from weapons-grade. Stored as uranium hexafluoride (UF6), 

the highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile, if further enriched to around 90%, is enough for roughly ten nuclear weapons. While IAEA inspectors had inventoried the stockpile, they have lost track of it since the start of the conflict. 

Trucks observed outside Fordow and Isfahan before and after the strikes suggest that Iran may have moved the material. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi confirmed that Iran had announced that it would take protective measures for its nuclear material prior to any attacks.

The ‘hunt for the hex’ remains significant because, even at lower enrichment levels, UF6 stockpiles can theoretically be fed directly into any remaining centrifuges for further enrichment. Iran’s domestic supply chain – including 14 uranium mines left untouched by the strikes – adds an extra layer of resilience by means of securing the material needed for both civilian and military programmes.

Fighting with Robots: The Time to Prepare is Now

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On December 20, 2024, Ukraine’s successfully conducted an “all-robot” ground and air attack, with dozens of drones in the air and unmanned ground platforms coordinated in an assault against a Russian position in Kharkiv oblast. The remarkable achievement highlighted the rapid integration of robotic systems into current military formations. 

Human-machine integrated formations are no longer speculative concepts—they are operational necessities. US Army Futures Command, created to transform the Army to ensure war-winning readiness, is developing unmanned ground and aerial drones in order to not sacrifice the lives of soldiers in our next fight.

Use of unmanned systems allows the Army to automate our riskiest tasks and to field robotic systems that enable leaders to make faster, better-informed decisions. The tactical formations of tomorrow will be hybrid in nature—comprised of soldiers and intelligent machines fighting together.

But fielding robotic platforms is not enough. The materiel component of this change in the character of warfare is paired with a cognitive element. To effectively command in the future, young leaders must understand robotic systems and how to employ them. Leaders must know what is required to win with robots, and the time to begin preparing is now.

Building the Skill Set: What Future Leaders Need to Know

If you polled senior Army leaders, the number one characteristic they would say a future leader must possess is adaptability. In doctrinal terms, they must be able “to influence conditions and respond effectively to changing threats and situations with appropriate,

flexible, and timely actions.” To effectively lead a human-machine integrated formation, soldiers must develop technical and digital fluency that matches their physical endurance and tactical knowledge. Tactical decision-making will increasingly rely not only on the warfighting expertise honed by hard training, but also on the ability to operate and understand complex systems—both hardware and software.

Could Israel target Pakistan’s nukes? A ticking geopolitical bomb

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Israel’s relentless strikes have crushed a series of nuclear ambitions: Egypt’s missiles in the ‘60s, Iraq’s Osiraq nuclear reactor in ’81, Syria’s al-Kibar nuclear reactor in ’07, and now Iran in 2025. A provocative Modern Diplomacy piece, “Once Israel Defeats Iran, Pakistan is Next”, now eyes Islamabad’s 170 warheads as a looming menace.

Should a volatile, Islamist-leaning regime wield such apocalyptic power? Pakistan’s tangled web – its nukes, jihadist ties, and role as China’s strategic ally – begs exposure. Not a war drum for Israeli raids, but a stark alert to a geopolitical fuse armed and live.

Pakistan is no small fish. Its operational, scattered arsenal, backed by Saudi gold and Chinese steel, thrives amid chaos. Osama bin Laden’s cosy hideout and hardliner currents betray shaky ground. Can such a state be trusted with doomsday weapons?

Modern Diplomacy floats Israel and India hitting Pakistan’s less-fortified nuclear sites, then potentially carving it into Sindh and Punjab, snatching Kashmir, and severing China’s Indian Ocean dreams. This depicts Pakistan as a strategic zone.

China relies on Pakistan’s Himalayan buffer. A toothless Islamabad would disrupt Beijing’s plans, from Taiwan to beyond, forcing a critical repositioning of forces. Pakistan’s nukes fuel its bravado. And while its bunkers are less fortified than Iran’s, its arsenal is no less deadly. This brew of volatility and alliances makes a lethal puzzle.

Beside the latest Iran air campaign, Israel’s 1985 Tunis raid, a 2.400-km achievement, proves its long-range resolve and ability to hit targets with precision. With tankers over Jordan or Iraq, enabled by Syria’s collapse, Pakistan is a reachable objective. Yet, a jump from Iran to Pakistan may be too long a shot.

Regime in Crisis? Iran’s New Strategic Dilemmas

László Csicsmann & Scott N. Romaniuk

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On June 22, at dawn, the worst-case scenario unfolded from the perspective of the Iranian leadership: the United States, in support of Israel, deployed heavy bombers against Iran’s underground nuclear facilities in Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan—targets that, according to US statements, were destroyed. 

Iran now stands against not just Israel, with its unmistakable edge in military and intelligence capabilities, but also against the direct involvement of a global superpower. Tensions between Washington and Tehran were already elevated following the 2020 assassination of Qasem Soleimani—commander of the Quds Force, 

the elite clandestine branch of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) responsible for foreign operations and widely considered Iran’s second most powerful figure. At that time, Iran responded with a limited missile attack on US military bases in Iraq, but the conflict quickly de-escalated by February 2020.

However, the current crisis differs markedly from the 2019–2020 US–Iran standoff. This time, the survival of the Iranian regime appears to be in jeopardy. This analysis aims to examine the key questions and strategic choices facing Iran’s leadership in this critical moment. According to the author, 

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei must now balance two interdependent priorities: preserving domestic stability and crafting a credible response to the attack.

Maintaining Political Stability and Avoiding a Power Vacuum

The Iranian leadership is justifiably concerned about the possibility that armed domestic groups, with foreign support, could organize a rebellion within the country and that Washington and Tel Aviv may ultimately seek to target and eliminate Iran’s political leadership.

America asks its allies the tough questions

Grant Newsham

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The United States wants to know what Japan and Australia would do in the event of a conflict over Taiwan.

Under Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby is under fire, as he sometimes is these days.

But the US has asked a reasonable question since the Americans are expected to do the heavy-lifting over Taiwan, and they need help. The United States is also treaty-obligated to defend both Japan and Australia in event of a fight unrelated to Taiwan.

The question appears to have been asked behind closed doors – which is good – but also appears to have been leaked. Which is not good – no matter who leaked it.

Even friends don’t like being ordered around.

And another reason to keep it out of public eye? If Japan and Australia equivocate on support for Taiwan, which they undoubtedly will, that’s surely a signal to Beijing to press ahead.

Washington absolutely needs those commitments – but privately.

Ironically, even the US isn’t entirely clear on Taiwan – although it’s reasonably expected to fight since it does more than everyone else put together to bolster Taiwan’s defense..

And if Washington is going to war, it’s helpful to know who else is coming – and with what.

As for Japanese, they understand that a PRC-controlled Taiwan is an existential risk. There’s no sense of urgency, however.

War planning and preparations are lagging – beyond plans to evacuate Japan’s southern islands and building bomb shelters.

Tokyo has almost no security relationship with Taiwan.

Using AI to Defend Against Cyber Threats

Lujo Bauer and Vyas Sekar

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The world is approaching a pivotal moment where advances in AI, critical infrastructure, and cybersecurity are rapidly converging. The U.S. has the opportunity to stay a step ahead of its adversaries, employing AI and automation to help prevent and protect our critical infrastructure from attack. Researchers at Carnegie Mellon University’s CyLab are at the forefront of this work.

Why it matters: AI is already changing how cyber threats evolve. With increasing use of AI for code generation and workflow automation, our ability to quickly build and deploy new features far exceeds our ability to secure systems.

 At the same time as new cyber threats are emerging, we are relying more heavily on AI and autonomous systems within the nation’s critical industries and infrastructure, including energy, water, transportation and health and financial services.

Catch up quick: Existing mechanisms, protocols, and processes used to secure our critical infrastructures are based on a “human attacker”’ mindset. Today’s security operations rely on manually predefined rules that grant or deny access based on simple heuristic factors and human time scale responses. 

CMU researchers have observed the use of AI-driven autonomous capabilities for uncovering and exploiting vulnerabilities dramatically accelerating attacks. The threats to our critical infrastructure will increase significantly and our existing mechanisms are no longer sufficient. The U.S. needs to invest in autonomous cyber operations for defending critical infrastructures against future autonomous cyberthreats.

The Time-Crunch for CyberEM Command’s Challenges

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The Strategic Defence Review places cyber and electronic warfare centre-stage but it remains unclear how ambitions on the digital battlefield will be resourced.

The forthcoming UK Cyber and Electromagnetic Command (CyberEM) outlined in the Strategic Defence Review could be a much-needed pillar of modernisation. It follows a line of thinking, pre-dating Russia’s 2022 Ukraine invasion, where electronic warfare (characterised by rigid hardware) and cyber operations are increasingly entwined.

If the past is a guide, we have a long way to go. Four years ago, Future Soldier promised to boost the Army’s electronic warfare (EW) capability ‘100%’, while UK doctrine from 2018 highlights the ‘imperative’ to master the ‘convergence’ of cyber and electromagnetic activities (CEMA).

This has not translated into reality, either in equipment or training. A well-identified problem is a lack of digital skills not only in the MOD but across the defence industry. Plans to address this may not be bold enough.

Ukraine’s CEMA lessons pose worrying questions for the command if the British Army faced a ‘fight tonight’ scenario. The problem is attracting talent while upskilling CEMA personnel in the Army – which could lose operators to ‘the domain lead’, 

CyberEM Command. For this new vision, the pipeline for specialists is thin, with 32 scheduled for training at Shrivenham this year. For context, 13 Signal Regiment was re-formed around a core of roughly 250 specialists. For the new “cyber pipeline” at Shrivenham, “recruitment into cyber roles in 2025 will initially be through the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, with the British Army joining for subsequent recruitment campaigns from early 2026.”

CyberEM Command will deploy contractors to conflicts as a Digital Warfighter Group alongside soldiers. Bolstering Army generalist ability and specialisation in this field has been identified as a serious near-term problem, so it is vital that this fundamental requirement is not lost amid reorganisation.

Trump Holds the Key to Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace

Garo Paylan

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In an unexpected turn of events, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev met in Abu Dhabi on Thursday, ending months of stalemate in diplomatic negotiations and reaffirming their mutual commitment to securing a final peace agreement that could end three decades of hostility.

Behind the scenes, the U.S. President Donald Trump administration has been nudging the two sides for a peace accord that would give Trump a White House photo-op with the two leaders—and another opportunity to argue that he indeed deserves the Nobel Peace Prize. At a recent White House meeting, 

Secretary of State Marco Rubio mentioned the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process as a priority for the Trump administration, likening it to U.S.-brokered peace efforts between India and Pakistan and Rwanda and Democratic Republic of Congo.

Despite this indication of good intent, the two sides are still far from a comprehensive peace treaty. After five hours of negotiations, they agreed to continue bilateral negotiations and confidence building measures between the two countries. To move the process forward, President Trump could engage in planned phone calls with both leaders, possibly inviting them to the White House.

Even though Washington has been consistent in its support for peace talks in the South Caucasus over the past few years, the Trump administration also has a chance to bring other players on board. Both Türkiye and Azerbaijan have seemed more interested in forging a deal under the Trump administration. Türkiye now seems on board:

 During recent bilateral meetings, Aliyev and Pashinyan have both heard from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that it was time to put the past behind and move toward a regional order.

Europe’s Claim to Geopolitical Power Isn’t Passing the Trump Test

Rym Momtaz

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Strategic Europe offers insightful analysis, fresh commentary, and concrete policy recommendations from some of Europe’s keenest international affairs observers.Learn More

With U.S. President Donald Trump’s return to the White House, Europeans had a choice: Either recalibrate their relationship with Washington or kowtow to America because they don’t want to suffer the short-term pain for the long-term gain.

It is now clear they have mostly chosen genuflection wrapped in sycophancy and reverence.

Since his inauguration in January, the Europeans have bought unlimited passes for the Trump roller-coaster ride. They have climbed on, 

strapped themselves in, and regularly screamed out in terror but failed to get off. Instead, they keep topping up for more. Their highest collective ambition seems to be to avoid or postpone worst-case scenarios—a U.S. withdrawal from NATO or a Trump-Putin lovefest—instead of working on shaping, with Trump, a new relationship with the United States.

As a result, the regular calls and proclamations of greater European geopolitical power are increasingly disconnected from reality. They are out of pace with the speed and intensity of the security challenge Europe is facing from Russia and others. Most European leaders also seem addicted to the transatlantic status quo, despite clear persistent U.S. bipartisan signals that it cannot endure.

Trump keeps blindsiding Europeans—with months of aggressive statements against Ukraine, and an escalating trade war—and yet, they keep thinking they can bite down through the whiplash and buy their way out.

I'm 'disappointed but not done' with Putin, Trump tells BBC

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Donald Trump has said that he is disappointed but not done with Vladimir Putin, in an exclusive phone call with the BBC.

The US president was pressed on whether he trusts the Russian leader, and replied: "I trust almost nobody."

Trump was speaking hours after he announced plans to send weapons to Ukraine and warned of severe tariffs on Russia if there was no ceasefire deal in 50 days.

In an interview from the Oval Office, the president also endorsed Nato, having once described it as obsolete, and affirmed his support for the organisation's common defence principle.

Listen to the full interview on BBC Sounds

How Trump woke me up for surprise interview

The president made the phone call, which lasted 20 minutes, to the BBC after conversations about a potential interview to mark one year on since the attempt on his life at a campaign rally in Butler, Pennsylvania.

Asked about whether surviving the assassination attempt had changed him, Trump said he liked to think about it as little as possible.

"I don't like to think about if it did change me," Trump said. Dwelling on it, he added, "could be life-changing".

Having just met with Nato chief Mark Rutte at the White House, however, the president spent a significant portion of the interview expanding on his disappointment with the Russian leader.