24 July 2025

The Taiwan scenarios 1: Subversion, quarantine, blockade, invasion


Xi likely favours a path to unification in which Taiwan is gradually worn down by sustained and intensifying Chinese coercion. However, if he sought to accelerate this process, he would likely favour actions that remained below the threshold of war but still compelled Taiwan to cede aspects of its sovereignty. 

This could include the China Coast Guard enforcing a quarantine of Taiwan—asserting a right to block certain imports and exports— or covert acts of subversion intended to trigger a broader crisis and increase pressure on Taipei.

While more overt options, such as a full-scale invasion or naval blockade, remain possible, they carry significant risks that could threaten the Chinese Communist Party’s hold on power. As long as Xi views these risks as credible, actions that could rapidly escalate to war are unlikely to be his preferred course.

Xi has made his intentions regarding Taiwan clear. At the 20th Party Congress, he reiterated that, while peaceful unification was his preferred approach, China still reserved the right to use force if necessary. Although he has set no specific deadline, 

he warned in 2013 that the Taiwan issue ‘should not be passed down generation after generation.’ In his recent speeches, Xi continues to assert that unification is inevitable, signaling his determination to bring Taiwan under Beijing’s control sooner rather than later.

Mesh Sensing for Air and Missile Defense

Masao Dahlgren, Patrycja Bazylczyk, and Tom Karako

The era of massed air and missile threats is already here. Adversaries are finding and fixing friendly forces and aim to disrupt air defenses’ ability to see and make sense of the battlespace. What is needed is a thicket of sensors—both high- and low-end—to better survive this environment. 

As Army doctrine exhorts, air defenders must “account for being under constant observation and all forms of enemy contact.” To date, however, the air and missile defense force structure has remained too heavily reliant on handfuls of exquisite, large-signature surface-based radars.

Proliferation, distribution, and emission control are all needed adaptations in this era. To that end, this report describes what is needed to realize a proliferated, resilient surface-based sensor architecture, 

with model-based analysis of asset coverage, engagement geometry, network bandwidth, and other factors. By combining meshed passive sensors with active radar, defenders could better cover difficult regions, conserve radar resources, and discriminate false targets from real ones.

This report is made possible by support from the Sierra Nevada Corporation and by general support to CSIS.

China’s Fast-Shrinking Central Military Commission: Implications for the PLA

Zi Yang

Since taking power, China’s paramount leader Xi Jinping has made purges under the anti-corruption pretext a hallmark of his tenure. As the chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), Xi executed similar purges in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 

first targeting officers from rival factions before turning on military leaders that he had promoted himself. The second round of the PLA anti-corruption campaign, launched in 2023, has destabilized the military’s high command, leading to the downfall of several sitting CMC members.

Defense Minister and CMC member Li Shangfu was the first to fall, disappearing after August 2023. His case was referred for criminal prosecution in June 2024, but there has been no news regarding the verdict. In November 2024, the Director of the CMC Political Work Department Miao Hua also fell from grace. Then,

 in April 2025, the Financial Times reported that CMC Vice Chairman He Weidong had been removed from power, making him the first incumbent CMC vice chairman to be purged since 1967. He has not appeared in public since.

These atypical removals have reduced CMC membership from seven to four. As China’s supreme defense decision-making organ, the CMC is responsible for managing some three million PLA personnel and 500,000 People’s Armed Police. 

The downsizing of the CMC under extraordinary circumstances is bound to have profound consequences for the PLA’s ability to function as a modern warfighting organization.

Bureaucratized Confucianism: How Tradition Became a Tool of Control in China

Carlo J.V. Caro

What does it mean when a regime speaks the language of ancient virtue but enforces it through curriculum mandates and ideological scorecards? The opening essay of Simulated Sagehood, a five-part series, traces how Confucianism has been reconstructed, not as a living tradition, but as a calibrated instrument of bureaucratic control.

Through textbook reform, propaganda choreography, and institutional incentives, Xi’s China fuses ethical language with Leninist mechanics. The result is not revival but simulation: a Confucianism of surfaces, stripped of its moral interior.

The return of Confucian language under Chinese leader Xi Jinping isn’t a spontaneous cultural revival. It’s a carefully orchestrated campaign — engineered from the top of the Chinese party-state — to wrap centralized political control in the language of ancient virtue. What’s unfolding is a quiet reversal: values once rooted in moral constraint, 

like filial piety, virtue, and ethical cultivation, are being refitted to serve a system built on obedience and authority. This isn’t Confucianism reborn. It’s a state-authored script, stitching together the vocabulary of tradition to legitimize modern power.

The turning point came in 2013 with a little-known but foundational document: the Communiqué on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere — more commonly known as Document No. 9. Here, the Chinese Communist Party elevated “cultural security” to the same strategic level as political or cyber defense, 

identifying “Western constitutional democracy,” “universal values,” and “historical nihilism” as existential threats. The proposed solution wasn’t dialogue or reform, but insulation: Confucian culture would be deployed as a kind of ideological firewall, meant to inoculate China against liberal ideas.

This approach was codified in the 2017 Opinions on Implementing the Inheritance and Development Project of Excellent Traditional Chinese Culture — a mouthful of a title, but one with clear intent. It brought Confucian texts under the wing of national security. The classics were no longer seen as sources of independent moral insight, but as symbolic tools linking the Communist Party to an unbroken Han civilizational arc.

Can Rapidus Achieve Japan’s Semiconductor Revival?

Atsushi Sumikawa

Japanese chipmakers gained supremacy in the global market during the 1980s. However, as the market evolved and new competitors emerged in East Asia, the country fell out in the race for advanced logic chip manufacturing. Today, Japan lags behind the world’s leading edge by as much as two decades.

The need to rebuild the domestic chipmaking industry has gained urgency among Japanese policymakers for strategic reasons. The supply chain disruptions during the COVID-19 pandemic exposed the fragility of global semiconductor supplies. 

Likewise, rising geopolitical risks – such as cross-strait tensions and China-U.S. competition – suggest the vulnerabilities of certain supply chain bottlenecks. With the global explosion of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, advanced semiconductors are also regarded as a key driver of broader economic growth.

At the heart of Japan’s economic strategy, Rapidus was founded in 2022 by the joint funding of the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) and a group of eight leading corporations, including household names like Toyota Motors, NTT, Sony, and Softbank Group. Through aggressive investment and drawing best knowledge worldwide, 

Rapidus aims to achieve mass production of today’s most advanced 2-nanometer process node logic chips in as little as five years. In April, the company activated its pilot production line in its newly constructed production site in Hokkaido, Japan. It plans to deliver its first prototypes as early as this July.

Despite the huge expectations it carries, Rapidus’ project has raised as much skepticism as it has hope. Given that advanced semiconductor production is one of the most complicated and capital-intensive industries in modern times, many point to the difficulty for a newcomer like Rapidus to achieve technological maturity on a compressed timeline. 

Furthermore, many doubt Rapidus’ ability to break into the competition with existing players in the fierce global chip market. To successfully develop 2-nm chip production capability and embody the country’s semiconductor revival, Rapidus must overcome at least three key hurdles.

The Great Wall Between China and the EU

Zoltán Fehér and Valbona Zeneli

In times of evolving transatlantic dynamics under the second Trump administration, and in response to shifting global power balances, some within the European Union have shown interest in exploring a more nuanced engagement with China

However, there are structural obstacles to a warming up between Brussels and Beijing, considering China’s unfair trade practices in the economic sphere, its troubling human rights record, and its alliance with Russia and support for Moscow’s war on Ukraine in the security sphere. China’s leadership is not willing to change course. Instead, 

China is gambling on the EU’s weakness and hoping that Brussels will simply give in. While the EU is indeed in a tough spot currently, it cannot agree to a “grand deal” if China is unwilling to make major concessions on its unfair economic practices and support for the war in Ukraine.

Now all eyes are on the upcoming China-EU summit to take place in Beijing on July 24, an important gathering that will mark 50 years of diplomatic relations. But if the summit demonstrates anything, 

it will be the fact that China is unwilling to play by the rules of the international order and that it is in neither in the EU’s nor in the United States’ interests to try to make a grand deal with Beijing without a major paradigm shift in China’s behavior.

The months-long discourse about an China-EU rapprochement and the China-EU summit take place against the backdrop of major divisions between the EU and the United States in recent months. The second Trump administration’s initial ambiguity on support for Ukraine and the assertive approach toward the EU in its trade policy created uncertainty in Europe,

The Syrian State After Suwayda

Kheder Khaddour

After fourteen years of civil war, Syria is engaged in its toughest battle yet, namely reshaping the state during a complex transitional phase in which local and regional dynamics have become intertwined. The recent events in Suwayda, which quickly descended into sectarian violence, 

exposed the limits of centralized control and attempts to impose sovereignty within fragile local contexts. Southern Syria, long a contested zone of influence, has resurfaced as a place of conflict, where localism has merged with sectarianism, and where national politics have clashed with regional ambitions.

The Suwayda fighting followed the kidnapping of a Druze vegetable seller by a Bedouin group, in a region where the Druze-Bedouin rivalry has long simmered. This soon escalated into widespread sectarian violence, marked by retaliatory attacks and summary executions. The transitional government, 

led by Ahmad al-Sharaa, sent government forces to Suwayda to restore order. However, the military operation failed both tactically and politically, as these forces were accused of perpetrating human rights violations against Druze civilians. Meanwhile, Israel seized the moment to implement a decision taken last February that southern Syria remain demilitarized,

and it carried through on its pledge to protect the Druze in Suwayda by bombing the Syrian Defense Ministry in Damascus and an area near the presidential palace. This led to outside intervention to prevent an escalation, 

leading to an agreement involving the United States and the Syrian authorities. Syrian government forces were compelled to withdraw from Suwayda, and since then a shaky ceasefire has been in place.

At the height of the fighting, Bedouin tribes mobilized on the outskirts of Suwayda Governorate in solidarity with their Bedouin kin, but they lacked a unified leadership. The Bedouin-Druze fighting, with government forces deployed in the background, transformed the conflict from a relatively limited local dispute into a complex multiparty struggle with regional repercussions.


US Warns Over Another Middle East War


The United States has warned there is "no Plan B" for Syria as it called for calm following a ceasefire brokered with Israel in the wake of clashes in southern Syria in which Israeli forces intervened.

"President Trump has huge interest in making sure we have regional stability," U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack said in Lebanon.

Newsweek has reached out to the U.S. State Department, the Syrian government and the Israeli prime minister's office for comment.
Why It Matters

Syria is at the intersection of conflicts involving major Middle Eastern powers Israel, Iran and Turkey and if it spins out of control it could become an epicenter of a bigger regional war that could also pull in the United States.

The ambassador's comments highlighted U.S. support for the transitional Syrian government of President Ahmad al-Sharaa, a former jihadi who overthrew Iranian-backed President Bashar al-Assad late last year.

Syria is trying to rebuild, regain control from armed groups, stop sectarian violence, and fight off ISIS. The latest fighting and Israel's expanded deployment shows the situation remains fragile.

Syrian soldiers raise the Syrian national flag in front of the Syrian Defense Ministry building, which was heavily damaged by Israeli airstrikes last Wednesday, in Damascus, Syria, Saturday, July 19, 2025. Omar Sanadiki/AP Photo
What To Know

U.S. envoy Tom Barrack on Monday reaffirmed support for Syria's transitional government, saying there's "no Plan B" for uniting the war-torn country. He said Israel's intervention "creates another very confusing chapter" and "came at a very bad time," in an interview with the Associated Press on Monday.

Confucian peace myth: East Asia minus US risks disaster

Hanjin Lew

Recently, several arguments have emerged suggesting that Korea, Japan and China could peacefully coexist without the US’s presence in Northeast Asia.

Columbia University economist Jeffrey Sachs recently argued that China has never invaded Japan in its entire history – aside from two failed attempts – and characterized Japan’s incursions into China as anomalies.

Citing Harvard sociologist Ezra Vogel, he claimed the two Confucian civilizations enjoyed nearly 2,000 years of relative peace – a striking contrast, he noted, to the near-constant wars between Britain and France.

Yonsei University professor Jeffrey Robertson added that, as “US attention drifts away from East Asia, the unthinkable becomes thinkable” – a region where Europe, Russia, India, and China balance each other imperfectly, but none dominates.

Political scientist John Mearsheimer also weighed in: “If I were the national security adviser to Deng Xiaoping – or Xi Jinping – and they asked me what I thought about the US military presence in East Asia, I’d say, ‘I want the Americans out. I don’t want them in our backyard.’”

This vision of a self-balancing Asia – shared by economists, sociologists, strategists and realists alike – assumes that history, culture and trust can fill the vacuum left by American power. But can it?
Confucian peace myth

Sachs’s notion of a historical “Confucian peace” collapses under scrutiny. In his speech, he conveniently omits Korea – arguably the most Confucian state in East Asia – which has frequently been at war with both China and Japan.

Israel blindsides Trump in self-serving effort to break up Syria


Just days before Israeli F-35s screamed over Damascus, the improbable seemed within reach. U.S. Special Envoy Tom Barrack, leveraging his dual role as Ambassador to Turkey and point man on Syria, was brokering painstaking back-channel talks between two historic enemies.

The Syrian government, led by interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa, the former Islamist militant turned statesman, signaled openness to a non-aggression pact with Israel. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar publicly welcomed Syria into “the peace and normalization circle in the Middle East.”

By July 12, leaks suggested a deal was drawing closer: al-Sharaa and Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani, forced to move quickly in exchange for much needed security guarantees, reconstruction aid and investment, 

had reportedly met directly with Israeli officials in Azerbaijan. In his ongoing quest for a Nobel Peace Prize, U.S. President Donald Trump had personally met al-Sharaa in Riyadh and thereafter started dismantling decades of sanctions, betting big on Syria’s rehabilitation and regional integration.

Central to this U.S. vision was the consolidation of a stable, unitary Syrian state. Barrack is spearheading this arduous task, working to dismantle potential sources of fragmentation. Currently, 

his most critical, and contentious mission is the merger of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) — America’s ground allies against ISIS — into the nascent Syrian national army. Barrack’s message to SDF commander Mazloum Abdi during tense Damascus meetings earlier this month was uncompromising: “One country, one army, one people.”

Barrack bluntly dismissed Kurdish demands for federalism or autonomous military structures as unworkable and destabilizing, arguing “in all of these countries what we learned is federalism doesn't work.”

Trump’s shift on Ukraine has been dramatic – but will it change the war?


Donald Trump presents himself as a peerless president, an unrivaled negotiator, even a “genius”. So it’s a unique moment when he comes close – I emphasize the qualifier –to conceding that another leader has outfoxed him. Trump suggested as much recently when characterizing Vladimir Putin’s modus operandi. 

“Putin,” he told reporters on 13 July, “really surprised a lot of people. He talks nice and then bombs everybody in the evening.” Melania Trump may have contributed to this reassessment. As Trump recounted recently, when he told her about a “wonderful conversation” with the Russian leader, she responded, “Oh, really? Another city was just hit.”

Trump’s new take on Putin is a break with the past. His esteem for Putin – whose decisions he has described as “savvy” and “genius” – has contrasted starkly with his derisive comments about the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, whom he memorably disrespected during a White House meeting and even blamed for starting the war.

As recently as February, he declared that Russia’s invasion didn’t matter to the United States because, unlike Europe, it was separated from Ukraine by “a big, big beautiful ocean”. He criticized Joe Biden’s assistance to Ukraine as a waste of taxpayers’ money.

Now, Trump has not only changed his view of Putin, stunning many within his “America First” MagaA movement; he’s decided to start arming Ukraine. Well, sort of.

Trump has gone beyond in effect conceding that Putin has played him. He has decided to sell military equipment to individual European countries so that they can supply Ukraine and restock their arsenals with purchases from the United States. The president formally announced the change during his 14 July meeting with Mark Rutte, Nato’s secretary general.

Putin’s Dilemma

George Friedman

In analyzing the process by which the Russia-Ukraine war will end, the most critical factor, as I have argued before, is that by not defeating Ukraine, Russia already has lost the war. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s primary interest was in creating and controlling a buffer between Russia and Poland on the eastern edge of NATO. Beyond that, he wanted to recover Russia’s status as a great power, 

which it had held from the end of World War II to the collapse of the Soviet Union. When it lost this status, it lost its dominion over Eastern Europe and the eastern half of Germany. It also lost unchallenged command of the South Caucasus and Central Asia, ceased to be more powerful than China and surrendered much of its influence in the Middle East. Its power in the Third World withered as well, losing its place to China – now the only true rival of the United States.

For Russia, the loss of military significance was accompanied by an inability to become a major economic power. Under the czars and the communists, Russia had always been an economic weakling. Although it had vast and valuable lands, as well as a reasonably educated population, Russia has continued to be what can most kindly be called an underperforming economy.

Russia’s decline started and ended well before Putin became president, of course. His rise to power depended on the private sector – the oligarchs who, in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse, consolidated a substantial portion of the economy and integrated into the global economic system. The oligarchs were the significant force that made Putin president, and the Russian economy had by then developed nicely, considering where it had started.

Putin held a traditional Russian view on high national priority: securing Russia from invasion and intrusion from the outside. From Putin’s point of view, the only way for the country to emerge economically was to be secure from attack. For Putin, that meant recovering as much of the buffer zone as he could from the losses Russia suffered in the 1990s, and thus securing Russia’s western border.

Strategic narratives and AI warfare: between Israel-Iran and India-Pakistan crises


In the contemporary era, the boundaries of warfare are rapidly blurring, expanding beyond traditional domains of fighter jets and missiles to include cyberattacks, situational awareness, and the engineering of public consciousness.

Both Israel and India, each confronting distinct yet analogous threats from Iran and Pakistan respectively, have developed sophisticated capabilities in artificial intelligence–based warfare, cyber operations, and strategic narrative shaping.

These developments reflect a shared understanding: the control of information, not only firepower—is emerging as a decisive factor in modern conflict.

In June 2025, Israel launched Operation Rising Lion in response to a series of proxy attacks on its strategic assets, attributed to Iranian-backed elements. The operation showcased full-spectrum integration of HUMINT, SIGINT, and cutting-edge AI-driven systems.

Precision strikes were executed against nuclear infrastructure, command centers, and weapons convoys, with Israel demonstrating the capability to detect and neutralize mobile targets within minutes.

(credit: MICAH AVNI)This was enabled by an AI-based “closed loop” targeting system that seamlessly combined real-time video analytics, unmanned combat drones, and distributed autonomous fire control protocols.

Simultaneously, Israeli cyber operations targeted Iranian financial institutions, water systems, and digital platforms. Iran retaliated not only with cyberattacks, but also by deploying disinformation campaigns, including sophisticated deepfakes aimed at generating public panic and diplomatic confusion.

In this evolving battlespace, the contest over real-time narrative control became central: Iran sought to craft a perception of military success through synthetic visual propaganda, while Israel countered with controlled transparency, verified imagery, and strategic deployment of media assets.

Russian Summer of Doubt and Foreboding Drags On


Russia is experiencing a decline in morale as its war against Ukraine enters its fourth summer, with feelings of hope and pride appearing to be replaced by indifference and fear.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s concerns about public discontent with the war are apparent in the Kremlin’s increase in information control and the severity of repression, including a new law criminalizing any internet searches for materials deemed “extremist.”

The economic situation in Russia continues to deteriorate amid budget deficits and industrial stagnation, and now faces a new EU sanctions package that institutes a price ceiling on Russian oil.

The fourth summer of Moscow’s war against Ukraine has brought feelings of tiredness and hopelessness, rather than the usual seasonal optimism, to Russia. The spring expectations of a probable cessation of hostilities are gone, 

and the messages from the Kremlin about the firm determination to stay the course aimed at subjugating Ukraine undercut the longing for a normal life. Opinion polls cannot fully capture this shift in public mood, particularly when conducted by “foreign agents.” They still indicate a decline in feelings of pride and hope, however, 

and an increase in indifference and fear (Levada Center, July 18). Even the weather in Moscow departs from all perceptions of normalcy. Following an extreme heat wave in early July, tropical rains have caused traffic chaos and local flooding (Ritmmsk.ru, July 17).

The course of combat operations, despite the upbeat official reporting and inflated claims of jingoist bloggers, is widely perceived as stagnant (TopWar.ru, July 16; Izvestiya, July 19). The intensity of Russian tactical attacks, which in May and June yielded a few square miles every day at the cost of enormous casualties, has notably declined (see EDM, July 14; The Insider; Meduza, July 18). 

What Will Become of the C.I.A.?


In December, 1988, as the Soviet Union was beginning to come apart, Senator Bill Bradley, a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, convened a closed-door hearing with several of the C.I.A.’s top Soviet experts. These were analysts, not operatives. 

They did not run spies or weapons, or shoot poisoned darts at people; mostly, they sat at their desks at Langley, reading Pravda or studying photographs of Soviet military parades. The hearing found them in a melancholy mood, 

pondering life without the U.S.S.R. “The Soviet Union is so fundamental to our outlook on the world, to our concept of what is right and wrong in politics,” Douglas J. MacEachin, who ran the C.I.A.’s office of Soviet analysis, said, “that major change in the U.S.S.R. is as significant as some major change in the sociological fabric of the United States itself.” And so,

 MacEachin explained, a C.I.A. analyst struggled to see things clearly; not only his world view but his livelihood was at stake. If the Soviet Union disappeared, what would become of those who made their careers analyzing it? “There are not many homes for old wizards of Armageddon,” MacEachin said.

Soon enough, the Soviet Union collapsed with a whimper, and the United States stood alone. Perceiving no enemies on the near horizon, the nation stopped looking for them so fervently. Budgets were cut, retirements suggested. 

Agents in the field were brought in from the cold. Bill Clinton, the first post-Cold War President, was elected to fix the economy. So infrequent were Clinton’s meetings with his first C.I.A. director, James Woolsey, that when a small plane crashed onto the White House lawn, in the fall of 1994, people joked that it must be Woolsey, trying to get an audience with the President.

Passive ground-based sensor networks could bolster air, missile defense resilience: CSIS

Theresa Hitchens

WASHINGTON — Moving away from reliance on large, ground-based radars in favor of a networked layer of smaller passive sensors could “substantially improve” US air and missile defenses and decrease vulnerability to attack, argues a new study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

“Faced with the threat of complex and integrated attack, the existing air and missile defense architecture would benefit from a more proliferated, passive, and ultimately resilient posture. Doing so would, at long last, better align AMD [air and missile defense] operations to the strategic environment of today,” the

Called “Mesh Sensing for Air and Missile Defense,” the study is a highly technical look at how such a network of multiple passive sensors could be designed and implemented, as well as the advantages and disadvantages.

The study posits a notional network to provide coverage of Poland as an example, finding that such a network if developed would require 400 electro-optical and infrared sensors, linked together by a robust communications and power grid.

According to the study, Poland was used as a case study because its geography “offers a useful test case for considering meshed sensors, with a mix of relevant topographies and an area comparable to theaters of interest, including in the Indo-Pacific.”

Most of the US military’s current air and missile defense systems rely on a small number of high-powered radars, which pinpoint targets by blasting out and then receiving the reflections of electromagnetic waves. 

Radars have many advantages, including day and night all-weather capability and long ranges. Their radiating energy, however, is increasingly easy for adversary weapon systems to detect. And the longer a radar’s range, the more power it needs and the more energy it emits.

From Ambiguity to Flexibility: Reframing U.S. Taiwan Policy

Tim Boyle

Strategic ambiguity has become a liability for U.S. policymakers. Though merely an informal shorthand, it is commonly treated as official policy in media and among national security professionals. This framing reduces U.S. decision-making to a false binary between war and inaction, 

obscuring a spectrum of options and overlooking legal commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act. With Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth warning that Chinese aggression could be “imminent,” Washington should recalibrate perceptions of U.S. Taiwan policy to strengthen deterrence and make its commitments and options unmistakably clear to Beijing and Taipei.

Rather than abandoning strategic ambiguity outright, U.S. officials should steer discourse toward flexibility as a defining feature of U.S. Taiwan policy. Flexibility avoids the binary trap by rejecting both indifference and rigid clarity. Instead, it rests on the presumption that the United States will respond to Chinese aggression, 

while preserving discretion over how — emphasizing optionality to employ varied and scalable instruments of power, with or without military force. Crucially, this narrative shift requires no change in policy or disavowal of strategic ambiguity. It simply reframes how existing policy is communicated and understood, offering a more credible and adaptable approach to managing the growing risk of conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

Though often linked to the U.S. One China Policy, the term strategic ambiguity does not appear in the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiqués, the Six Assurances, or any other law, regulation, or formal policy directive. It emerged as an informal concept in the mid-1990s when Joseph Nye, 

Making America Alone Again


Henry Kissinger once compared himself to the lone cowboy who rode into town to sort out the bad guys. But the U.S. secretary of state, who also served as national security adviser, knew different when it came to dealing with major powers. His hero was the Austrian statesman Klemens von Metternich, 

who somehow brought together the unlikely combination of Austria, the United Kingdom, Prussia, Russia, and a number of even smaller allies and their incompatible leaders into the alliance that finally defeated Napoleon in 1815. As Kissinger understood, even lone rangers need friends.

It is an insight that appears to be lost on U.S. President Donald Trump. Since returning to office in January, Trump has called the United States’ closest allies cheaters and freeloaders. Japan and other Asian trading partners, he insists, are “very spoiled”; immediate North American neighbors stand accused of exporting drugs and criminals. 

He freely and publicly labels the leaders of some of the United States’ most important democratic partners as has-beens, weak, or dishonest, while heaping praise on autocrats he finds easier to deal with, such as Hungarian President Viktor Orban (“a very great leader”), Salvadoran strongman Nayib Bukele (“a great friend”), 

North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un (“a smart guy”), and—at least until very recently—Russian President Vladimir Putin, whom he has called “a genius” and “very savvy” in attacking Ukraine. In what would have been unthinkable in previous administrations, 

including Trump’s first, the United States in February even sided against its own democratic allies and with Russia and other authoritarian states, such as North Korea and Belarus, in voting against a UN resolution that condemned Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and upheld the latter’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

China Stood Up to Trump, and It’s Not Giving Europe an Inch, Either


Having forced the Trump administration into a trade truce through economic pressure and strategic defiance, China now appears to be playing the same kind of hardball with Europe.

It has retaliated against trade curbs, accused Europe of protectionism, slowed exports of critical minerals and further embraced Russia, with China’s top leader himself pledging support for Moscow just days before a summit of European Union leaders that China is scheduled to host this week.

The moves are part of a tough posture that Beijing is taking in its trade and geopolitical disputes with Brussels. China wants Europe to lift heavy tariffs that it has imposed on Chinese electric vehicles and refrain from further restrictions on trade. 

E.U. leaders see Beijing as effectively supporting Russia in its war with Ukraine, and are also concerned that China is dumping artificially cheap products that could undermine local industries.

Beijing has learned that it has leverage it can use against outside pressure. It stood up to the Trump administration’s punishing trade war by demonstrating how dependent global industry was on China for its supply of critical minerals.

And Beijing likely assesses that it is in a stronger position because Western unity is fracturing, analysts say, with President Trump’s “America First” foreign policy weakening the historical bonds between Europe and the United States.

“Beijing perceives that the global order is in flux,” said Simona Grano, a China expert at the University of Zurich. “From its perspective, the United States is overstretched and preoccupied with multiple conflicts around the world and domestic polarization.”

To Hit Russia Hard and Support Ukraine, Capture the Oil Discount

Clayton Seigle

Last week, President Trump announced renewed and expanded transfers of weapons to Ukraine in support of its defense against Russia. As Putin has grown more aggressive, despite the United States pushing for a ceasefire, the president has hinted at the need to dial up the pressure on Russia. 

In his press conference on July 14, 2025, he warned that Russia had 50 days (ending September 2) to negotiate a ceasefire, before the United States would impose 100 percent “secondary tariffs” on Russia, which can be presumed to apply to importers of Russian energy exports.

Limiting Russian energy revenues has been a primary objective for Western policymakers since the start of the Ukraine war. The oil price cap mechanism was devised to reduce revenues while maintaining market access for Russian barrels and avoiding a global price spike. 

However, the policy has not appreciably reduced Moscow’s oil revenues, mainly due to lax enforcement and the rise of the “shadow fleet” of tankers. As such, Russian oil prices have remained higher than the architects of sanctions intended, leaving ample revenues in the Kremlin’s war chest.

Now, the president and other U.S. policymakers are looking for options to put far greater pressure on Russian oil revenues. There is strong bipartisan support for Senator Lindsey Graham’s (R-SC) proposed Sanctioning Russia Act (SRA), 

which seeks to end the sale of Russian oil, gas, uranium, and other key commodities by threatening buyers with 500 percent “secondary tariffs.” Such high tariffs would effectively halt trade between countries that import Russian energy and the United States. 

The triggering mechanism is a presidential determination that Moscow has violated Washington’s demands, including any military action against Ukraine—the very next shot fired following enactment would qualify. Failure to negotiate an end to the war would also trigger sanctions. Only a lasting ceasefire and good-faith war-ending negotiations would save Russia and its counterparties from the new sanctions.

A French medium-range ballistic missile and ‘very high altitude’ ambitions


The two models on display show two different designs: one with a single-stage solid-propellant booster and one with two stages, suggesting the company may be considering two distinct types with different ranges. 

Both appear to show a separating re-entry vehicle fitted with aerodynamic control surfaces for terminal guidance and, potentially, manoeuvring. The MBT will likely use a road-mobile launcher for greater survivability. ArianeGroup has not yet commented on any development timeline.

A French element of ELSA? Reports in April 2025 from the National Defence and Armed Forces Committee of the French National Assembly suggested that France might propose the MBT as part of the European Long-range Strike Approach (ELSA) framework. France, 

Germany, Italy and Poland launched ELSA in July 2024 with the intention to jointly and indigenously develop long-range strike capabilities, with Sweden and the United Kingdom subsequently joining the initiative in October 2024 and the Netherlands joining in November 2024. In addition, 

the French division of MBDA is proposing the Land Cruise Missile, a ground-launched version of the sea-based, subsonic Missile de Croisière Naval/Naval Cruise Missile (MdCN-NCM). This offshoot of an existing cruise-missile design could be delivered faster than a new ballistic missile, 

but it may offer a range short of 2,000 km, considering that the stated range of MdCN-NCM is only some 1,000 km. Recent conflicts have also shown that subsonic cruise missiles tend to be more vulnerable to interception than ballistic designs.

America’s AI Energy Revolution Has Global Stakes – OpEd

Dalia Al-Aqidi

The next great American industrial revolution is not being shaped in think tanks; it is being built in real time. In Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, once a powerhouse of steel and smoke, the US has launched a future rooted in artificial intelligence, 

energy innovation and industrial revival. What unfolded at the Pennsylvania Energy and Innovation Summit last week was not just a domestic policy pivot. It was a global declaration.

With more than $90 billion in private sector commitments, this initiative, spearheaded by the President Donald Trump-aligned state administration and welcomed by leaders on both sides of the aisle, sends a clear message to the world: the US intends to lead the AI era with power, precision and pragmatism.

That message matters far beyond American borders. For leaders across the Middle East, this moment is worth watching, not just because of its scale but because of what it signals: the future of AI will be forged by the nations that control the energy, infrastructure and values that guide its use.

AI is not an abstract Western luxury. It will soon define everything from national security and energy management to education, agriculture and healthcare. AI is already reshaping global trade, defense and diplomacy. In the Middle East, governments are investing heavily in smart cities, surveillance systems, digital health and fintech, all of which are powered by AI.

But AI is not magic; it demands enormous amounts of energy to train, deploy and sustain. The summit in Pennsylvania highlighted this reality with refreshing honesty. Rather than chasing slogans or downplaying the environmental and industrial demands of AI, American leaders there did something rare: they confronted the energy challenge head-on.

What will future wars look like?


In a world undergoing unprecedentedly swift changes, traditional battlefields are giving way to a complex, multidimensional, and technologically driven arena. Future wars will integrate advanced technologies, cyber warfare, and emerging strategic threats alongside conventional military forces such as tanks, aircraft, and ground troops.

In this dynamic reality, the crucial question arises: What will future wars look like, and what character will the new battlefield take?

The current arena: Geopolitical turbulence and its impactThe world is currently experiencing significant geopolitical upheaval. Rapid shifts in foreign policies, particularly from global powers like the United States, are causing profound alterations in power balances and the international rules of engagement. 

Changes in attitudes towards countries like China, Iran, Russia, and Turkey, along with new policy initiatives concerning conflict areas such as the Gaza Strip, directly affect combat patterns and global security perceptions.

Key trends in the future battlefieldIn the future battlefield, political, military, and social leaders will face complex and diverse challenges, including psychological warfare, the strategic exploitation of civilians, the empowerment of women in key roles, 

integration of advanced technologies and autonomous systems, Europe’s growing strategic autonomy, the advancement of offensive capabilities, handling asymmetric warfare, controlling evolving narratives, and preparing for conflicts of varying durations.

Obliteration or Degradation


You may recall that a few weeks ago there was a war between Israel and Iran. For some two decades this was a war which had been discussed, with some dread, as a likely occasion for massive violence and disruption throughout the region and potential chaos in the international economy.

In the event, as in all wars, there was death and destruction, awful for those involved but not on the scale feared. Iran absorbed twelve days of attacks from Israel, including one overnight contribution from the United States, while offering little by way of a riposte. Its main means of retaliation was missile strikes, 

and a number of these got through causing damage in Israel, but not enough to avoid the impression of a one-sided affair. Iranian air defences proved to be useless while the various regional militias that would once have been poised to act against Israel had already been neutralised. They ended up as spectators.

Short wars are often the most consequential precisely because they tend to be the most one-sided. On occasion, and this may be the case this time, the importance only becomes clear in retrospect. The durability of the Islamic Republic will depend on its ability to manage the aftermath and continue to claim a great victory. 

President Trump also claimed a great victory and that the problem that had been vexing the internbational community for so long had now been solved. But had the combination of Israeli and American strikes really eliminated Iran’s nuclear programme or just set it back?

The length of the campaign was determined by what Trump considered his political base would tolerate. NBC reports that US Central Command had a plan that would have involved hitting more sites over several weeks instead of a single night. 

But Trump did not want to linger and get bogged down in the sort of Middle Eastern War he was pledged to avoid. So he ordered a quick and sharp US contribution after which he declared victory. He then pressured Benjamin Netanyahu, who in contrast to Trump likes to keep his wars going for as long as possible, to do the same.

The Other AI Race: An Export Promotion Strategy for the Global South

Marianne Lu and Sam Winter-Levy

The Technology and International Affairs Program develops insights to address the governance challenges and large-scale risks of new technologies. Our experts identify actionable best practices and incentives for industry and government leaders on artificial intelligence, cyber threats, cloud security, countering influence operations, reducing the risk of biotechnologies, and ensuring global digital inclusion.Learn More

For many in Washington and Silicon Valley, the race to artificial general intelligence has become the defining test of U.S. technological leadership. But the scramble to dominate the frontier has obscured a parallel—and in many ways more immediate—contest: the race to deploy and embed AI systems across the globe and thereby secure market share,

 technological influence, and political leverage. In much of the world, the outcome of that race will not hinge on who builds the most powerful model, but on who shows up with reliable infrastructure, tailored applications, and financing to match.

The scramble to dominate the AI frontier has obscured a parallel contest: the race to deploy AI systems across the globe and thereby secure market share, technological influence, and political leverage.

While America leads at the frontier, in this broader contest its position is less secure. “Good enough” and cheaper Chinese alternatives may increasingly become the default choice in many parts of the world, especially the Global South. In the weeks following its release, Chinese-owned DeepSeek became the most downloaded mobile app in 140 markets,

 including Brazil and India, and now has more than 125 million global downloads. Chinese companies are rolling out models in local languages in key emerging markets, part of a “going global” strategy in deploying cloud infrastructure abroad. Eventually, China may be able to produce competitive AI chips at scale, 

at which point it will likely seek to deploy them globally. Taken together, these developments reflect a broader strategic imperative of the Chinese Communist Party: During the Politburo’s April study session, Xi Jinping called on the country to “vigorously engage in international cooperation on AI” and “help Global South countries enhance their technological capabilities.”