21 July 2025

The Limits to China’s Transactional Diplomacy in Africa

Paul Nantulya

China has long hailed its noninterventionist strategy of engaging with any type of sitting government regardless of how they came to power. Yet, the legal authority of a government and its commitment to upholding the rule of law have fundamental implications for stability and prospective returns on investments. China’s experience in Niger provides an instructive illustration.

In March 2025, three Chinese oil executives working for the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and its subsidiaries were expelled from Niger. This represented the latest setback in China’s dealings with the military junta of General Abdourahamane Tchiani who seized power in July 2023. 

The regime had previously terminated the license of a Chinese-owned hotel in Niamey after accusing it of “discriminatory practices and administrative violations.” Matters escalated in May when the military government ordered CNPC and its oil refinery, Soraz, to suspend the work permits of expatriate employees with more than 4 years of service.

There are inherent financial risks to transacting deals in contexts where constitutional rule has been overthrown.

These developments, coming on the heels of the junta’s strategy of resource nationalism, economic populism, and revolutionary fervor against perceived foreign domination, 

threaten China’s sizable investments in Niger. This includes the development and operation of the Agadem oil field by CNPC and the 2,000-km (1,240-mile) oil pipeline that runs from the isolated southeast of the landlocked country to the Atlantic seaport of Sèmè in neighboring Benin. 


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