6 November 2023

It looks inevitable that the war in Gaza will spread. Is it?

Anatol Lieven

At first sight, it looks almost inevitable that the war in Gaza will spread. Quite apart from the anger it has caused in the Muslim world, China and still more Russia would seem to have every incentive to cause trouble for the United States – and, as has been demonstrated again and again over the years, the Middle East is the greatest area of US vulnerability.

On closer examination, things do not look so simple. In the first place, if Moscow and Beijing are content with a purely diplomatic and public relations victory, they do not need to do anything at all. US virtual silence in the face of Israel’s indiscriminate bombardment of Gaza is doing it for them. Yet again, the United States has used its UN security council veto to defend Israel, as the solitary opponent both of all the other UNSC members, and a large majority of the general assembly. As western (and some US) diplomats have remarked (off the record), unfaltering US support for Israel has shredded the Biden administration’s strategy of competing with China for influence in the “global south”.

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the western reaction to it, the charge has been made across most of the non-western world (including by US partners like India) that the west has one standard for white victims, and a much lower one for everyone else. The Biden administration (and many European governments) have now in effect confirmed this.

Witness (in a widely circulated clip) the US national security council spokesperson John Kirby choking back crocodile tears over Russian bombardment of civilians in Ukraine, then justifying Israeli “collateral damage” in Gaza – although according to UN figures, Israel has already killed almost as many Palestinian civilians in two weeks as Russia has killed Ukrainian civilians in 20 months. Equally striking has been the refusal of the Biden administration to do anything to help the 500-600 Palestinian American US citizens trapped in Gaza. If anyone wants evidence to argue that in the eyes of Washington some US citizens are more equal than others, they need look no further than this.

Dependence on imported oil also gives China a strong incentive not to try to extend the Gaza conflict across the Middle East. Especially given its present economic troubles, China cannot afford the shock to the world economy that would result from a massive and prolonged surge in oil prices. China has used the Ukraine war and western sanctions to drive some very advantageous energy deals with Russia, but Moscow is nowhere near being able to compensate for Chinese energy supplies from the Persian Gulf.

Moreover, given their own restive Muslim regions, both Russia and China fear the spread of Sunni extremism. This may well happen anyway, but Moscow and Beijing will not help the process. Fear of Sunni jihadi movements was a key reason for Russia’s intervention in the Syrian civil war, where many Chechens and other Muslim volunteers were fighting for the Islamic State.

In Syria, Russian forces fought alongside Iranian revolutionary guards and Hezbollah. Since the invasion of Ukraine has faltered, Russia and Iran have forged a closer partnership, and Russia has come to increasingly depend on Iran for supplies of drones. On the other hand, Russia is in a position to give extremely important help to Iran in the areas of missile technology and satellite intelligence.

That does not mean that Iran will launch itself into an appallingly risky war with the United States at Russia’s behest, nor that Hezbollah will launch such a war against Israel at Iran’s behest – though it is easy to imagine how the clashes occurring on the Lebanese-Israeli border could escalate to full-scale war.

One thing does nonetheless seem certain: that if hawks in Israel and the US manage to exploit this crisis to bring about a US attack on Iran (as many of the very same people 20 years ago used 9/11 to bring about a US attack on Iraq), then Russia at least will do its utmost to arm Iran. For Russia, such a strategy would be irresistible, given US and Nato arming of Ukraine. Attacks by Iranian-backed Shia militias on US troops in Iraq, if they manage to cause significant casualties, could give these hawks a casus belli.

In two ways, the repercussions of the war in Gaza will be beyond the power of any outside state to control. The first is the reaction of the Arab masses – whom, as the Arab spring of 2011 demonstrated, cannot safely be ignored. It is impossible to judge just how endangered the regimes in Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia are at present; but their differing vulnerabilities are obvious.

Second, there is the likely spread of terrorism. Tens of thousands of US and European citizens working in the Gulf are acutely vulnerable to attack, if only by infuriated lone wolves. Their flight would in turn have a severe effect on the local economies, potentially worsening mass discontent.

Above all, there is the dire threat of a new wave of terrorism in Europe (which has indeed already begun on a small scale) as a result of Europe’s refusal to support a ceasefire in Gaza. Given Russia’s own experience of terrorism, there is no reason to think it would support such terrorism, but it could bring Russia considerable benefits.

Increased Islamist terrorism would almost certainly drive still further anti-immigrant sentiment and support for rightwing parties in Europe, which are already surging in the polls. As a result of the invasion of Ukraine, these have mostly reduced (in public at least) their traditional sympathy for Russia; but their overwhelming focus on immigration in itself would reduce their commitment to Ukraine. Moreover, the ascent to power of populist rightwing movements in western Europe would deepen divisions within the European Union and leave Germany isolated.

The repercussions of an ongoing war in Gaza will therefore work themselves out over many months and years. It is hard to see how any of them will be to the advantage of the United States or Europe.

No comments: