1 August 2025

Trump Is Pushing India to Submit to China

Sushant Singh

By any historical measure, India is reluctant to bow to coercion. Jawaharlal Nehru, the country’s first prime minister, championed the cause of nonalignment, and his successors have sworn by variants of strategic autonomy. Yet recently India has swallowed more provocations and offered more concessions to China than at any point since the two countries’ 1962 border war.

In the last six months, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, Defense Minister Rajnath Singh, Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri, and External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar have all visited China. Each trip culminated in a pledge to normalize relations, even amid Chinese provocations. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is preparing for his own trip to China in September, seemingly completing a progression of Indian officials accepting Chinese terms.


Opinion – ASEAN Centrality in Indian Discourse: Rhetoric or Realpolitik?


Over the years, Indian leaders have frequently reaffirmed their commitment to ‘ASEAN centrality’ in regional affairs. In fact, as per the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) website, since Prime Minister Modi’s keynote address at Shangri-La Dialogue in 2018, where India’s vision for the Indo-Pacific region was articulated for the first time, New Delhi has invoked ASEAN Centrality in official speeches and statements with predictable regularity—at least 30 times. 

As a principle, ASEAN centrality refers to the notion that ASEAN should remain at the core of the region’s diplomatic architecture. This includes a network of summits and dialogue platforms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asia Summit (EAS), and ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+). 

For India, ASEAN centrality has been a consistent element of its ‘Act East Policy,’ which builds on the earlier ‘Look East Policy,’ and forms an integral part of its broader vision for the Indo-Pacific. Within this framework, ASEAN is regarded as a key partner in fostering economic integration, enhancing connectivity, and promoting security cooperation.

India’s engagement with ASEAN is driven by geographic proximity, economic prospects, shared security interests, and enduring cultural ties. The northeastern states of India serve as an interface between the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia, forming a natural land bridge. On the economic front, ASEAN constitutes a vital market, with bilateral trade reaching US$131.57 billion in 2023.

India’s Northeast Identified as Promising Area for Rare Earth Elements and Critical Minerals

Rajeev Bhattacharyya

India’s border region of the Northeast has been identified as an area with “promising” deposits of rare earth elements and critical minerals essential for digital and defense manufacturing, and clean energy transition.After years of research and exploration, the state-owned Geological Survey of India (GSI) has concluded that “the states of Arunachal Pradesh and Assam have emerged as promising zones for graphite, vanadium, REEs, base metals, gold, coal and limestone, while Meghalaya and Nagaland hold extensive resources of limestone, coal, and minor strategic metals.”

The 63-page report by GSI added that the country’s growing demand for such resources underlines “the need to identify and develop domestic sources, particularly in geologically promising regions such as the northeast.”The rare earth elements (REE) are a set of 17 metallic elements grouped into light and heavy categories. They are necessary for the production of more than 200 consumer products, such as cellular telephones, computer hard drives, electric and hybrid vehicles, and televisions. Defense applications include guidance systems, lasers, electronic displays, and radar and sonar systems.

India’s northeastern states, especially the states of Assam, Meghalaya, Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh, have been known for their hydrocarbon reserves since the colonial era. Rich deposits of uranium have also been discovered in Meghalaya, but extraction of these deposits has been opposed by local organizations.The GSI report identified Lodoso village in Arunachal Pradesh’s Papum Pare district as having 2.15 million tons of REE-bearing ferruginous phyllite, a type of metamorphic rock. 

In Assam, the concentrations of REE ranged from 1,000 to 5,000 parts per million, while it was between 3,646 and 5,100 parts in Meghalaya.The GSI’s estimate of REE deposits in the Northeast is part of the total of 482.6 metric tons of various cut-off grades in 34 exploration projects in the country. The Atomic Minerals Directorate for Exploration and Research (AMD) has identified around 7.23 million tons across the states of Andhra Pradesh, Odisha, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, West Bengal, Jharkhand, Gujarat, and Maharashtra.

Afghanistan: Taliban Bans Chess In Crackdown On Sports, Pastimes – Analysis

RFE RL

The circumstances of Naveed Ahmad’s life have imposed many restrictions on the impoverished Afghan teenager. He can’t travel abroad, pursue his dream of getting a university degree, or even afford to eat out with friends.But the one thing the19-year-old never lost access to was his favorite sport and pastime: Chess.Among the dozens of restrictions the Taliban have imposed on its citizens, the recent adoption of a measure banning chess due to “religious considerations.”

As someone who loves playing chess, I was very, very upset that chess has been banned in Afghanistan,” said Ahmad, speaking by phone from his native province of Kunduz in the country’s north.I have always dreamt of taking part in chess tournaments and hoped that at least I would travel to various provinces to play chess,” said Ahmad, who has played chess since the age of 10.

The Taliban’s sports directorate said it was suspending chess until the further notice over concerns that the sport encourages gambling, which is banned in Islam.The state agency’s spokesman Atal Mashwani told reporters in mid-May that chess would remain suspended across Afghanistan “until these considerations are addressed, the sport of chess is suspended in Afghanistan.”

Nearly three months on, the Taliban authorities have not announced if they have come to a final decision.RFE/RL contacted Mashwani for comment, but he did not respond to the requests.The Taliban first outlawed chess during its previous stint in power that ended in 2001.The chess suspension adds to a long list of bans and restrictions that the Taliban has imposed on sports, arts, and other activities since returning to power in August 2021.

Anatomy of an Insurgency: Balochistan’s Crisis and Pakistan’s Failures


Balochistan is Pakistan’s largest province, comprising 44 percent of the country’s territory, yet it has a relatively small population of approximately 14.8 million. Of this population, only 5.9 million are ethnic Baloch, with Pashtuns forming the other significant demographic group.The province has been engulfed in an insurgency since 2006, but the conflict has recently undergone a dramatic transformation. What began as a tribal resistance movement has evolved into a formidable insurgency with separatist ambitions, complemented by a broader peaceful political movement. Recent escalations demonstrate both the insurgents’ growing operational capabilities and the Pakistani state’s persistent reliance on heavy-handed military responses that continue to alienate Baloch society.

The roots of contemporary unrest, according to Baloch nationalists, trace back to Pakistan’s founding when in 1948 the State of Kalat was forcibly incorporated into the federation despite local resistance. However, the current insurgency was catalyzed by then-President General Pervez Musharraf’s unilateral decision to construct Gwadar Port, bypassing constitutional structures including the National Assembly, Council of Common Interest, and the Balochistan Provincial government. This decision came despite ongoing negotiations through a Senate Committee led by Senator Mushahid Hussain, then the secretary general of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League (Q), that had nearly achieved consensus.

Akbar Bugti – a veteran political leader and Tumandar of the Bugti tribe who had served as chief minister, governor, and federal minister of state – had opposed the Gwadar project due to concerns about demographic changes from nationwide migration and the lack of guarantees that locals would benefit from development. Musharraf’s handling of political disagreements with Baloch leaders was marked by intimidation, and when security forces initiated operations against protests surrounding the port’s construction, Bugti and his supporters retreated to the mountains where military forces killed him in August 2006. 

Bugti’s death transformed him from a collaborator with Islamabad into a nationalist hero, reinvigorating independence demands that had largely lain dormant since General Zia-ul-Haq’s rapprochement with Baloch dissidents in the 1980s. Bugti’s death became a rallying point for the insurgency. The August 2024 surge in insurgent violence coincided with his death anniversary, demonstrating the enduring symbolic power of the event.

As Philippine Province Declared Free of Abu Sayyaf, Counterterrorism in Southeast Asia Moves Online


The Philippines’ restive island of Basilan was officially declared to be free of Abu Sayyaf on June 10. The announcement comes 10 years after the group, known for being Islamic State’s Philippine branch, launched its first major attack there, where a Moroccan suicide bomber killed 11 people (GMA News Online [The Philippines], August 1, 2018). Secretary Carlito Galvez Jr. of the Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace, Reconciliation and Unity stated that Abu Sayyaf’s demise was “a turning point for [Basilan] province from a place once tainted by bloodshed to one filled with peace” (Philippine News Agency, June 10). 

Abu Sayyaf’s defeat in Basilan may be more complete than in other parts of the southern Philippines, where the group once operated with near-impunity. The removal of Abu Sayyaf from Basilan is the latest progress in the battle against the group’s low-level but intractable insurgency, itself representative of the decline of violent Islamism in Southeast Asia. Prior to the Presidential Peace Adviser announcing Abu Sayyaf’s demise from Basilan, there were many signs that Abu Sayyaf was on its last legs. 

One Abu Sayyaf member who was involved in the Dos Palmas kidnappings in Lantawan township on Basilan in the early 2000s was arrested in March, having spent the last two decades on the run (GMA News Online [The Philippines], March 31). The Dos Palmas (also called the Golden Harvest) kidnappings were a thirteen-month crisis that involved Abu Sayyaf capturing more than 100 civilians, at least 20 of whom were killed. Ever since, Dos Palmas kidnappings have been at the forefront of Philippine counterterrorism efforts, with authorities still conducting arrests in 2019 and 2021 (The Philippine Star, March 12, 2019; Benar News, September 15, 2021). 

While it was originally reported that an American was abducted and killed by Abu Sayyaf in Basilan last October, it appears that the motive of the armed men behind the crime was financial and/or personal, with no direct connection with jihadism or Abu Sayyaf being identified (Minda News, October 19, 2024; Manilla Bulletin, October 21, 2024; Medium/@Crime Desk, January 11). The nearby island of Jolo in the province of Sulu is also putting its notoriety as a previous hotbed of Abu Sayyaf activity behind it. Jolo is currently enjoying economic rejuvenation as the island transitions from “terrorism to tourism,” with night markets and entertainment becoming hallmarks of the territory (South China Morning Post, December 2, 2024). 

China’s Joint Patrols on the Mekong River: Much Less Than Meets the Eye

Amy Sinnenberg

On October 5, 2011, thirteen Chinese sailors were found bound, blindfolded, and executed, their bodies dumped in the Mekong River near northern Thailand. The scene was grisly. Two Chinese cargo ships, the Hua Ping and Yu Xing 8, were later discovered with nearly a million methamphetamine tablets onboard.

Within days, Chinese authorities blamed the massacre on Naw Kham, a drug lord operating in the Golden Triangle, launching a full-scale manhunt. Authorities captured Kham, brought him to China, tried him, and then executed him by lethal injection in 2013. The state broadcast the execution on national television.

A murkier truth is buried under that official story. Thai investigators – and eventually, Chinese ones, too – uncovered that nine Thai soldiers from an elite anti-narcotics unit carried out the killings. They orchestrated the massacre after a protection racket went sideways, then allegedly tried to frame Kham by planting the drugs. And yet the Thai soldiers faced no charges. They walked free. The Chinese public got the closure of televised justice, but the men who pulled the triggers? Nothing.

Following the murders, China halted all shipping on the Mekong and scrambled to reassert control. Within weeks, it convened an emergency summit with Thailand, Laos, and Myanmar (the three countries touching the Golden Triangle) and rolled out a bold new initiative: joint river patrols. The plan, as Beijing envisioned it, would have Chinese boats and personnel operating across borders, patrolling shoulder-to-shoulder with forces from neighboring countries. However, that did not happen.

Maritime Militia: China’s Hybrid War Strategy in the Indian Ocea


Europe depends on open waters for trade, energy, and security. However, lurking within the waves of international waters is a hidden danger: Chinese fishing trawlers that serve as extensions of Beijing’s maritime intelligence operations. Ostensibly commercial, these ships are integral to China’s “maritime militia.” They are outfitted with sophisticated sensors, satellite communications, and small arms, posing as deep-sea fishermen while gathering sensitive information. 

Their increasing presence across the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, and beyond has caused two interconnected issues: damaging the livelihoods of local fishermen and supplying critical intelligence to the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). This was particularly apparent during India’s military operation Sindoor, targeting terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan in May 2025, when seemingly benign fishing vessels trailed India’s navy, transmitting movements to both China and Pakistan.

According to the London-based think tank Overseas Development Institute (ODI), China’s distant-water trawler fleet is estimated to number around 17,000 vessels worldwide. Their purpose is not merely to pursue squid or tuna. A report by Andrew S. Erickson, Professor of Strategy at the China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College, indicates that a significant portion of these vessels are part of the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM), a state-sponsored entity that bolsters the PLAN and Coast Guard under the guise of civilian cover.

These ships are equipped with automatic identification system (AIS) transponders, satellite communication equipment, and high-intensity LED lights for nocturnal fishing, which is frequently done utilizing purse seines and gill nets. Some are armed with non-lethal devices such as water cannons or lasers—tools that are effective for ‘grey-zone’ harassment rather than legitimate fishing.Some specialized naval-design vessels are constructed for dual purposes: 

China’s ‘Over Capacity’: Boon Or Bane – OpEd

Lim Teck Ghee

“Western hostility towards China reflects the grudging realization that the West may not be the pinnacle of achievement after all. Rather than possibly learning from China’s successes, westerners have chosen resentment borne of a sense of frustrated superiority”. — “Why the West’s resentment of China is so misguidedAs China’s higher value industrial and manufacturing exports carve an increasingly larger share of markets around the world, the United States (US) and European Union (EU) countries have undertaken separate but in reality complementary policies aimed at beating back this unprecedented threat to Western dominance of the international trading and economic order.

The criticisms levelled by Washington and Brussels to counter the Chinese exports impacting their domestic producers for now emphasize that China’s state-led and subsidized export-driven economic model has created excess manufacturing capacity, flooding their markets with cheap goods.Apart from the over-capacity charge refrain, also commonly featured in the media pronouncements are accusations of unfair trade practices, intellectual piracy, market disruption and national security concerns as the flood of Chinese products – electric vehicles, batteries, solar panels, wind turbines, ships, electronic devices and components, steel and aluminium products, and practically the entire range of everyday consumer and household products – gain a foothold in Western markets. 

This popularity – on account of their quality, pricing and superiority over domestic and other rivals – has driven the US and EU nations into record deficits in their accounting trade figures with China. An indication of how serious these concerns have become for Western governments and policymakers is that the issue of alleged Chinese over capacity is a key subject of negotiation in the ongoing US and China tariff meetings. It also emerged as the most prominent concern of the EU delegation visiting Beijing for a one day summit to mark the 50th anniversary of China-EU diplomatic relations.

What policy changes can arise from these negotiations and meetings remains to be seen.
Over Capacity: Bane for Some, Boon for Others The consensus amongst independent market analysts and international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is that the charges levelled against China’s export success have little or no basis. This success has been hard earned and is due mainly to China’s huge disciplined work force and adherence rather than subversion or evasion of the market principles, norms and practices required of World Trade Organization (WTO) member countries.

The Roots of the Thailand-Cambodia Border Conflict

Sebastian Strangio

On the morning of July 24, in circumstances that remain the subject of dispute, fighting erupted between Thai and Cambodian soldiers close to Ta Moan Thom, an eleventh-century Khmer-Hindu temple perched on the border between the two countries. Within hours, the fighting had spread to other parts of the border, where both armies deployed heavy weaponry, including multiple-launch rocket systems, artillery, and tanks. Cambodia fired batteries of Russia-made BM-21 rockets and artillery shells into Thailand while the Thai air force scrambled F-16 jets to bomb Cambodian military targets. As of press time, the conflict had killed more than 30 people, including 13 civilians in Thailand and eight in Cambodia, and more than 200,000 people had been evacuated from border areas.

The outbreak of the conflict, which followed months of growing tensions over the nations’ land and maritime boundaries, has confused many international observers. This hasn’t been helped by the fact that both nations have adopted the position of victim, accusing the other of a campaign of premeditated aggression. Thailand claims that Cambodian soldiers fired the first shots at Ta Moan Thom, while Cambodia’s government asserts that its troops retaliated after an “unprovoked incursion” by Thai forces and “acted strictly within the bounds of self-defense.” Both claim that the other has targeted civilian populations and violated international law. The two governments’ views have been dishearteningly echoed by many media outlets in both countries, as well as (less surprisingly) by Thai and Cambodian netizens, who have deployed to defend their nations’ honor and innocence on the battlefields of social media.

As some observers have noted, the conflict involves much more than the few square kilometers of rugged terrain that are in dispute. Indeed, it is hard to understand why the conflict has broken out, and its timing, without understanding the weight of nationalist sentiments that lie behind it, as well as the ways that these have been exploited and instrumentalized by politicians on both sides of the border.Like so much else, the Thailand-Cambodia border conflict is a vestige of Western colonialism – in particular, of a treaty signed between Siam and French Indo-China in 1904, which set the land border between the two polities. This treaty, which was modified by a subsequent treaty in 1907, charged a Mixed Delimitation Commission, made up of French and Siamese officials, with “setting the new boundaries” within four months of the treaty’s ratification.

Put the Quad to Work On Energy Security

Larry W. Schwartz

Since its inception in 2007, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—the strategic partnership between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States—has struggled to define a clear purpose beyond counterbalancing China. Despite regular summits and growing rhetorical alignment, the grouping has largely fallen short of delivering tangible economic cooperation.

The Quad was revived in 2017 during the first Trump administration to create a more unified Indo-Pacific security strategy. The Biden administration then elevated the Quad to leader-level summits and broadened its agenda beyond security. The 2024 Wilmington Declaration marked a turning point, committing the four nations to deeper collaboration on clean energy supply chains as part of a wider focus on energy security and economic resilience.

Larry W. Schwartz is a senior advisor at Pollination Group and the CEO of infrastructure developer Kitfield Group. He was previously appointed to the U.S. Commerce Department’s U.S.-Brazil CEO Forum in the first Trump administration.

Narayan Subramanian is the former director for energy transition at the White House National Security Council and advisor to U.S. Energy Secretary Jennifer Granholm in the Biden administration. He is currently a nonresident fellow at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Why Putin Should Declare Victory in Ukraine Now

Thomas Graham

The grisly Russia-Ukraine war is well into its fourth year with no end in sight. Russia has the advantage on the battlefield, pounding Ukraine’s critical infrastructure, defense industries, and major cities from the air and slowly but steadily pushing the front lines deeper into Ukraine. The cost in Russian lives lost and materiel destroyed is staggering. The dead and wounded now number north of one million; the materiel losses are incalculable, but Russia’s stocks of weapons have been depleted to the extent that it relies on extra supplies from North Korea and Iran.

Yet Putin vows that Russia will continue this war of attrition until he has achieved all the goals he set out when he launched the invasion. At the same time, his lead negotiator with the Ukrainians boasts that Russia will fight for decades, as it did in the Great Northern War of the early eighteenth century, if that is what it takes to gain victory. The Kremlin shrugged off President Donald Trump’s recent decision to step up arms deliveries to Ukraine and levy harsh sanctions should Russia not agree to a ceasefire.

The great irony is that for all practical purposes, Russia has already largely achieved its goals, while prosecuting the war further saps the strength Russia will need to hold its own in the intensifying great-power competition that will shape world events in the years ahead. An astute strategist would recognize that it’s time to declare victory,A year ago, Putin laid out his goals: No NATO membership for Ukraine, Ukraine’s recognition of Russia’s annexation of five of its provinces, its demilitarization, its denazification (code for regime change), and the lifting of Western sanctions. Where do things stand at the moment?

Now, Ukraine is unlikely to join NATO anytime soon. Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the United States and its European allies have emphatically demonstrated that they are not going to risk war with Russia to defend Ukraine. They are not now about to commit to doing just that by admitting Ukraine into the alliance.Further, Russia now occupies roughly 85 percent of the Ukrainian territory it has formally annexed. Its land bridge along the Sea of Azov to Crimea is next to impregnable. While Kyiv refuses to recognize de jure Russia’s control of this territory, it has conceded that it cannot regain it by force. 

Will He, Or Won’t He? That Is The Question As US Frustration With Netanyahu Mounts – Analysis

James M. Dorsey

Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu appears determined to depopulate Gaza by hook or by crook, even if he has bowed to US pressure by agreeing to a reduced military presence in the Strip as part of a temporary ceasefire.The reduced presence, involving a withdrawal from the Morag Corridor that separates Rafah from the rest of Gaza, would complicate Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz’s plans to corral hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in a tent camp on the flattened ruins of the Strip’s southernmost city close to the Egyptian border. 

That hasn’t stopped Israel from seeking to depopulate Gaza by ensuring that the Strip is unliveable and uninhabitable in the hope that Palestinians will “voluntarily” relocate to a third country. While allowing some food and essential goods into Gaza after preventing any humanitarian aid from entering for 130 days, Israel continues to throttle the flow so that it remains far below what is needed.In addition, Israel complicates access to whatever aid makes it into Gaza by restricting distribution to the one site operated by the controversial Israel and US-backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation near Rafah and some United Nations-managed points. 

Daily Israeli attacks kill tens of desperate Palestinians, as many risk travelling to the Foundation’s distribution hub or looting the UN convoys allowed entry.In what appeared to be an attempt to coerce Hamas into a ceasefire agreement, Israel this week issued a forced evacuation order for Palestinians in Deir al-Balah in central Gaza. Israeli leaflets dropped urged Palestinians to leave because the military was about to “operate in areas where it has not operated in the past.

Simultaneously, Israel’s Arabic-language military spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Avichay Adraee announced the imminent Israeli operation on X.Many of those Hamas commanders Israel has not killed are believedto be hiding in eastern parts of Deir al-Balah that have so far been spared the brunt of Israeli assaults. The families of Hamas’ remaining hostages, kidnapped during the group’s October 7, 2023, attack on Israel, fear that their loved ones may also be in eastern Deir al-Balah.

Deterrence Runs on Rare Earths

Jake Kwon and Benjamin Jensen

In the future, the United States will maintain a deep stockpile of rare earth minerals that support a ground force with larger numbers of unmanned systems and data links spread across the forward line of troops. In competition, swarms will pulse in and out of theaters, keeping adversaries off balance, denying benefits, and encouraging restraint. Deterrence will be a function not just of the lethality of this human-machine force but “combat power in being” and how adversaries assess the ability of the U.S. Army and other services to scale combat power.

The United States’ ability to deter China depends on critical minerals most Americans have never heard of. These materials have increasingly been recognized as a key economic lever of power for the United States and China. Rare earth elements are not only indispensable components of U.S. economic strength, but also of the United States’ security infrastructure. Found in everything from smartphones and laptops, they also power complex systems such as precision-guided munitions, stealth technology, and training AI models. Rare earth elements form the backbone of modern defense capabilities.

As China controls 90 percent of rare earth element processing, the United States is at an inflection point. To maintain credible deterrence against China and defend against Beijing’s ability to weaponize global defense supply chains, the United States should act quickly and reestablish a robust strategic rare earth element reserve.From 1939 to the 1980s (prior to World War II through the end of the Cold War). 

the United States maintained stockpiles of rare earth elements to create a buffer against shortages and allow for uninterrupted defense production through the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling ActWith the relative global calm following the Cold War, the United States sold off its stockpiles, accepting the theory that global supply chains would support rapid scaling in times of conflict. However, the Covid-19 pandemic starkly illuminated a U.S. vulnerability, exposing critical supply chain disruptions that severely impacted the United States’ ability to procure necessary materials in a timely manner.

Out-Adapting the Enemy: Why Mass Alone Won’t Win Tomorrow’s Wars

Benjamin Jensen

In the future, the U.S. Army will field modular systems of drones and loitering munitions alongside electronic warfare and intelligence collection kits that can be tailored to the mission at the tactical level. Soldiers will tinker and adapt, creating unique mosaic effects that enable more rapid adaptation at lower echelons. Grenades will be thrown, fired from a rifle, or dropped from a drone. Sensors will be distributed forward as digital sentries, mounted on small drones, or used to augment crew-served weapons. Entire remote weapons pods will be swapped between unmanned vehicles depending on the mission and threat profile. 

War is defined by what J. F. C. Fuller called the constant tactical factor. Every adaptation on the battlefield begets a counter-adaptation. This dynamic creates an imperative to build forces built to maximize adaptation and a family of systems that support prototyping and rapid adjustments on the frontlines. The trend towards smaller, commercial sensors and software packages reinforces this dynamic. It is now cost-effective to build adaptable systems at the company level, but doing so will require a fundamental cultural change and policy reforms.

Specifically, commanders will need to be allowed to assume more risk in training, and existing training areas will need to accommodate more live fire exercises that include small drones operating in the air littorals. Industry will need to participate in these exercises using contract procedures that allow them to support prototyping warfare and constant adjustments. Last, the Army will need to ensure provisions are in place within its contracts to allow units in the field to tinker with equipment and reduce the reliance on field service engineers.
The Logic of Adaptation

For too long, equipment has been given to soldiers with the expectation that there should be few to no adjustments. Soldiers fire javelins. They don’t modify them. This rigidity makes the force brittle to enemy adaptation. If you optimize to find one signature—say the thermal image of a tank or the electronic signature of a command post—and the enemy correctly masks it, you are blind.This is not how modern land armies gain an advantage. Across the frontline in Ukraine, there is a constant cycle of learning to mask signatures and spoof sensors with decoys alongside daily adjustments to drone strike missions. 

The Intifada That Hasn’t Arrived


The Middle East is in crisis, and Israel is at the center of the storm. Since Hamas’s surprise attack on October 7, 2023, that killed around 1,200 Israelis, the Israeli military has assailed and occupied much of the Gaza Strip, ramped up operations in the West Bank, struck Houthi targets in Yemen, devastated Hezbollah in Lebanon, hit nuclear and military sites in Iran, and bombed parts of Syria. All these adversaries have links to terrorism: in the decades before October 7, Hamas and Hezbollah used terrorism against Israel, killing over 1,000 civilians as well as many soldiers. 

In these circumstances, Israel appears to be courting a new wave of terrorist attacks, maybe even a wider uprising. The war in Gaza has caused tremendous civilian suffering. At the same time, Israel is squeezing the West Bank with raids on suspected terrorist hideouts. Those operations have caused approximately 1,000 deaths and displaced tens of thousands more Palestinians. Along with the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and numerous Jewish settler depredations there, Palestinians and Arab citizens of Israel have many reasons to be outraged at Israel.

Despite that anger and despite Israel’s long slate of adversaries, the number of terrorist attacks within Israel since October 7 has been surprisingly low. Israel has not seen high-casualty terrorist attacks or even a sustained series of low-level incidents. A third intifada, in which Palestinians would rise up against the Israeli occupation as they did between 1987 and 1993 and between 2000 and 2005, remains a distant prospect. 

That is in large part attributable to the success of Israel’s campaigns against its enemies, the disarray of its foes, its vice-like grip on the Palestinian territories, and its stiffened internal defenses. And yet that success comes with deep costs. In addition to killing many civilians, Israel’s aggressive approach threatens to foreclose potential political resolutions to the many conflicts it is embroiled in. By trying to stave off its adversaries and protect itself from terrorist attacks, Israel will in fact be entering a state of permanent war.

The Bomb Lady’ shows how immigrants power national defense

FRANK A. ROSE

In an era when immigration policy is often reduced to threats and responses, we would do well to remember the story of Nguyet Anh Duong, a retired U.S. civil servant and one of the quiet heroes behind a vital piece of modern American military capability.Duong, a Vietnamese immigrant who fled to the United States after the fall of Saigon in 1975, went on to become a leading weapons scientist at the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Indian Head, Md. There, she played a pivotal role in developing “bunker buster” bombs that eventually led to the weapons used in the recent U.S. strikes against Iranian nuclear sites. For her ingenuity and dedication, she earned the nickname “the Bomb Lady.”

Her story is remarkable not only because of what she achieved, but because of what it symbolizes: the extraordinary, often overlooked contributions that immigrants make to American national security and technological innovation. In the current debates over immigration, we rarely hear about people like Anh Duong—but we should.Duong’s journey from refugee to weapons designer encapsulates what has long made the United States exceptional: not just its material wealth or military strength, but its ability to attract, absorb, and empower global talent, especially during moments of national crisis. She is not an outlier. Immigrants have been critical to nearly every major scientific and technological breakthrough in modern American history, from the Manhattan Project to Silicon Valley.

In his 2017 book Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who Turned the Tide in the Second World War, historian Paul Kennedy explores how the Allied victory was shaped not only by battlefield heroism, but by the ingenuity of engineers and scientists who solved daunting operational problems. From designing better radar and long-range aircraft to developing amphibious landing craft and cracking German codes, it was technological adaptation, fueled by open societies and free inquiry, that gave the Allies the edge.

As Evan Thomas wrote in his review of the book, “Culture, as much as material strength, played a critical role in the Allied victory.” The Allies thrived not because they had the most tanks or ships, but because their societies—unlike their fascist adversaries—fostered experimentation, welcomed dissent, and valued creative problem-solving. The United States, in particular, benefited from a wave of scientists and engineers who had fled authoritarian regimes in Europe. In many ways, America’s openness was its ultimate asymmetric advantage.

Ukraine Just Bombed Russia’s Top Electronic Warfare Factory

Reuben Johnson

A U.S. Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcon based in the Central Command area of operations conducts armed aerial patrols in Somalia in support of Operation Octave Quartz, Jan. 9, 2020. The F-16s support to OOQ demonstrates the U.S. military’s reach and power projection across vast distances to hold adversaries such as al-Shabaab at risk with flexible, precise and lethal force that is capable of rapidly responding anywhere on the globe. The mission of OOQ is to reposition U.S. Department of Defense personnel from Somalia to other locations in East Africa. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Taylor Harrison)

Key Points and Summary – In a significant strategic victory, Ukrainian drones appear to have struck deep inside Russia, badly damaging the Signal Radio Plant, a critical factory for military electronics.The plant, located 330 miles from Ukraine, is a leading producer of vital Russian electronic warfare (EW) and radar systems.The strikes reportedly hit workshops containing expensive, imported machinery that will now be “impossible to replace” due to Western sanctions.

The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), in a rare admission of responsibility, confirmed the attack is part of a systematic campaign to degrade Russia’s military-industrial capacity.Ukraine’s Drones Appear to Again Hit Deep Inside RussiaWARSAW, POLAND – Video footage posted on local Russian social media sites shows a Ukrainian drone striking a critical Russian defense industrial site this past weekend.This factory is responsible for many of Moscow’s most vital defense electronics systems.

The company, known as the Signal Radio Plant, is located in the Stavropol region of Russia and is about 330 miles from Ukraine, demonstrating that the drone warriors in Kyiv continue to be able to hit targets progressively deeper inside Russia’s rear area.The Signal plant is one of Russia’s leading producers of defense electronic systems, including radar, electronic warfare equipment for front-line aircraft, active jamming systems, remote weapon-control modules, systems for air defense batteries, and other radio-electronic equipment, said an unidentified Ukraine Security Service (SBU) official.

Putin Is Mocking You’: The 4 Words That Sparked Trump’s Dramatic U-Turn on Ukraine

Reuben Johnson

An F-16 Fighting Falcon assigned to the 54th Fighter Group sits on the flightline at Holloman Air Force Base, May 1, 2025. The F-16 was the first production aircraft with a fly-by-wire flight control system, meaning it's controlled electronically instead of with direct mechanical linkages, allowing for more precise and safer maneuvers. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Gaspar A. Cortez)Key Points and Summary – A single, secret phone call on July 4th from Poland’s Foreign Minister, Radosล‚aw Sikorski, reportedly triggered President Trump’s dramatic policy U-turn on Ukraine.

-Sikorski informed Trump’s envoy that Russia had just launched a massive attack on Kyiv that struck the Polish consulate, framing the move as Vladimir Putin personally “mocking” Trump’s peace efforts.The insult, coming just after a Trump-Putin phone call, reportedly infuriated the President.He immediately ordered the Pentagon to reverse a freeze on military aid, a pivotal moment that led directly to resumed Patriot missile shipments and a tougher U.S. stance on Russia.WARSAW, POLAND – It was early morning on July 4 – a Friday and one of the biggest annual US holidays.

US President Donald Trump’s special envoy, retired Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg, was hoping to take a rest for at least part of the weekend.Suddenly, Kellogg’s mobile phone lit up with a phone call with a +48 prefix, the country code for Poland.On the line from Warsaw and six hours ahead of US East Coast time was Polish Foreign Minister Radosล‚aw Sikorski.What he had to say to the American presidential envoy may very well end up changing the course of this war that has been on-going since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022.

Sikorski had two kinds of news to relay to Kellogg: the bad kind and the worse kind.The bad news was that overnight, Russia had mounted another one of its massive attacks on Ukrainian cities.No less than 11 missiles and 539 drones had been launched at Kyiv alone. At the time this was the largest Russian barrage against the Ukrainian capital since the war began. Although, since Russian President Vladimir Putin’s military has exceeded even these numbers in subsequent attacks.)

How a Cyber Alliance Took Down Russian Cybercrime

Julia Dickson and Emily Harding

In a dramatic success and a global pushback against Russia’s hybrid warfare operations, a mid-July joint international operation disrupted a massive Russian cybercrime network known as NoName057(16). Since 2022, this ideologically motivated hacktivist network has claimed responsibility for more than 1,500 distributed denial-of-service attacks (DDoS) against countries aligned with NATO. The group’s activity is a prime example of a broader and concerning trend: Moscow using hybrid warfare in an attempt to undermine support for Ukraine and destabilize the United States and its allies. This success is likely to be temporary—one round in an ongoing match that can only be definitively won by intensive cooperation among allie.

NoName057(16) has been active since 2022, around the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. With an estimated 4,000 volunteers, this cyber army initially focused on Ukraine, then expanded its targets to include countries that support Ukraine, including the United States and NATO allies like Czechia, Poland, and Spain. Its operations have included DDoS attacks against Swedish authorities and banking websites, more than 250 German companies and institutions, and organizations linked to the June 2025 NATO summit. NoName057(16) also participated in DDoS attacks against Japanese logistics and shipbuilding companies in 2024.

In response to the growing threat, Europol facilitated Operation Eastwood. The operation involved 19 countries, the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), and the Joint Cybercrime Action Taskforce (J-CAT), part of Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre (EC3). Operation Eastwood ultimately proved highly disruptive to the group’s operations, at least temporarily. It disrupted more than 100 of the group’s servers worldwide and took a significant part of the group’s central server infrastructure offline. Authorities also made two arrests (in France and Spain) and issued seven arrest warrants (six by Germany and one by Spain).

Groups like this tend to be fluid, however, and its remnants are likely to reconstitute and reengage in the near future. As such, international cooperation is critical. EC3 and J-CAT provide a promising model for collaborative, regional cyber threat intelligence sharing centers that could be expanded or replicated in other regions as Russian cyberactivity grows more aggressive.NoName057(16)’s operations are only part of Russia’s escalating cyber campaign. Moscow has long been a dominant player in the cyber domain but has become more active since 2021, in the lead-up to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Beyond the Ceasefire: How the US and China Shadowed the Cambodia-Thailand Clash

Khoo Ying Hooi

Malaysia’s Prime Minister and current ASEAN Chair Anwar Ibrahim (center), flanked by Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet and Thai Acting Prime Minister Phumtham Wechayachai announces a Cambodia-Thailand ceasefire, Putrajaya, Malaysia, July 28, 2025.Credit: Facebook/ Anwar IbrahimThe brief but deadly eruption of violence between Thailand and Cambodia last week jolted Southeast Asia. During the fighting, over 250,000 people were displaced, at least 35 people were killed, and cultural heritage sites once again became collateral in a nationalistic tug-of-war.

But beyond the bullets and borderlines lies a deeper story: one of geopolitical performance, transactional diplomacy, and the lingering question of who truly gets to shape peace in Southeast Asia.The rapid announcement of a ceasefire today, brokered in Putrajaya with Malaysia as mediator, offered a welcome pause. Yet the dust had barely settled before the shadow of great power rivalry reemerged. Both the United States and China issued statements during the crisis.

U.S. President Donald Trump, ever theatrical, claimed credit for pushing leaders toward dialogue, declaring himself the “the President of PEACE” and claiming to have “saved thousands of lives.” China, predictably circumspect, spoke in favor of restraint and regional process. But it was Malaysia that stepped up as a peacemaker.Fighting erupted on July 24 along the Cambodia-Thailand border, marking the most serious escalation between the two countries in over a decade. Rooted in longstanding territorial disputes and political tension, the clashes quickly intensified into a broader military confrontation involving airstrikes, artillery, and retaliatory fire. Both sides accused each other of targeting civilians, while tens of thousands of residents were displaced amid growing regional concern.


Light Infantry Lethality: Understanding the Power of the Goose


The Carl Gustaf Multi-Role Anti-Armor Anti-Personnel Weapon System (MAAWS) is a remarkable weapon system for light infantry forces. But this weapon is also one of the least understood systems across the Infantry.The 84mm Recoilless Rifle goes by many nicknames: Carl G, the Gustaf, the Goose, MAAWS, the M3. Whatever you call it, it looks like a beast, and one glance tells you that it packs a punch. Yet the uninitiated mistake the Carl G as little more than a reloadable AT4 so it still gets driven like an old station wagon when it has the performance, versatility, and power of a race car.

The new M3A1 MAAWS with the integrated fire control system (FCS) is so capable, it’s almost cheating… but only if our gunners — and our leaders — understand all that it is capable of and how to employ it. The Carl G deserves to be more than a show pony that sits in the arms room, neglected.The M3A1 Carl Gustaf is the most powerful weapon system in a rifle platoon. As the Army searches for ways to increase the lethality of the infantry brigade combat team (IBCT), one of the solutions is already sitting quietly in our arms rooms, waiting to get the attention it deserves.

There are two compounding reasons why the Carl G gets overlooked and has yet to truly infuse itself into the light infantry ethos. The first is a general lack of familiarity or exposure to the weapon among maneuver leaders. Few saw the original M3 in action in Iraq or Afghanistan due to its limited fielding (mostly across special operations forces [SOF]), and even less have seen the new M3A1 perform with the integrated digital optic, which completely changes the consistency and accuracy of the weapon by an exponential factor.

The second is a gross lack of available training ammunition (sub-caliber 7.62mm training rounds or full caliber training practice [TP] rounds) to build the needed appreciation for the weapon. What can we expect in terms of proficiency or confidence in our weapons when we give our gunners the minimum required rounds yearly to train with? The answer: a day familiarization that, at best, helps teams hit a static target at 300 meters during the day, which is what we can expect from an AT4. The M3A1, however, can hit targets beyond 1,000 meters day or night. 

These wargames explored drone attacks on US military bases

Michael Peck

In March 2025, the U.S. government conducted a wargame on how to defend military bases in the United States from drone attacks.Just three months later, what had seemed a theoretical possibility became frighteningly close to reality. In June 2025 came Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb. Ukrainian agents had spent months smuggling hundreds of drones deep inside Russia. In a coordinated strike, more than 100 small drones destroyed 20 to 40 Russian warplanes on five airbases scattered from Moscow to Siberia.

The damage extended to more than Russian airpower or the Kremlin’s pride. The drone’s-eye videos of burning bombers sent a chilling signal to nations around the world. If this could happen to Russia, then it could happen to any country — including the United States.Allvin calls Ukraine drone strikes a wake-up call for US air defenseThe Air Force's top uniformed leader said that planners need to consider vulnerabilities at military sites once thought untouchable by enemy forces.

Since 2022, the U.S. Army’s Joint Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office, or JCO, and the RAND Corp. think tank have held six wargames on how to mitigate the drone threat.We are trying to understand the policies and authorities we have in place to prevent us from contending with a scenario like Operation Spiderweb,” said Paul Lushenko, an assistant professor at the U.S. Army War College who helped run the drone wargame.

Many of the details of these wargames are classified, but one key finding is that protecting domestic U.S. bases can’t be just the military’s job.The tabletop exercise emphasized the need for a framework to integrate, enable, and synchronize state, local, tribal, and territorial authorities into counter-drone operations at or near military bases,” noted an essay by the game’s designers. But this, in turn, raises a slew of jurisdictional and communication issues.

Pentagon unit seeks Ukraine-like conditions for drone testing

Courtney Albon

For most of the firms that participated in a late June drone trial staged by the Defense Innovation Unit in remote Alaska, it was the first time their systems had flown outside of a lab setting.The five companies brought drones and radio prototypes to a range near the U.S. Army’s Fort Wainright to see how they’d fare against simulated electronic warfare systems looking to jam their navigation and command-and-control capabilities. DIU was assessing whether any of them were ready to transition to the military services for further development or fielding.

With a few exceptions, the lack of field testing showed. While several companies made progress by the end of the four-day test event, they struggled initially to maintain targets and navigate flight routes. Some of that was due to jamming and some of it was because their technology wasn’t as mature as expected.That outcome is not unusual for a prototype demonstration, DIU officials told Defense News during the event. In fact, the government team in Alaska wanted to see how the companies responded when the systems failed and whether they could iterate and come back the next day with a better solution.

That process is vital for both the DOD and the companies, but most small, commercial firms don’t have access to test space where they can learn and refine their products under the types of conditions they might face in the field. That’s a problem for the Defense Department, whose leaders want to field technology — and drones in particular — from a broader pool of companies and at faster rates.

DIU’s Trent Emeneker, who leads several autonomy projects for the organization and helped facilitate the Alaska testing, said in order to field systems that meet the needs of troops on the ground, DOD needs to change the way it tests in two key ways — by providing more opportunities for small tech companies to wring out their systems, and staging those tests in the field with military operators.