Moscow Formally Recognizes Taliban Government in Afghanistan

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Russia became the first country to formally recognize the Taliban government in Kabul. Moscow has rationalized the move as a pragmatic concession in the fight against drug trafficking and emerging terrorist threats.While in some ways purely symbolic, the Kremlin’s decision is rooted in regional security concerns, centered on the spread of the Islamic State–Khorasan Province, which threatens the completion of several north-south connectivity projects.The globally isolated Taliban regime hopes that Moscow’s recognition will strengthen the legitimacy of its government while opening the way for Kabul to become a more central player in regional transit and counterterrorism operations.

On July 3, Moscow accepted the credentials of Taliban ambassador Gul Hasan, an act that confers formal recognition of the Taliban as Afghanistan’s legitimate government. This makes Russia the first country to formally recognize the de facto Taliban regime. Hasan arrived in Moscow on July 1, where Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko received his diplomatic credentials (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; TASS; Pravda.ru, July 3). Dmitry Zhirnov, the Russian ambassador to Kabul, stated that this decision “demonstrates Russia’s sincere desire to establish a full-fledged partnership with Afghanistan … More than 100 years ago, our country was also the first in the world to recognize the independence of Afghanistan” (TASS, July 3).

The Kremlin’s recognition of the Taliban government comes after years of steadily normalizing relations with Kabul (see EDM, November 13, 2024, June 25). Russia’s interests are driven by security and transit concerns, as Moscow’s war against Ukraine has diminished its dominance over regional trade routes. The Kremlin believes the Taliban regime will play a crucial role in the development of north-south transit corridors that extend from Russia’s Northern Sea Route to the Indian Ocean (see EDM, January 15, June 25).

China’s Progress Toward Military Supremacy

Mercy A. Kuo

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The Diplomat author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with Dr. Joel Wuthnow ̶ senior research fellow in the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs within the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University (NDU) and co-author with Philip C. 

Saunders of “China’s Quest for Military Supremacy” (Polity 2025) – is the 471st in “The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.” This interview represents only Wuthnow’s views and not those of NDU or the Department of Defense.

Explain this statement in your book: China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) “has become a global actor, but it is not yet a global power.”

The PLA has become more actively involved beyond China’s immediate periphery, but usually in very modest ways. Examples include counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, participation in U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa and the Middle East, 

and a single overseas base in Djibouti. These are all non-combat-focused missions that involve no more than a few thousand troops. There are also strong constraints on the PLA’s ability to deploy larger contingents abroad, including the lack of a global command structure and limited global logistics infrastructure.

This means that while the PLA can project influence and shape the security environment, it cannot conduct the same range of combat missions that the U.S. military can based on our forward presence of hundreds of thousands of troops in Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. China has avoided a larger commitment because it has opted to focus on priorities closer to home, and because it tries not to get too enmeshed in foreign conflicts.

Is China’s New Stealth Fighter Jet Ready for Combat?

Peter Suciu

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The second domestically built flattop is the first PLAN carrier to be outfitted with electromagnetic catapults, which can enable the launch of heavier aircraft with higher payloads. The warship has been undergoing sea trials and is expected to enter service later this year.

The presence of shark markings, which also appear on the J-15, indicates that the J-35s are already in service with the PLAN.

The recent viral photos, which circulated on the Weibo platform last weekend, showed two PLAN F-35s flying in close formation, with the official serial numbers “0011” and “0012.” Chinese military aviation researcher Rupprecht Deino reposted one of the images on X.

This is not the first time that Beijing has offered teasers of its military hardware, notably its advanced aircraft. Just a week before last November’s 15th China International Aviation & Aerospace Exhibition, the Ministry of National Defense shared an image of the twin-engine, all-weather J-35, likely to build hype for the air show.

The Chinese military often created high-quality content that is shared on platforms including Xiaohongshu (REDBOOK), Douyin (TikTok), and Weibo. Posting to those platforms allows Beijing to control the narrative and closely monitor any negative commentary.

In addition, the People’s Republic of China has been quick to shoot down the military hardware of other nations. In the run-up to the China International Aviation & Aerospace Exhibition, Chinese social media users responded negatively 

to the Russian-made Sukhoi Su-57 (NATO reporting name: Felon). The criticism went viral, which helped cast the spotlight on the J-35 just as it made its official debut at the air show. The posts further put greater attention on the Chengdu J-20 Mighty Dragon.

More recently, Beijing unleashed a propaganda “disinformation” campaign against the Dassault Rafale, claiming the French-made omni-role aircraft significantly underperformed during the recent flare-up between India and Pakistan. Paris has accused China of trying to “hammer the reputation and sales of France’s flagship fighter.”

Inside the elite Ukrainian combat unit revolutionizing modern drone warfare — and its offer to the US

Caitlin Doornbos

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KYIV, Ukraine — An elite Ukrainian combat unit is defining the future of warfare by battle-testing new drone technology in real-time — which will provide invaluable insight and opportunity for the US, according to the unit’s commander.

As the more than three-year war turns to the skies, The Post visited a Ukrainian assault unit, which falls under the elite 3rd Assault Brigade, pioneering land and air drones to use in battle.

From ground units that lay mines and fire assault rifles to flying drones that drop grenades, Ukrainian Armed Forces are constantly deploying new technologies — and making regular tweaks to perfect them — on the battlefield.

6The Post visited a Ukrainian assault unit using advanced land and air drones that are defining the future of warfare.Caitlin Doornbos/NY Post

“This brigade systematically uses assault drones in its operations,” a UAF drone unit commander who goes by the callsign “Makar” told The Post. “They close the distance between Russian and Ukrainian troops because they can go farther than is safe for troops.”

All of the drones used by Makar’s unit are designed and produced in Ukraine, where developers have instant access to troop feedback on how to perfect their products.

Ground-zero for the US AI energy challenge: A state-level case study

Andrea Clabough

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AI growth, the advent of “hyperscalers”, and plans for new power-hungry data centers dotting the country from coast to coast have overturned previous assumptions of a stable US energy demand growth outlook. One state in particular is at the epicenter of America’s AI revolution: In 2024 alone, Virginia connected fifteen new data centers and anticipates adding another fifteen by the end of 2025. These are not isolated occurrences: 

already an established hub for US data centers, a recent WoodMackenzie report showed that Virginia lags only Texas as the top destination for newly announced data centers since January 2023 (boasting over 23,000 MW of capacity in the pipeline). Much of this development has been driven by Northern Virginia’s long-standing “Data Center Alley” concentrated around Washington, 

DC. Meanwhile, the state’s primary utility company, Dominion Energy, has suggested that the average Virginia ratepayer could see their power bills increase by 50 percent over the next fifteen years driven largely by power-hungry new data centers coming online.

As the Commonwealth considers the anticipated wave of new centers, its policymakers have an unmissable opportunity to lead the state toward a clear-eyed, viable path forward to reap economic benefits while ensuring both the affordability and sustainability of its energy system. None of these issues will be resolved quickly or easily but should be front and center as Virginia voters decide on their new governor this year and a new legislature.

Fighting Irregular Wars: Is it Time to Rethink the Laws of Perfidy?

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On June 8, 2024, Israeli forces executed a hostage-rescue operation in Nuseirat, central Gaza. The Israeli operation was widely reported to have utilized civilian disguises, with some forces allegedly being transported in civilian vehicles and wearing civilian clothing. In the aftermath, the former Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, 

Kenneth Roth, contended that these alleged uses of civilian disguises may have violated the laws of perfidy. This contention prompts one to consider the usefulness of disguises in combatting irregular adversaries embedded within civilian areas, and to wonder whether this rescue operation would have been possible without some form of disguise. 

Could it be that the laws of armed conflict (LOAC) prohibit the utilisation of disguises in this manner? This article will analyze the current state of the law and discuss the tensions and dilemmas that arise when the law confronts the realities of irregular wars. Following close examination, there appear to be compelling reasons to debate the suitability of the laws of perfidy in the context of irregular wars, and there might even be a case for limited reform.

It was suggested on multiple occasions that the Nuseirat operation may have violated the laws of perfidy. Perfidy is defined in Article 37 of the 1977 Additional Protocol (I) to the Geneva Conventions: Art. 37 states that perfidy is the act of a combatant falsely leading their adversary to believe that they are entitled to certain protections under the LOAC, 

with the intention of betraying this confidence. Article 37 explicitly mentions several examples of perfidious conduct, including feigning surrender, feigning incapacitation due to wounds, and feigning civilian or non-combatant status. 

In relation to feigning civilian status, Article 44 (3) should also be noted, as it clarifies that if combatants carry their arms openly during attacks and the deployments preceding them, there can be no argument that they have perfidiously feigned civilian status.

Influence by Design: Reassessing U.S. Military Advising

Alexandra Chinchilla 

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After the failure to build a sustainable Afghan military that could survive without U.S. presence, many scholars and practitioners now argue that U.S. efforts to build foreign militaries are nearly predestined to fail and should rarely, 

if ever, be undertaken. In Training for Victory: U.S. Special Forces Advisory Operations from El Salvador to Afghanistan, Frank Sobchak pushes back against this view, arguing that “…we have not failed because advising our allies is too hard; we’ve failed because we have never taken it seriously …Building foreign militaries is a difficult, long-term, 

and often thankless endeavor. But it is not impossible” (2024, 177). To support his argument, Sobchak examines five cases of U.S. military advising: El Salvador during the Cold War, and the Philippines, Colombia, Iraq, and Afghanistan during the Global War on Terror. While cases like Colombia and El Salvador are considered successes by some scholars, 

Afghanistan is widely seen as a failure. Sobchak seeks to understand why some advising efforts succeed while others do not. He tackles this challenging analytical problem with a clear research design and well-researched case studies offering new empirical detail on important U.S. advising missions.

Existing explanations attribute security force assistance outcomes to structural conditions or the provider’s use of strategies like carrots and sticks or military-to-military socialization to encourage local compliance. Sobchak’s work broadly supports the findings of researchers who argue that human contact between militaries generates more influence for security force assistance providers. 

His contribution lies in demonstrating that advising missions vary greatly in their design across cases, and this variation makes some more successful than others at generating influence. Within the U.S. special operations forces (SOF) community—the military organization most frequently engaged in advising—so-called “SOF truths” shape beliefs about how special operations forces should be built and maintained. Despite this shared reference point, in practice, 

Putin’s War Against Ukraine Diminishing Moscow’s Dominance Of Former Soviet Space – Analysis

Paul Goble

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Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in part to shore up and expand Moscow’s unchallenged dominance of the former Soviet space. The relative success of Ukrainian resistance and the impact of Putin’s war against Ukraine on Russian actions elsewhere produced the opposite effect, 

alienating many of the former Soviet republics from Russia and leading them to pursue more independent foreign policies to protect themselves from Russian aggression and international isolation.

Putin’s hope that his full-scale invasion would weaken the West and restore Russia’s dominance over the former Soviet republics may have been realized if the war had ended rapidly and decisively. Instead, 

Ukraine’s determined resistance, international support for the Ukrainian military, and diplomatic deadlock have meant the war has gone on for more than three years, undermining Russia’s relationships with the West and its position across the former Soviet space (see Strategic Snapshot, February 24).

Leaders of the former Soviet republics appear to be realizing that the Russian military is not all-powerful. Moscow’s arrogant responses to such moves, despite its demonstrated lack of military dominance, however, are poisoning ties between Moscow and even countries that had not previously broken with the Kremlin. 

Outside powers have had greater opportunities to expand their influence as Moscow’s wanes, cementing the Kremlin’s reduced position (see EDM, November 1, 2022, July 31, August 10, October 3, November 6, 2023, July 8, September 12, 2024). Russia is unlikely to recover that power unless Moscow changes its attitudes and approach, something that is unlikely as long as Putin is in power.

China’s Enduring Trust in Russia: The Public Sentiment Behind an Unlikely Partnership

Reza Hasmath

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Russia’s President Vladimir Putin walks with China’s President Xi Jinping at a welcome ceremony including the Beijing Capital Garrison Honor Guard Battalion and children holding the two countries’ national flags in Beijing, during Putin’s state visit to China, May 16, 2024.Credit: Russian Presidential Press and Information Office

When Chinese and Russian officials meet beneath the banners of “no limits” cooperation, it is easy to focus on the pageantry: bilateral summits, choreographed handshakes and scripted joint declarations. 

Beneath this diplomatic theater, however, lies a more subtle and resilient connection – one forged not solely in elite dialogues, but in the minds of everyday Chinese citizens. It is a bond sustained less by ideology and more by the quiet mechanics of perception.

The latest data from the Chinese Citizens’ Global Perception Survey (CCGPS) confirms that in 2025, Russia remains the most trusted global partner for mainland Chinese respondents. Forty-two percent assigned Russia the lowest possible adversarial rating on the survey’s 7-point Likert scale. 

Although Russia’s perceived importance to China’s long-term future dipped marginally, down 3 percent year-over-year, it still outpaces sentiment toward other jurisdictions, including the United States, the European Union, and Japan. Remarkably, this trust endures even as Russia remains embroiled in its war with Ukraine and continues to face international condemnation.

Understanding this enduring sentiment requires unpacking the foundations of public knowledge. The survey consistently finds a strong statistical correlation between trust in Russia and reported “knowledge of Russia.” In both 2024 and 2025, this variable overshadowed all others in explanatory power.

China Now Dominates Open Source AI. How Much Does That Matter?

Ben Dubow

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U.S. AI models still control over 70 percent of the market, but a collaborative, open source approach has enabled Chinese labs to punch far above their weight. For the second time in six months, a small Chinese artificial intelligence lab has made major waves across the global landscape. 

Moonshot AI, with just a few hundred employees, recently released its K2 model to remarkable acclaim. On OpenRouter, a platform that tracks which AI models developers actually pay to use, K2 quickly surpassed offerings from well-funded U.S. competitors including xAI and Meta.

This achievement mirrors the success of DeepSeek, another Chinese AI model that made headlines earlier this year. Both share a crucial characteristic: they are open source, meaning their underlying code and architecture are freely available for anyone to examine, 

modify, and build upon. Among big labs in the United States, only Meta has followed suit. But with the social media giant’s latest model widely considered a flop, China is now the undisputed leader in open source AI development.

To understand why this matters requires clarifying what “open source” means in the context of AI. Open source AI models are free to download but, unlike most open source software, they come with significant operational expenses. 

When DeepSeek offered free access to consumers, many confused this promotional strategy with the inherent nature of open source models. In reality, all base models require significant computing power, whether it’s paid for by the hosting company – as in the case of consumer products or APIs – or the user.

For everyday consumers, the distinction between open-source and closed is invisible. Google’s Gemini and OpenAI’s ChatGPT offer free basic access. Despite the enthusiasm around DeepSeek’s launch, ChatGPT still commands six times as many users globally. The same ranking that showed Moonshot surpassing xAI and Meta has Anthropic and Google alone with majority market share.

As PKK Lays Down Arms, Iraq Emerges As Power Broker | Opinion

Tanya Goudsouzian

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At the entrance to a cave northwest of Sulaymaniyah in Iraq's Kurdistan Region, PKK fighters threw their weapons into a fire in a ceremony that marked the end of their decades-long armed struggle against the Turkish state. The symbolic act followed the group's public announcement of disarmament and was attended by representatives of most Kurdish factions.

Since 1984, the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) has waged an insurgency against the Turkish state that has cost over 40,000 lives and transformed borderlands into militarized zones. Now, with incarcerated PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan's blessing—and a surprising political overture from Turkey's far right—the PKK has unilaterally moved to disarm. 

Last October, Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the far right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and a close ally of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, stunned observers by suggesting in Parliament that Öcalan could be considered for parole if he formally renounced violence and dismantled the PKK.

A fighter with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) puts his weapon into a pit during a ceremony in Sulaymaniyah, in Iraq's autonomous Kurdistan region, on July 11, 2025. SHWAN MOHAMMED/AFP via Getty Images

Iraq was a significant behind-the-scenes mediator and its involvement may prove decisive in determining whether this will bring a permanent end to a decades-long conflict. Concerns center on interference from remaining factions unimpressed by the terms, or by regional spoilers. For now, however, arrangements seem to be holding as all sides work to reach a final agreement.

The move was welcomed in Iraq, where Turkish cross-border operations against the PKK had long provoked public anger in a country fiercely protective of its sovereignty and deeply resentful of foreign incursions. With the PKK now signaling demobilization, Baghdad sees an opportunity to reassert authority in the north, ease regional tensions, and reestablish security—especially with elections in November, where the government is eager to project stability and assertiveness.

Trump Digs Coal, But is it Too Late to Arrest its Decline?

Greg Priddy

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President Trump has long been a supporter of the coal industry, most recently touting his support for coal, among other things, at the “Energy and Innovation Summit” event he held in Pittsburgh on July 15. Trump later reposted on Truth Social an item from his Secretary of Energy, Chris Wright, stating, 

“President Trump has TRANSFORMED the American energy landscape. You’re going to see a lot more of big, beautiful, clean coal!” So will we? Probably not. Trump’s recent pro-coal policy moves may slow coal’s long decline, but they almost certainly will not result in any net growth of US coal production.

The recently announced policy changes are substantial, both from the One Big Beautiful Bill Act and regulatory changes Trump has the authority to do on his own. The latter will probably have more of an impact. In the bill, there is a mandate for the Department of the Interior to make more land available for coal leases, 

and it tags metallurgical coal as a “critical mineral” eligible for a production tax credit. The Trump administration also had acted in March to lift some requirements on power plant pollutant emissions —both carbon dioxide and other pollutants — without which we would have seen the shutdown of most of the remaining coal-fired US generators within the next decade.

The Trump administration also made a direct intervention in the market by issuing an executive order in April, which, in effect, mandates that the Department of Energy (DOE) issue orders to keep some coal-fired power plants slated for closure in the near future in operation.

A related study by the US Department of Energy, which has received much criticism, argued that the United States faces major challenges to the reliability of the electric grid unless the federal government intervenes to prevent coal-burning power plant closures. In some cases, this has abruptly undermined plans by the plants’ operators to retire them, necessitating the imposition of substantial additional costs to keep them in operation.

The West Won’t Survive Its Own Cowardice

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Across Europe, things feel increasingly fragile. As governments lose control of basic order and the state becomes rapidly incapable of maintaining law and order, this isn’t so much a ‘clash of civilisations’ as the West quietly rolling over and letting itself die.

Today, it was announced that Germany will be working alongside the Taliban. Yes, those same extremist Islamists that NATO forces—including Germany’s—spent years fighting in Afghanistan. The aim here is to facilitate the deportations of Afghan criminals living in Germany. 

Despite not officially recognising the Taliban regime, Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s government will allow two Taliban officials to work at Afghan diplomatic missions in Germany. Apparently, the only way Merz can conceive of deporting undesirable migrants and failed asylum seekers from the country is by enlisting the help of a murderous, terrorist regime.

It is a depressing indictment of the situation Europe has got itself into, where a nation must grant de-facto diplomatic representation to a brutal Islamist government in order to deport asylum seekers driven to Germany by the Taliban themselves. 

This scheme, however ridiculous, is at least doing something to stop Germany from being overrun by opportunistic criminals, dangerous thugs, and those who will generally strain the country’s already creaking public services.

In other areas, the government is failing miserably to even try to stop rising crime. German police are more interested in going after pensioners who are rude to politicians online than stopping young male migrants from assaulting teenage girls and running riot in small towns. 

In some places, like the town of Harsefeld, the authorities have given up policing altogether, and now let gangs of migrant youths commit violence and deal drugs as they please. As such, local citizens have been forced to set up their own patrols in an attempt to keep the streets somewhat safe.

How U.S. Forces Should Leave Europe

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For decades, collective European self-defense was merely an aspiration. Today, the time to realize this goal is finally at hand. Momentum in Europe is building: years of marginal steps to bolster European defenses gave way to meaningful action after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, and these efforts have accelerated in the six months since U.S. 

President Donald Trump came into office. European leaders promised a sharp increase in defense and defense-related spending at the NATO summit in June, raising members’ overall budget commitments from two percent to five percent of GDP. To make good on those crucial new pledges, Europe is introducing new financial mechanisms and breaking down barriers to cooperation in its defense industry.

The danger now is that Europe will lose its momentum—and that the United States, by delaying an expected drawdown of forces from the continent, will let it. Both sides have good reason to see Europe’s defense buildup succeed. 

The United States would be able to free up forces now stationed in Europe for other missions, or simply make cuts and pocket the savings. A more capable Europe would become the kind of partner that Washington wants and needs, and it would gain the freedom to set its own strategy as a global power.

To ensure that this necessary rebalancing proceeds, the Trump administration must withdraw substantial numbers of U.S. forces from Europe, starting now, and truly shift the burden of the region’s conventional defense onto the continent. Hesitating would undermine Europe’s progress and risk locking in a suboptimal security structure for years to come. 

To encourage Europe to follow through on its own promises, Washington must lay out a realistic, targeted, and phased plan that cuts U.S. troop levels in Europe roughly in half over the next four years while keeping in place forces vital to U.S. security interests or forces that Europe cannot reasonably replace in that time. If a drawdown is executed well, there is little reason to fear that it would end the transatlantic partnership or leave either side less safe.

The Violent Gaza-ification of the West Bank

Nimrod Novik

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With all eyes on Gaza and on the fallout from Israel’s war on five other fronts—Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Iranian militias in Syria and Iraq, as well as Iran itself—few have noted the unprecedented uptick in violence in the West Bank. Even the murder earlier in July of Saif Musallet, 

an American citizen, and the attack on CNN’s Jeremy Diamond as he was on his way to visit the family of the slain American—both by violent West Bank settlers—did little to attract attention to what is an increasingly unstable tinderbox, fanned by convergence of troubling factors

Although President Donald Trump’s early January decision to lift sanctions on settlers sent the wrong message, a series of significant developments on the ground have triggered the dramatic increase in West Bank violence: Israeli extremists seizing what they see as an opportunity; their leaders using government platforms to provide support; the IDF looking the other way; and many Palestinian youth becoming radicalized.

Looming over it all is the shadow of two of the most extreme leaders of the annexationist minority in Israel, entrusted, since late 2022, by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with portfolios directly relevant to West Bank policies.

One, Itamar Ben Gvir, a self-proclaimed Jewish Supremacist, controls the national police force. Since entering office, he has enacted a "hands off" policy concerning Jewish settler terrorists, relaxed the prerequisites for owning weapons and, prioritizing West Bank settlers, launched a campaign for Israelis to arm themselves.

The other, Bezalel Smotrich, employs his dual position as minister of finance and as a minister in the ministry of defense in the service of his three publicly declared objectives: rapid expansion of Jewish settlements, increase pressure on Palestinians to emigrate, and financially choking the Palestinian Authority to bring about its collapse.

Russian Intelligence Recruits Refugees and Migrants in NATO Countries for Espionage

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Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, harsh sanctions, growing awareness among North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states of Russian intelligence tactics, and enhanced counterintelligence operations have made the Kremlin’s traditional information-gathering methods nearly impossible.

Following widespread expulsions of Russian diplomats from NATO countries in 2022, Russian intelligence agencies shifted from traditional espionage featuring trained agents under diplomatic cover to more diffuse recruitment of vulnerable groups

The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (GRU) are preying on socially, economically, and legally marginalized groups, including Ukrainian refugees and Russian migrants, for intelligence gathering and sabotage.

These recruits are often unaware they are part of Russian operations and receive no support from the Kremlin when arrested.

Russian intelligence operations in countries such as Poland and Czechia focus less on traditional intelligence collection and more on generating panic, undermining social cohesion, and weakening NATO’s support for Ukraine by exploiting local fears and divisions.

The Czech Security Information Service’s annual report for 2024, released on July 10, documented intel about Russia’s Federal Security Service’s (FSB) operations in the country. The report found that the FSB was recruiting migrants from outside of the European Union via Telegram to engage in criminal activities with the intent of weakening public cohesion,

 undermining trust in the government, and reducing support for Ukraine (Seznam Zprávy, June 9; Czech Security Information Service, July 10). Similarly, in May 2024, Polish counterintelligence arrested several individuals suspected of spying for the FSB (TVN24, May 20, 2024). Among those detained were refugees from Ukraine and Belarus who had arrived in Poland after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. According to Polish authorities, 

Putin’s War Against Ukraine Diminishing Moscow’s Dominance of Former Soviet Space

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Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine aimed to reassert dominance over the former Soviet space, but Ukraine’s resistance and sustained Western support have instead weakened Moscow’s influence in the region.

Moscow’s war against Ukraine has led the former Soviet republics to pursue more independent foreign policies as they seek to protect themselves from possible Russian aggression and international isolation.

Any future effort by Moscow to use military force in other post-Soviet states to reverse this process would likely be counterproductive and could potentially bleed this division back into the Russian Federation itself.

Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in part to shore up and expand Moscow’s unchallenged dominance of the former Soviet space. The relative success of Ukrainian resistance and the impact of Putin’s war against Ukraine on Russian actions elsewhere produced the opposite effect, 

alienating many of the former Soviet republics from Russia and leading them to pursue more independent foreign policies to protect themselves from Russian aggression and international isolation. Putin’s hope that his full-scale invasion would weaken the West and restore Russia’s dominance over the former Soviet republics may have been realized if the war had ended rapidly and decisively. Instead, Ukraine’s determined resistance, 

international support for the Ukrainian military, and diplomatic deadlock have meant the war has gone on for more than three years, undermining Russia’s relationships with the West and its position across the former Soviet space (see Strategic Snapshot, February 24).

Leaders of the former Soviet republics appear to be realizing that the Russian military is not all-powerful. Moscow’s arrogant responses to such moves, despite its demonstrated lack of military dominance, however, are poisoning ties between Moscow and even countries that had not previously broken with the Kremlin. 

Donald Trump’s Tariff Dealmaker-in-Chief

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When Howard Lutnick moved to Washington, earlier this year, to become the Secretary of Commerce, he painted one wall in his new living room gold. It was the only significant modification he made to the house, a château-style mansion purchased for twenty-five million dollars from the Fox News anchor Bret Baier. On a recent Sunday afternoon, Lutnick was in the living room, 

flipping through a commemorative coffee-table book designed by his family which pairs photographs of him with some of his favorite sayings. “It’s between me and the mirror,” one read. He turned the page: “You are either in or you are out.” Lutnick’s dog, a Havanese-poodle mix named Cali—three of his four children went to college in California—kept nosing her way through a gate to come sit with us. Lutnick was about to fly to London for a round of trade negotiations with China, 

whose restrictions on the sale of rare-earth metals were threatening to render parts of the American economy nonfunctional. Several suitcases were packed and waiting in the entryway, next to a gold Pop-art sculpture by Robert Indiana that spelled the word “LOVE.” Later, Lutnick led me from room to room to point out a few more works from his personal collection: Rothko, Diebenkorn, Lichtenstein, de Kooning.

A staffer gently reminded Lutnick that he had to leave for the airport, but he was in the middle of a story. Lutnick’s anecdotes, much like those of his boss, tend to meander. A billionaire who became the head of a major bond-trading firm at twenty-nine, he radiates a brash, ebullient energy that is often referred to as “scrappy” or “outer borough.” He likes to dish. He talks with his hands and emphasizes his points with catchphrases such as “How about no” or “How about we don’t.”

Lutnick and President Donald Trump speak on the phone most nights, at around one in the morning, just after Lutnick gets in bed. They talk about “real stuff,” like Canadian steel tariffs, Lutnick told me, and also about “nothing,” which he summarized as “sporting events, people, who’d you have dinner with, what was this guy like, 

The US Air Force’s New Drones Are a Game Changer

Harrison Kass

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The Collaborative Combat Aircraft program marks the next step in the evolution of airpower, signaling the beginning of the end for manned fighter platforms.

The US Air Force’s forthcoming Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program is designed to serve as an autonomous drone wingman to the sixth-generation F-47 NGAD, marking the beginning of a new era in airpower, where automated and manned aircraft work in synchronization.

The CCA drones, which are designated as fighter aircraft, are being built to provide combat capability at a mere fraction of the cost of standard, manned fighter jets. The CCAs will be built with an emphasis on survivability, autonomy, and adaptability, with the Air Force planning to procure about 1,000 units, allowing for two CCAs to be paired with each manned fighter.

The result, in theory, will be scalable force multiplication while controlling costs and reducing risk exposure for human pilots. While the CCA is ostensibly a pairing between manned and autonomous platforms, the program is undoubtedly the next step in a shift away from manned fighters toward autonomous or unmanned fighters. If the CCA program goes well, expect the fighter developed after the F-47 to be completely unmanned.

The CCA program will feature two distinct platforms: the General Dynamics YFQ-42A and the Anduril Industries YFQ-44A. In March 2025, the Air Force designated both CCA platforms as a “fighter,” the first time any drone has received the fighter designation. The symbolism is clear, marking a doctrinal shift towards the use of drone aircraft.

The YFQ-42A is derived from the XQ-67A demonstrator, which first flew in early 2024. The YFQ-44A is derived from Anduril’s Fury drone. Both drones are part of the Air Force’s Increment 1 effort, which focuses on air-to-air missions and integration with manned fighters, such as the F-35 Lightning II and F-47 NGAD.

Pentagon’s BIG FIVE Face Serious Challenge From Tech Giants As New Arms Race Brews In The U.S. For Lucrative Military Deals

Sumit Ahlawat

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A momentous shift is underway in the US defense market. Dominated by the big five for decades, a slew of new-age military tech firms are challenging the dominance of traditional defense manufacturers.

For years, the lucrative US defense market has been dominated by the big five: Lockheed Martin, RTX, Boeing, General Dynamics, and Northrop Grumman. They still account for an overwhelming portion of the Pentagon’s budget.

However, their dominance is no longer unchallenged. A bunch of new-age military tech firms in the fields of AI, autonomous vehicles, satellite connectivity, and communications are challenging the traditional dominance of the big five.

Leveraging emerging technologies, the rapidly changing nature of warfare, combined with traditional influence-building strategies such as financing election campaigns, bankrolling influential politicians, and funding think tanks, these new-age military tech firms —such as SpaceX, Anduril Industries, and Palantir —are breaking the glass ceiling of the US defense market.

However, these firms are not the only challenge facing the dominance of the Big Five. Traditional tech firms such as Microsoft, Google, and IBM are also eyeing a slice of the ever-expanding US military budget.

It’s a silent revolution that can change the face of the world’s most lucrative defense market.

The Dominance Of The Big Five

Over the last three decades, the US defense market has been dominated by private companies. Their share in the Pentagon’s defense spending budget has gradually increased.

See How Drones Are Dominating Every Corner of the War in Ukraine

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KOSTYANTYNIVKA, Ukraine—On the sun-drenched eastern front of this grueling war, Ukrainian drones are doing more and more jobs, from killing Russian troops to evacuating casualties to bringing dinner to foxholes.

Around this city, some infantry from Ukraine’s 93rd Mechanized Brigade have been stuck in their dugouts for three months. Rotating the troops must wait for fog and rain to block the view of Russian drones.

So Ukraine’s air and ground drones bring the men food, water and ammunition, said Lt. Col. Yehor Derevianko, a battalion commander in the brigade. “We even deliver burgers.”

He’s been fighting Russian forces in Ukraine’s east since 2014, and says the war is evolving faster than ever. Drones are now so dominant that they force everything else—infantry, armor, artillery, logistics and even trench design—to adapt to a sky full of buzzing robots.

The wiry commander leads the defense of his sector from a basement full of large screens under an abandoned apartment block. Men with laptops direct drone pilots to where Russian infantry are trying to infiltrate the fields and woodlands around the city.

Members of the 93rd Brigade monitor drone footage in a basement in Kostyantynivka, eastern Ukraine.

On one screen, the crosshairs of a reconnaissance drone fixed on a Russian soldier squatting in a bush. A small quadcopter drone closed in slowly and dropped a grenade. It missed.

“He’s going to die of old age out there,” grumbled Derevianko. The bush swayed gently in the summer breeze. A second grenade turned it into a cloud of gray smoke.

US Nuclear Weapons 'Deployed' to UK for First Time in 17 Years

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The United States military has moved nuclear weapons to British soil for the first time in close to two decades, new analysis indicates.

Open-source analysts identified an aircraft taking off from the Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, New Mexico, bound for the United Kingdom's Royal Air Force (RAF) base at Lakenheath, in the east of England. Kirtland Air Force Base is the headquarters of the U.S. Air Force (USAF) Nuclear Weapons Center, a main storage site for nuclear weapons.

A U.S. defense official told Newsweek the U.S. did not comment on the "status or location of strategic weapons." A spokesperson for the British Defense Ministry said: "It remains a long-standing UK and NATO policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons at a given location."

Speculation has long surrounded whether the East England RAF base could once again host U.S. nuclear weapons. RAF Lakenheath hosted American nuclear weapons for several decades until 2008.

The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) said in 2023 that U.S. military budget documents "strongly" implied the Air Force intended to re-establish its nuclear weapons mission in the U.K. RAF Lakenheath—the home of the 48th Fighter Wing, dubbed "Liberty Wing"—has been upgraded in recent years.

If Washington moves nuclear weapons back into the U.K., "it would break with decades of policy and planning and reverse the southern focus of the European nuclear deployment that emerged after the end of the Cold War," the FAS said in updated analysis earlier this year.

A USAF C-17 Globemaster III from the 97th Air Mobility Wing participates in the Miami Beach Air and Sea Show on May 25, 2024. AP/NewsBase

What To Know

Putin’s Dilemma

George Friedman

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In analyzing the process by which the Russia-Ukraine war will end, the most critical factor, as I have argued before, is that by not defeating Ukraine, Russia already has lost the war. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s primary interest was in creating and controlling a buffer between Russia and Poland on the eastern edge of NATO. 

Beyond that, he wanted to recover Russia’s status as a great power, which it had held from the end of World War II to the collapse of the Soviet Union. When it lost this status, it lost its dominion over Eastern Europe and the eastern half of Germany. It also lost unchallenged command of the South Caucasus and Central Asia, 

ceased to be more powerful than China and surrendered much of its influence in the Middle East. Its power in the Third World withered as well, losing its place to China – now the only true rival of the United States.

For Russia, the loss of military significance was accompanied by an inability to become a major economic power. Under the czars and the communists, Russia had always been an economic weakling. Although it had vast and valuable lands, as well as a reasonably educated population, Russia has continued to be what can most kindly be called an underperforming economy.

Russia’s decline started and ended well before Putin became president, of course. His rise to power depended on the private sector – the oligarchs who, in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse, consolidated a substantial portion of the economy and integrated into the global economic system. The oligarchs were the significant force that made Putin president, and the Russian economy had by then developed nicely, considering where it had started.

Putin held a traditional Russian view on high national priority: securing Russia from invasion and intrusion from the outside. From Putin’s point of view, the only way for the country to emerge economically was to be secure from attack. For Putin, that meant recovering as much of the buffer zone as he could from the losses Russia suffered in the 1990s, and thus securing Russia’s western border.

Why Turkey’s Kurds are tired of fighting Armed struggle is so last century

Matt Broomfield

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When the guerrilla fighters of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) began their armed struggle back in 1984, the Cold War was in its death throes. Ronald Reagan was trying to roll back the Soviet “Evil Empire”, the USSR was chaotically transitioning toward Gorbachev, and the IRA had just narrowly failed to assassinate Margaret Thatcher.

Some of those Kurdish fighters have been in the mountains ever since, waging a seemingly endless campaign against Turkey. When they finally descended this week, to ceremonially destroy their weapons as part of a closely-watched disarmament process, 

they brought a symbolic end to the Cold War era of armed campaigns for national liberation. In his first video appearance for over 25 years, jailed Kurdish figurehead Abdullah Öcalan announced: “The PKK movement and its national liberation strategy… has had its day… I believe not in arms, but in the power of politics.”

With their traditional Kurdish clothes and battered Kalashnikovs, the guerrilla fighters certainly seem a world away from the hair gel, wrap-around sunglasses and slick suits of the media scrum, spooks and politicos awaiting them at the foot of the mountain. Öcalan made his historic video appearance sporting a Lacoste polo shirt, prompting ordinary Kurds to rush out and buy up the brand.

The present day is strange, but also familiar. Some headlines from 1984 could have been written just a few weeks ago — try “Nuclear Tensions Peak as TV Star Turned US President Jokes About Dropping The Bomb”. And amid our century’s New Cold War, the Kurds are grappling with contemporary versions of some age-old questions. 

When wars never really end but endlessly evolve into proxy and frozen conflicts, what does it actually mean to declare victory or defeat? And amid spiralling regional confrontations, what are the potential consequences of forging a pact with the devil, and allying with your own long-term oppressors?

Cyber Crossroads in the Indo-Pacific

Vivek Chilukuri, Lisa Curtis, Janet Egan, Morgan Peirce, Elizabeth Whatcott  Nathaniel Schochet

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The Indo-Pacific faces a cyber crossroads. Down one path lies deeper military, intelligence, and economic ties between Washington and its key allies and partners in this strategically vital region. Down another, rising cyber threats from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, Russia, and a growing shadow industry of cybercriminals and hacktivists derail these ambitions by compromising critical infrastructure, weakening data security, and undermining democratic institutions. The outcome will depend on the choices Washington and its Indo-Pacific partners make—or fail to make—in the coming years.

The U.S.-China rivalry has long extended to the cyber domain, but in recent years, Beijing has increasingly exploited the gray zone of cyberspace to test, probe, and push other nations as part of a broader campaign to gain influence and shape regional norms and power structures.1 In recent years, the PRC has sharply escalated its cyber aggression in a dangerous new game that combines traditional operations focused on espionage, intellectual property theft, 

and data exfiltration with newly assertive disinformation, influence operations, and pre-positioning in critical infrastructure. Adding to the uncertainty, rapid advances in artificial intelligence (AI) could further tilt the balance toward offense in cyberspace in unpredictable and potentially dangerous ways.Against this backdrop, Indo-Pacific governments have taken historic steps to strengthen their resilience in a cyber landscape that has grown more varied, volatile, and dangerous than ever.

To assess how Washington and its Indo-Pacific partners are navigating this cyber crossroads, the Center for a New American Security’s Technology and National Security Program and Indo-Pacific Security Program led a year-long research project that combined extensive desk research with in-person field research and expert workshops in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. This report draws on this research to offer in-depth assessments of the cyber landscapes in all four countries to identify key trends, challenges, and opportunities to strengthen cybersecurity and resilience in partnership with the United States.